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Summary 
 
The thesis in question is titled “Readjusting Orthodoxy”. It 
constitutes a discourse in UK constitutional law although legal 
theoretic, historical, politicial, philosophical, and EU-related 
complementary themes are also present.  
It is founded upon, and driven by, two fundamental, inter-related 
premises. First, that it is the orthodox reading of the UK 
Constitution which best describes and explains the present 
constitutional arrangement: the UK Parliament is a sovereign 
institution sitting at the apex of the UK Constitution and vested 
with the right to make and unmake any law whatsoever. In the 
second place, that, notwithstanding the above, this very reading 
of the UK Constitution is currently deficient in terms of internal 
cohesion, is plagued by ingrained anachronistic dogmas and 
enjoys only a limited adaptability. From these premises emerges a 
third proposition; namely, that the UK constitutional discourse as 
a whole would stand to lose greatly should alternative 
constitutional theories that are less suited to describe and explain 
the current constitutional arrangement replace the orthodox 
reading of the Constitution by exploiting these conspicuous 
drawbacks. Thus, the present treatise argues that the orthodox 
reading should after critical evaluation be readjusted so as to be 
rendered coherent, consistent, impervious to the numerous 
challenges it currently faces and, ultimately, capable of 
continuing to offer the canonical account of the ever-changing UK 
  
 
 
 
Constitution.  
The fundamental propositions “readjusted” in this thesis include 
orthodox interpretations of the European Communities Act 1972, 
the Statute of Westminster 1931 as well as the Parliament Acts 
1911 and 1949. Equally, they include the submission that little 
interpretive value vis-à-vis the UK constitutional context inheres 
in the judicial decisions that self-embracing sovereignty theorists 
primarily rely upon to verify their claims. Additionally, included 
are the twin submissions that the pre-union Scottish Estates was 
a sovereign legislative body but, equally, that even if that were 
not so, the limited Scottish Estates thesis would still be of mere 
historical, rather than constitutional, interest, as well as the 
submission that the Anglo-Scots union agreement is not 
unalterable and has, in fact, been breached on several occasions. 
Furthermore, it was necessary to revisit the implied repeal 
doctrine’s intellectual rationale, the consequent attenuation of the 
doctrine’s hitherto mechanistic application, as well as its 
separation from the related, but discrete, principle that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors. The submission that the 
distinction between form and substance, insofar as types of 
putative restrictions to Parliament’s legislative ability are 
concerned, is not sustainable as well as the clarification of the 
principle proclaiming the Parliament Roll’s alleged 
conclusiveness, are also amongst the fundamental statements 
proposed. Further, the proposition that the UK Parliament is an 
atemporal, continuous, sovereign institution and that, therefore, 
no logical paradox is involved in the principle that Parliament 
cannot bind its successors is offered. Finally, the thesis, in various 
  
 
 
 
places, sets about to answer the forthcoming question of whether 
or not, then, an Act binding Parliament’s successors differs from 
an ‘ordinary’ enactment that can be repealed on a whim, 
ultimately reaching an affirmative conclusion, primarily 
politically but also, in one sense, legally.  
All in all, both the readjustments of principle as well as the case-
specific corrections offered are intended to complement one 
another in illuminating and applying, respectively, the orthodox 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty which, properly 
understood, entails, in this author’s view, the following 
propositions: 
The UK Parliament is an atemporal, sovereign 
institution comprised of the House of 
Commons, the House of Lords and the Crown, 
and vested, under the present constitutional 
arrangement, with the power to make any law 
whatsoever, including a law binding, primarily 
politically but also legally, its future 
incarnations. Equally, it may unmake, 
expressly or impliedly, any law whatsoever, 
including a law by which it has been bound by 
its previous manifestations. The judiciary is 
under a duty to ascertain that Parliament has 
acted, whether by ensuring that the assent of 
its three elements has been tendered or by 
ensuring that the requirements of any other 
intra-Parliamentary agreement dictating when 
the courts should acknowledge Parliament as 
  
 
 
 
having acted have been fulfiled, and enforce its 
sovereign will faithfully against whomever 
comes before a UK court. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty 
means neither more nor less than this, 
namely, that Parliament … has … the right 
to make or unmake any law whatever; and, 
further, that no person or body is recognised 
by the law of England as having a right to 
override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament .1 
 
It is a commonality in British constitutional discourse 
to commence by reciting from Albert Venn Dicey, 
whether one turns to the 20 th century – during the 
better part of which, scholars rehearsed the Oxford 
jurist’s work in approval of his iconic doctrinal 
formulation – or to the dusk of the millennium and 
onwards –  during which time a plethora of authors 
adduce the aforecited passage only to proceed, 
immediately thereafter, to attempt its abrogation. What 
                                                            
1 Dicey, 1889, at p.38 [emphasis added].  
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is less common however,2 and what this treatise aspires 
to achieve, is to defend, rather than complacently 
reiterate, the thesis that Parliament’s sovereignty is 
the fundamental, unqualified principle of the present 
UK constitutional arrangement. This will require 
following  in the notional, rather than mimicking the 
actual, footsteps of constitutional giants such as Dicey; 
by fathoming that modern challenges cannot always be 
resolved with Victorian tools, much like Dicey 
understood that Victorian challenges could not be dealt 
with solely with the Georgian heritage bequeathed upo n 
him by Sir William Blackstone;  and much like 
Blackstone recognised that to compose an 18 th century 
paradigmatic discourse of orthodox constitutional 
principle one could not merely transpose the 17 th  
century work of Sir Edward Coke. Put differently, the 
thesis will require acknowledging that orthodoxy and 
constitutional conservatism are far from synonymous 
with an ingrained antipathy towards change and an 
apotheosis of anachronistic dogmas and mechanistic 
thought-processes and must therefore proceed on the 
basis of evaluating critically, expanding upon, refining 
and readjusting orthodoxy so as to render it coherent , 
                                                            
2 With the expected, if particularly coruscating, exceptions. 
See e.g. :  Wade, 1955; Goldsworthy, 1999; Forsyth, 2000.  
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consistent and, ultimately impervious –  as, at present, 
it is certainly not – against the numerous, permeating 
challenges it faces.  
The present treatise will espouse a strictly orthodox, 
legally formal, doctrinal, constitutionally conservative 
perspective in readjusting orthodoxy. Importantly, the 
endeavour will be purely descriptive, rather than 
normative, in nature, for orthodoxy will not be 
readjusted at will but rather solely  according and 
towards the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty, 
properly so called, which is herein understood to entail 
the following propositions:  
The UK Parliament is an atemporal, 
sovereign institution comprised of the 
House of Commons, the House of Lords 
and the Crown, and vested, under the 
present constitutional arrangement, 
with the power to make any law 
whatsoever, including a law binding, 
primarily politically but also legally,  its 
future incarnations. Equally, it  may 
unmake, expressly or impliedly, any law 
whatsoever, including a law by which it 
has been bound by its previous 
manifestations. The judiciary is under a 
duty to ascertain that Parliament has 
acted, whether by ensuring that the 
assent of its three elements has been 
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tendered or by ensuring that the 
requirements of any other intra-
Parliamentary agreement dictating 
when the courts should acknowledge 
Parliament as having acted have been 
fulfiled, and enforce its sovereign will 
faithfully against whomever comes 
before a UK court. 
In doing so, the orthodox or traditional reading of the 
UK Constitution’s responsive arsenal vis-à-vis the 
challenges it faces will be readjusted in an organised, 
but holistic, and principled, but selective, manner. 
Indeed, although the traditional doctrines and devices 
devised to respond to each challenge will be presented 
and readjusted in a separate, organised manner, the 
orthodox reading of the Constitution must be singular 
and coherent, and therefore a considerable inter -
connectedness of the issues at hand is both unavoidable 
and desirable. The lodestar principle guiding the 
treatise’s subject-matter will revolve around 
meaningfully adding to the existing body of knowledge 
and, thus, the challenges to be adduced, analysed and, 
in turn, refuted in a readjusted but orthodox manner 
will constitute the most prominent of their kind, with 
the exclusion of topics that are either derivative of the 
issues to be discussed or have been dealt with more 
than adequately by the previous orthodox literature.  
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For one, as long as it can be shown that Parliament’s 
sovereignty was not affected by the Unions between the 
country’s composite nations (as it will be advocated), it 
is arguable that the same must hold true for the recent 
devolutionary arrangements to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.  
Similarly, if Parliament has not been denuded of any 
part of its powers by the granting of independence to 
former colonies (as it will be suggested), then, surely, 
similar considerations must apply to the partitioning of 
Ireland.  
Moreover, if the country’s membership of the European 
Communities (EC) has not entailed a diminution of 
Parliament’s unlimited law -making authority (as it will 
be maintained) and if the reformulated principle that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors (to  be proposed 
below) forms part of the present UK constitutional 
order, it largely follows that the recent human rights 
legislation poses no further difficulty that necessitates 
separate treatment.  
Furthermore, erecting the general case for separating a 
right’s existence from the likelihood of its usage (as will 
be done), effectively responds to the flourishing 
anthology of derivative, self -styled ‘realist’ accounts 
that predominantly draw from popular sovereignty 
principles and proceed to take the logical leap from an 
empirical proposition (P) – be it truthful or not – that 
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‘Parliament is unlikely to do X’, to the normative 
proposition (N) that ‘Parliament is (therefore) unable to 
do X’.  
Additionally, an orthodox reading of the Constitution 
need not extend rearward to periods prior to 1689; the 
Glorious Revolution did not create or institute the 
modern, orthodox theory of the Constitution but  it did 
crucially and definitively confirm and consolidate it.  
Equally, as long as the legal manifestations of the 
political fact that the Revolutionary settlement 
constituted a victory of Parliament over the Crown to 
which the courts acquiesced, such as the implied repeal 
doctrine and the conclusiveness of the Parliamentary 
Roll, are appropriately understood and refined  (as they 
will), the idea that the relationship between the courts 
and Parliament – the Highest Court of the Realm – is 
hierarchical, rather than symbiotic and co -ordinate, 
becomes clear.  
Lastly, the tenacious ultra vires  doctrine3 that adeptly 
encapsulates the orthodox account of the position of, 
                                                            
3 See e.g. :  R v Lord President of the Privy Council,  Ex Parte 
Page  [1993] AC 682, 701; Forsyth, 1996.  
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and justification for, judicial review in UK 
administrative law requires no updating or refinement.  
In short, issues purportedly arising from the recent 
devolutionary arrangements, the partitioning of 
Ireland, the 1998 human rights legislation, the political 
realism and popular sovereignty theses, pre -1689 legal 
precedents and academic discourses, the common law 
constitutionalism thesis, as well as judicial review will 
not be approached separately and will only be referred 
to, if at all, when illuminating the themes under 
consideration.  
To the contrary, the thesis will strive, from an orthodox 
perspective, to readjust the traditional responses to the 
challenges posed against the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty from the country’s membership of the EC, 
from an incorrect understanding of the implied repeal 
doctrine, from the logical paradoxes which the  principle 
that Parliament cannot bind its successors prima facie  
entails, from the self -embracing theory of sovereignty, 
from the granting of independence to former colonies, 
from the anomalous process through which the UK was 
created, as well as from the enactment of the 
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949.  
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The orthodox camp has proven itself unprepared to 
respond satisfactorily to the challenges Parliament’s 
sovereignty faces in view of the country’s accession and 
continuing membership of the EC.4 For instance, the 
20 th century heir apparent of Dicey, the late Sir William 
Wade, can seldom be understood as having done justice 
to his admirable previous work when, in the wake of the 
House of Lords’ decision in Ex Parte Factortame ,5 he 
directed little effort towards attempting to cater for 
what appeared at first sight to be a novel judicial 
outcome and was quick to characterise it as a technical 
legal revolution whilst proclaiming that “[w]hile Britain 
remains in the Community we are in a regime in which 
Parliament has bound its successors successfully…” 6 In 
similar vein, the otherwise exemplary orthodox theorist 
Jeffrey Goldsworthy7 reconciles the principle of 
                                                            
4 At the time of writing the revised version of this thesis, the 
Prime Minister has made use of s.1(1) of the European Union 
(Notification of Withdrawal) Act 2017 and notified the UK’s 
intention to withdraw from the EU. However, formally, the UK 
remains an EU member.  
5 [1989] 3 CMLR 1; [1990] 3 CMLR 375.  
6 Wade, 1996, at p.571. See also: Wade, 1980, at pp.26 -27, 37-
38. 
7 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at pp.287-298. 
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Parliamentary sovereignty with his conviction that the 
European Communities Act 1972 instituted manner and  
form requirements that Parliament must follow in order 
to legislate inconsistently with directly applicable 
Community law, by suggesting that any restriction 
imposed upon Parliament has been assumed voluntarily 
and can be removed by express legislation to  that effect. 
However, in truth, neither approach can be reconciled 
with an orthodox account of the Constitution: a 
sovereign Parliament cannot, voluntarily, temporarily, 
or otherwise, bind its successors. Chapter II  will, 
therefore, propose an alternative  orthodox prism 
through which to conceive of UK membership of the 
European construct. It will be maintained that the 
decision in Factortame  is not only able to be 
accommodated by a traditional account of the UK 
Constitution but, in fact, any other outcome would have 
been contrary to Parliament’s sovereign will. In 
particular, by introducing the novel concept of 
‘contingent unclarity’, it will be suggested that 
suspending the operation of Parliamentary enactments 
in certain well-defined circumstances, far from being 
contrary to Parliament’s intention, is required to 
uphold it. Equally, it will be highlighted that 
disapplying an Act of Parliament, to the extent that it  
is irreconcilably inconsistent with directly effective 
Community law, is imperative for the preservation of 
Parliament’s sovereignty.  
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Both conclusions critically depend on the attenuation of 
the implied repeal doctrine’s absoluteness and the 
refinement of its hitherto mechanistic application that 
will be attempted in Chapter III . In order to do so, 
revisiting the intellectual rationale of the doctrine’s 
applicability in UK law will be required. Advancing the 
thesis that Parliament is an atemporal, continuous 
institution, a central theme of the present treatise, it 
will be proposed that Parliament’s intention should 
displace chronological precedence as the nucleus of the 
orthodox justification for the prima facie  paradoxical 
situation in which a subordinate  court adjudges an 
enactment of the sovereign legislature repealed by 
implication. Ultimately, a ‘modified’ version of the 
implied repeal doctrine that is non-automatic and 
particularly exceptional in its application will be 
constructed on the basis of logico-theoretical analysis, 
orthodox constitutional principle as well as overlooked 
19 th century authoritative texts and precedents. 
Crucially, the conflation of the implied repeal doctrine 
with the related, but discrete, principle that Parliament 
cannot bind its successors will also be addressed.  
The orthodox reading of the principle that Parliament 
cannot bind its successors is, itself, not impeccable 
however, insofar as its formulation allows room for 
ample philosophical discussion – after all, can an 
omnipotent God create a stone he cannot lift? For good 
measure, traditional jurists have predominantly 
abstained from taking part in this discussion. 
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Therefore, Chapter IV  will attempt to address and 
resolve the logical paradox which the principle that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors involves. To do 
so, both normative and semantic modifications to the 
traditional principle will be necessary. Ultimately, 
drawing once again from the idea that Parliament is an 
atemporal, continuous institution, a modified doctrine 
will be advanced, providing that the present incarnation 
of Parliament, being sovereign, can, primarily 
politically but also, in one sense, legally , bind its 
successors, but, equally, that future incarnations of 
Parliament, being equivalently sovereign, can legally 
unbind themselves from any restrictions placed upon 
them by their predecessors.    
However, since the Bodinian assumption that sovereign 
power must be continuous in nature is both conceptually 
and analytically flawed, the alternative solution to the 
aforementioned logical paradox that stems from the so -
called self-embracing theory of sovereignty will have to 
be addressed. First and foremost, it will be made clear 
that the distinction between form and substance is not 
sustainable and, thus, self -embracing sovereignty 
theory is decidedly not a variant of the orthodox 
account of the UK Constitution, as Sir Ivor Jennings 
would have maintained, but is, rather, directly opposed 
to it, and must be treated as such. Regardless, self -
embracing sovereignty theory constitutes a remarkable 
adversary to the principle that Parliament cannot bind 
its successors, even as readjusted, that cannot be 
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refuted at the legal theoretical plane. Hence, its 
suitability to describe the present UK constitutional 
settlement will have to be evaluated on the basis of 
precedent. Indeed, the better part of the remainder of 
the treatise will, in one sense, attempt to do just that: 
illustrate – to the extent that proving a negative is 
possible – that legal sovereignty, in the UK 
constitutional law context, is not “merely a name 
indicating that the legislature has … power to make 
laws … in the manner required by the law” 8 and, 
therefore, that the UK Parliament cannot effectively 
bind its successors by changing its composition, or the 
‘manner and form’ or ‘forms and procedures’ in which 
legislation is passed. Doubtlessly, in the process, a 
plethora of different issues will be highlighted. 
Chapter V  will address the judicial decisions that self -
embracing sovereignty theorists primarily rely upon to 
verify the claim that the UK Parliament has the ability  
effectively to bind its successors by altering the criteria 
proposed legislation is required to fulfil in order to be 
considered valid. Although none of the adduced cases 
involves conflicts between British citizen-subjects on 
UK law resolved by a UK court, the reasons for which 
their ability to illuminate the UK constitutional context 
                                                            
8 Jennings, 1959, at pp.152-153. 
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is slim will not be assumed, as is customary in orthodox 
discourses, but will rather be arrived at through honest 
and exhaustive analysis.  
Issue will also be taken with the enactment of the 
Statute of Westminster 1931 and the granting of 
independence to former colonies in Chapter VI .  
Orthodox theorists are, predominantly, content with 
conceding that although the idea that Parliament can 
legislate notwithstanding, or even repeal, the negative 
duty to refrain from unilaterally legislating for a 
Dominion contained in s.4 of the 1931 Act holds true in 
theory, it has “no relation to realities”. 9 However, so 
doing is not only a tactical miscalculation – insofar as it 
arbitrarily portrays the traditional theory of the UK 
Constitution as a utopian, secluded province of like -
minded scholars, and allows an empty playing field fo r 
conflicting, ostensibly more pragmatic  theories to be 
developed – but, more importantly, is also a legal error. 
Indeed, employing legal reasoning to accentuate the 
difference between a law applying to a former colony as 
a matter of domestic law and as a matter of UK law, it 
will be submitted that a careful, literal interpretation 
of the 1931 Act reveals that its s.4 did not intend to 
have any effect on UK law but, rather, was solely aimed 
                                                            
9 BCC v King  [1935] AC 500.  
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at establishing a rule of Dominion law to the effect that 
Dominion courts should, thenceforward, refuse to take 
notice of UK statutes unless the consent of the relevant 
Dominion had been provided. From this proposition, two 
important conclusions will follow. For one it w ill supply 
an immediate response to the question at hand, since it 
will necessarily follow therefrom that the 1931 Act can 
have no effect whatsoever on Parliament’s sovereign 
legislative ability. The inescapability of this conclusion 
will be cemented further, this time in terms of judicial 
precedent, in the context of refuting the alternative, 
purposive interpretation of s.4 championed by self -
embracing sovereignty theorists. Secondly, it will 
cleanse the orthodox position from the self -inflicted 
charges of unrealism, insofar as it will provide the 
necessary groundwork to proceed in describing more 
accurately the consequences of a potential repeal of the 
Acts granting independence to former colonies. 
Although, therefore, an orthodox interpretation of the 
granting of independence to former colonies and of the 
1931 Act that does coincide with reality will have been 
made possible, the attempt of cynical claims of ‘political 
reality’ to creep into constitutional law will also be 
halted: equating the improbability  of a right being 
exercised, such as Parliament’s right to legislate for 
former colonies, with the existence of such a right is a 
logical leap of indescribable proportions, as it will be 
maintained.  
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Chapter VII  will address a series of enactments, the 
claims to having bound Parliament’s successors of 
which are of a more fundamental, constitutive nature: 
the Acts that brought about the political and legislative 
Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England to form 
Great Britain, as well as the Acts that brought about 
the merger of Ireland with Great Britain to form what 
was then the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland. The claims being voiced with regards to such 
Acts are possibly more serious than has so far been 
assumed by orthodox theorists. For instance, the 
characterisation, common amongst earlier traditional 
scholars, of the 1707 Union as a takeover or absorption 
of an ostensibly powerless Scotland from a purportedly 
all-powerful England must, and will, be rejected as 
anachronistic both in political as well as, most 
importantly, in legal and constitutional terms: the 
Parliament of Great Britain, it will be submitted, 
should be perceived as a de novo  creation. It follows,  
however, that whether the pre-Union Scottish 
Parliament was sovereign or whether, as MacCormick 
contended, it was limited by popular resistance devolves 
into a question of historical interest. Nevertheless, to 
be sure, the limited Scott ish Parliament thesis will be 
critically evaluated and, ultimately, refuted. 
Regardless, the twin questions of whether the  architects 
of the Anglo-Scots Union intended to bind the unified 
Parliament of Great Britain and, if yes, whether they 
succeeded in doing so, will have to be addressed. Insofar 
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as the former issue is concerned, the historical account 
to be proposed will conclude that the mindset of the 
institutionally empowered players in the period 
immediately preceding the Union was characterised by 
an intention to set limits on the powers of the 
Parliament that was thereby being breathed life to. 
However, the effectiveness of the vehicles and mediums 
utilised to give effect to such intention can only be 
appraised by looking at the post-Union legal history of 
Great Britain. In so looking, the most comprehensive 
list of breaches of the Treaty’s professedly unalterable 
clauses to date will be compiled and presented. Before 
dismissing the Treaty’s alleged immutability however, 
it will prove necessary to address and refute several 
theses that defend the effectiveness of the Treaty’s self -
professedly unalterable clauses whilst acknowledging 
the existence of at least some breaches thereof. 
Although, therefore, having done so, it will appear  to 
follow invariably that the Union’s creators failed to 
actualise their intention of binding the newly created 
Parliament, it will be argued that the only respect in 
which the statesmen of 1707 failed – assuming that was 
their intention – was to provide jurisdiction to the 
courts for the purpose of regulating Treaty breaches. In 
every other sense, much like any sovereign incarnation 
of Parliament that intends to bind its successors, they 
were perfectly successful for they endowed Parliament 
itself with the twin abilities of making the 
determination as to whether a potential measure would 
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be inconsistent with a fundamental provision of the 
1707 Treaty and, thereafter, cognising and controlling 
such breaches. The evaluation of the bindingness of the 
1800 Union Acts will follow,  albeit in shorter form, as 
the considerations that need to be borne in mind are 
equivalent to the ones aforementioned.  
The final instance of a statute that has troubled 
traditional theorists insofar as it has been claimed to 
have bound Parliament’s successors is the Parliament 
Act 1911 that will be analysed in  the treatise’s last 
section, Chapter VIII . For the better part of the 20 th 
century, the main orthodox line of defence anent such 
claims was encapsulated in the delegation argument  
that conceived of the 1911 Act as an instrument 
whereby a superior body, Parliament, delegated 
legislative authority to the House of Commons and 
Crown strictly upon the conditions prescribed. 
Nevertheless, the argument – it will be submitted – was 
fundamentally flawed and was, thus, correctly rejected 
by the House of Lords in R (Jackson and Others) v 
Attorney General .10 In its place, the ‘alternative 
procedure’ and ‘reconstitution’ theses have been 
erected, albeit they are similarly not without their 
                                                            
10 EWHC 94 (Admin); [2005] EWCA Civ 126; [2005] UKHL 56, 
SESSION 2005-06. 
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difficulties. Their drawbacks will, thus, be exposed and, 
with the ambition of capturing Parliament’s will as 
expressed in the 1911 Act more precisely, the novel 
‘intra-Parliamentary decision-making agreement’ thesis 
will be proposed as a viable alternative. An evaluation 
of the express and implied restrictions that exist vis-à-
vis  the use of the 1911 Act’s s.2 procedure will  also be 
attempted. In the process, hitherto unexpressed, 
positive law reasons why the procedure does not enable 
the extension of Parl iament’s life or the abolition  of the 
House of Lords will be revealed. In commenting upon 
the final aspect in which the Parliament Act 1911 may 
constitute a cause of concern –  namely, the question 
whether the courts’ assumption of jurisdiction to decide 
Jackson  was an overstepping of authority that breached 
Parliamentary privilege and, thereby, indirectly 
questioned the invio lability of the legislature’s 
sovereignty – the alleged conclusiveness of the 
Parliamentary Roll, a traditional starting point of 
orthodox constitutional theory, will be critiqued.  
The natural starting point of a modern, orthodox 
account of the UK Constitution is undoubtedly 
Community membership – the most radical 
constitutional, political and economic development of 
recent times –  and, thus, that is whence readjusting 
orthodoxy must commence.  
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Chapter II: UK membership 
of the EC 
 
The UK’s decision to join what were then the European 
Communities11 was effectuated, at the international 
level,12 by signing the Treaty of Accession that makes it 
a party “to the Treaties establishing these 
Communities” ,13 and, at the domestic level, through the 
enactment of the European Communities Act 1972 
(ECA). For reasons that are understandable, this 
decision has been conventionally interpreted as 
involving, or betokening, a potential challenge to the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
                                                            
11 Id est ,  the EEC, the EURATOM and the ECSC.  
12 In accordance with Arts.237, 205, and 98 of the EEC Treaty 
1957, the EURATOM Treaty 1957, and the ECSC Treaty 1951, 
respectively.  
13 Treaty of Accession 1972, Art.1.   
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Sovereignty: The EU perspective 
 
To identify the source of the constitutional law 
problems posed by the EU construct one need not search  
beyond the twin principles of primacy and  direct effect 
of Community law. Ironically, nowhere is express 
mention to be found of either in the founding EC 
Treaties; both concepts are predominantly constructs of 
an activist court’s teleological interpretation 14 of such 
Treaties and may be traced back to two separate lines of 
judicial authority.15,16 For present purposes, what is 
                                                            
14 See e.g. :  Case C-283/81, CILFIT v Ministro  [1983] 1 CMLR 
472, 490.  
15 EC Supremacy Doctrine : Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v 
Administratie der Belastigen  [1963] ECR 1, 12; Case 6/64, 
Costa v ENEL  [1964] ECR 585, 594, 605; Case 11/70, 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr - und 
Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel  [1970] ECR 1125, 
1134;  Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato  
v Simmenthal SpA (No.2)  [1978] 3 CMLR 263, 283; Case 
294/83, ‘Les Verts ’  v European Parliament  [1987] 2 CMLR 343, 
371. See also: Bebr, 1971, at pp.487 -494.  Doctrine of Direct 
Effect:  [1963] ECR 1, 12; Case 41/74, Van Duyn v Home Office  
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important to highlight is that Regulations,17 Decisions18 
and, in several instances, Treaty provisions 19 and 
Directives20,21 bind Member States in their entirety and 
may be relied upon in national courts irrespective of 
whether, or how, they have been transposed into 
domestic law. Most importantly, such Community 
measures are seen as emanating from a new, 
autonomous, sovereign source and, thence, as taking 
precedence over any form of national law, whether it be 
                                                                                                                                                       
[1975] 1 CMLR 1, 15-16; Case 43/75, Defrenne v SABENA  
[1976] 2 CMLR 98, 122-124. See also:  Winter, 1972.  
16 Whether the ECJ was legitimised, compelled and/or justified 
to proceed, on the basis of its mandate, in promulgating these 
doctrines is a separate issue. For which, see : Hamson, 1976; 
Pescatore, 1983; Cappeletti,  1987; Rasmussen, 1988; Craig, 
1997. 
17 TFEU, Art.288.  
18 ibid. .  See also: Case 9/70, Franz Grad v Finanzamt 
Traunstein  [1971] CMLR 1, 23; Greaves, 1996.  
19 [1963] ECR 1, 12.  
20 [1975] 1 CMLR 1, 15-16; Case 148/78, Ministero v Ratti  
[1980] 1 CMLR 96, 110.  
21 Recommendations and Opinions do not have direct effect.  
C.f .  Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v Fonds de Maladies  [1991] 2 
CMLR 265, 277.  
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ordinary or constitutional, general or specific, prior or 
subsequent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
62 
 
Incorporation of EU principles into 
UK domestic law: the ECA 1972 
 
By mid-1971,22 these cornerstone Community legal 
principles had already been laid down, albeit perhaps in 
rudimentary form. It was, therefore, from a 
contractarian perspective, on the basis of the principles 
of supremacy and direct effect of Community law that 
UK membership materialised on January 1 st 1973.23  
As it is a well-established principle that any 
international treaty that has not received 
Parliamentary approval in the form of an Act of 
Parliament, neither forms part nor can be enforced as a 
                                                            
22 That is, the publication date of the White Paper (Cabinet 
Office,  1971) setting out the terms agreed for UK membership.  
23 Indeed, both principles are implicitly acknowledged in the 
Act of Accession, Art.2 of which provides that ‘ [f]rom the date 
of accession, the provisions of the original Treaties and the 
acts adopted by the institutions of the Communities shall be 
binding on the new Member States and shall apply in those 
States under the conditions laid down in those Treaties and in 
this Act. ’  C.f.  Nicol,  1999, at p.149; Elliott, 2004, at p.548.  
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matter of domestic law,24,25 the dual action of the 
conclusion and ratification of the Treaty of Accession as 
                                                            
24 Case of Proclamations  (1610) 12 Co Rep 74, 75; The 
Parlement Belge  (1879) 4 PD 129, 154. C.f.  Mann, 1958, at 
pp.30-32; Minister v Teoh  (1995) 69 ALJR 423.  
25 Whilst legislation expressly contrary to its terms will ,  
without further inquiry (c.f.  Bloxam v Favre  (1883) 8 PD 101, 
106-107; Salomon v Commissioners  [1967] 2 QB 116, 143),  be 
interpreted as having such an effect and, consequently, will be 
held automatically applicable and overriding ( Cheney v Conn  
[1968] 1 WLR 242, 245-247). This doctrine relating to the 
inapplicability of Treaty law, ex proprio vigore ,  in UK 
domestic law stems directly from the principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. More specifically, mirroring the 
fact that under international law it constitutes an essential  
and exclusive attribute of State  sovereignty, the treaty-making 
process has long been regarded as lying within the prerogative 
of the sovereign Head of State,  the Monarch, exercisable upon 
the advice of his Ministers, unless otherwise provided in 
statute (see e.g. :  European Parliamentary Elections Act 1978, 
s.6(1)).  Treaties, therefore, may bind the Crown in its 
international relations as well as the State in international 
law (see: Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969,  
Arts.26, 27, 46), but do not ipso facto  alter domestic law 
(Watson v Department of Trade  [1990] 2 AC 418, 500) unless 
and until  they are approved by Parliament, and then only to 
the extent that the relevant Parliamentary enactments 
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well as the enactment of the ECA was, under the 
auspices of the UK Constitution, necessary for 
membership to be enabled.26,27 The additional relevant 
hurdle, in this case,  was that Parliament had to ensure 
that not only previous and present Community legal 
initiatives would be given effect domestically – a 
situation that was secured by expressly repealing 28 and 
amending29 “about fifty existing statutes” 30 that were in 
conflict with Community law –31 but, in order to comply 
with the principles of the direct applicability and effect 
of Regulations and other Community provisions 
respectively, also that those to come could be enforced 
without the need for further Parliamentary enactment. 
The solution was provided by s.2(1) which stated:  
                                                                                                                                                       
properly constructed do so (Mortensen v Peters  (1906) 8 F (J) 
93, 100-101).  
26 Blackburn v Attorney-General  [1971] 1 WLR 1037, 1039. See 
also: McWhirter v Attorney-General  [1972] CMLR 882, 886.  
27 It follows, as Mitchell correctly notes, that the ECA should 
not be conceived of as “Parliamentary ratification of the Act of 
accession” (Mitchell,  1980, at p.75).  
28 ECA, Sch.3.  
29 ibid . ,  Sch.4.  
30 Kozyris, 1972, at p.303.  
31 On why this was necessary see: Martin, 1969, at pp.20 -21. 
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All such rights, powers, liabilities, 
obligations and restrictions from time to time  
created or arising by or under the Treaties, 
and all such remedies and procedures from 
time to time provided for by or under the 
Treaties, as in accordance with the Treaties 
are without further enactment  to be given 
legal effect or used in the United Kingdom 
shall be recognised and available in law, and 
be enforced, allowed and followed 
accordingly…32 
This did not, as yet, say anything about whether 
Parliament also intended to comply with, and 
accommodate, the second relevant Community doctrine; 
id est, supremacy of Community law. Indeed, by virtue 
                                                            
32 [Emphasis added].  
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of s.2(1), Community legal measures 33 could, 
conceivably, be given direct effect and be treated either 
as subordinate to, or as taking precedence over, Acts of 
Parliament.34  
The ensuing s.2(4) attempted to respond to the dilemma 
by providing that ‘any enactment passed or to be 
passed, other than one contained in this part of this 
Act, shall be construed and have effect subject to the 
foregoing provisions of this section’ whereby the 
‘foregoing provisions’ appear to include s.2(1). 
                                                            
33 On a literal interpretation of s.2(1), its reach would appear 
to extend only to Community measures that create ‘right s’  or 
‘powers’,  impose ‘ liabilities’ ,  ‘obligations’  or ‘restrictions’,  
provide ‘remedies’ or lay down ‘procedures’.  Nevertheless,  such 
an approach never seems to have found favour with the courts; 
the section has had the effect of incorporating into UK law  the 
Treaties, as well as all provisions made under them, “lock 
stock and barrel”:  Re Westinghouse Uranium Contract  [1978] 
AC 547, 564 (c.f.  Shields v Coomes  [1978] 1 WLR 1408, 1414).  
34 The argument has also tentatively been put forward that 
since s.2(1) has the effect of giving legal force to Community 
law in the UK, and such law contains the principle of 
Community law primacy, s.2(1) is conclusive for all  relevant 
purposes. In truth, however, this is not so since, as earlier 
noted, treaties are incorporated into UK law only to the extent 
that Parliament so provides.  
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Therefore, on its face, as Geoffrey Rippon suggested 
during the passage of the ECA, the combined effect of 
s.2(1) and s.2(4) appears to be that:  
the directly applicable provisions ought to 
prevail over future Acts of Parliament in so 
far as they might be inconsistent with 
them.35  
Unfortunately, however, the Delphic style purposely 
employed by the section’s draughtsmen served to 
frustrate any attempt to apply straightforwardly the 
principle in practice.36 Consequently, the reader must 
direct himself to post-1972 judicial dicta  and legal 
commentary for answers.  
 
                                                            
35 HC Debs, 1972, 15 t h  February, vol.831, col.278 (Geoffrey 
Rippon MP).  
36 As Craig notices: “[t]he ECA s 2(4) is notoriously difficult to 
interpret if  one attempts to give sense to every word.”  (Craig, 
2010, at p.16).  
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Incorporation of EU principles into 
UK domestic law: the courts’ 
reception 
 
After some 6 years of hesitant, benumbed judgements, 37 
the first significant contribution towards the 
Community supremacy issue came in Shields  wherein 
Lord Denning MR made reference to the “twin pillars on 
which Community law rests … ‘direct applicability’ … 
[and] ‘the supremacy of Community law…’”38 The latter, 
says Denning citing Costa  and Simmenthal  in his 
support, arises: 
whenever there is a conflict or inconsistency 
between the law contained in an article of 
                                                            
37 See e.g. :  Aero Zipp v YKK  [1973] CMLR 819, 820; Bulmer v 
Bollinger  [1974] Ch 401, 418, 425-426; Gaz v Falks  [1974] Ch 
381, 393; Felixstowe v BTDB  [1976] 2 CMLR 655, 664-665; 
[1978] AC 547, 564.  
38 [1978] 1 WLR 1408, 1414.  
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the Treaty [or in a Regulation39 or, in some 
cases, a Directive]40 and the law contained in 
the internal law of one of the member states, 
whether passed before or after joining the 
Community.41  
Two questions arise from the then Master of the Rolls’  
judgement. First and foremost, in what manner would 
Community law ‘prevail’  over domestic law? Would it be 
through impliedly repealing or rendering inapplicable 
the offending domestic legislation, or through reading 
down the apparently conflicting provisions and, if so, to 
what extent and with the employment of which tools of 
statutory interpretation?  
Secondly, is such prevalence of Community law all -
embracing? At first glance, it would appear so from 
Lord Denning’s speech, although, on closer inspection, 
it becomes evident that the choice of the ECA as his 
point of reference is misguided so no firm conclusions 
can be drawn.  
                                                            
39 ibid . ,  1415. 
40 ibid . .  
41 ibid . .  
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Indeed, it is irrelevant, for present purposes, whether a 
domestic law has been passed before or after the ECA. 42 
In truth, the crucial distinction with respect to 
understanding the effect of the Community supremacy 
principle is between a Community law enacted before or 
after a conflicting domestic law. Since Denning seems to 
have mistakenly had in mind the former point of 
                                                            
42 To explain, a hypothetical Equal Pay Act enacted after the 
ECA, say in 2017, and in no way inconsistent with it,  may be 
usefully employed. Assuming such statute is also consistent 
with related Community law pronouncements, it will  certainly 
be enforced by domestic courts and remain into operation 
unless otherwise stated. A Community Regulation coming into 
force in 2018 and being inconsistent with the 2017 statute 
would, equally certainly, take precedence over it.  Such 
precedence would be given by a straightforward application of 
the ‘ lex posterior derogat priori ’  rule: a later provision having 
the force of law in the UK as per  s.2(1) ECA (no question 
relating to the repeal of which arises since the hypothetical 
2017 statute was assumed to be consistent both  with the ECA 
and Community law) would have directly conflicted with a 
previous enactment on the same subject -matter. Therefore, 
this hypothetical scenario admits to a solution according to 
uncontroversial, orthodox principles of interpretation and has 
little to say about the Community supremacy principle, 
properly so understood. The situation would, however, be 
different should one reverse the dates of the domestic and 
Community legal pronouncements.  
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reference and specifically advocated the primacy of 
Community law merely “in any such event”,43 the legal 
position appertaining to a subsequent domestic law 
conflicting with a previous Community prov ision 
remained implicitly unanswered.  In the eventide of the 
first decade of Community membership, by and large 
this remained so.  
Discharging the heavy burden began steadily, if by 
necessity, in a series of cases in the 1980s. Concerning 
the first question, the multivocality of the ECJ 
judgement in Von Colson44 with respect to whether the 
then novel doctrine of indirect effect 45 related merely to 
domestic laws specifically introduced to implement a 
Directive or whether it extended to any laws occupying 
the same field, exacerbated the UK judiciary’s confusion 
and indecisiveness.  
 
                                                            
43 [1978] 1 WLR 1408, 1415 [emphasis added].  
44 Case 14/83, Von Colson v Nordrhein-Westfalen  [1986] 2 
CMLR 430, 453-454. 
45 That is, the duty of national courts to interpret national law 
consistently with the wording and purpose of Directives.  
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Statutes implementing Community 
obligations 
On the one hand, the position in relation to statutes 
enacted for the purpose of implementing Directives was 
swiftly settled in the wake of Von Colson .  Indeed, in 
Pickstone46 the House of Lords emphatically maintained 
that such enactments fall into a special category with 
the implication that they must be “construed 
purposively in order to give effect to the … intention of 
… Parliament”47 which is assumed to be the faithful 
implementation of relevant Community measures even 
if, or perhaps more correctly, especially when, they are 
not directly effective.  
It would be constructive to pause, for a moment, and 
consider the apparent oddity, and the consequent 
objection,48 that this legal position gives rise to: how 
                                                            
46 Pickstone v Freemans  [1989] AC 66.  
47 ibid . ,  112. See also: Apple and Pear v Commissioners  [1987] 
2 CMLR 634, 654; Oakley v Animal  [2006] Ch 337, 348.  
48 Downplaying the judgement’s innovativeness in tandem with 
Collins’s contention (Collins, 1990, at p.135) that the courts 
have always sought to construe domestic legislation  
consistently with the UK’s international commitments could 
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can the existence of an actual, often grave, discrepancy 
between a particular Directive and national legislation 
be sincerely reconciled with the presumption that 
Parliament, in enacting the latter, sought genuinely to 
implement the –  directly effective, or otherwise – 
obligations arising under the former?  Doing so, one may 
protest, seems dangerously close to putting the cart 
before the horse; it is the consistency, or otherwise, of 
the domestic measure which is alleged to implement a 
Community provision which should give rise to the 
presumption that Parliament did or did not, 
respectively, intend to comply with its international 
obligation at hand, not the other way around.  
Understandable as this claim may seem, it is, at least 
in relation to Community law, misconceived. Leaving 
aside the very palpable possibility of misguided 
draughtsmanship, it must firstly be remembered that 
what the Pickstone /Litster  line generously gave with one 
hand, it largely took with the other, on account of the 
oft-forgotten reservation that only “if [the words of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
have been possible, had it not been for the fact that the use of  
the purposive interpretation laid down in Pickstone  and 
extended in Litster v Forth Dry Dock  ([1990] 1 AC 546, 559) 
was said not to  be limited –  as is traditionally the case –  to 
instances in which an ambiguity in domestic law implementing 
Community obligations is established.  
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domestic statute] are reasonably capable of bearing” 49 a 
meaning consistent with the relevant Community 
provision may the suggested purposive interpretation be 
utilised to bring it about. Secondly, in accordance with 
Art.288 TFEU, a Directive is binding upon Member 
States ‘as to the result to be achieved’. Such ‘result’, or 
purpose, may not be conspicuous at the time of the 
adoption of the Directive, at least in the eyes of 
Parliament. Thus, in implementing the measure, the 
legislator must turn to its text, on the dual assumption 
that, first, it represents the best available indication of 
the measure’s purpose as well as, second, that those 
that will be called upon to interpret the implementing 
statute – that is, the courts – will understand that she 
is doing so on that basis and with that intention. 
Therefore, the fact that, in view of the established 
Community legal structure and jurisprudence, a 
situation in which the ECJ, ultimately, interprets the 
measure in a manner inconsistent with – what in the 
eyes of Parliament appeared to be the literal meaning of 
–  its original text so as to give effect to its genuine 
purpose is conceivable and, in fact, occurs not 
infrequently, cannot derogate from the truthful 
                                                            
49 Case 12/81, Garland v British Rail Engineering Ltd  [1983] 2 
AC 751, 771.  
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observation that Parliament has sought to give effect to 
the measure properly so construed and that therefore 
its intention must be given effect to by the judiciary. 
Crucial for thus concluding is the fact that the ECJ 
considers its judgements as declarations of what 
Community law has always been. 50  
 
Statutes not implementing Community 
obligations 
On the other hand, as Lord Templeman suggested in 
Duke ,51 neither s.2(1) and s.2(4) nor Von Colson  
provided authoritative guidance on the position relating 
to the conflict of a non-directly effective Community 
measure and a domestic statute that merely occupies 
the same field albeit has not been enacted to implement 
it –  a situation which is traditionally assumed to arise 
when the latter predates the former. 52 The ECJ’s 
                                                            
50 Case 61/79, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v 
Denkavit Italiana Srl  [1981] 3 CMLR 694, 707.  
51 Duke v GEC  [1988] AC 618, 638-641. 
52 In the opposite case, the judiciary will  be anxious to 
conclude that the domestic statute was intended to implement 
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clarification of the duty of national courts, as a matter 
of Community law, with respect to the interpretation of 
domestic law was therefore necessary. Indeed, in an 
unmistakable passage in Marleasing ,53 it was made 
clear that: 
in applying national law,  whether the 
provisions in question were adopted before or 
after  the directive, the national court called 
upon to interpret it is required to do so, as 
far as possible , in the light of the wording 
and the purpose of the directive in order to 
achieve the result pursued by the latter… 54 
The UK courts, for their part,  followed suit in 
recognising such principle.55  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Community provision or,  at least,  if an examination of the 
statute as well as a perusal of Hansard cannot substantiate 
any such intention, that its purpose and effect was intended to 
be consistent with relevant Community law. C.f.  Finnegan v 
Clowney  [1990] 2 AC 407, 416.  
53 Case C-106/89, Marleasing v Comercial de Alimentación  SA 
[1993] BCC 421.  
54 ibid . ,  439. 
55 See: Webb v EMO  [1993] 1 WLR 49, 59.  
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Irreconcilable conflict 
In light of the above, what is, then, to be made of cases 
in which Community law cannot be reconciled with 
domestic law?  
As for non-directly effective Community law, it seems 
that the interpretive obligation of Marleasing/Webb , 
whilst being of great strength and therefore leaving 
little room for national authorities, is not limitless: 
should non-directly effective Community law be 
fundamentally inconsistent with a national statute, 
whether predating or postdating, it is the latter that 
will prevail.  
Insofar as directly effective Community law is 
concerned, the courts have always conceived the legal 
position as depending on, and directly flowing from, 
s.2(4) and, thus, as being relatively straightforward 
even if, at least for the first two decades of EC 
membership, they had been hesitant of expressly 
spelling it out: irreconcilably inconsistent national law, 
whether antecedent or subsequent, must be ‘disapplied’ 
in favour of directly effective Community provisions.  
This was, indeed, precisely what happened in a series of 
early cases decided by the lower courts. For instance , in 
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Re Medical Expenses ,56 what was then the National 
Insurance Commissioner decided that the claimant 
should be allowed to “escape”57 the provisions of the 
relevant domestic statute58 by virtue of establishing 
that his case was within the reach of a conflicting 
Community Regulation.59 Similarly, in Re An Absence ,60 
the relevant Regulation61 was held to “override”62 
conflicting national law provisions. 63  
Turning to cases decided by courts higher in the judicial 
hierarchy, one finds judgements that are to the same 
                                                            
56 Case C 897/V, Re Medical Expenses Incurred In France  
[1977] 2 CMLR 317.  
57 ibid . ,  333. 
58 National Insurance Act 1965.  
59 Council Regulation 1408/71/EEC.  
60 Case CS 7/76, Re An Absence In Ireland  [1977] 1 CMLR 5.  
61 Council Regulation 1209/76/EEC.  
62 [1977] 1 CMLR 5, 10. See also:  Decision CA 3/77, Re 
Residence Conditions  [1978] 2 CMLR 287, 290-291; The 
Siskina  [1979] AC 210, 262.  
63 Social Security Act 1975.  
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effect albeit being noticeably more obscure about it. One 
such instance is Macarthys v Smith64 wherein the 
majority of the Court of Appeal declined to follow Lord 
Denning’s suggestion that the relevant domestic statute 
should be interpreted broadly, even at the expense of its 
literal meaning, so as not to conflict with the directly 
effective Art.119 EEC.65,66 Thus, after ascertaining the 
meaning of the said Treaty Article by virtue of a 
request for a preliminary ruling by the ECJ, 67 the court 
decided, without further ado, 68 to give effect to it even 
though such decision entailed the non-application of the 
conflicting s.1(2) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 as amended 
by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.  
                                                            
64 [1979] ICR 785.  
65 Currently,  Art.157 TFEU.  
66 [1979] ICR 785, 787-792. 
67 Macarthys v Smith  [1979] 3 CMLR 381; Case 129/79, 
Macarthys v Smith  [1980] 2 CMLR 205, 213.  
68 The strikingly short judgement tried hard to convince that it 
was “only about costs” (Macarthys v Smith  [1980] 2 CMLR 217,  
218) and that therefore nothing remarkable was being decided.  
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The Court of Appeal’s approach in Pickstone69 was 
largely equivalent: since the words of the relevant 
domestic provisions70 were unambiguous and not 
reasonably capable of bearing a meaning consistent 
with Art.119 EEC without ascribing them some 
artificial meaning, the court decided that the appellant 
should, in line with Art.119 EEC, be allowed to claim 
equal pay with a man employed on work of equal value 
with her, even though under national law she was 
debarred from thus claiming. Admittedly, on appeal, the 
House of Lords, despite confirming the Court of 
Appeal’s ruling, was able to adopt the less radical path 
of construing the domestic provisions consistently with 
Community law. However, achieving such a result was 
made possible solely by diverting attention from Art.119 
to Directive 75/117/EEC – which the relevant national 
laws had sought to give effect to – and by consequently 
reasoning that a purposive construction of the latter to 
resolve the apparent conflict with the former was 
warranted. In other words, had it not been for the 
Directive in question, it is likely that the Court of 
Appeal’s reasoning would have been followed and, thus, 
                                                            
69 Pickstone v Freemans  [1987] 3 WLR 811, 821-822. 
70 Equal Pay Act 1970, s.1(2)(a)(c);  Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, s.8.  
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for the first time, the House of Lords itself would have 
been seen as disapplying an Act of Parliament in favour 
of giving effect to utterances emanating from a 
different, alien source.  
Albeit a few years had to elapse, the time for the House 
of Lords to rule thus – and in so ruling to affirm and 
impliedly to acknowledge what the lower courts had 
been doing for decades, and what, few would doubt, the 
ECA itself from its inception had dictated –  came in 
Factortame . 
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The Factortame saga 
 
This lengthy series of cases emerged from the 
Community’s controversial attempts to regulate the 
economically lucrative, if ecologically sensitive, fishing 
industry through its Common Fisheries Policy (CFP). 71  
More specifically, when, not long after the CFP’s 
inception, it became apparent that the principle of 
equal access72 was prone to lead to overfishing and 
resource depletion, total allowable catches were 
implemented which were thereby divided into quotas 
allocated to individual Member States. 73 Spanish 
nationals, in their attempt to elude the relevant 
restrictive agreements74 that their country had 
                                                            
71 See: Art.38(1) TFEU; Council Regulation 2141/70/EEC.  
72 Council Regulation 101/76/EEC, Art.2(1).  
73 Council Regulation 170/83/EEC.  
74 As well as the restrictive treatment they were facing by the 
EC. For which, see: Foster and Churchill ,  1987.  
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concluded with the Community both before, 75 as well as 
on the eve of,76 its accession, began exploiting the 
outdated provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act 
(MSA) 1894 which allowed shipping vessels owned, inter 
alios ,  by corporate bodies established and having their 
principal place of business in the UK, to be deemed 
British and be registered accordingly. 77 With the 
introduction of national quotas in 1983, the existence of 
such vessels, which flew the Union Jack but landed 
their catches in Spain, became problematic insofar as 
their catches began counting against the UK quota. 78 
Remedial action was, thus, sought by Parliament. Its 
first attempt having proven futile, 79 Parliament opted to 
make use of the Sea Fish (Conservation) Act 1967 80 to 
impose further operating, crewing and social security 
conditions for the licensing of fishing vessels. Despite 
the fact that all three licensing conditions were 
                                                            
75 E.g. :  Council Regulation 3062/80/EEC.  
76 Treaty of Accession (Spain) 1985, Arts.156 -166. 
77 MSA 1894, s.1(d).  
78 See: Churchill ,  1990.  
79 British Fishing Boats Act 1983.  
80 In particular, its s.4.  
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challenged as being allegedly incompatible with 
Community law, and before the requested preliminary 
rulings of the ECJ that would allow the Divisional 
Court to pronounce upon their compatibility were 
issued,81 Parliament proceeded with issuing the 
Merchant Shipping (Registration of Fishing Vessels) 
Regulations 1988 and enacting the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1988.  
In particular, s.14(1) of the MSA 1988, decisively 
minded towards combating the phenomenon of ‘quota 
hopping’, provided that a fishing vessel was to be 
regarded as eligible to be registered as British only so 
long as it was British-owned and managed from within 
the UK, and only insofar as any charterer, manager or 
operator of such vessel was a qualified person or 
company; ‘qualified person or company’ being defined, 
in turn, by s.14(7), as any person who was a British 
citizen-subject resident or domiciled in the UK, or a 
company that was incorporated in the UK, had its 
principal place of business there, and, additionally, had 
                                                            
81 Operating conditions: Case C-216/87, R v Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  [1990] 3 WLR 265. Crewing 
and Social Security Conditions: Case C -3/87, R v Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food  [1990] 3 WLR 226. See also: 
Case C-279/89, Commission v UK  [1993] 1 CMLR 564.  
  
 
85 
 
at least 75% of its shares owned by, and at least  75% of 
its directors being, ‘qualified persons’.  
The new licensing scheme prompted the response of 
both the Commission and the owners and operators of 
95 fishing vessels, including Factortame, which were 
registered as British shipping vessels under the MSA 
1894 but were unable to satisfy one or more of the 
conditions of the MSA 1988 scheme so as to remain 
registered, or re-register, as British vessels after March 
31s t 1989. The former brought an action pursuant to 
Art.169 EEC82 before the ECJ for a declarat ion that, by 
enacting the nationality requirements of ss.13 -14 MSA 
1988, the UK had failed to fulfil its obligations under 
Arts.7, 52 and 221 EEC,83,84 whilst by a separate 
document85 it sought an order requiring the UK to 
suspend the nationality requirements  of s.14, insofar as 
nationals of Community Member States were 
                                                            
82 Currently Art.258 TFEU. 
83 Currently, Art.18 TEU and Arts.49 and 55 TFEU 
respectively.  
84 Case C-246/89, Commission v UK  [1991] 3 CMLR 706.  
85 Lodged in accordance with Art.186 EEC (currently, Art.279 
TFEU) and Art.83 of the Rules of Pro cedure. 
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concerned.86 The latter sued in the Queen’s Bench 
Division for a declaration of illegality that the relevant 
provisions of the MSA 1988 and the related 1988 
Regulations may not be applied to them since such 
application would be discriminatory within the meaning 
of Arts.7, 52 and 58 EEC87 whilst also infringing 
Arts.34, 38, 39, 40 and 221 EEC88 and, secondly, an 
order of prohibition against the Secretary of State for 
Transport from treating their registration under the 
MSA 1894 as having ceased from March 31 s t 1989 
onwards.89 
Neill LJ, at first instance, had “no hesitation whatever 
in concluding that”90 a preliminary reference was 
warranted in order to determine whether a conflict 
                                                            
86 Case 246/89R, Commission v UK  [1989] 3 CMLR 601.  
87 Currently,  Arts.18, 49 and 54 TFEU respectively.  
88 Currently,  Arts.35, 38, 39, 40 and 55 TFEU respectively.  
89 Ex Parte Factortame  [1989] 2 CMLR 353. See also:  
Magliveras, 1990, at pp.909-910. 
90 ibid . ,  369. 
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between Community law and the domestic statutory 
provisions at hand did in fact exist .91 
More importantly, the Divisional Court also assumed 
the jurisdiction to grant interim relief against the 
operation of a statute and, in fact, to “ensure that 
justice can be done”,92 utilised it in the case at hand 
with respect to the MSA 1988, by way of an order 
suspending the provisions relating to the registration of 
British fishing vessels contained therein,93 and 
restraining the Secretary of State from enforcing the 
same, in respect of any of them, pending the ECJ’s 
preliminary ruling.  
Despite the court’s best efforts to characterise the 
latter part of its decision as being not the dispensation 
of the relevant provisions of the 1988 Act itself, but 
merely the suspension of the coming into force of the 
                                                            
91 Since the ECJ was in a “much better position than any 
national court to place the provisions of the Common Fisheries 
Policy in the wider context of the Treaty provisions as a 
whole.” [ ibid . ,  370].  
92 ibid . ,  376. 
93 That is, Part II of the MSA 1988 (ss.12 -25). 
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time limit prescribed by statutory instrument, 94 
Bingham LJ, on appeal, considered that what had been 
decided amounted to a “constitutional enormity” 95 that 
should be quashed.  
The House of Lords, for its part  part, shared Bingham’s 
conviction96 since, in their Lordships’  view, firstly, a 
presumption that a clear and self -executing Act of 
Parliament is compatible with Community law unless 
proven otherwise operated and meant that as a matter 
of UK law there was no power to stay a statute to 
protect putative or disputed Community law rights and, 
secondly and inter-relatedly, there existed, once again 
as a matter of UK law, no interlocutory remedy in 
judicial review proceedings against a Minister of the 
Crown having statutory powers under an Act of 
Parliament.97 Nevertheless, unlike the Court of Appeal, 
they were additionally satisfied that whether 
equivalent and overriding rules derived from the ECJ 
                                                            
94 [1989] 2 CMLR 353, 376.  
95 ibid. ,  407. See also: ibid . ,  404-405. 
96 Ex Parte Factortame  [1989] 3 CMLR 1, 13-14. 
97 Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s.21(2).  C.f.  M v Home Office  
[1994] 1 AC 377; Senior Courts Act 1981, s.31.  
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jurisprudence requiring or empowering national courts 
to do otherwise existed was uncertain and, 
consequently, felt obliged to order a further reference to 
the ECJ on the interim relief issue. The ECJ,  for its 
part, responded affirmatively by ruling that:  
a national court which … considers that the 
sole obstacle which precludes it from 
granting interim relief is a rule of national 
law must set aside that rule. 98 
On resumption of the appeal, the House of  Lords, to the 
surprise of many,99 had no hesitation in unconditionally 
endorsing the ECJ’s pronouncement whilst, for good 
measure, since the European court had declined to do 
so, also felt obliged to issue guidelines 100 as to when 
such relief should be made available. On the facts of the 
                                                            
98 Case C-213/89, Ex Parte Factortame  [1990] 3 CMLR 1, 30.  
99 Before the House of Lords’  second ruling, commentators had 
been sceptical as to whether the ECJ’s preliminary ruling, as 
formulated, would be capable of providing the necessary 
jurisdiction for UK courts to grant interim relief where none 
had hitherto existed: Toth, 1990; Gravells, 1991, at pp.188 -
190. 
100 Subject to a reservation: Ex Parte Factortame  [1990] 3 
CMLR 375, 396.  
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case at hand, their Lordships were content that the 
declared conditions had been satisfied and, hence, 
granted an order restraining the Secretary of State 
from withholding or withdrawing registration pursuant 
to the MSA 1988 and the 1988 Regulations, in respect of 
the vessels owned or managed by the applicants and 
insofar as the residence and domicile requirements 101 of 
the said Act were concerned.  
In the closing chapters of the saga, 102 the ECJ, in 
response to the Divisional Court’s initial reference, 
ruled that the relevant provisions of the MSA 1988 
were, in fact, contrary to Arts.5, 7, 52 and 221 
EEC;103,104 a ruling which the Divisional Court  in its 
                                                            
101 The nationality requirements contained in s.14 MSA 1988 
had already been made redundant by the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1988 (Amendment) Order 1989 which was enacted to give 
effect to the interim injunction that was granted against such 
requirements in [1989] 3 CMLR 601 referred to ab ove. 
102 For purposes that are here irrelevant, the judicial conflict 
stretched out further, only to be concluded in 2002: R 
(Factortame Ltd and Others) v Secretary of State for 
Transport, Local Government and the Regions (No.8)  [2002] 
EWCA Civ 932.  
103 Currently Art.4(3) TEU and Arts.18, 49 and 55 TFEU 
respectively.  
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unreported judgement of October 2 nd  1991, in turn, set 
out to apply by giving priority to Community law and 
consequently denying effect to the MSA 1988, so far as 
was necessary. Importantly, the relevant provisions of 
the MSA 1988 were also repealed by Parliament. 105 
  
Factortame and Parliament’s  sovereignty 
The lengthy, complex and at times confused journey of 
the MSA 1988, broadly subsumed under the ‘Factortame  
proceedings’ heading, drew widespread attention and 
aroused much controversy in legal and political circles; 
that much is fairly certain and remains true up to this 
day. The reasons why this was so are, nevertheless, less 
clear. For one, some were concerned by the suggestion 
that interim relief may lie against domestic statutory 
provisions and, by extension, against the Crown insofar 
as it derives relevant powers thereunder, in lieu of the 
protection of putative Community rights. Others, yet, 
focused on the principle that in case of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
104 Case C-221/89, Ex Parte Factortame  [1992] QB 680, 734-738. 
By and large, the same conclusions were reached by the ECJ in 
its judgement in the Art.169 EEC proceedings against the UK: 
[1989] 3 CMLR 601. 
105 Merchant Shipping (Registration, etc) Act 1993, s.8(4),  
Sch.5, Part I;  Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s.314(1),  s.316(2), 
Sch.12. 
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establishment of a conflict between the provisions of a 
domestic statute and directly effective Community law, 
the former is bound to give way to the latter. In what 
follows, both principles will, in turn, be analysed in 
terms of whether their acceptance in Factortame  
constitutes a challenge to the traditional doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty as most commentators 
allege. 
 
Interim relief 
With respect to the ‘interim relief’ point, it is 
instructive, firstly, to stress that Factortame  
constitutes the first instance of a UK court suspending 
the operation of an Act of Parliament; surely a 
permeating challenge to the traditional theory of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. Delving deeper, however, 
reveals a different picture. To explain, one must 
commence with acknowledging that Parliament 
genuinely intends its post-1973 pronouncements, and 
via s.2(4) ECA has legally directed courts to understand 
these pronouncements as intending, to conform with 
relevant Community edicts  and to take effect only as 
long as and to the extent that they are so, unless 
otherwise provided expressly or by necessary 
implication. It is frequently submitted that this 
acknowledgement entails the qualification of a 
constitutional doctrine hitherto considered orthodox, 
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necessary and absolute: the doctrine of implied repeal. 
However, as will be discussed later in this Chapter  as 
well as in Chapter III, that is not so: the legal position 
that has flowed from the ECA is not inconsistent with 
the implied repeal doctrine and fully conforms with the 
orthodox UK constitutional framework.   
On this basis, therefore, Factortame  can be said to have 
been concerned with precisely such a statute: a statute 
that Parliament intended, and had legally directed 
courts via  s.2(4) ECA to understand as intending, to be 
applied subject to Community law. From thus 
concluding, important consequences relating to the 
operation, reach and effect of the statute at hand ensue. 
Such consequences are not, however, limited to the 
disapplication of the said statute, so far as is necessary, 
on the occasion that it is found to be incompatible with 
directly effective Community law, as is often assumed; 
they must extend to cases, like the present, in which 
domestic legislation appears incompatible with putative 
Community rights. Such extension entails vesting UK 
courts with the discretionary power to grant interim 
relief against the application of an Act of Parliament in 
the event that a strong prima facie  case is made that its 
provisions infringe or, at any rate, do not allow the full 
enjoyment of, Community rights. To explain why 
assumption of the power to provide such relief is not 
merely unoffensive towards Parliamentary sovereignty 
but, rather, ironically, is required by a theory of the 
modern UK Constitution that concentrates faithfully on 
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giving effect to Parliamentary intention, it is essential 
to understand the three options with which the court in 
a case like Factortame  is faced.  
For one, it could dismiss the application for interim 
relief and give effect to the meaning that the domestic 
statutory provisions had if  taken on their own, 
interpreted literally outside the Community context. A 
decision along those lines would have the result of 
potentially denying directly effective Community rights 
to the applicants, pending the preliminary ruling of the 
ECJ. Since directly effective rules of Community law 
“must be fully and uniformly applied in all the member -
States from the date of their entry into force ”,106 such a 
course of action would be tantamount to disregarding 
Parliament’s intention as expressed in s.2 ECA. 107  
Alternatively, the court could dismiss the application 
for interim relief but at the same time strive to 
interpret the domestic statute consistently with such 
                                                            
106 [1978] 3 CMLR 263, 282 [emphasis added].   
107 One must be careful to distinguish between the fact that the 
approach runs the risk of a potential  denial of Community 
rights and the fact that it entails an actual  abridgement of 
Parliament’s intention, whether or not such potential denial is 
actualised.  
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putative Community rights, until the ECJ’s preliminary 
ruling is delivered. Such approach, despite being 
careful to avoid disregarding Parliament’s intention by 
potentially denying Community rights to individuals 
entitled to them, remains on the wrong track because 
the interpretation exercise that it would require the 
court to undertake, would seldom be able to escape – in 
fact, it would arguably by definition involve – the kind 
of distortion of statutory language which has been 
considered unauthorised under the UK Constitution and 
for the avoidance of which the judiciary has considered 
it its duty to disapply, rather than struggle to 
interpret, an Act of Parliament that is irreconcilably 
inconsistent with directly effective Community law. For 
good measure, such an approach would also be akin to 
suggesting that the meaning and true interpretation of 
an Act of Parliament can change merely because the 
ECJ in the future decides that the domestic statute is 
or is not, after all, compatible with Community law; a 
suggestion that can certainly not stand in view of the  
fact that any ECJ pronouncement under an Art.177 
EEC108 preliminary reference merely:  
clarifies and defines … the meaning and 
scope of [a Community provision] as it must 
                                                            
108 Currently Art.267 TFEU. 
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be or ought to have been understood and 
applied from the time of its coming into 
force.109  
In other words, there can, in such circumstances, be no 
presumption as to the meaning and effect of an Act of 
Parliament: it is either consistent or inconsistent with 
Community law.110 However, since Parliament intends 
its legislation to be compatible with Community law, so 
long as Community law remains uncertain, a domestic 
statute, with respect to which a strong prima facie  case 
                                                            
109 [1981] 3 CMLR 694, 707.  
110 It is instructive to mention additionally the ‘ interpretive’ 
approach (Arangones, 1990-1991, at pp.811-813) that whilst 
correctly justifying the interim relief grant in Factortame ,  
does so on a fallacious basis. The argument maintains that it 
allegedly flows from the ECA that a domestic statute must be 
interpreted consistently with Community law unless and until  
it  has been declared to be incompatible thereto,  and that 
therefore the MSA 1988 was correctly ‘ interpreted’  thus. As 
seen, however, this is not the case –  there can neither be a 
presumption as to the effect of an Act of Parliament nor can 
its meaning change because of a declaratory ECJ judgement in 
the future. Furthermore, it is overly artificial to treat the 
temporary disapplication of an Act of Parliament as a way of 
interpreting it;  the distinction between interpretation and 
non-application is clear -cut.   
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against its compatibility with such law has been made, 
must be considered uncertain or unclear. Until such Act 
ceases to be unclear, that is, until the true meaning of 
Community law has been declared by the ECJ, an 
interim injunction against its operation, to the extent 
that it is unclear, is warranted.  
This third approach –  which, as seen, was the one 
ultimately adopted by the House of Lords upon the 
issuance of the ECJ’s preliminary ruling –  is, in fact, 
the sole that remains faithful to the Parliamentary 
intention, for Parliament, in these circumstances, 
cannot be presumed to have intended the application of 
an Act that is thuswise  unclear .   
One must be careful to recognise the importance of the 
italicised words in the previous sentence. Indeed, there 
are two senses in which a statutory provision may be 
unclear but merely one of them justifies the conclusion 
that Parliament did not intend the provision’s 
application. To explain, the crucial distinction that 
must be made is between ‘normal’ unclarity which 
entails a statutory provision that is unclear by virtue of 
its structure, language, internal consistency or 
relationship to other provisions,  principles or 
presumptions, and prepensely ‘transient’ or ‘contingent’ 
unclarity that involves a provision that is unclear in 
view of an event that is:  
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{ 
(a) implicitly or explicitly incorporated 
therein, in the sense that it was intended by 
Parliament to be, and, knowledgeable of such 
intention, the court also considers that it 
actually is, crucial for the provision’s effect  
AND 
(b) has not yet been actualised but is able to 
be actualised either through Parliament 
itself or through the employment of a 
particular procedure implicitly or explicitly 
designated by Parliament.111  
                                                                            
} 
 
                                                            
111 The latter part of requirement (b) is, essentially, already 
incorporated in requirement (a): if the court considers the 
actualisation of the event as not being possible, it will seldom 
conclude that Parliament intended such event to be implicitly 
incorporated in the provision at hand.   
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So, for instance, in a case such as R v Ann Harris112 
there was no intended, anticipated event to resolve  the 
ambiguity of the concepts of ‘stabbing, cutting, or 
wounding’ within the meaning of the Offences Against 
the Person Act 1828, so the court, as it does in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, employed familiar rules 
of interpretation to conclude that bi ting off the end of a 
person’s nose did not constitute such ‘stabbing, cutting, 
or wounding’. Contrariwise, such an anticipated event 
is implicitly incorporated in the provisions of a statute 
such as the MSA 1988. Indeed, the requirement of  
British nationality in the Act’s definition of ‘qualified 
person’ insofar as nationals of Community Member 
States are concerned is unclear and cannot and must 
not be resolved through the utilisation of any of the 
familiar rules of interpretation because Parliament is 
presumed to intend it to remain unclear until such 
intended and anticipated event is actualised.  
To summarise the ‘interim relief point’, the main line of 
defence of the respondent in the first Factortame  case 
may usefully be employed: suspending the application of 
the MSA 1988, it was alleged, would be tantamount to 
abridging Parliament’s will since it was far from certain 
that the ECJ would rule that the 1988 Act is 
                                                            
112 (1836) 7 C&P 446.  
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incompatible with Community law and, consequent ly, 
must be disapplied. As seen however, such argument is 
misguided in view of the particularly short -sighted 
approach it takes with respect to Parliament’s 
intention. Indeed, Parliament, in its post -1973 
enactments, has both a ‘specific’ as well as a ‘meta’ 
intention. The respondent in his argument has in mind  
merely the former – that is, the fact that Parliament 
intends the full and faithful application of its latest 
enactment: the MSA 1988. However, when one also 
takes into account, as she must, Parliament’s ‘meta’ 
intention that its enactments be compatible with 
Community law, the picture that is revealed is much 
different: any domestic statute with respect to which a 
strong prima facie  case that it is contrary to 
Community law is made, must be considered 
intentionally and expectedly unclear ( ‘contingent 
unclarity’, in the terminology adopted above), so long as 
the allegedly conflicting Community law is unclear and 
Parliament is, additionally, presumed to intend it to 
remain so until the reach and effect of such Community 
law is definitively determined. Therefore, empowering 
the court with the discretion to grant  interim relief on 
any such occasion, far from being contrary  to 
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Parliament’s intention, is in fact required to uphold it. 
Lastly, even if such power is absent from the common 
law, as it probably is not,113 it is very much a part of 
Community law, as the ECJ in its preliminary ruling in 
Factortame  made clear, and therefore, by virtue of 
Parliament’s sovereign will as expressed in s.3(1) 
ECA,114 must be made available to individuals coming 
before the UK courts in appropriate circumstances.  
 
Community law supremacy 
Turning to the Community law supremacy point, it is 
essential to fathom that the principle’s validity as a 
matter of UK law, its applicability in the present case, 
as well as its soundness more generally was not doubted 
either by the applicants or the respondents or, 
evidently, by the court itself at any stage of the 
proceedings. Indeed, it was accepted throughout that, 
                                                            
113 See: M v Home Office  [1994] 1 AC 377.  
114 Insofar as it provides that ‘any question as to the meaning 
or effect of any of the [Community] Treaties … or 
instrument[s],  shall be treated as a question of law  … and … 
be for determination … in accordance with the principles laid 
down by and any relevant decision of the European court…’.  
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should the Divisional Court’s preliminary reference to 
the ECJ return a verdict establishing that the 
provisions of the MSA 1988 were incompatible with 
Community law (as it ultimately did) , the domestic 
statute would have to be disapplied (as it ultimately 
was) to such an extent as would be necessary to ensure 
the full effectiveness of the relevant Community laws. 115 
Furthermore, it may be useful to remember that the 
principle had been fairly well -established, if not on the 
eve of entry into the Community, then arguably shortly 
thereafter and certainly long before the UK courts were 
called upon to decide Factortame . Thence, in that 
respect, Factortame  is stripped of anything more than 
                                                            
115 In the words of Bingham LJ:  
if  the answer given by the European Court … 
proves unfavourable to [the respondent,] the 
Divisional Court will  be obliged to give effect to 
that ruling by upholding any rights the applicants 
might be shown, in accordance with that ruling, to 
have, and this it will  be obliged to do even though 
the 1988 Act had not been repealed and even 
though its decision involves dispensing with (or 
disapplying) express provisions of the statute.  
([1989] 2 CMLR 353, 403).  
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affirming, if for the first time in the House of Lords, a 
principle long since in operation in UK law and, 
consequently, insofar as the source of Factortame-
related academic commentary has been the case’s 
pronouncement of the said principle, such commentary 
has been excessive, misguided and perhaps even 
hypocritical.  
Nevertheless, this is not to suggest that the principle 
does not deserve the most religious of treatments to 
ascertain whether it poses a challenge to the traditional 
understanding of Parliamentary sovereignty. Indeed, 
the Community supremacy doctrine, as conventionally 
understood by UK courts, appears at first sight to be in 
direct juxtaposition to Dicey’s orthodox analysis insofar 
as it seems to suggest that a:  
body of persons …  can, under the … [UK] 
constitution, make rules which override or 
derogate from an Act of Parliament, [and] … 
which … will be enforced by the Courts…116  
In truth however, when the court, having in mind that 
Parliament intends its legislation to be consistent with 
Community law and acting in good faith, fails in its 
                                                            
116 Dicey, 1889, at p.38.  
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attempt to construe an Act of Parliament consistently 
with Community law, its duty is clear  and clearly 
enshrined in s.2(4) ECA: it cannot ignore the latter and 
give effect to the domestic statute, nor distort  the 
meaning of the statute in a manner that could not have 
possibly been within Parliament ’s intention but, rather, 
must give effect to the true meaning of the statute only 
to the extent that it does not interfere with directly 
effective Community law. As in Factortame , this will 
evidently involve, in several cases, denying effect to 
Acts of Parliament to the extent that they are 
inconsistent with Community law.  
Therefore, scholars adhering to the orthodox theory of 
the Constitution should not only not be fearful of 
acknowledging, but should, rather, celebrate, such 
denial in that it constitutes the apogee of giving effect 
to Parliament’s genuine intention: free from the 
anachronistic strictures and unyielding dogmas which 
may have had a place in earlier times but have 
certainly outlived their raison d’être , the partial 
disapplication of the MSA 1988, given the 
circumstances, constituted the actual intention o f 
Parliament both at the time of the enactment of the 
MSA 1988 as well as at the time the case was brought 
before the courts, and it is of paramount importance 
that, despite knowing that it would sustain arduous, 
long-lasting criticism, the House of Lords found the 
courage to go to great lengths and to uphold it in 
Factortame . Amidst misleading vociferations on both 
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sides, such gallant behaviour on the part of the court in 
discharging its duty of giving effect to the actual, 
expressed Parliamentary intention was, unfortunately, 
hard to identify.  
Indeed, one is perfectly justified in asking, why, if 
Factortame  was decided against Parliament’s wishes, 
was there no response by Parliament? Why did it not 
pass legislation to avoid Factortame ’s outcome,117 as it 
did in the wake of Bate’s Case ,118 Darnel’s Case119 and R 
v Hampden120,121 as well as, much later, in the wake of 
Burmah Oil?122,123 Why did it not, alternatively, dictate, 
through Act of Parliament, that Factortame  was 
                                                            
117 For instance, by enacting a Merchant Shipping Act 1993 
that mirrored the provisions of the MSA 1988 and made it 
clear that it should apply to EU nationals notwithstanding 
s.2(4) ECA. 
118 Anon  (1607) 12 Co Rep 33.  
119 (1627) 3 St Tr 1.  
120 (1637) 3 St Tr 825.  
121 See: Petition of Right 1627. 
122 Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate  [1965] AC 75.  
123 See: War Damage Act 1965.  
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wrongly decided?124 Why, in view of the fact that 
“judges’ commissions [are] quamdiu se bene 
gesserint”,125 did Parliament not remove the judges that 
heard the case from their office, as it could have done 
upon the address of both Houses to the Queen and as it 
has in fact done in the past with Sir Jonah Barrington 
in 1830?126 Why did it instead swiftly enact the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1988 (Amendment) Order 1989 
to give effect to the interim injunction granted against 
                                                            
124 Evidently, Parliament reserves this right, even if exercising 
it could be viewed as somewhat improper insofar as it is more 
akin to expressing an (educated) opinion rather than ch anging 
the law.   
125 Act of Settlement 1700, Art.III.  See also:  Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005, s.33; Senior Courts Act 1981, s.11(3).  
126 For cases of (ultimately unsuccessful) motions introduced to 
consider the removal of a judge, not on account of 
embezzlement (as with Barrington) or other criminal activity,  
but rather in view of his political prejudice, one may refer to 
the motion tabled against Justice Luke Fox in the House of 
Lords in 1805 (see e.g. :  HL Debs, 1805, 15 t h  January, vol.3,  
cols.22-24) and the two motions introduced in the House of 
Commons against Mr Justice Grantham in 1906 (see e.g. :  HC 
Debs, 1906, 6 t h  July, vol.160, cols.369-414 (John Swift 
MacNeill  MP); HC Debs, 1911, 1 s t  March, vol.22, col.366 
(Athelstan Rendall MP)).  
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the MSA 1988 nationality requirements in Case 246/89R 
and later, the Merchant Shipping (Registration, etc) Act 
1993 that repealed altogether the relevant provisions of 
the MSA?  
Apart from allegedly abridging Parliament’s sovereignty 
in Factortame , were the courts, EU law, or some other 
elusory force also responsible for the fact that 
Parliament opted to follow the said course of action 
which implicitly confirmed that its intentions had been 
given effect to, rather than any of the above that would 
signify its disapproval towards the Factortame  
judgement? Certainly, there were voices of dissonance 
from individual MPs127 but this cannot hide the fact that 
Parliament128 as a whole did not, as it most certainly 
could, decide to respond in a manner that would come 
anywhere close to hinting that in Factortame its 
intentions had been disregarded.   
                                                            
127 See e.g. :  HC Debs, 1990, 20 t h  June, vol.174, cols.923-924 
(Teddy Taylor MP), 926 (Richard Shepherd MP); HC Debs, 
1990, 26 t h  June, vol.175, cols.141-143w (Sir Patrick Mayhew 
AG). 
128 No less a Conservative -dominated Parliament with what 
was by 1990 a determinately Eurosceptic PM.  
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Loughlin proposes that the contrast between the 1964 -
1965 episode that resulted in the enactment of the War 
Damage Act 1965 and “the quota -hopping saga thirty 
years later could scarcely be more stark.” 129 However, in 
truth, nothing has changed: Parliament in  1991 could 
act in identical fashion. The only real contrast between 
the two episodes is located in the fact that, unlike 1965, 
Parliament did not want to respond negatively to 
Factortame  for reasons, in fact, that are clear.  
Indeed, as Nicol revealingly notes, during the passage 
of the Merchant Shipping Bill : 
Transport Secretary Paul Channon devoted 
only seven sentences of his speech to quota-
hopping; Robert Hughes for the Opposition 
just two. David Harris (Conservative, St 
Ives) was the only backbencher to devote his 
speech to quota-hopping. He noted that there 
was some suggestion that if the Bill became 
law, it would be challenged in the European 
Court, and asked whether this constituted a 
real threat. Closing the debate, junior 
minister David Mitchell replied that the 
government were confident that their 
                                                            
129 Loughlin, 2000, at p.41.  
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measures were wholly in accord with the 
Community’s fishing quotas system. The 
nationality conditions were not discussed in 
Committee.130 
Succinctly put, the Bill was approached by Parliament 
as a “non-contentious, wide-ranging piece of 
legislation”131 and was thus forthwith enacted. It follows 
that Parliament did not positively consider the Act to be 
inconsistent with relevant Community law provisions , 
intending to abrogate them to the extent necessary. 
Equally, it is evident that Parliament was not 
indifferent as to whether its enactment was 
inconsistent with relevant Community law provisions, 
intending it to apply notwithstanding any potential 
inconsistency thereof.  Rather, Parliament positively 
considered its 1988 Act to be consistent with  
Community law; the sincere possibility of a conflict  
between the two did not cross the legislators’ 
(collective) mind.  
Thus, rather than unduly prejudicing the UK’s position 
in a supranational politico-economic union which it 
                                                            
130 Nicol,  2001, at p.182 [references omitted].  
131 ibid. .  See also: Lindell,  2006, at p.195.  
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desired (at the time) to remain a part of and the rules of 
which it desired to continue to follow wholly due to an 
honest and unintentional misunderstanding, Parliament 
intended its 1988 Act to be disapplied to the extent 
necessary should it be found to be inconsistent with 
Community law. In other words, Parliament’s genuine 
intention was upheld in Factortame  and that is 
precisely why it did not, as it could have,  respond 
negatively to the said judgement.   
In short, nothing out of the ordinary happened during 
the landmark judicial saga; the alarm hurriedly to 
fabricate contorted, impulsive theories for explaining 
the series of decisions was never sounded and those 
theorists who mistakenly thought or intentionally 
professed they heard it – quickly enlisting themselves, 
as Turpin and Tomkins note, to “two main camps … the 
‘revolution view’ and the ‘evolution view’”  –132 inevitably 
produced fallacious or at best superfluous theses as a 
result.  
For one, placing undue weight upon Dominion and 
Commonwealth practice to answer UK jurisprudential 
questions, several academics, including orthodox 
                                                            
132 Turpin and Tomkins, 2011, at p.351.  
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theorists such as Goldsworthy,133 have resorted to 
elusive distinctions between the institution by 
Parliament of procedural and substantive restrictions to 
its power, or between the institution of alternative 
legislative procedures that have an ‘upwards’ and 
‘downwards’ vector, in order to accommodate Factortame  
within the existing orthodox rubric which are, in truth, 
absolutely unnecessary.134  
Equally, Wade’s thesis that “at least in a technical 
sense … a constitutional revolution” 135 has taken place 
is flawed for it is based on his unjustifiable assumption 
that, in light of Factortame , the “Parliament of 1972 … 
succeeded in binding the Parliament of 1988 and 
restricting its sovereignty…”136 with the apparent result 
that the “established rule about conflicting Acts of 
Parliament, namely that the later Act must prevail, was 
evidently violated…”137 In truth, Wade’s strict 
                                                            
133 Goldsworthy 1999, 2010a, 2013.  
134 And, in fact, as will be shown later (see pp.517-539), also 
fundamentally flawed.   
135 Wade, 1996, at p.568.  
136 ibid. .  
137 ibid. .  See also: Wade 1980.  
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adherence to a mechanical, anachronistic version of the 
implied repeal doctrine, to be discussed and dismantled 
in Chapter III,  inhibits him from seeing that far from 
making sovereignty “a freely adjustable commodity” 138 
or entailing a revolution,  Factortame  constitutes an 
assuredly orthodox judicial  decision: one more 
uneventful, if complicated, instance in which  the 
genuine will of the sovereign Parliament, as expressed 
both in 1972 and 1988,  was given effect to, as the 
orthodox reading of the Constitution and as the 
traditional implied repeal doctr ine dictate it must.  
Accordingly, neither did the court have recourse to any 
‘noble lie’ nor  was the judgement based on a ‘ fairy tale’ 
or ‘ legal fiction’ merely to preserve , as Craig suggests, 
“the formal veneer of legal sovereignty” .139 More 
generally, although the Oxford scholar accurately 
catalogues “five ways in which the courts can view 
legislation”,140 his additional proposition that “ [e]ach 
entails a differing [and gradually increasing] degree of 
                                                            
138 ibid. ,  at p.573.  
139 Craig, 2003a, at p.108.  
140 ibid. ,  at p.107.  
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constraint on sovereign power” 141 is flawed. In truth, 
whether a curtailment of Parliament’s sovereignty has 
taken place can only be evaluated ex post  by asking 
whether Parliament’s intention , in any given case, has 
been honoured or ignored. For instance, although 
Craig’s first method, which involves interpreting 
legislation literally, is proposed as the most innocuous 
in respect to sovereignty, a not insignificant corpus of 
cases exists in which, owing to draughtsmanship error, 
the changing meaning of words and concepts, or other 
reasons, a court championing an uncompromising literal 
interpretation of the provisions at hand would not do 
justice to the result Parliament sought to achieve. More 
liberal, purposive approaches towards statutes, for 
their part, have been developed by the courts not as a 
medium to appropriate power for themselves but rather 
to solidify the investigation of, and to facilitate giving 
effect to, the sovereign Parliament’s intention . 
By and large, the same should apply to the “third 
technique”142 which, Craig claims, is used, when 
required, in relation to Community law and involves the 
courts adopting a “priority rule that legislation will not 
                                                            
141 ibid. .  
142 ibid. ,  at p.108.  
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be read to allow an interference with important rights 
unless this has expressly, or by necessary implica tion, 
been sanctioned by Parliament” :143 it does not, in 
principle, entail, any more than the other 
‘techniques’,144 the denudation of the sovereignty  
doctrine’s substantive content .  Indeed, Parliament, 
when legislating, is conscious of the existence of the 
presumptions , methods and ‘techniques’  which it itself 
has played a critical role in cultivating and which are  
utilised by the courts to interpret its legislation , and 
thus structures, phrases and presents laws accordingly 
in order to achieve the desired results without, in the 
process, suffering a diminution of its sovereign power . 
Evidently, as already noted, this is conditional upon the 
important reservation that the first and foremost aim of 
the process as a whole remains the discovery and 
application of the sovereign Parliament’s genuine 
intention. However, as will be seen in the following 
discussion, it is doubtful whether the said caveat is met 
in respect of this so-called ‘statutory construction’ 
                                                            
143 ibid. .  See also: Craig, 1991.  
144 Apart from Craig’s ‘ f inal approach’,  of course, that involves 
the invalidation of statutes for incompatibility with higher 
constitutional values or fundamental rights.   
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reading of Factortame  heralded by, inter alios ,  Craig 
and Allan.   
Lastly, Craig’s thesis is not only false as a  matter of 
legal fact but also allows claims for the wholesale 
abandonment of orthodox theory ,  like Allan’s,  to be 
voiced in the following terms:  
When theories embody only formal veneers 
they should be ditched in favour of 
alternatives that better reflect the realities 
of the legal and constitutional landscape. 145 
Allan has correctly rejected Wade’s ‘constitutional 
revolution’ thesis and, instead, treats  the issue at hand 
as:  
a matter of construction:  the later Act was 
interpreted in the light of what may, quite 
reasonably, be understood as a continuing 
legislative intention to avoid conflicts 
between English and Community law. 146  
                                                            
145 Allan, 2003a, at pp.582-583. 
146 Allan, 2003b, at p.228 [ reference omitted].  
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Despite these insightful remarks however , his position 
is deficient in at least two interrelated respects.   
For one, notwithstanding their striking resemblance at 
first glance, the Cambridge philosopher’s ‘statutory 
construction’ theory  differs substantially from the 
understanding of Community law herein proposed – and 
is, therefore, it is submitted, misguided – with respect 
to the underlying reasons  for which domestic provisions, 
in a case like Factortame , are construed the way they 
are.  
Indeed, unlike the reading of Factortame  espoused here,  
in Allan’s constructivist theory, no role whatsoever is 
reserved for Parliament’s intention. After all, for anti -
sovereignty scholars like Allan, owing to the ostensible 
“conceptual difficulties inherent in attributing specific 
intentions to a composite legislative body”,147 the 
intention of Parliament “is necessarily a constructive 
one”148 and appeals to it “can decide nothing.” 149    
                                                            
147 Allan, 2011, at p.162.  
148 Allan, 1997, at p.31.  
149 ibid. ,  at p.30.  
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More specifically, according to the constructivist 
approach, their Lordships construed the MSA 1988 as 
not having the effect of repealing, partially or 
otherwise, the ECA 1972 in view not of Parliament’s 
genuine ‘specific’ and  ‘meta’ intention to that effect, as 
was actually the case, but rather of a prima facie  
presumption that Parliament does not intend to 
abrogate the continuing validity and applicability of 
Community pronouncements in domestic law, to which 
the courts accord “special moral force”, 150 which can be 
overridden only by the use of express words and which 
“stems from the important political role which United 
Kingdom membership of the Community has come to 
assume.”151 According to this interpretation of 
Factortame  – a statutory construction approach only in 
name for, as Craig admits, it entails “in effect … a 
priority rule, rather than a rule of construction” –152 the 
courts, largely at their own volition, make the decision 
whether to uphold, judge inapplicable or even invalidate 
the sovereign Parliament’s edicts based on their 
“perception of the political community ... and political 
                                                            
150 Allan, 1994, at p.279.  
151 ibid. .  
152 Craig, 2001, at p.164.  
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principle, which must itself respond to the realities of 
practical politics.”153 For good measure, according to 
this line of argument,  as Craig notes,  “[t]he reaction of 
our national courts to … [the] unlikely eventuality [of a 
domestic law intentionally derogating from the 
country’s EU obligations] remains to be seen.” 154 In the 
even more explicit language of Allan,  if the day should 
ever come when the courts consider  that “secession 
[from the Community has] recede[d] as a practical 
option”155 they may “give unconditional allegiance to the 
Community … as a superior source of law…” 156 by no 
longer being “careful to preserve the authority of 
Parliament to legislate (if [allegedly] by appropriate 
language) in contravention of Community law…” 157   
But this, evidently, cannot be right. On one hand, it 
was not necessary for the judiciary to proceed to erect  
such an artificial presumption, for Parliament clearly 
                                                            
153 Allan, 1994, at p.279.  
154 Craig, 2011, at p.120.  
155 Allan, 1994, at p.279.  
156 Allan, 1997, at p.446.  
157 Allan, 1994, at p.279.  
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did not intend its MSA 1988 to have the effect of 
overriding Community obligations or repealing the ECA 
1972 whilst, on the other, even if it were otherwise, 
statutory presumptions do not stem from the judges’ 
opinions of political principle . Indeed, “Parliament does 
not legislate in a vacuum” –158 as Allan habitually 
proposes by reciting from Lord Steyn – but the 
background that fills this vacuum is created from the 
whole corpus of the legal system’s officials ,  the guide, 
orchestrator and proprietor of the last word of which 
belongs to Parliament that constructs legislative 
presumptions and authorises the construction of, or 
does not abrogate, legislative presumptions which the 
judiciary has created and which, in its opinion, are, for 
the time being, consonant with the spirit , and conducive 
to the smooth passage of , its legislative agenda. As Lord 
Oliver impeccably proposed for instance, any legislative 
presumption that might exist in the UK with regards to 
a post-dating domestic statute that appears to be in 
conflict with antecedent Community pronouncements 
has its roots in “the manifest purpose of the legislation, 
[in] … its history, and [in] …  the compulsive provision 
of section 2(4)…”159 ECA.  
                                                            
158 Ex Parte Pierson  [1998] AC 539, 573, 587 . 
159 [1989] AC 66, 128.  
  
 
120 
 
Secondly, Allan joins the long list of scholars that have 
wrongly conceived of Factortame  as constitutionally 
extraordinary and hence have academically responded 
to it accordingly. Indeed, in his work, Factortame  is 
considered a ‘hard case’ in the Dworkinian sense  that 
“no settled rule dictate[d] a decision either way  … [and 
hence] a proper decision could be [and was] generated 
by either policy or principle.” 160 This ‘proper decision’, 
says Allan, entailed an acknowledgement of 
“Parliament’s capacity to impose limited restrictions on 
its successors…”161  
Thus, Wade’s ‘constitutional revolution’ thesis is 
rejected not because Factortame  admitted to only one 
legal solution consonant to orthodoxy which the court 
proceeded to adopt as herein argued. Rather, it is 
dimissed because the impediment of the unlimited legal 
power of Parliament’s successors that professedly took 
place and appears to the “detached observer”162 that 
commits a Hartian “formalistic error” 163 as a 
                                                            
160 Dworkin, 1997, at p.108.  
161 Allan, 2003b, at p.228.  
162 Allan, 2013, at p.149.  
163 Hart, 1961, at p.149.  
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“revolutionary break with tradition” 164 is, in reality, 
from the internal perspective of what Allan terms the 
system’s “committed legal reasoner”165 (but what is, in 
reality, a caricature of an omnicompetent judge that 
seems to have rights and powers but no Razian 
exclusionary reasons for action166 such as his oath of 
allegiance or the duty to obey the Constitution and the 
laws of the Realm), “merely an adaptation and renewal 
of existing tradition … responsive to political 
developments…”167  
Put differently, a common law constitutionalism theory, 
like Allan’s,  dismisses “pre-ordained fundamental 
rule[s]”168 that guide the behaviour and decisions of 
legal systems’ officials as  altogether chimerical or, at 
best, overly “fluid … and indeterminate” 169 to be of use 
and substitutes the concept with the idea that “the 
                                                            
164 Allan, 2013, at p.146.  
165 ibid. .  
166 Raz, 1990, at pp.37-40. 
167 Allan, 1997, at p.146.  
168 Allan, 1994, at p.289.  
169 Allan, 2003b, at p.230.  
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content of law is always a question of moral or political 
principle, adapted to a specific legal context” .170 Anyone 
that thinks otherwise is considered as broadcasting an 
“invitation to abandon the study of constitutional 
law” ;171 a study which, for Allan, does not entail 
ascertaining and describing what the law is but, rather, 
involves the clearly normative quest of surmising what 
the law should be or, in Allan’s words, fabricating “an 
account of ‘political reality’”. 172,173 Hence, from the 
imperious position it occupies in this theory, the 
common law “has no need for revolutions to explain its 
continual process of assimilating change within the 
general, overarching fabric of constitutional 
principle” ;174 if the principle that Parliament cannot 
bind its successors had, or retains, any place at all in 
                                                            
170 Allan, 2011, at p.162.  
171 Allan, 2003b, at p.231.  
172 Allan, 2013, at pp.73-74. 
173 Equally,  Craig’s ‘preferred view’ of the study of 
constitutional law is “to regard decisions about supremacy as 
being based on normative arguments of legal principle the 
content of which can and will vary across time .” (Craig, 2011, 
at p.123 [emphasis in original]) .  
174 Allan, 2013, at p.149.  
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UK constitutional theory, it is not because it constitutes 
a logical, normative corollary of the principle of 
sovereignty (as is actually the case) but rather, 
allegedly, because “the common law  does not allow 
Parliament to surrender its legislative supremacy…” 175 
Thus, not only is the ability of the sovereign Parliament 
to be bound recognised but, for good measure, it is the 
courts that decide, and effectuate, such binding  (and 
unbinding) of Parliament’s successors based not on the 
sovereign Parliament’s genuine intention but rather on 
an ethereal notion of political principle that dictates 
what judicial loyalty to each statute – which, 
incidentally, is considered as being nothing more than 
“an expression of the democratic will” –176 requires. 
Indeed, says Allan, as opposed to limitations of 
Parliament’s power with regard to Community law, “it 
cannot be supposed that the … [courts have] 
acknowledge[ed] an unrestricted freedom for Parliament 
to fetter the legislative authority of subsequent 
Parliaments”177 such as to: 
                                                            
175 ibid. ,  at p.148 [emphasis added].  
176 ibid. ,  at p.146.  
177 Allan, 1997, at p.446.  
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bind its successors by requiring the approval 
of the Engineers’ Union to any future 
employment legislation; and the relevant 
legal distinction is firmly grounded on 
political principle.178 
In summary, it seems incredible that a decision such as 
Factortame  that wholly conforms to the dictates of 
orthodox theory since the sovereign Parliament’s 
genuine intention was therein dutifully upheld, could be 
given an interpretation that commences correctly with 
the proposition that the MSA 1988 was construed as not 
having the effect of impliedly repealing the ECA 1972 
but then proceeds to take the indefensible  logical leap 
that conveniently fits and reflexively assists in shaping 
what aspires to be a theory of the UK Constitution that 
not only curtails Parliament’s omnipotence by 
authorising the binding of its successors’ hands but 
additionally elevates the judiciary as the final arbiter 
of the matter. Equally paradoxical is  the fact that, in 
truth, the approach that would strip the sovereignty 
doctrine from all but its formal veneer is the alternative 
route which, Craig and Allan propose, the Factortame  
court should have followed in order to remain within 
the confines of the orthodox theory of the Constitution : 
                                                            
178 Allan, 2003b, at p.229.  
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namely, to adopt a strictly literal interpretation of the 
provisions at hand coupled with a mechanistic 
application of the implied repeal doctrine. Indeed, this 
allegedly orthodox interpretation of the MSA 1988 
would dramatically fail to give effect to Parliament’s 
intention by recklessly exposing the UK to the risk of 
an unwanted diplomatic incident with the Community 
whilst, ironically, shielding the court espousing it from 
claims that, at least in a formal sense, it transgressed 
the limits of its authority! 
If common law constitutionalists are to be convincing 
that their thesis constitutes a truly descriptive theory 
of what the UK Constitution is , as opposed to a 
normative and wishful thesis of what it should be, they 
must, it is submitted, withdraw their emphasis from 
Factortame  and attempt to locate other judicial 
decisions, if they exist,  in their thesis’s support.  
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❖  
Prior to proceeding, three additional observations are 
pertinent with respect to the ‘Community law 
supremacy’ point. Firstly, it is essential to remember 
that, albeit the Court of Appeal and House of Lords 
reached essentially the same result, some comments 
uttered in the former have a potentially objectionable 
flavour. Characteristically, it is arguable that Bingham 
LJ went too far with his suggestion that:  
[a]ny rule of domestic law which prevented a 
court from … giving effect to directly 
enforceable rights established in Community 
law would be bad. To that extent a United 
Kingdom statute is no longer inviolable as it 
once was.179 
Indeed, for one, Bingham LJ, with respect, appears to 
be putting the cart before the horse by suggesting that 
any rule of domestic law preventing the application of 
Community law is ‘bad’. In truth, under the present 
constitutional settlement, the only type of rule that is 
‘bad’ is one that denies effect to Parliament’s intention 
                                                            
179 [1989] 2 CMLR 353, 403-404. 
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and Bingham’s conclusion is but a specific and 
ephemeral manifestation of such general truth: the 
validity, enforceability and superiority of Community 
law stems from Parliament’s sovereign will as expressed 
in 1972, 1988 and continuously thereafter  up to at least 
June 23 rd 2016.180  
Additionally, in a constitutional sense, a UK statute 
remains absolutely inviolable. The line of authority 
confirmed for the first time by the House of Lords in 
Factortame , questions not, in any way whatsoever, the 
validity  of an Act of Parliament; it merely maintains 
that particular provisions of a statute may be denied 
effect if, and then only strictly to the extent that, they 
are contrary to directly ef fective Community law.181,182 It 
                                                            
180 That is, the date of the European Union membership 
referendum. 
181 With respect, it  seems incredible that learned judges such 
as Lords Neuberger and Mance would, some 40 years after the 
enactment of the ECA, commit the mistake of confusing the 
invalidity with the inapplicability of an Act of Parliament ( R 
(HS2) v Secretary of State  [2014] 1 WLR 324, 382). Equally,  
although Lord President Hope’s submission that “[t]he position 
is different where the validity of an Act of Parliament is 
questioned on grounds other than incompatibility with 
Community law” (Murray v Rogers  1992 SLT 221, 225)  is most 
probably an oversight rather than a conscious statement of 
  
 
128 
 
is in this manner that it manages to remain within the 
confines of the orthodox reading of the Constitution. 183 
                                                                                                                                                       
principle, it is submitted than one must exert considerably 
more attention when, even in the margins of a case, discussing 
matters as constitutionally important as the effect of 
Community pronouncements on the validity of Acts of 
Parliament.  
182 See also:  R v Secretary of State Ex Parte EOC  [1994] 2 WLR 
409. C.f.  the Community perspective on the matter: [1978] 3 
CMLR 263, 283.  
183 The contention that Community law pertains in the UK by 
virtue of Community law itself rather than by virtue of 
domestic statute requires a parenthetic answer.  
An ever-growing anthology created by Community judicial  
organs enclaves this line of argument ([1963] ECR 1 ; [1964] 
ECR 585; [1978] 3 CMLR 263; Case 249/85, Albako v BALM  
[1987] ECR 2345; Cases C-97/87, 98/87 and 99/87, Dow 
Chemical v Commission  [1989] ECR 3165; Opinion 1/91 ,  
[1991] ECR I-6079; Opinion 1/92 ,  [1992] ECR I-2821; Case C-
285/98, Kreil v Deutschland  [2000] ECR I-69; Case C-87/02, 
Commission v Italy  [2005] Env LR 3).  
However, the only time it was advanced in a UK court 
(Thoburn v SCC  [2003] QB 151, 182),  it  was categorically 
rejected ( ibid. ,  189) and rightly so:  as has always been clear to 
orthodox scholars and as confirmed last year in the wake of 
the European Union membership referendum of June 23 r d  
2016, a novel constitutional arrangement did not take effect in 
the wake of the UK’s entry to the Community; Parliament 
retains the absolute legislative initiative within the UK. It 
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may effectuate a termination of the country’s Community 
membership expressly; it may do the same by implication; it  
may even, if it so wishes and effectively communicates its 
intention, disregard or legislate directly contrary to particular 
Community laws or ECJ rulings and retain Community 
membership (see: European Communities Bill 1979; Food 
Supplements (European Communities Act 1972 Disaplication) 
Bill 2005; House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 
2010, at pp.28-29). Surely, such course of action would result 
in the Commission bringing infringement proceedings before 
the ECJ against the UK under Art.258 TFEU. Penalties would, 
thereafter, be imposed and/or lump sum payments ordered to 
be paid if the UK failed to repeal the offending provisions and 
take the necessary measures to comply with the ECJ ruling. 
Should the UK’s non -compliance wilfully endure, two things 
can be stated with certainty. Firstly, neither any further 
action nor any mechanism to compel Member States to pay 
fines is contemplated by the Community Treati es. Secondly, 
whatever may be the course of action that the Community 
chooses to pursue it will not derogate from the fact that the 
offending domestic statute will  be valid,  insofar as UK law is 
concerned, and enforceable by UK courts so long as Parliament  
wishes it to be so. Any conceivable disputes between the UK 
and the Community will not touch upon the domestic 
constitutional arrangement or Parliament’s sovereignty, but 
will necessarily be restricted to the international and 
Community politico -legal plane. 
In tandem with Laws LJ in Thoburn  (see also: European Union 
Act 2011, s.18; [2014] 1 WLR 324, 349), the spirit with which 
the national judges in other Member States have dealt with 
similar claims has been overwhelmingly and unequivocally 
negative. Indeed, with some marked, but elusive, ex ceptions 
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such as the Kingdom of Belgium (Minister v Le Ski  [1972] 
CMLR 330; Henri Orfinger v Belgium  [2000] 1 CMLR 612; c.f.  
Case 12/94, Schola Europaea v Hermans-Jacobs  108 ILR 642),  
the highest judicial authorities of the remaining Member 
States, from the Bundesverfassungsgericht  in Germany (Case 2 
BvL 52/71, Solange I  [1974] 2 CMLR 540, 550; Case 2 BvR 
197/83, Solange II  [1987] 3 CMLR 225, 263, 265; Cases 2 BvR 
2134/92 & 2159/92, Brunner v EU Treaty  [1994] 1 CMLR 57, 
81, 89; Case 2 BvE 2/08, Gauweiler v Treaty of Lisbon  (2009) 
BVerfG 123, 267; see also: Weiler, 1995), the Cour de 
Cassation  and Conseil Constitutionnel  in France (Douanes v 
Cafes Jacques Vabre  [1975] 2 CMLR 336, 341; Decision 92 -308 
DC, Maastricht I  [1993] 3 CMLR 345; Decision 92 -312 DC, 
Maastricht II  (1992) 98 ILR 180; Decision 2004-496 DC, Re 
Law on Data Protection in the Digital Economy ,  JORF ,  22, 
11182, at considérant  7; Decision 2006-540 DC, Re Law on 
Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society ,  
JORF ,  178, 11541, at considérant  28),  the Italian Corte 
Costituzionale  (Sentenza 183/73, Frontini v Ministero  [1974] 2 
CMLR 372, 389; Sentenza 170/84, Granital (SpA) v 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato  [1984] 4 CMLR 756; 
Sentenze 348/2007 & 349/2007, Re Compensation for Seizure  of 
Property ,  2007; see also: Laderchi, 1998) and the Tribunal 
Constitucional  of Spain (Declaración 1/2004 of December 13 t h  
2004 ,  BOE ,  No.3 of January 4 t h  2005, at 5) , to the Danish 
Højesteret  (Carlsen v Rasmussen  [1999] 3 CMLR 854, 857-858, 
861-862) and the Respublikos Konstitucinis Teismas  of 
Lithuania (Ruling No.17/02-24/02-06/03-22/04 of March 14 t h  
2006, On the limitation of the rights of ownership in areas of 
particular value and in forest land ,  at para.9(4)) have 
unswervingly followed the route of the UK in their rejection of 
the Costa /Simmenthal  understanding of the nature of 
Community law.  
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Making sense of this doctrinal rift between the ECJ and 
national courts has perplexed scholars for decades (see e.g. :  
Schilling, 1996; Weiler and Haltern, 1996; Hartley, 2001; 
Craig, 2003b).  More likely than not however, a correct answer 
does not (as yet) exist: from a legal scientific perspective, both 
Community and national viewpoints are equally justified.  
Indeed, as MacCormick has suggested, from a legal or 
constitutional pluralist standpoint the idea of distinct,  
independent normative systems coexisting is certainly not 
inconceivable (see e.g. :  MacCormick, 1995; MacCormick, 1999,  
Chapter 7) whilst neo-Hartian theory does not preclude the 
existence of overlapping, partially inconsistent rules of 
recognition (see e.g. :  Raz, 1971, at p.810), at least for brief 
constitutional moments. Thus, currently choosing between the 
two, as Kelsen would have noted, can “be made only on  the 
basis of non-scientific,  political considerations” (Kelsen, 1967, 
at p.346).  
Anyhow, whatever may be the ultimate answer, it  is strictly 
irrelevant for the purposes of UK law. As a matter of UK law, 
it is beyond question that Community provisions app ly and 
take priority due to Parliament’s sovereign will  as expressed 
in the ECA. Even if the day comes when the opposite position 
is, in practice, applied on UK soil,  it will be as a result of 
either “overwhelming force or overwhelming acceptance” 
(Hartley, 2001, at p.231). In the former case, the 
Costa /Simmenthal  principle will  have been imposed upon the 
British people by external agents. This will have entailed, 
necessarily, the subjugation of the present UK constitutional 
arrangement. In the latter case,  the principle will have been 
imposed by internal agents acting in an illegal, i l legitimate 
and extra-constitutional manner; otherwise stated, by agents 
not acting in the capacity assigned and bestowed upon them by 
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Finally, it is imperative to make clear that the full 
range of constitutional authorities with respect to the 
doctrine of implied repeal were not addressed in 
Factortame .  The lack of elaboration on the issue is 
particularly unfortunate184 since the very foundation of 
the decision – namely, the court ’s ability to disapply 
Acts of Parliament – as well as, in turn, the major 
source of confusion that has led so many prominent 
theorists to misapprehend it, lies with a proper 
understanding of the rationale and reach of the 
orthodox doctrine of  implied repeal to which this 
present thesis now turns.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
the present constitutional arrangement. In other words, the 
principle cannot be brought about within the confines of the 
present UK constitutional arrangement. It follows, therefore, 
that as far as UK law is concerned, Community provisions do 
not, and cannot conceivably, take effect in the UK by any other 
modus  than UK law itself.  
184 See also: Elliott,  2003, at p.25; Allan, 1997, at p.448.  
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Chapter III: The doctrine of 
implied repeal  
 
The idea that subsequent laws abrogate contrary earlier 
ones originates in Roman law; ‘ lex posterior derogat 
priori ’ .185 The concept has also found a firm place in UK 
constitutional law and practice in the form of what has 
become known as the implied repeal doctrine . This 
doctrine appears to provide that the mere existence of a 
more recent Act constitutes, even in the absence of an 
express imperative towards that direction, a repeal, by 
implication, of any previous contrary law, be it a mere 
byelaw, an Order in Council, or even an Act of 
Parliament. Despite the nebulous lineage between the 
two, few have attempted to question the orthodoxy of 
the aphoristic maxim’s transmogrification into UK law.  
However, as seen above, with respect to certain 
enactments such as the one enabling UK membership of 
the EC in 1972, the judiciary has been seen as reluctant 
to make use of this ostensible  doctrine. In light of the 
                                                            
185 See: Mackeldey, 1883, at p.3.  
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above therefore, any attempt – as the one hereby made 
–  to explain UK membership of the EC with traditional 
constitutional terms must confront the inconsistency 
which emerges by the apparent non-application, in 
several instances with respect to the ECA, of a 
constitutional doctrine hitherto considered orthodox, 
necessary and absolute.  
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Theoretical underpinnings and 
precedent 
 
To that end, it is useful firstly to present the 
conventional thesis in favour of the doctrine’s 
applicability in UK law.  
“[I]t is a maxime in the law of the parliament, quod 
leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant ”,186 Coke 
makes clear in his Fourth Institute. 187 In similar vein, 
Blackstone submits that:  
[W]here words are clearly repugnant  in two 
laws, the later law takes place of the elder: 
leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant  
is a maxim of universal law, as well as of our 
own constitutions. And accordingly it was 
laid down by a law of the twelve tables at 
                                                            
186 4 Co Inst ,  43. 
187 See also: Dr Foster ’s Case  (1614) 11 Co Rep 56b, 59a.  
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Rome, quod populus postremum jussit, id jus 
ratum esto.188,189,190 
In terms of judicial precedent, two cases, decided less 
than three years apart and both concerned with the 
combined effect of s.7(1) of the Acquisition of Land 
(Assessment and Compensation) Act 1919 and s.46 of 
the Housing Act 1925, are invariably and almost 
exclusively adduced in support of  the so-called doctrine; 
the Vauxhall Estates191 and Ellen Street Estates192 cases. 
Indeed, in the former of such cases, “the question … to 
be considered”,193 according to Avory J, was:  
                                                            
188 [What the populous has last enacted, let that be the s ettled 
law]. 
189 In an allusion to the principle’s Roman law origins, 
Blackstone’s closing remark in Latin is a paraphrasis of Titus 
Livius’s words: Livius, 1886 [26 BC], Lib.VII,  Cap.17, 12 -13. 
See also:  ibid. ,  Lib.IX, Cap.34, 6 -8. 
190 Blackstone, 1765, at p.59 [emphasis in original].  
191 Vauxhall Estates,  Limited v Liverpool Corporation  [1932] 1 
KB 733. 
192 Ellen Street Estates, Limited v Minister of Health  [1934] 1 
KB 590. 
193 [1932] 1 KB 733, 743.  
  
 
137 
 
whether the provisions of s.46 of the Housing 
Act, 1925 … are not so incons istent with the 
provisions of the Act of 1919 that the two 
Acts cannot stand together; because, if they 
are inconsistent to that extent, then the 
earlier Act is impliedly repealed by the later 
in accordance with the maxim ‘Leges 
posteriores priores contrar ias abrogant.’194 
Humphreys J, for his part, approvingly referred to the 
principle “which lays down that where two inconsistent 
provisions are found in two Acts of Parliament … the 
later provision shall prevail and shall be deemed 
impliedly to repeal the ear lier provision”195 as an 
“ordinary rule of construction”. 196  
Above and beyond academic and judicial support for the 
doctrine however, lies an even more fundamental 
defence of the sagacity of its applicability in UK law. 
Such defence revolves around the contention that the 
doctrine of implied repeal flows logico -rationally from, 
and constitutes a necessary pre-condition for the 
                                                            
194 ibid . ,  743-744. 
195 ibid . ,  745. 
196 ibid . .  
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continued validity, operation and systemic consistency 
of the broader scheme underlying, the cornerstone 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty; not only do the 
two co-abide as a matter of fact within the UK 
Constitution, but, a fortiori , the latter could not , even 
conceivably, exist without the comprehensive and 
unqualified operation of the former. For instance, 
Barber argues that:  
when there is conflict between an older and a 
newer statute, the resolution of this conflict 
must give legal force to the newer 
statute…197  
Similarly, Young suggests that:  
[t]he doctrine of implied repeal … is a legal 
rule that would be found to be a component 
of the rule of recognition in any  system that 
adhered to Dicey’s conception of 
sovereignty.198  
                                                            
197 Barber, 2011, at p.145 [emphasis added].  
198 Young, 2011, at p.166 [emphasis added].  See also: 
MacCormick, 1998-1999, at p.31.  
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In other words, the largely incontrovertible proposition 
is advanced that Parliament’s role as the ultimate, 
sovereign law-making authority of the Constitution is 
axiomatically predicated upon, inter alia , the 
continuous and unconditional bestowal of validity and 
legal force upon its enactments. Depriving Parliament 
of the privilege of enacting legislation would be 
tantamount, ex necessitate , to an automatic 
abridgement of its sovereignty. In this light, the role of 
the implied repeal doctrine can be understood: it 
operates to secure the perpetuity of Parliament’s law -
making prerogative by dictating that it may enact ‘any 
law whatever’ and that such law will be held to be fully 
effective, even if  the price to be paid for so holding 
includes the sacrifice of previous laws by adjudging 
them as having been impliedly repealed.  
The body of evidence in favour of the proposition that 
the doctrine of implied repeal const itutes an essential 
component of the UK Constitution, as presented above, 
may not be voluminous, but it is, undoubtedly, 
exceptionally pervasive. Its deconstruction, therefore, 
constitutes a perilous and unprecedented task but one 
that is necessary in order to defend the proposition that 
UK membership of the EC does not alter the 
foundational principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.  
Commencing from the extracts adduced above that 
attest the doctrine’s primeval origin, the careful reader 
may at once descry that its application in Roman law 
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was justified in popular sovereignty terms: 199 ‘what the 
populus  has last enacted, let that be the settled law’. In 
other words, the latest enactment is held as having 
repealed all previous contrary enactments because it 
represents the people’s current will. Thus, the 
attempted importation into the UK of a doctrine that 
was formed within, and premissed upon the 
fundamental principles of, the Roman Republic, 
prematurely encounters an elementary obstacle: the UK 
Constitution is not founded on the principle of popular 
sovereignty. Admittedly, the Constitution owes its 
diachronic approval and support to the fact that it has 
been able, throughout the years, reflexively to embody 
and exhibit publicly prevalent principles and modes of 
governance, one of which has, as of late, been popular 
sovereignty. This cannot blind one, however, from 
appreciating that the foundational principle of the 
Constitution is Parliament’s supremacy and that 
popular sovereignty, or even democracy itself, are 
nothing but modern, ephemeral exhibitions of a flexible 
unwritten constitutional settlement which are not 
constitutionally  essential for its existence even if they 
                                                            
199 This must not be confused with the equally true statement 
that the Roman Republic was not democratic as one would 
understand the normative adjective today.  
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may well be, politically , deeply entrenched.200 A 
different, updated rationale for justifying its 
application in UK law must therefore be sought. 201  
Useful insights in the quest for finding such a rationale 
may be drawn from the United States in which a 
similarly paradoxical phenomenon appears to be in 
play, albeit in reverse. More specifically, it would only 
be logical to expect to find manifestations of the 
doctrine, in its archetypical form, in jurisdictions such 
as the US, the Constitution of which strictly adheres to 
the popular sovereignty principle.  
Strangely however, the briefest of encounters with US 
law is sufficient to reveal that that is far from the case. 
Indeed, US courts vigilantly abide by a ‘presumption 
against  implied repeals’202 which Black explains thus:  
                                                            
200 See: Bogdanor, 1997, at p.15.  
201 A supplementary rationale for the Roman law maxim is 
provided by Mackeldey and revolves around an alleged need 
for legislative updating on account of the fact that “the law of 
the state is developed only gradually” (Mackeldey, 1883, at 
p.3).   
202 See e.g. :  Supreme Court:  Wood v United States  (1842) 41 US 
342, 362-363. State courts:  SYA v Lucky Stores  (1998) 17 Cal 
4th 553, 569.  
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Repeals by implication are not favored. A 
statute will not be construed as repealing 
prior acts on the same subject  …  unless 
there is an irreconcilable repugnancy 
between them, or unless the new law is 
evidently intended to supersede all prior acts 
on the matter in hand…203 
For good measure, the presumption is an exceptionally 
strong one; so strong that Dwarris’s treatise justifiably 
goes as far as to suggest that:  
[t]he leaning of the courts is so strong 
against repealing the positive provisions of a 
former statute by construction, as almost to 
establish the doctrine of ‘no repeal by 
implication.’204  
                                                            
203 Black, 2008 [1896], at p.112.  
204 Dwarris, 1875, at p.154. Equally fo rcefully, Petroski 
maintains that:  
[i]n recent decades, the presumption against 
implied repeals,  as used by the [US] Supreme 
Court,  seems to have evolved into a virtual rule 
against implied repeals… Some justices on the 
Court … now appear to use this phrase as a purely 
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Even more surprising, however, is the fact that the 
presumption against implied repeals is thought to have 
as its intellectual progenitor the same individual that is 
accredited with embedding the ostensibly diametrically 
opposite doctrine of implied repeal deeply within the 
UK constitutional tradition: Sir Edward Coke! This 
paradoxical realisation allows for a sincere, detached 
evaluation of the various authorities’ opinions on the 
matter. 
To be fair, Coke does, as already noted, approvingly 
mention the ‘leges posteriores ’  maxim on several 
occasions. In Foster’s Case , however, he proceeds in 
making emphatic that although the contrariety between 
two statutes requisite for the implied repeal doctrine to 
come into play may be either ‘in quality’ or ‘in matter’ 
and can therefore take multiple forms: 205  
it must be known, that forasmuch as Acts of 
Parliaments are established with such 
gravity, wisdom and universal consent of the 
whole realm, for the advancement of the 
commonwealth, they ought not by any 
constrained construction out of the general 
                                                                                                                                                       
pejorative term for a result that is by definition 
undesirable!  
(Petroski, 2004, at pp.511-512 [reference omitted]).  
205 “[C]ontrarium est multiplex ”:  11 Co Rep 56b, 62b.  
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and ambiguous words of a subsequent Act, to 
be abrogated: sed hujusmodi statuta tanta 
solennitate et prudentia edita 206 … ought to 
be maintained and supported with a benign 
and favourable construction…207  
To elaborate, Coke appears to be advocating that, in 
view of Parliament’s institutional position, courts are 
bound to allow for a marge d'appréciation  when, in the 
ordinary course of interpreting statutes, they are called 
upon to decree the existence, or otherwise, of a 
contradiction. This proposition shrouds both 
conservative as well as venturesome undertones insofar  
as the judiciary is concerned;  conservative with respect 
to the deference which judges are advised to show vis-à-
vis Parliament and its ‘wise’ judgement, both current 
and previous, and venturesome to the extent that the 
courts are encouraged to engage in an active 
reconciliation of statutes. 
What is most important, however, is that Coke is 
clearly implying more than what the traditional implied 
                                                            
206 [And indeed bills passed into law with such solemnity and 
foresight].  
207 11 Co Rep 56b, 63a [references omitted].   
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repeal doctrine literature would have him. In truth, 
Coke eludes the rigid edifices of formalism and daringly 
suggests that the determination of the existence, or 
otherwise, of a contradiction between statutes, far from 
being discrete from the interpretation process, is, and 
must be understood as being, an integral part of it: 208 a 
construction which is ‘benign’ or ‘favourable’ may 
achieve to maintain two apparently contradictory 
statutes in place, whereas a ‘constrained’ construction 
will lead to the unfortunate abrogation of the one that 
happened to be enacted earlier. Coupled with the above, 
the inclusion, twice, of the modal ‘ought’ in the 
aforecited section of Coke’s report, synthesises – what 
US authorities understand, not without foundation, as 
being – a powerful and authoritative argument in 
favour of a presumption against implied repeals.  
                                                            
208 Interestingly, Allan seems to side with Coke on the matter 
when castigating the “artificial division between 
interpretation and application” [Allan, 1994, at p.280] of 
statutes. However, for Allan the thread that necessarily unites 
statutory interpretation and application or repeal is not the 
quest for discovering and honouring Parliament’s genuine 
intention but rather, as seen earlier, the ostensibly all -
powerful judiciary’s sensitivity to “political change ” [ibid. ].  
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Blackstone, for his part, certifies that “ leges posteriores 
priores contrarias abrogant”209 but proceeds to state 
that:  
this is to be understood, only when the latter 
statute is couched in negative terms, or by 
it ’s [sic] matter necessarily implies a 
negative.210  
Holistically, therefore, and in light of the above, i t 
appears that the venerable jurist after all endorses a 
strictly circumscribed incarnation of the doctrine; one 
that comes into play only when the contradiction 
between two statutes is so pervasive that it is actually 
impossible  for them to stand together and necessarily  
one has to repeal the other, in which case it is the 
latter in time that will prevail. Said differently, if a 
plausible construction that enables two statutes to both 
remain in force exists, it must, according to Blackstone, 
be preferred.  
Several, especially older, legal treatises tread on 
equivalent routes. Indeed, Burn is explicit that:  
                                                            
209 Blackstone, 1765, at p.89.  
210 ibid. .  
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[t]he law does not favour a repeal by 
implication, nor is it to be allowed unless the 
repugnancy be quite plain… 211 
Furthermore, in Broom’s collection of legal maxims it is 
suggested that although it is “an elementary and 
necessary rule”212 that ‘lex posterior derogate priori ’ ,  
this is only the case:  
provided the intention of the legislature to 
repeal the previous statute be expressed in 
clear and unambiguous language, and be not 
merely left to be inferred from the 
subsequent statute. For a more ancient 
statute will not be repealed by a more 
modern one, unless the later expressly 
negative the former, or unless the provisions 
of the two statutes are manifestly  
repugnant…213 
Moreover, in ‘The Grounds and Rudiments of Law and 
Equity’, the maxim ‘ leges posteriores ’  is presented as a 
                                                            
211 Burn, 1837, at p.873.  
212 Broom, 1874, at p.27.  
213 ibid .  [reference omitted].  
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veritable ‘principle of law’ but an important reservation 
is added: 
This rule must be understood only to extend 
to such prior laws, as are by these subsequent 
laws intended to be abrogated or taken away, 
or where the former law is repugnant to the 
new one…214 
Even more forcefully, Viner’s Abridgement provides 
that: 
[i]t is a rule that leges* posteriores abrogant  
priores ;  but though this holds in thesi, yet it 
does not hold in hypothesi, if the last act be 
not contradictory or contrary to the former; 
but if it be only so far differing or 
disagreeing that by any other construction 
they may both stand together, it is 
otherwise…215 
Significantly, the footnote (*) appended, reads:  
                                                            
214 A Gentleman of the Middle Temple, 2009 [1749], at p.190 
[emphasis in original].  
215 Viner, 1793, at p.525.  
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This is a true rule, but repeals by 
implication  are things disfavoured by law ,  
never allowed of but where the inconsistency 
and repugnancy are plain and 
unavoidable…216 
                                                            
216 ibid .  [emphasis in original].  Similarly, Hardcastle suggests 
that:   
[t]he Court must be satisfied that the two 
enactments are inconsistent before they [sic ] can, 
from the language of the later, imply the repeal of 
an express prior enactment –  i.e. ,  the repeal must, 
if  not express,  flow from necessary implication… 
To determine whether a later statute repeals by 
implication an earlier, it  is necessary to scrutinise 
the terms and consider the true meaning and 
effect of the earlier Act. Until this is done, it is 
impossible to ascertain whether any inconsistency 
exists between the two enactments.  
It must … always be a question for the Court to 
decide whether … [the ‘ lex posterior ’  principle] is 
applicable or not, and in coming to a decision on 
this point repeal by implication is never to be 
favoured. 
(Hardcastle,  1892, at pp.346, 353 [references omitted]).  
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Incredibly, solid support for this alternative concept ion 
may also be found in Roman law itself. Indeed, the 
Justinian Digest can hardly be misunderstood when 
dictating that “[s]ed et posteriores leges ad priores 
pertinent, nisi contrariae sint, idque multis argumentis 
probatur .”217  
In short, the deeper one peruses the academic literature 
the more it becomes evident how long a way he has 
come from the traditionalist doctrine initially presented 
with confidence. The strict, mechanical application of 
the bright line rule of implied repeal quickly transforms 
itself into a deeper inquiry into whether two 
enactments can be reconciled, or, even better, into a 
foundational search of Parliament’s genuine intention 
through its multifarious manifestations in consecutive 
Acts. The matter is, evidently, far from settled however; 
whether the same realisation also stems from a 
comprehensive study of judicial opinion on the matter 
has yet to be answered. Indeed, the decisions in 
Vauxhall Estates  and Ellen Street Estates  cited earlier 
are particularly unpromising vis-à-vis  the attempted 
doctrinal revision cause.  
                                                            
217 [But later laws also refer to earlier ones, unless they 
contradict them; there are many proofs of this]:  Dig 1.3.28.  
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But there also exists another line of cases, even if its 
thread is overwhelmingly difficult to follow as a result 
of its near-complete absence from relevant modern UK 
literature. Indeed, for instance, in an 1875 Scottish 
case, Moncreiff LJC is reported as saying that:  
[i]n the first place, the repeal of one statute 
by another subsequently passed by mere 
implication is not easily to be presumed; and 
secondly, before such repeal can be inferred 
by implication, repugnancy between the 
provisions of the two statutes must be 
proved…218 
Firstly, it is imperative to note that Lord Moncreiff’s 
proposition exhibits a fairly negative judicial 
disposition towards the doctrine of implied repeal. Such 
disposition is, indeed, much less solicitous and 
receptive than is conventionally portrayed as being the 
norm, but is also reflected in several other instances. 
For instance, in Great Western Railway ,219 Lord 
Bramwell argues that “[w]e ought not to hold a 
sufficient Act repealed, not expressly as it might have 
                                                            
218 Bain v Mackay  (1875) 2 R (J) 32, 36.  
219 GWR v Swindon and Cheltenham Ry  (1884) 9 App Cas 787.  
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been, but by implication, without some strong reason” 220 
whilst in Re Chance ,221 Farwell J is even more explicit 
insofar as he considers courts as being under a “duty”222 
to prefer interpretations that allow allegedly 
contradictory enactments to stand together, should they  
exist. 
Secondly, Lord Moncreiff correctly suggests that a 
contradiction between the two allegedly incompatible 
statutes must be proven. To put it differently, as 
subsequent cases have,223 this means that, unlike the 
position with respect to express repeals,  the burden of 
proof rests with the party claiming that a repeal by 
implication has taken place.  
The idea that a subsequent statute will not be 
considered as repealing a previous one unless the two 
                                                            
220 ibid . ,  809. 
221 [1936] Ch 266.  
222 ibid . ,  270. 
223 See: Lybbe v Hart  (1885) 29 Ch D 8, 15.  
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can not  be reconciled finds further support in Great 
Central Gas224 wherein Pollock CB maintains that:  
Looking at the 19 th section of the … 
[subsequent Act], we think it is impossible to 
read it otherwise  than as repealing the 24 th 
section of the … [previous Act]. 225 
Similarly, Smith J suggests that the test is whether 
“the provisions of a later Act are so inconsistent with, 
or repugnant to, the provisions of an earlier Act that 
the two cannot stand together” 226 whilst, in a different 
case,227 elaborates further that the “two Acts … [must 
be] so plainly repugnant to each other, that effect 
cannot be given to both at the same time” 228 and that 
there must be “a necessary inconsistency in the two 
Acts standing together.”229 For Grantham J, the two 
                                                            
224 The Great Central Gas Consumers Company v Clarke  (1863) 
13 CBNS 838.  
225 ibid . ,  840 [emphasis added].  
226 Churchwardens v Fourth City  [1892] 1 QB 654, 658.  
227 Kutner v Phillips  [1891] 2 QB 267.  
228 ibid. ,  272. 
229 ibid . .  
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Acts must be “absolutely inconsistent” 230 whilst for Dr 
Lushington in The ‘India’231 they have to be:  
wholly incompatible … or … the two statutes 
together … [have to] lead to wholly absurd 
consequences, or … the entire subject matter 
… [has to be] taken away by the subsequent 
statute.232  
Furthermore, dicta  from the Conservators  case233 
suggest that the court before deciding that a subsequent 
statute has repealed a previous one by implication must 
be satisfied that “it is a necessary implication” 234 or, as 
suggested in Hill v Hall ,235 that “a repugnancy clearly 
exists between”236 the two statutes or, yet again, in the 
words of Grove J in the same case, that “the 
                                                            
230 ibid . ,  276. 
231 (1864) Br&L 221.  
232 ibid . ,  224. 
233 Conservators v Hall  (1867-68) LR 3 CP 415.  
234 ibid . ,  421. 
235 (1875-76) LR 1 Ex D 411.  
236 ibid . ,  415. 
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inconsistency … [is] so great that they cannot both be to 
their full extent obeyed.”237 Importantly, according to 
Lord Roskill, courts are even more reluctant before 
reaching such a decision of repeal by implication when 
dealing with modern statutes because “[u]ntil 
comparatively late in the last century statutes were not 
drafted with the same skill as today.”238 
Therefore, statutes do not repeal one another by 
implication unless:  
 
{ 
(a) it is impossible to interpret them in a 
harmonious, intelligible manner  
OR 
(b) from the range of interpretations made 
available by the statutory text, and/or the 
legislative background of the apparently 
conflicting enactments, and/or the state of 
the law in general, and/or the justice of the 
                                                            
237 ibid . ,  414. 
238 Ex Parte Jennings  [1983] RTR 1, 19.  
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case, it cannot  have been intended for both 
enactments to remain in force. 239 
                                                                                                                              
} 
 
It is noteworthy that, albeit according to the above, 
there exist occasions in which a benign interpretation 
between statutes, even if it exists, will not be preferred 
and, as a result, the earlier statute will be deemed as 
having been repealed by implication, in truth, such 
potentiality is (and courts have overwhelmingly treated 
it as being) arguably more notional than real. To 
explain, it must firstly be noted that when it is 
established that Parliament ‘cannot  have intended’ two 
enactments to both remain in force, it is extremely 
unlikely, in practice, for a consistent interpretation to 
exist between them. Thus the pool of instances in which 
the latter of the alternative conditions may become 
relevant is ab initio  very limited. Secondly, and most 
importantly, even in the unlikely event that an 
                                                            
239 Or, as Lord Blackburn put it,  “where one can see that it 
must have been intended that the two should be in conflict”:  
Garnett v Bradley  (1878) 3 App Cas 944, 966.  
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argument is raised to the effect that such an apparently 
consistent interpretation exists, the mere fact that it 
will, by definition, be so inimical to Parliament’s 
intention that even its alleged existence cannot 
overturn the conclusion that Parliament could not have 
intended both statutes to remain intact, renders it 
legally non-existent, even if grammatically or 
semantically it may appear to have some force. Thence, 
one is entitled to treat both notionally alternative 
conditions for the coming into operation of the implied 
repeal doctrine as one: namely, the case in which it is 
impossible to interpret meaningfully two statutes in a 
consistent manner. 
What amounts to such an impossibility, however?  For 
one, a court or statute deeming an event ‘impossible’ is 
always – and must  always be – interpreted as referring 
to ‘legally impossible’.240 As Chitty J in the Chancery 
Division suggests: 
that is a case of such particularity … [with 
respect to which] it would [not] be possible 
                                                            
240 Rous v An Abbot  (1449) Fitz Abr [sub nomine  Annuity 41];  
(1490) Stath Abr [sub nomine  Annuity 11] .  See also:  Lappas, 
2017 (forthcoming).  
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by any reasonable ingenuity to say that the 
two clauses could stand.241  
For Wood V-C, only on the occasion in which two Acts 
“admit of but one construction” 242 can it be said that 
such construction arises from ‘necessary implication’.  
Pollock CB, for his part,  hints at a first systematic 
answer by suggesting that the court must turn to:  
the plain words of the … [subsequent Act] … 
the general scope and object of it, and also … 
the justice of the case.243  
In other words, the inquiry is a grammatical one, an 
equitable one as well as one that attempts to locate 
                                                            
241 Pollock v Lands Improvement Company  (1888) LR 37 Ch D 
661, 666.  
242 The London and Eastern Banking Corporation  (1858) 4 K&J 
273, 286. Modern instances of the lengths to which the courts 
will go to in order to avoid adjudging a statute as having 
impliedly repealed another (and therefore illustrations of the 
modified version of the implied repeal doctrine herein 
supported) can be found in: Henry Boot v Malmaison  [2001] QB 
388, 403; Smith v Petroleum Services  [2006] 1 WLR 252, 254-
255. 
243 13 CBNS 838, 840.  
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Parliament’s intention.  Evidently, this inquisitive 
process is dynamic and singular rather than static and 
strictly tripartite. The Inhabitants  case244 provides a 
pertinent example of this exercise’s kaleidoscopic 
nature. Indeed, therein, Bayley J pointed out that:  
unless we see clearly that it was the 
intention of the Legislature to repeal the 
former Act, I think we ought not to come to 
that conclusion… Although, therefore, the 35 
G. 3, c.181, did introduce a general 
provision, still, as it does not contain any 
thing to shew that it was intended to repeal 
the 33 G. 3, c.54, I think that Act was not 
repealed.245 
Therefore, although on a literal reading of the two 
statutes, the latter could grammatically have been 
interpreted as impliedly repealing the precedent 
statute, a more benevolent interpretation that allowed 
both statutes to remain in force emanated from 
Parliament’s intention and was therefore to be 
                                                            
244 The King v The Inhabitants of Idle  (1818) 2 B&Ald 149.  
245 ibid . ,  155. 
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preferred. As marvellously explained in Williams v 
Pritchard :246 
It cannot be contended that a subsequent Act 
of Parliament will not controul the 
provisions of a prior statute, if it were 
intended to have that operation; but there 
are several cases in the books to shew, that 
where the intention of the Legislature was 
apparent, that the subsequent Act should not 
have such an operation, there, even though 
the words of such statute, taken strictly and 
grammatically, would repeal a former Act, 
the Courts of Law, judging for the benefit of 
the subject, have held, that they ought not to 
receive such a construction.247 
And even more clearly, as long ago as 1560, in a case 
wherein it was proposed, as Sir Edmund Plowden 
reports, that: 
the Judges of the law in all times past have 
so far pursued the intent of the makers of 
statutes, that they have expounded Acts 
                                                            
246 (1790) 4 TR 2.  
247 ibid . ,  3.  
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which were general in words to be but 
particular where the intent was particular… 
So that though the words are general, they 
are not to be taken generally, but are to be 
reduced to a particularity… 248 
[T]he sages of the law heretofore have 
construed statutes quite contrary to the 
letter in some appearance, and those 
statutes which comprehend all things in the 
letter, they have expounded to extend but to 
some things, and those which generally 
prohibit all people from doing such an act, 
they have interpreted to permit some people 
to do it, and those which include every 
person in the Letter they have adjudged to 
reach to some persons only, which 
expositions have always been founded upon 
the intent of the Legislature, which they 
have collected sometimes by considering the 
cause and necessity of making the Act, 
sometimes by comparing one part of the Act 
with another, and sometimes by foreign 
circumstances. So that they have ever been 
guided by the intent of the Legislature, 
                                                            
248 Stradling v Morgan  (1560) 1 Plow 199, 204.  
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which they have always taken according to 
the necessity of the matter, and according to 
that which is consonant to reason and good 
discretion.249 
Importantly, Parliamentary intention must be 
determined not only by examining the two 
relevant statutes as a whole250 but also with 
reference to their legislative background, 251 “the 
cause and necessity of the Act[s] being made”, 252 
the policy imported by either, 253 the state of the 
law when they came into operation, 254 the 
discrepancy of the manner or ‘mode’ in which they 
attempt to deal with a particular subject, 255 
                                                            
249 ibid. ,  205. 
250 Bramston v The Mayor  (1856) 6 El&Bl 246, 253. See also: 
Summers v Holborn District  [1893] 1 QB 612, 618.  
251 Henry Boot v Malmaison  [2001] QB 388, 401-403. 
252 Hawkins v Gathercole  (1855) 6 De GM&G 1, 22.  
253 Shepherd v Hodsman  (1852) 18 QBR 316, 319.  
254 Ely v Bliss  (1842) 5 Beav 574, 582; Ex Parte Pierson  [1998] 
AC 539, 573, 587.  
255 See: R v Edward Cator  (1767) 4 Burr 2026.  
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“foreign (meaning extraneous) circumstances, so 
far as they can justly be considered to throw light 
upon the subject”,256 the absurdity, inconvenience 
or momentous change potentially flowing from 
repealing the antecedent statute or keeping the 
two enactments in force,257 and bearing in mind 
‘the justice of the case’, as the presiding judge in 
the Inhabitants  case made clear258 and as Parke B 
confirmed in Phipson v Harvett .259 
                                                            
256 6 De GM&G 1, 22.  
257 Viscountess Rhondda’s Claim  [1922] 2 AC 339, 365, 368-369; 
Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation  No.6 1971 SC (HL) 85, 121; 
Nairn v University Courts  1909 SC (HL) 10, 13.  
258 When noting:  
it  may be very convenient, notwithstanding the 
effect of the 35 G. 3,  to keep the provisions of the 
33 G. 3 in force… It would … be depriving the  
members of such [friendly] societies of a material 
benefit,  if we were to hold the 35 G. 3 to be a 
virtual repeal of the provisions of the 33 G. 3.  
(2 B&Ald 149, 153).  
259 By stating:  
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After all, as Maxwell notes:  
[i]n determining either what was the general 
object of the Legislature,  or the meaning of 
its language in any particular passage, it is 
obvious that the intention which appears to 
be most agreeable to convenience, reason, 
and justice, should, in all cases open to 
doubt, be presumed to be the true one. An 
argument drawn from an inconvenience …  is 
forcible in law; and no less force is due to 
any drawn from an absurdity or injustice. 260 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Looking at the context of the act, it does not 
appear to have been the intention of the 
Legislature to … [repeal the earlier enactment]. 
Any other construction than this would work a 
serious injury to those persons who have advanced 
money on the security of the tolls.  
((1834) 1 CrM&R 473, 483. See also:  [1893] 1 QB 612, 620).  
260 Maxwell,  1991 [1896], at p.166 [reference omitted].  
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Rationale revisited: The ‘modified’ 
doctrine 
 
In synopsis, therefore, arguably compelling academic as 
well as judicial evidence can be collected to 
substantiate the circumscription of the conventional 
doctrine of implied repeal. What still remains pensile, 
however, is the construction of a suitable ra tionale to 
fortify such revised doctrine; a rationale which, it will 
be remembered, was found to be lacking with respect to 
the conventional doctrine.  
To that end, it may, at the outset, be underlined that 
this more stringent position relating to the warranted 
treatment of apparently conflicting, asynchronous 
statutes appears, ex facie , more consonant to the 
Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine insofar as it focuses 
more clearly upon the task of discovering Parliament’s 
genuine intention with respect to whether a newer 
statute must co-exist with, or displace, an older one, 
rather than blindly on the task of following the latest 
enactment even if thus doing would result in 
disregarding Parliament’s intention and, in the long 
run, denigrating the legislative process into what the 
current Senior Associate Justice of the US Supreme 
Court, Justice Scalia, once called:  
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a sort of blind gamesmanship, in which … 
[Members of Parliament] vote for or against 
a particular measure according to their 
varying estimations of whether its 
implications will be held to suspend the 
effects of an earlier law that they favor or 
oppose.261  
More importantly, however, repeals by implication cast 
doubt on the wisdom of previous  incarnations of 
Parliament, the enactments of which are impliedly 
repealed, whilst, at the same time, as Viner attests:  
carry along with them a tacit reflection upon 
… [the present  incarnation of Parliament], 
that … [it] should ignorantly and without 
knowing it, make one act repugnant to and 
inconsistent with another.262  
The modified position herein advocated is rid of such 
unfortunate undertones: only if two enactments cannot 
be reconciled –  and, consequently, Parliament could not 
                                                            
261 US v Hansen  (1985) 772 F 2d 940, 944.  
262 Viner, 1793, at p.525.  
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have intended for them to be read side-by-side – will 
the more recent impliedly repeal  the earlier one.263  
It is appropriate, at this point, to stress the organic 
assumption shrouded behind this conclusion. Indeed, if, 
for instance, Parliament is conceived as a series of 
disjointed, successive legislative entities with distinct 
programmatic commitments to an ever-changing, all-
powerful electorate, which come into being when they 
are summoned to meet for the first time and cease to 
exist when they are dissolved, then the operation of the 
implied repeal doctrine, in its original form, may 
appear befitting: any previous enactment which appears 
to be inconsistent with current expressions of 
legislative – and therefore, in turn, articulations of 
popular –  will must necessarily and automatically be 
considered repealed. This is, however, not the case  
insofar as the Constitution of this country is concerned: 
under the UK Constitution, “Parliament is neither the 
agent of the electors nor in any sense a trustee for its 
constituents”,264 as Dicey states, citing to his support 
                                                            
263 To use Razian terminology, only in such a case will the 
more recent statute encompass a second-order exclusionary or 
preemptive reason for action: Raz, 1990, at pp.35 -48. 
264 Dicey, 1889, at p.45.  
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the then recently repealed crucial provisions of the 
Septennial Act 1715. In truth, the UK Parliament is 
better conceived as a ‘timeless’, atemporal, unified body 
with a singular will which courts seek to discover and 
give effect to. Parliament, in other words, is akin to 
Maxwell’s reasonable author which:  
must be supposed to be consistent with 
himself; and, therefore, if in one place he has 
expressed his mind clearly, it ought to be 
presumed that he is still of the same mind in 
another place, unless it expressly [or by 
necessary implication] appears that he has 
changed it.265  
Thus, it is only rational for courts to attempt to 
reconcile as many expressions of Parliamentary will as 
logically possible rather than be fast to conclude, 
without it being absolutely necessary, that Parliament 
has acted in a careless, self -contradictory manner.  
                                                            
265 Maxwell,  1991 [1896], at p.133 [reference omitted].  
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In fairness, emblematic figures such as Sir Ivor 
Jennings266 and McIlwain267 have been prompted, in 
view of the process of Parliamentary dissolution and 
consequent re-summoning, to conclude that Parl iament 
is not a permanent body.   
Therefore, the opposite view herein espoused –  namely, 
that Parliament is a unified body with a singular will – 
calls for elaboration. For one, the continuity of 
Parliament, in the interim period between dissolution 
                                                            
266 Jennings, 1951, at p.50.  
267 E.g. :   
If  we adhere to the strictness of this legality, we 
find a rather peculiar sovereign resulting. One, in 
fact, whose very precarious existence is dependent 
upon the whim of a power outside itself.  It is no 
answer to this to say that it is the ‘King in 
Parliament’  who does these things. Where is the 
‘King in Parliament’  during the interval between 
the dissolution of one Parliament and his issuing 
writs for a new one?  
(McIlwain, 1910, at p.381).  
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and re-summoning, is ensured by the Crown,268 which is 
itself one of Parliament’s three constituent elements 
and which, according to established principle, “is 
esteemed to be immortal, invisible, [and] not subject to 
death…”269 Indeed, there is never an interregnum : upon 
the natural death of the incumbent monarch, the Crown 
passes immediately to the person next in line who is 
eligible to succeed to the throne. Equally, when the line 
of succession is changed and the current Monarch 
vacates, abdicates or is deposed of the throne ,270 it is 
the sitting Commons and Lords that ensure the 
continuing existence of Parliament. The break in legal 
continuity is also averted by rules of continuity that 
govern the transfer of power from one instantiation of 
Parliament to the next.271 Moreover, the House of Lords 
                                                            
268 C.f.  the even more unmistakable position that obtained 
prior to the Representation of the People Act 1985: Meeting of 
Parliament Act 1797, s.3.  
269 Calvin’s Case  (1608) 7 Co Rep 1a, 10a.  
270 As was the case with James II,  Edward VIII and Richard II 
respectively, to name but a few.  
271 See e.g. :  Representation of the People Act 1985, s.20; Fixed -
term Parliaments Act 2011, s.16; Parliament Act 1911, s.7;  
Succession to the Crown Act 1707.  
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never dissolves; its Members – being appointed –  
remain Members of the House of Lords during 
dissolution. Equally, prior to the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005, in order to prevent delay in the 
administration of justice, the Lords of Appeal in 
Ordinary could sit and act for the purpose of hearing 
and determining appeals during any prorogation or 
dissolution of Parliament.272 In addition, Ministers (that 
is, usually, Members of the House of Commons or Lords) 
remain in office during Parliament’s dissolution in view 
of the fact that they are appointed by the Crown and 
not Parliament.273  
Notwithstanding the above, the understanding of 
Parliament as an atemporal body remains vulnerable to 
an additional criticism. In particular, the presumption 
that Parliament, being atemporal, enacts laws “with 
full knowledge of all existing ones on the same 
subject”274 leads, the argument flows, to treating 
“multiple statutes as a single document written by an 
                                                            
272 See e.g. :  Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, ss.8 -9.  
273 The same applies for the revealingly -titled Clerk of the 
Parliaments .  
274 Sedgwick, 1857, at p.127.  
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ideal drafter who integrates them into a super-text”;275 
surely a fictitious and ultimately unacceptable 
conclusion. But one need not tread so long a way down 
the road to substantiate the abovementioned 
contentions. As Petroski correctly notes:  
[I]t is possible to impute awareness of part 
of the existing statutory scheme to an 
enacting legislature without imputing 
omniscience, or awareness of the entire 
statutory scheme, to that legislature. Such 
an imputation … is likely to be empirically 
supportable… Moreover, even if this 
assumption is not empirically supportable, it 
may be normatively desirable. 276  
In fact, not only does one not need to do so, but 
arguably she must  also not do so, since doing so may 
have the unfortunate consequence of clouding the actual 
aim of the interpretation process itself, which is none 
other than discovering Parliament’s genuine intention. 
As Lord Chancellor Loreburn warns in Nairn :  
                                                            
275 Popkin, 1991-1992, at p.1148.  
276 Petroski, 2004, at p.526, fn.200. See also:  Fisher v Bell  
[1961] 1 QB 394, 399.  
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It is a dangerous assumption to suppose that 
the Legislature foresees every possible result 
that may ensue from the unguarded use of a 
single word, or that the language used in 
statutes is so precisely accurate that you can 
pick out from various Acts this and that 
expression, and skilfully piercing them 
together lay a safe foundation for some 
remote inference… [F]rom early times Courts 
of law have been continuously obliged, in 
endeavouring loyally to carry out the 
intentions of Parliament, to observe a series 
of familiar precautions for interpreting 
statutes…277 
As a final note, it is interesting to emphasise anew that 
replacing the conventional doctrinal understanding of 
implied repeal with the modified version herein 
supported, cleanses the decisions in which a statute has 
been found to have been repealed by implication from 
their inferences about Parliamentary ignorance or 
incompetence: statutes are deemed as impliedly 
repealed solely because Parliament has thus  positively 
decided by leaving no viable interpretive option to the 
judiciary.  
                                                            
277 1909 SC (HL) 10, 13.  
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Understood in this manner, it even becomes 
questionable whether there genuinely exists a reason 
for normatively  distinguishing between the few 
occasions in which this happens, from the instances in 
which so-called ‘express repeal’ takes place. For one, in 
both cases, the catalytic factor is Parliament’s 
intention. Additionally, the result brought about by 
both should, ceteris paribus ,  be the same: one or more 
statutes are repealed, to the extent Parliament so 
intends. Thirdly, with respect to both cases, the courts 
may be required to make several inferences. The 
Interpretation Act 1978, for instance, directs the cour ts 
to follow a plethora of inferences when dealing with 
express  repeals. ‘[W]here an Act repeals an enactment’, 
s.16(1) reads:  
the repeal does not, unless the contrary 
intention appears, – 
(a) revive anything not in force or 
existing at the time at which the repeal 
takes effect;278 
                                                            
278 See: Lauri v Renad  [1892] 3 Ch 402, 420-421. 
  
 
175 
 
(b) affect the previous operation of the 
enactment repealed or anything duly 
done or suffered under the enactment;  
(c) affect any right, privilege, 
obligation or liability acquired, accrued 
or incurred under that enactment… 279 
Provision is also made for the time of commencement of 
Acts,280 their classification as public or private, 281 the 
meaning to be given to words importing the masculine 
or feminine gender,282 the meaning to be given to 
references to distance283 and time,284 et cetera . All such 
considerations may indirectly influence the manner in 
which a repeal order which is ‘express’ will be 
understood.  
                                                            
279 Interpretation Act 1978, s.16(1).  
280 ibid . ,  s.4.  
281 ibid . ,  s.3.  
282 ibid . ,  s.6.  
283 ibid . ,  s.8.  
284 ibid . ,  s.9.  
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Logical as these propositions may seem, and as 
accustomed as one may have become to them by an 
extended study of the UK, or more generally Western, 
legal systems, they remain presumptions and should not 
be mistaken for necessarily truthful, a priori  principles 
that operate in every legal system. For instance, the 
date at which Acts have been deemed to commence if 
provision for such commencement has not been made 
within such Acts, has undergone significant change over 
the centuries.285 
In other words, contrary to popular understanding, the 
mere fact that a repeal order is ‘express’, does little to 
ensure that such order can be given effect to without 
the use of rules of interpretation, presumptions and 
inferences. In fact, giving effect to so -called ‘implied’ 
repeals may, on some occasions, be even less eventful 
than giving effect to ‘express’ repeals, owing to the fact 
that much of the conjecture taking place in giving effect 
to ‘express’ repeals happens, in the case of ‘implied’ 
repeals, one step earlier: indeed, unlike the case of 
‘express’ repeals, the process of determining the 
existence of an ‘implied’ repeal includes, in itself and by 
                                                            
285 See: Partridge v Strange and Croker  (1552) 1 Plow 77, 79; 
Acts of Parliament (Commencement) Act 1793; Interpretation 
Act 1978, s.4.  
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definition, the discovery of concrete, determinate 
evidence of a Parliamentary intention towards that 
effect. 
Therefore, even if it may be useful for empirical or 
taxonomical reasons to distinguish between so -called 
‘express’ and ‘implied’ repeals, normatively their 
differences are very much illusory and it is better to 
conceive of all repeals equally as one: as an order of 
Parliament which may be formulated in either express 
or non-express language that is impossible to be 
construed in more than one meaningful way so that an 
inference that Parliament intended a particular 
construction necessarily arises.  
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Juridical-logical or contingent 
principle? 
 
One should not, however, be quick to endorse the 
revision of the traditional implied repeal doctrine 
attempted above, until one final, erosive contention has 
been dealt with. It has been argued –  and much more 
frequently assumed, without particular reflection – that 
the ‘lex posterior ’  or implied repeal rule constitutes a 
necessary prerequisite for the existence as well as 
preservation of the principle of Parliamentary 
sovereignty or, more broadly, of any legal system 
properly so called. According to this line of argument, 
‘lex posterior ’  is elevated, by definition, to the status of 
a general principle of law that must apply non-
contingently or a priori , above and beyond, and 
irrespective of its invocation by a  specific, normative 
system’s legal officials.  
In fact, no less a figure than Kelsen, at least at one 
stage of his extensive academic career, consti tuted a 
chief proponent of such an idea. Indeed, in a 1914 
paper, the Austrian jurist proposes:  
That a later norm invalidates an earlier 
norm when the content of the one contradicts 
that of the other … counts as a juridico-
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logical principle  only within a unified 
normative system. Within the same 
normative system, the basic tenet that a 
later norm invalidates an earlier norm …  
represents the regulator by means of which 
the normative system qua logically closed 
system –  this basic postulate of all 
normative cognition … –  is continuously 
sustained… The requirement that the later 
norm take precedence over the earlier norm 
… is a purely logical  consequence that 
follows from the nature of the norm and from 
the essence of unity … in the normative 
system.286 
The key to understanding such undoubtedly forceful and 
confidently unequivocal statements is to be found in 
Kelsen’s express assumption that normative systems 
must, ex necessitate , be logically closed – this is, after 
all, the ‘basic postulate of all normative cognition’. 
Logical closure is arguably here understood by Kelsen 
as entailing a system’s normative consistency; that is, 
the Kantian precept that valid norms (or, probably more 
accurately, valid norms’ particular prescriptions) 
                                                            
286 Kelsen, 1914, at pp.206-207 [emphasis in original] quoted 
in: Paulson, 1983, at p.7, fn.12.  
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cannot conflict. At its most basic, this is no more than 
the rudimentary insight that actions must either be 
permitted or prohibited in order for individual agents to 
be able to comply with particular norm prescriptions 
without, in the process, violating others.  
Since the avoidance of  potential norm conflicts is, in 
practice, virtually impossible, every system must, in 
order to ensure logical closure, have in place the 
necessary means for norm-conflict resolution; whether 
that entails the abrogation of one of the conflicting 
norms through what Hart would term secondary rules of 
change, or whether it involves principles of 
interpretation that allow apparently conflicting norms 
to be given a consistent reading or to retain their full 
and unhindered application albeit in distinct fields. O ne 
such principle, says Kelsen, is the implied repeal 
doctrine. Indeed, as he later elaborates:  
The principles of interpretation … [namely] 
the principle of lex posterior derogat priori ,  
the principle that the lower norm must give 
way to the higher … etc. –  all of these have 
no other purpose than to give a meaningful 
interpretation to the material of positive 
law… For the most part, they are not rules of 
positive law, not established norms, but 
presuppositions of legal cognition. This 
means that they are part of the sense of the 
basic norm, which thus guarantees the unity 
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of the norms of positive law as the unity of a 
system which, if it is not necessarily just, is 
at least meaningful.287 
The attentive reader of Kelsen will surely notice the 
neo-Kantian turn as well as the enhancement of his 
previously quoted passage with clear references to his 
maturing, albeit still unpublished, second edition of 
‘Pure Theory of Law’,288 but what is, for present 
purposes, important is that a presupposed ‘Basic Norm ’  
or ‘Grundnorm ’, comprised of rules of interpretation 
such as ‘lex posterior ’ ,  exists, according to Kelsen, at 
the heart of the legal system and serves to give a 
‘meaningful interpretation’ to, as well as, more 
fundamentally, guarantees the unity of the norms of, 
positive law.  
However, even accepting both that rules of 
interpretation are necessary for the functioning of a 
legal system (as one, undoubtedly, must) as well as 
endorsing the more tentative assumption 289 that 
                                                            
287 Kelsen, 2009 [1925, 1928, 1934], at pp.406 -407. 
288 Kelsen, 1967.  
289 Which Kelsen himself abandoned towards the end of his life: 
Kelsen, 1991, at p.214.  
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normative consistency also constitutes a pre -requisite 
for such a system to exist, nowhere does the Austrian 
jurist provide convincing evidence that the ‘ lex 
posterior ’  principle must necessarily be amongst such 
rules that are required to ensure the consistency of 
norms. In fact, more broadly, apart from the admission 
that rules of interpretation must exist and, possibly, if 
somewhat generously, that they must operate as a 
working, non-contradictory whole, it is unclear why one 
must concede anything whatsoever about the possible 
content  of such rules: at no point is an attempt made to 
rebut the logically-flowing as well as experience-driven 
presumption that they should necessarily be anything 
more than non-systemic, contingent or even ad hoc  and 
irrational rules institutionalised by particular 
Austinian principals or followed due to customary agent 
practice. In other words, it is indeed non-controversial 
to suggest that a particular set of rules of 
interpretation is sufficient  for a normatively consistent 
system to emerge, but contending that specific rules – 
such as the implied repeal doctrine – must necessarily  
be included in such set is a logical leap which can 
certainly not be accepted, all the more without powerful 
argument towards that effect.  
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To be fair, it must indeed be noted that a rule such as 
‘lex posterior ’  may prove extremely convenient, socio -
politically, for the everyday workings of a legal system, 
whilst its absence may make legal change 290 a 
challenging exercise.  Still, however, that is far from the 
proposition that its endorsement by every legal system 
is necessary for the system’s existence and continued 
survival. Indeed, why – one is perfectly legitimated in 
asking –  should time have, by definition and 
necessarily, any relationship whatever with the 
resolution of conflicts between norms? And even if for 
some strange, unknown reason it does, why must it be 
the more recent norm that necessarily abrogates the 
earlier, conflicting one?  
Towards that end, Merkl is in fact able to construct a 
strong thesis for what intuitively would, on its face, 
seem absurd: that is, the idea that it is the more recent 
law that must give way to the earlier one should they be 
found to be in conflict. As the eminent Vienna School 
theorist suggests: 
                                                            
290 Evidently, arguendo ,  even legal change does not, in itself,  
contain some inherently virtuous property, so as to make it 
imperative for the existence and preservation o f legal systems.  
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It is, of course, not age conferring priority 
for the older vis-à-vis the younger law … but 
the fact (ex hypothesi) that the earlier law 
has been enacted according to the 
constitution and that it has therefore …  
taken a specific place in the legal system of 
and thus taken the place of any contrary 
legal content.291 
In fact, at various points, including, importantly, the 
end of his career when he had abandoned the notion of 
imperative normative consistency, Kelsen himself 
flirted with this idea first expressed by his student and 
colleague, Merkl. In a 1962 essay, for instance, he 
maintains that “a conflict can but need not be resolved 
by derogation, and derogation will take place only if a 
legislative authority has provided for it” 292 and, further,  
that “lex posterior derogat priori  [ist] kein logisches, 
sondern ein positiv-rechtliches Prinzip .”293 
                                                            
291 Merkl, 1993 [1918] , at p.190.  
292 Kelsen, 1962, at p.351.  
293 [ ‘Lex posterior ’  is not a logical, but a positive -law principle]:  
Kelsen, 1979, at p.103.  
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To accommodate this radical Merklian view in the 
context of the modified implied repeal doctrine herein 
proposed, it need only be remembered that Parliamen t’s 
sovereignty is located at the core of the UK’s ‘Basic 
Norm’. It follows that, since the function of legal organs 
must be traced back to such norm, norm-conflict 
resolution must be less consumed in mechanically and 
strictly ascertaining the temporal sequence of the 
statutes (as the traditional doctrine of implied repeal 
would suggest, and as could, indeed, be the warranted 
approach in a majoritarian-inspired polity in which the 
constituency’s wishes are at the core of the ‘Basic 
Norm’) and more orientated towards always striving to 
discover the sovereign Parliament’s intention even if 
this entails the sacrifice of bright -line guidelines for 
individual agents.  
In conclusion, to be fair, although, as seen, a forcible 
case can be made to the effect that normative legal 
systems can exist without the operation of some  form of 
an implied repeal rule, the question may not be 
permanently closed, as the existence of modern 
proponents of Kelsen’s initial position 294 illustrates. 
Ultimately, however, it is important to  fathom that 
settling such question is not, for the purpose of 
                                                            
294 See e.g. :  Harris, 1979; Harris,  1986.  
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substantiating the modified doctrine of implied repeal, 
essential, since at no point has it been argued that 
statutes in the UK cannot repeal one another by 
implication, so long as the intention of the more recent 
enactment is clearly towards that effect. After all, a 
Parliament that could not impliedly effect a repeal of 
one of its previous enactments would clearly not be 
sovereign. In short, the conservative but sufficient 
conclusion one may deduce from the foregoing is that 
legal theory does not dictate the form the ‘ lex posterior ’  
doctrine must assume in every normative legal system 
properly so called and, hence, the putative logico -
rational obstacles against the acceptance of the 
modified version of such doctrine herein proposed are 
lifted.  
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‘Constitutional statutes’ 
 
Having thus concluded, reference remains to be had to 
Thoburn . It must, at this point, be conceded that, in 
light of the revision of the traditional doctrine of 
implied repeal attempted above, the hitherto absence of 
a reference to Thoburn  which is celebrated for its 
curtailment of such doctrine, will, at first, 
understandably appear strange. The reason for such 
delay, however, will become evident through the 
forthcoming discussion.  
The said case involved the appeal of Collins against the 
conditions imposed by the London Borough of Sutton 
upon the renewal of his street trading licence as well as 
those of Thoburn, Hunt, Hartman and Dove against 
their convictions for allegedly disregarding the weights 
and measures legislation by selling  loose fruit and 
vegetables in Imperial measures.  
Central to the defendants’ case was the relationship 
between s.2(2) ECA and s.1 of the Weights and 
Measures Act 1985, a consolidating statute. Under the 
latter, both Imperial as well as metric units are deemed 
to be legal units of measurements for trade in the UK, 
whilst under the former, and subject to Schedule 2 of 
that Act:  
  
 
188 
 
Her Majesty may by Order in Council, and 
any designated Minister or department may 
by order, rules, regulations or scheme, make 
provision … for the purpose of implementing 
any EU obligation of the United Kingdom… 295 
Indeed, the Units of Measurements Regulations 1986, 
the Units of Measurements Regulations 1994 and the 
Units of Measurement Regulations 2001 were made 
utilising precisely such powers in order to give effect to 
Council Directives 80/181/EEC, 89/617/EEC and 
1999/103/EEC respectively. To give effect to 
89/617/EEC, the Weights and Measures Act 1985 
(Metrication) (Amendment) Order 1994 was also made, 
albeit its vires  consisted in s.8(6) of the 1985 Act rather 
than s.2(2) ECA.  
Succinctly put, the 1994 Regulations and the 1994 
Amendment Order amended s.1 and s.8 of the 1985 Act 
respectively so as to make the use of Imperial measures 
as primary indicators for the sale of goods loose in bulk 
unlawful as of January 1 st  2000, whilst the 1986 
Regulations, as amended by the 2001 Regulations, 
                                                            
295 ECA, s.2(2), as amended by the Legislative an d Regulatory 
Reform Act 2006 and the European Union (Amendment) Act 
2008. 
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proscribed their use as supplementary indicators from 
January 1s t 2010 onwards.  
The defendants’ cardinal contention was that the 1985 
Act had impliedly repealed pro tanto  s.2(2) ECA to the 
extent that it empowered the making of subordinate 
legislation inconsistent with the relevant provisions of 
the 1985 Act. The 1994 Regulations were precisely such 
a subordinate statutory instrument: they were 
purportedly authorised by s.2(2) ECA and were 
expressly inconsistent with the 1985 Act. 296 Thus – the 
argument flowed –  the 1994 Regulations were ultra 
vires ,  null and void, and of no legal effect whatsoever 
and, therefore, the 1985 Act stood unamended with the 
result that the defendants were, by law, permitted to 
use Imperial measures in the exercise of their trade.  
This line of argument was, nevertheless, rejected by 
Laws LJ. Indeed, in the first place, the rule anent 
implied repeals was stated as being that:  
if Parliament has enacted successive 
statutes which on the true construction of 
each of them make irreducibly inconsistent 
                                                            
296 In fact,  their aim was precisely to amend the said Act.  
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provisions, the earlier statute is impliedly 
repealed by the later.297 
It follows, Laws LJ opined, that the implied repeal 
doctrine did not in the particular instance come into 
play: the 1985 Act did nothing to annul or amend the 
power contained within s.2(2) and s.2(4) ECA to enact 
delegated legislation that can modify primary 
legislation, passed or to be passed,298 and therefore 
there were no ‘irreducibly inconsistent provisions’ to be 
found in the two statutes. In turn, this meant that the 
1994 Regulations were an intra vires  exercise of the 
power contained in the ECA and had thus amended the 
1985 Act to the effect that the defendants’ usage of 
Imperial measures was unauthorised. 299 This 
recognition that the ratio decidendi  of Thoburn  is 
located in the absence of conflict between the two 
statutes in question, despite being fairly 
straightforward, is frequently forgotten owing to the 
                                                            
297 [2003] QB 151, 176.  
298 Or, more generally, that there is no inconsistency between a 
provision conferring a Henry VIII power to amend future 
legislation and the terms of such legislation.  
299 [2003] QB 151, 180-181. 
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fact that Laws LJ proceeded300 in making a series of 
further, more controversial, obiter  statements regarding 
the implied repeal doctrine and the nature of 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  
Indeed, later in Sir John’s judgement, one finds 
advanced the suggestion that:  
[t]he common law has in recent years 
allowed, or rather created, exceptions to the 
doctrine of implied repeal: a doctrine which 
was always the common law’s own creature. 
There are now classes or types of legislative 
provision which cannot be repealed by mere 
implication. These instances are given, and 
can only be given, by our own courts… The 
courts … have said … that there are certain 
circumstances in which the legislature may 
only enact what it desires to enact if it does 
so by express, or at any rate specific 
provision.301 
                                                            
300 Largely in response to the hard-line, intransigent litigation 
approaches adopted both by Shrimpton, for the appe llants, and 
Sharpston QC and Moser, for the prosecution.  
301 [2003] QB 151, 185.  
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In the present state of its maturity the 
common law has come to recognise that there 
exist rights which should properly be 
classified as constitutional or fundamental… 
We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of 
Parliament: as it were ‘ordinary’ statutes 
and ‘constitutional’ statutes… Ordinary 
statutes may be impliedly repealed. 
Constitutional statutes may not. 302  
Several remarks must be made regarding such forceful, 
oft-quoted, obiter dicta , but it is warranted to 
commence by scrutinising the argument that the 
implied repeal doctrine is a common law creature, the 
signification of which is unclear. Is Laws LJ truly 
suggesting that courts could modify the implied repeal 
doctrine to the effect that, notwithstanding 
Parliament’s intention, in a conflict between two 
statutes, the older enactment should, for instance, 
always prevail? Or worse, is it being maintained that 
the courts could, in the final analysis, forsake the 
doctrine itself and begin giving effect to any statutory 
provisions, past or present, at their whim? Surely that 
cannot be right. As explained earlier, the doctrine of 
implied repeal – liberated from the unnecessary 
                                                            
302 ibid . ,  186. 
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baggage that the traditional, mechanical account had 
burdened it with, and perceived correctly to entail the 
proposition that later statutes impliedly abrogate 
earlier ones only on the occasion that it is impossible, 
through a benign interpretation, for them to “live 
together”303 intelligibly – is a means to an end, rather 
than an end in itself that may or may not be desirable 
and may or may not be applied by the courts, as Laws 
LJ would seemingly have one believe; it is, indeed, one 
of the means employed to give effect to the sovereign 
Parliament’s intention. In other words, correctly 
understood, it constitutes a corollary of Parliament’s 
sovereignty, and therefore it is the judiciary’s duty 
unreservedly to uphold it whenever the occasion arises.  
In truth, what Laws LJ probably has in mind is not that 
the courts can renounce or alter fundamentally the 
implied repeal doctrine, but that they may at least 
carve exceptions to it. This, in fact, he submits, has 
already happened in recent years. Even understood in 
this more conservative manner, however, the contention 
cannot stand. For one, the aforementioned 
considerations do not cease to apply: any alteration to 
the implied repeal doctrine procured by a person or 
                                                            
303 Re Silver Bros  [1932] AC 514, 523.  
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body other than Parliament itself304 would constitute a 
deviation from the task of giving effect to Parliament’s 
intention which, in turn, would be tantamount to an 
abridgement of Parliament’s sovereignty. Moreover, at 
any rate, Sir John provides no evidence whatsoever of 
instances in which such exceptions have been created or 
of their professed content. Indeed, the only purported 
exception to the doctrine which appears in his 
judgement is the one which he himself circularly 
attempts to advance, building upon his previous work 
on the subject;305 that is, the idea that a particular class 
of legislative enactments, vaguely defined as 
‘constitutional statutes’, cannot be repealed by mere 
implication.  
Thus, understood literally, this statement cannot be 
accepted even if it has been repeated in subsequent 
                                                            
304 Even one by Parliament itself would prove contentious in 
view of the principle,  to be analysed infra ,  that Parliament 
cannot bind its successors.  
305 Laws, 1995, at p.89. See also:  International Transport Roth 
GmbH and others v Secretary of State for the Ho me Department  
[2003] QB 728, 759-760. 
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obiter remarks.306 In the first place, it expressly 
maintains the existence of a hierarchy of statutes; a 
notion fundamentally repugnant to the core of the UK 
Constitution as well as clearly antagonistic to the 
Diceyan principle that all Acts are of equal status and 
embody, equally forcefully, the intentions of the 
legislature.307  
Secondly, it opens the door for an equally 
unconstitutional eventuality – the entrenchment of 
legislation and, consequently, the binding of future 
Parliaments. No matter how hard the Lord Justice tries 
to deny it,308 accepting that an enactment is safe from 
being repealed impliedly is equivalent to acknowledging 
that it has been entrenched, that the Parliament 
passing such legislation succeeded in binding its 
successors and that, in turn, future Parliaments will no 
longer be (equally) sovereign.  
Therefore, thirdly and relatedly, it implicitly, but 
surely, strips Parliament from its sovereignty by 
                                                            
306 H v Lord Advocate  [2013] 1 AC 413, 425-426; [2014] 1 WLR 
324, 382.  
307 Dicey, 1894, at p.66; Dicey, 1889, at pp.135 -136, 190.  
308 [2003] QB 151, 184-188. 
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denying it at least one power: that of impliedly ordering  
the repeal of a statute. That is, in fact, why 
Goldsworthy’s309 attempt to portray the ECA as having 
imposed upon Parliament a ‘procedure or form’ 
requirement which must be followed in order for 
legislation contrary to its terms to be enacted and, in 
the same breath, to strive to defend the orthodox 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty 310 is doomed to 
failure as Chapter VIII will further discuss .  
To be fair, as Young suggests, 311 Laws LJ could be 
understood as making a more pragmatic claim. Such 
claim would involve the observation that Parliament 
rarely intends impliedly to repeal certain statutes 
which are considered central or organic to the 
Constitution as currently composed, but, at the same 
time, would concede that Parliament retains the 
unconditional right to do so. In other words, Lord 
Justice Laws’s phrase ‘constitutional statutes cannot be 
repealed by implication’ is interpreted as meaning that 
‘constitutional statutes are  not, in practice, usually 
                                                            
309 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at pp.174-201. 
310 What he terms the “ ‘weak’ version of the thesis of 
continuing sovereignty”: ibid. ,  at pp.112-113. 
311 Young, 2009, at pp.40-45. 
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repealed by implication’. Thus understood, Sir John’s 
contention devolves from an incorrect statement of legal 
principle into a probably true, empirical observation.  
Nevertheless, despite Young’s praiseworthy efforts, the 
arguments in favour of understanding Laws LJ as 
making a pragmatic claim rather than a theoretical 
statement of principle are probably unconvincing.  
Perhaps, they are potent enough to interpret away the 
offensive undertones in Lord Wilberforce’s similar -
minded comment that:  
[i]n strict law there may be no difference in 
status … as between one Act of Parliament 
and another, but I confess to some reluctance 
to holding that an Act of such constitutional 
significance as the Union with Ireland Act is 
subject to the doctrine of implied repeal or of 
obsolescence – all the more when these 
effects are claimed to result from later 
legislation which could have brought them 
about by specific enactment.312  
                                                            
312 Earl of Antrim’s Petition  [1967] 1 AC 691, 724. See also:  The 
Earl of Waterford’s Claim  (1832) 6 Cl&F 133, 174-179; 
Robinson v Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and Others  
2002 WL 1446153, at para.11.  
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Additionally, they are, in all probability, effective 
insofar as the established principle of ‘generalia 
specialibus non derogant ’313 is concerned: Parliament 
may, but is unlikely to have, in practice, intended 
general provisions enacted in later legislation to detract 
from specific provisions enacted in previous legislation.  
Moreover, they may be sufficient to conceive the 
controversy between the so-called ‘subject-matter’ and 
‘conflict-of-norms’ theories of implied repeal not as a 
misguided theoretical-notional exercise but as a 
descriptive, empirical dilemma. To explain, Tomkins for 
instance advances the thesis that implied repeal does 
not apply where there is an ostensible conflict between 
two statutes regulating different subject -matters.314 He 
adduces dicta  from Ellen Street Estates  in his support to 
the effect that it is “impossible for Parliament to enact 
that in a subsequent statute dealing with the same 
                                                            
313 Lyn v Wyn  (1665) Bridg 122, 127; Comyns, 1793, at p.255; 
[2006] 1 WLR 252. And, conversely, the principle that a later 
specific statute should not, if  possible,  be held impliedly to 
derogate from an ear lier general statute: Mount v Taylor  
(1867-68) LR 3 CP 645, 654-655. 
314 Tomkins, 2003, at pp.117-119. See also:  Barber and Young, 
2003, at pp.115-116; Goodwin v Phillips  [1908] 7 CLR 1, 7.  
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subject matter there can be no implied repeal.” 315 Even 
more forcefully, he correctly contends that in Thoburn  
no conflict was held to exist between the ECA and the 
1985 Act because they regulated different subject -
matters: the former was concerned with the 
implementation of directly effective Community law in 
the UK whilst the latter related with determining –  or 
rather, more correctly, consolidating, certain 
enactments determining –  legally valid weights and 
measures.  
Similarly, Maxwell’s insight that “where the objects of 
two apparently repugnant Acts are different, no repeal 
takes place”,316 Ellis’s idea that implied repeal only 
occurs where “statute 1 makes provision for a  particular 
situation and then statute 2 is passed saying something 
different about that same situation ”,317 Loveland’s 
understanding that implied repeal will only apply “in 
situations where the later Act ‘envelopes’ the former, 
but not when there is simply an ‘overlap’ of inconsistent 
                                                            
315 [1934] 1 KB 590, 597.  
316 Maxwell,  1991 [1896], at p.153.  
317 Ellis, 1980, at p.513 [emphasis in original].  
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provisions”,318 as well as McHarg’s soi-disant 
“broader”319 interpretation of the doctrine, under which 
statutes impliedly repeal one another only if a conflict 
between the norms they establish exists, can, without 
much difficulty, be understood as attempts to posit 
useful but consciously fallible empirical models or 
guidelines for discovering when Parliament is likely, in 
practice, to intend to repeal statutes by implication. 320  
However, in the case of Laws LJ,  unless a broader, less 
fastidious interpretation of his dictum  is taken, such is 
the sheer force of his propositions, both in Thoburn as 
well as thereafter in his more recent extra-curial 
submissions,321 that they leave little room for re-
interpretation: Laws LJ is advancing a happily obiter , 
fallacious statement of legal principle, unheard of in 
UK law. Indeed, it is one thing to recognise that the 
                                                            
318 Loveland, 2009, at p.34, fn.42.  
319 McHarg, 2006, at p.554.  
320 Burrows, for instance, is correct to denote the classified 
examples of the doctrine of implied repeal he provides as 
“[i]llustrations of its application”:  Burrows, 1973-1976, at 
p.607. 
321 Laws, 2008, at pp.8-9. 
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Lord Justice correctly advances the curtailment of the 
automatic, mechanistic understanding of the implied  
repeal doctrine322 and an entirely different matter to 
enquire how, to what extent and for what reasons he 
does so. More specifically, for Laws LJ the curtailment 
of the traditional implied repeal doctrine is tantamount 
to the curtailment not of rigidity but, rather, of 
Parliament’s sovereignty; an empowerement not of 
Parliament (by allowing greater flexibility in the 
discovery and upholding of its genuine intention) but, 
rather, of the courts; a vindication not of Parliament ’s 
actions from any undertones of  carelessness and self-
contradictoriness but, rather, of common law 
constitutionalism ’s claims of true ownership over the 
UK Constitution (by allowing judges to decide 
independently on the ethereal notion of constitutional 
statutes).  
The reason for reserving reference to Thoburn  may now 
appear clear: although, much like this present thesis, 
Laws LJ did seek to criticise and modify  the traditional 
understanding of the implied repeal doctrine, the spirit 
and direction of the two attempted revisions are rather 
distinct. Therefore, to accentuate this substantial 
                                                            
322 Or, rather, its re -railment on orthodox UK constitutional 
law tracks.  
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differentiation that may not be, at first, 
straightforward as both theses lead to equivalent 
results in the majority of cases , it was considered 
warranted firstly to establish a strong construct of the 
version of the implied repeal doctrine herein supported 
before introducing Lord Justice Laws’s dictum  into the 
discussion.  
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The modified doctrine in context 
 
Having thus insulated the version of the implied repeal 
doctrine herein argued as being valid and operational in 
UK law, it is at this point warranted to attempt to 
affirm its compatibility with both the rationale adopted 
as well as the outcome itself in each of the legal 
decisions that have been variously reported as 
purportedly dealing with the relationship between EU 
and UK law in an unorthodox or offensive manner.  
For one, in Thoburn , the conundrum essentially arose 
because the appellants perceived the very much existent 
conflict between the 1985 Act and the 1994 Regulations 
as pertaining to the repeal or otherwise of s.2(2) and 
s.2(4) ECA by the 1985 Act. This was, in fact, an 
unfounded logical leap. Indeed, as the court properly 
reasoned, the crucial consideration was that no 
inconsistency whatsoever existed between the 
provisions determining legally valid weights and 
measures contained in the 1985 Act and the provisions 
relating to the implementation of directly effective 
Community law contained in the ECA. Otherwise 
stated, utilising the modified test advanced earlier, the 
court was able to read the two statutes consistently and 
thus did not feel obliged to decide that the one had 
impliedly repealed the other to any extent.  
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The Macarthys  judgement, for its part, was implicitly 
grounded upon the premiss that no conflict existed 
between s.1(2) of the Equal Pay Act 1970 as amended by 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, and the ECA.  
Equivalently, in Factortame , it was common ground that 
the MSA 1988 – the contentious provisions of which 
sought to regulate the registration of British shipping 
vessels – and the provisions relating to the 
implementation of directly effective Community law 
contained in the ECA were in no sense inconsistent: 
reading the two statutes consistently required that the 
former be able to be read in an intelligible manner 
subject to directly effective Community law and this 
was very much possible by restricting its reach to non -
EU nationals. Therefore, the House of Lords correctly 
suggested, no question as to the repeal, implied or 
otherwise, of the latter arose. As with Thoburn , the 
only genuine conflict involved was one between the 
domestic statute and another piece of legislation, not 
the ECA. Evidently, the two types of cases are not 
identical insofar as in Macarthys  and Factortame  the 
conflict was between a domestic statute 323 and directly 
effective Community law, whilst in Thoburn it was the 
                                                            
323 The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the MSA 1988 
respectively.  
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provisions of two domestic enactments 324 that were in 
discord. Nevertheless, they share in common the fact 
that in the resolution of both such types of conflicts the 
ECA was crucial: in Thoburn ,  the fact that the ECA had 
not been impliedly repealed meant that the 1994 
Regulations were intra vires and therefore uneventfully 
prevailed over the antecedent 1985 Act, while in 
Factortame ,  somewhat more controversially, directly 
effective Community law prevailed over post-dating  
national law since the conflict was governed by the 
unaffected s.2(4) ECA. 
In summary, given that it was certainly not impossible 
for the Weights and Measures Act 1985,  Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 or MSA 1988 to be read 
consistently with the ECA, the only path open to the 
courts was to conclude that the doctrine of implied 
repeal, properly so interpreted, did not come in play as 
Parliament did not intend any of them to override its 
earlier 1972 enactment.  Interestingly, not only was it 
not impossible to interpret any of the aforementioned 
enactments consistently with the ECA, not only did 
none intend, or exhibit an intention, to abrogate or 
apply notwithstanding Community law but, as already 
noted, at least one of them – and, for that matter, the 
                                                            
324 The 1985 Act and the 1994 Regulations.  
  
 
206 
 
one involved in the most contentious judicial conflict –
was, in fact, enacted by a Parliament not indifferent as 
to the relationship of the Act ’s provisions  vis-à-vis 
European directives but positively acting under the  
(mis)understanding that the two sets of legal edicts 
were consistent. To put it otherwise and conclude, if the 
court in any of these cases had invoked the implied 
repeal doctrine, adjudged the ECA as having been 
partially or fully repealed and ruled the respectively 
relevant Community pronouncements as having been 
overridden by the more recent domestic laws, it would 
have dramatically failed to give effect to Parliament’s 
genuine intention and, in turn, abridged its 
sovereignty. Inversely (and although scholars, such as 
Allan,325 Craig326 and Goldsworthy,327 espousing the 
anachronistic, mechanistic idea that the traditional UK 
Constitution accommodates – or accommodated, when 
and if it ever existed – an ostensible “doctrine of 
automatic implied repeal”328 under which “[t]he courts 
                                                            
325 Allan 1983, at pp.25, 32. 
326 Craig, 2011, at p.117.  
327 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.182; Goldsworthy, 2013, at p.62.  
328 Allan, 1983, at p.32.  
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… [are]  required to obey the most recent Act”, 329 rather 
than Parliament’s genuine intention, would propose 
otherwise) from the latter conclusion it follows that 
utilisation of the implied repeal doctrine in these 
circumstances would be absolutely unjustified since the 
said doctrine is not an end in itself but rather a mere 
means to solidify the investigation of, and to facilitate 
giving effect to, Parliament’s intention .   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
329 Allan, 2013, at p.146.  
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Immunity from repeal? 
 
In light of the above, dealing with the final criticism 
that has been directed towards this version of the 
implied repeal doctrine is rendered both possible and 
warranted. This criticism entails the proposition that 
the doctrine of implied repeal, as understood and 
applied by courts such as the one in Factortame  and as 
herein endorsed and defended, regardless of the 
operation which its proponents profess it has, 
ultimately immunises, in practice, certain statutes from 
being repealed impliedly.  
In particular, it is maintained that this version of the 
implied repeal doctrine goes hand in hand with the 
proposition that a statute will only be held impliedly to 
repeal another if a conflict exists between thei r stated 
provisions. For instance, in the example of the ECA, 
such repeal by implication would necessarily have to 
take the form of a provision that imposes a duty upon 
the courts that directly contradicts their current duty 
stemming from the ECA and requires them to give effect 
to legislation subject to directly effective Community 
law. Requiring the fulfilment of so stringent a condition 
so that statutes such as the ECA be considered as 
having been impliedly repealed is tantamount, the 
argument concludes, to suggesting that in practice the 
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only viable method of their repeal is by express 
words.330  
To commence responding to such criticism, it must be 
remembered that one must be very attentive in avoiding 
the hazards which formalism involves. Suggesting that 
the implied repeal doctrine, as herein defended, is 
restricted to conflicts between two statutes’ stated 
provisions is a prime example of failing to elude such 
pitfalls by confusing, as seen earlier, empirical claims 
with theoretical statements of principle: when 
adjudging an allegation of repeal by implication, the 
emphasis should always be upon discovering 
Parliament’s actual intention.  
So, for example, as regards the ECA, Young suggests 
that:  
[t]he 1972 Act required the provisions of the 
…  [MSA] to be read and take effect subject to 
the provisions of directly effective European 
Community law. The 1988 Act would only 
challenge the requirement to read and give 
                                                            
330 Boyron, going even further, maintains that the ECA is 
“drafted so as to ensure that implied repeal cannot  occur”:  
Boyron, 2002, at p.778, fn.29 [emphasis added].  
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effect to its provisions subject to directly 
effective European Community law if it  were 
not possible to read and give effect to its 
provisions in this manner. However, it is at 
least arguable that this could be achieved by 
reading a section into the 1988 Act requiring 
its provisions to take effect subject to 
directly effective European Community 
law…331 
Indeed, interpreting the 1988 Act consistently with the 
ECA was the approach expressly adopted by the House 
of Lords in the first Factortame  case, as the following 
excerpt of Lord Bridge’s judgement shows:  
By virtue of … [s.2(4) ECA,]  Part II of the 
Act of 1988 is to be construed and take effect 
subject to directly enforceable Community 
rights and those rights are, by … [s.2(1) 
ECA], to be 'recognised and available in law, 
and … enforced, allowed and followed 
accordingly…' This has precisely  the same 
effect as if a section were incorporated in 
Part II of the Act of 1988 which in terms 
enacted that the provisions with respect to 
                                                            
331 Young, 2009, at pp.43-44. 
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registration of British fishing vessels were to 
be without prejudice to the directly 
enforceable Community rights of  [EEC] 
nationals.332 
In other words, should there have not been a way to 
interpret the ECA consistently with the MSA 1988, the 
court would have deemed the former as having been 
impliedly repealed pro tanto  for the simple reason that 
such inability would signify, in the clearest way 
possible, a Parliamentary intention to annul, partly or 
wholly, the 1972 Act. As emphasised earlier, one must 
not confuse the courts’ inability to interpret a post -1972 
Act consistently with the ECA, which would result in 
the implied repeal of the latter, with an inability to 
interpret an Act, not inconsistent with the ECA, 
consistently with directly effective European 
Community law which would result in the 
disapplication, so far as deemed necessary, of the 
former . 
Similarly, and more assuredly, an Act being at its heart 
fundamentally inconsistent with the extant 
pronouncements of the EU legislature or with any 
appreciable part of the contemporary core values 
                                                            
332 [1989] 3 CMLR 1, 10.  
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fostered by the Union would, even if it did not contain 
any duty-imposing or other rule that conflicted with the 
duty to give priority to directly effective Community 
law enshrined in the ECA, be held impliedly to repeal 
the 1972 Act to the extent deemed necessary to give 
effect fully to such a conspicuous –  as it will certainly 
be – manifestation of Parliament’s intention. 333 More 
broadly speaking, the pool of available methods to 
indicate an intention to effect the repeal by implication 
of a statute is, in fact, virtually unlimited, if only, in a 
linguistic-philosophical sense, by the shortcomings of 
language itself.  
The same considerations that apply with respect to the 
ECA also pertain to the other instances in which these 
questions have been thought to arise; namely, 
‘Interpretation Acts’ and Acts containing prospective 
‘Henry VIII’ clauses.  
To explain, ‘Interpretation Acts’ or, equally, Acts 
containing rules of interpretation, have not been held to 
be repealed impliedly by prospective Acts which 
seemingly attach a meaning to particular concepts that 
is antithetical with the one proposed by the 
                                                            
333 See also: McWhirter v Secretary of State  [2003] EWCA Civ 
384, at para.14; [2014] 1 WLR 324, 382.  
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Interpretation Act in question, and rightly so: if it were 
otherwise, the very purpose of such Interpretation Acts, 
at least to the extent that they were intended by 
Parliament to have prospective effect, would be 
defeated and, consequently, Parliament’s will would be 
thwarted. So, for instance, the Human Rights Act 1998 
(HRA) is not, and rightly so, deemed repealed by 
implication each time a subsequent statute is enacted 
which is prima facie  inconsistent with any one of the 
rights enshrined in the ECHR that have been given 
domestic legal effect by the HRA. 334 If that were not so, 
both the interpretive obligation contained in s.3 HRA 
which requires courts to interpret previous and 
subsequent,335 primary and subordinate336 legislation as 
compatible with such Convention rights “so far as it is 
possible to do so”337 and the duty338 imposed upon higher 
                                                            
334 The Articles and Protocols of the ECHR that enjoy such 
status are set out in the statute’s s.1(1).  
335 HRA, s.3(2)(a).  
336 ibid . .  
337 ibid . ,  s.3(1).  
338 Although the wording of s.4(2) provides a discretionary 
power to courts in issuing a declaration, it  is best to speak of 
“something akin to a duty” (Bonner, Fenwick and  Harris-
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UK courts339 by s.4 to issue a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility’ of any primary340 legislation with such 
rights when a compatible interpretation is not 
‘possible’, would be rendered ab initio  meaningless and 
redundant; surely not something Parliament intended  
or intends. Similarly, the Scotland Act 1998 is not 
considered as having been impliedly repealed pro tanto  
each time a postdating Act of Parliament which touches 
upon an area of devolved competence is enacted because 
s.28(7) of the former Act clearly accommodates such 
possibility by providing that ‘this section [conferring 
the right upon the Scottish Parliament to make laws, to 
be known as Acts of the Scottish Parliament] does not 
affect the power of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom to make laws for Scotland.’ 341 
This does not, however, mean that such Acts can only be 
repealed by express words, as some authors would have 
                                                                                                                                                       
Short, 2003, at p.561) in light of the obligation placed upon all 
‘public authorities’ ,  which include “court[s] or tribunal[s]” 
(HRA, s.6(3)(a)) to act “in a way that is … [compatible] … with 
a Convention right.” ( ibid. ,  s.6(1)) as long as s.6(2) i s not 
applicable.  
339 ibid . ,  s.4(5).  
340 As well as a limited category of secondary enactments 
defined in: ibid . ,  s.4(4)(b).  
341 See also: Himsworth and O’Neill ,  2009.  
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one believe.342 Equally, it does not mean that they can 
only be repealed impliedly through a postdating Act 
implementing a conflicting duty-imposing rule of 
interpretation. Indeed, in that regard, s.2 of the now 
repealed Acts Interpretation Act 1924 of New Zealand 
provides an apposite template of conditions that, if 
present, may also lead to a finding of implied repeal of 
Acts containing duty-imposing rules of interpretation 
such as the HRA, the Acts introducing the respective 
devolutionary schemes for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland as well as the ECA itself:  
This Act …  shall extend and apply to every 
Act of the General Assembly of New Zealand 
heretofore or that may hereafter be passed, 
except in so far as any provision hereof is 
inconsistent with the intent and object of 
any such Act, or the interpretation that any 
provision hereof would give to any word, 
expression, or section in any such Act is 
inconsistent with the context, and except in 
so far as any provision hereof is inconsistent 
with the context, and except in so far as any 
provision hereof is inconsistent with any 
                                                            
342 See e.g.  with respect to the HRA: Lester, 1998.  
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particular definition or interpretation 
contained in any such Act.  
Dealing with prospective Henry VIII clauses is 
somewhat harder on account of  the generally 
uncongenial reception that these clauses, ex ante  
burdened by their very name with the symbolic baggage 
of the 16 th century autocratic King, have elicited 
amongst academics and politicians alike. In particular, 
it has variously been recommended that Parliament 
should, as far as is possible, refrain from enacting such 
“pernicious”343 instruments that empower the 
modification of future Acts of Parliament. 344 In extremis ,  
it has been alleged that such clauses cannot be deployed 
to amend legislation not already on the Statute Book at 
the time of the passage of the parent Act. In truth, 
however, as Laws LJ correctly maintained in Thoburn ,  
if such argument were good, it:  
would amount to a rule that Parliament 
lacks the legal power effectively to enact a 
                                                            
343 R (Evans) v Attorney General  [2013] 3 WLR 1631, 1637.  
344 Committee on Ministers’  Powers, 1932, at p.65; Rippon, 
1989, at pp.206-207; Marshall,  2002, at pp.496 -499; House of 
Lords Select Committee on Delegated Powers and Regulatory 
Reform, 2002.  
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Henry VIII clause enabling amendment of 
future legislation… [S]ince it would inhibit 
what Parliament may enact, it is a fetter on 
sovereignty345  
and, therefore, cannot be accepted: prospective Henry 
VIII clauses, despite the fact that they entice complex 
interpretation exercises, potentially give rise to 
frictions between the Executive and Parliament, as well 
as may prove otherwise inconvenient, fall well within 
the all-embracing ambit of the sovereign UK 
Parliament. What is, however, more important for 
present purposes is that Henry VIII clauses, even if 
they are narrowly construed 346 and properly so, are not 
considered as having been impliedly repealed by 
postdating legislation that falls within the ambit of, or 
that is prima facie  inconsistent with, the powers 
contained in such clauses. Once again, if it were 
otherwise, the very raison d'être  of such clauses (and 
with it, Parliament’s intention) would be defeated. So, 
for example, the prospective Henry VIII power 
contained in s.10 HRA which empowers the Executive to 
                                                            
345 [2003] QB 151, 181.  
346 See: ITV Broadcasting Ltd and Others v TV Catchup Ltd  
[2011] EWHC 1874, at para.66.  
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modify post-1998 primary legislation that has been 
declared under s.4 of the same act to be incompatible 
with an incorporated ECHR right so as to remove the 
said incompatibility, is not repealed each time no action 
is taken, or alternative procedures are followed, with 
respect to a particular provision that has been declared 
incompatible under s.4. This is far from suggesting, 
however, that provisions containing Henry VIII powers 
can only be repealed either expressly or by implication 
through a provision containing a conflicting power -
conferring rule.  
In summary, a reading of the UK Constitution that can 
explain contemporary constitutional advancements such 
as Community membership without resorting to 
extravagant theses entailing revolutions, manner and 
form restrictions, artificial statutory presumptions and 
constructions, noble lies or constitutional statutes 
appears possible, if only by displacing from the nucleus 
of the doctrine of implied repeal chronological 
precedence and substituting for Parliament’s genuine 
intention. Cementing this conclusion, however, 
necessitates analysis of the interrelationship between 
the implied repeal doctrine and its twin principle – the 
rule ostensibly forbidding Parliament from binding its 
successors –  to which the thesis now turns.  
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Chapter IV: Can Parliament 
bind its successors? 
 
In the antecedent discussion, the atypically erratic 
treatment of the doctrine of implied repeal by some 
scholars was noted. Coke and Blackstone were seen as 
both upholding the traditional, Roman law maxim of ‘ lex 
posterior derogat priori ’ ,  as well as lending their 
support to a seemingly entirely antipodal doctrine – the 
presumption against implied repeals, prevalent in US 
law – in almost the same breath. At the time, it was 
implied by the analysis that both jurists sought to carve 
a middle way by perceptibly distancing themselves from 
the formalist tradition of the ‘ lex posterior’  rule. 
Leaving it at that would, however, be failing to paint 
the whole picture.  
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Two related but distinct doctrines 
 
In truth, the marked discrepancy is merely apparent, 
not real. Coke and Blackstone, as well as Dicey and 
other Victorian scholars, were confident that the place 
of the implied repeal doctrine in UK law was positively 
prescribed; its use was reserved only for those cases in 
which a clear and unambiguous intention to repeal a 
previous enactment was found in a posterior statute. In 
other words, their allegiance rested considerably  
farther along the road – that is, much closer both to the 
US law presumption against implied repeals as well as 
the modified implied repeal doctrine presented above – 
than was initially suggested.  
If that is so, the question is evidently raised as to why  
explicit, approving citation of the ‘ lex posterior’  doctrine 
is to be found in their works. The reason is none other 
than a modernly-conceived, fallacious doctrinal 
conflation; in particular, the amalgamation of the 
‘ implied repeal’  doctrine, properly so understood, with 
the principle that ‘Parliament cannot bind its 
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successors’347 which MacCormick elegantly expresses in 
the following manner:  
Parliament has an unrestricted and general 
power to enact valid law, subject to only two 
disabilities, namely, a disability to enact 
norms disabling Parliament on any future 
occasion from enjoying the same unrestricted 
and general power, and a disability to enact 
laws that derogate from the former 
disability.348 
To explain, the maxim ‘ lex posterior derogat priori’  is 
adduced in most pre-20 th century treatises of UK 
constitutional law not – as many have, without much 
thought, assumed – in an attempt to accommodate in 
UK law the rigid, formalist notion that any and every 
inconsistency, no matter how small, insignificant or 
unintended, between two enactments must necessarily 
result in the pro tanto  repeal of the one that happens to 
have been chronologically enacted first, but rather in 
their endeavour to verify that an Act cannot protect 
                                                            
347 An understandably different expression of which, 
incidentally, also pertains in US law, sub nomine  ‘presumption 
against irrepealable laws’:  Black, 2008 [1896], at p.109.  
348 MacCormick, 1998-1999, at p.21. 
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itself against its future repeal (that is, the principle 
that ‘Parliament cannot bind its successors’) so that a 
‘lex posterior ’  will always ‘derogat priori ’  if it so intends 
to . Indeed, the idea that a mechanistic concept so 
discordant with the UK constitutional culture and 
Parliament’s sovereignty as the literal meaning of the 
‘lex posterior ’  maxim could ever find a place in UK law 
was so foreign, that seldom was time taken by jurists to 
explain that their use of the maxim is circumstantial 
and serves merely as a way to exemplify the truthful 
principle that previous Acts cannot tie the hands of 
future Parliaments.  
In short, the key is located in highlighting that 18 th and 
19 th century British thinkers conceived the rule that 
the legislature cannot bind its successors and the 
implied repeal doctrine as being distinct but closely 
inter-related principles or, otherwise put, as being 
opposite sides of the same coin: the implied repeal 
doctrine being backward-looking whilst the principle 
that Parliament cannot bind its successors being 
forward-looking. For instance, in Blackstone’s 
enumeration of “the rules to be observed with regard to 
the construction of statutes”,349 “leges posteriores priores 
                                                            
349 Blackstone, 1765, at p.87.  
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contrarias abrogant”350 is to be found at point 7 whilst 
the principle that “Acts of parliament derogatory from 
the power of subsequent parliaments bind not” 351 
occupies point 9. In Coke’s Institutional writings, this 
is even more prominent: under the heading ‘Acts 
against the power of the Parliament subsequent bind 
not’, the jurist suggests that: 
albeit it appeareth by these examples … 
what transcendent power and authority this 
court of parliament hath, yet though divers 
parliaments have attempted to barre, 
restrain, suspend, qualifie, or make void 
subsequent parliaments, yet could they never 
effect it, for the latter parliament hath ever 
power to abrogate, suspend, qualifie, 
explain, or make void the former in the 
whole or in any part thereof, 
notwithstanding any words of restraint, 
                                                            
350 ibid . ,  at p.89. As seen earlier, he proceeds to qualify the 
application of the maxim by stating that “this is to be 
understood, only when the latter statute is couched in 
negative terms, or by it ’s [sic ]  matter necessarily implies a 
negative” ( ibid . ) .  
351 ibid . ,  at p.90.  
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prohibition, or penalty in the former: for it is 
a maxime in the law of the parliament, quod 
leges posteriores priores contrarias 
abrogant .352 
Interestingly, the rule prohibiting irrepealable laws 
also formed part of Roman law, as several sources 
attest. For instance, the Roman constitutionalist Cicero 
suggests that “cum lex abrogatur, illud ipsum abrogatur 
quo non eam abrogari oporteat .”353,354  
Indeed, not only was the principle’s place in Roman law 
firm, but, much like their 18 th and 19 th century British 
descendants, Roman lawyers considered it as going 
hand in hand with the ‘lex posterior ’  rule.  
It is, then, only tempting to go even further in utilising 
this interpretive prism to resolve any remaining 
ambiguities anent the ‘ lex posterior ’ rule – that is, 
chiefly, the incongruity that appears to exist between 
the modified implied repeal doctrine herein advanced, 
                                                            
352 4 Co Inst ,  43. 
353 [When a law is repealed, the provision against repeal is  
repealed at the same time].  
354 Cicero, 2004 [58-57 BC], Book 3, Letter 23, at p.52.  
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and the prima facie  meaning of the decisions in the 
Vauxhall Estates  and Ellen Street Estates  cases. As 
discussed earlier, the twin cases are the earliest 
comprehensive judicial approval of the ‘ lex posterior ’  
rule recorded in the UK and still constitute the first 
and foremost textbook point of reference of any 
discussion of the topic. In light of the above however, 
the question is raised as to whether they should, 
ultimately, be conceived as attempts to import into UK  
law a strident, formalist version of the ‘ lex posterior ’  
maxim or whether they should be understood as 
hitherto misconceived applications of the principle that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors.  
It is respectfully submitted that a more rigorous 
analysis of the two cases reveals the veracity of the 
latter reading. Indeed, towards that end, it is useful to 
reproduce the arguments material to such conclusion 
heard in court. As earlier mentioned, both cases 
revolved around the inconsistency between the 
Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act 
1919 and the Housing Act 1925, s.2 and s.46 of which, 
respectively, laid down rules, differing in certain 
respects, for the assessment of compensation in respect 
of land acquired compulsorily for public purposes. 
Crucially, Mr Hill, counsel for the claimants in both 
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cases, did not attempt to argue that a consistent 
reading of the two Acts was possible 355 and, therefore, 
should be preferred over the application of the ‘ lex 
posterior ’ rule and the consequent implied repeal of the 
relevant parts of the 1919 Act. Instead, he sought to 
rely on s.7(1) of the 1919 Act which provided that:  
[t]he provisions of the Act or order by which 
the land is authorised to be acquired, or of 
any Act incorporated therewith, shall, in 
relation to the matters dealt with in this 
Act, have effect subject to this Act, and so 
far as inconsistent with this Act those 
provisions shall cease to have or shall not 
have effect…  
In particular, Mr Hill suggested that the  effect of s.7(1) 
of the 1919 Act was that the “provisions of s.46 for the 
assessment of compensation in so far as they differ from 
those of the earlier Act of 1919 are of no effect 
whatever”356 or, even more forcefully in Ellen Street 
                                                            
355 Indeed, he forthwith admitted that “[i]t  i s not … disputed 
here that the later provisions are inconsistent with the 
earlier, and the amounts of the alternative assessments have 
been agreed between the parties”: [1932] 1 KB 733, 738.  
356 ibid. .  
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Estates , have “never had statutory force” !357 Even 
though it was conceded that “the Legislature, in 
enacting s.46 of the Act of 1925, no doubt had the 
provisions of the earlier Acquisition Act of 1919 clearly 
in mind”,358 this was thought to be insufficient; should 
Parliament have wished to repeal the 1919 Act it should 
have said so expressly.  
The impossibly extravagant assertion of counsel 
prompted the equally forceful judicial comments that 
have been misinterpreted as affirmation of the hard -
line ‘lex posterior ’ maxim. In truth, however, at no point 
in either case was the implied repeal doctrine 
contested: no consistent reading of the two Acts was 
submitted to the court to pronounce upon which meant 
that they could not both stand together and therefore 
inevitably the former had to  give way to the latter. 
Unless, of course, the opposite side of the coin – the 
principle that Parliament cannot bind its successors –  
could be revised. That was, indeed, the principle which 
counsel for the claimants contested by proposing that 
Parliament can, in fact, bind its successors by 
effectively removing from their legislative arsenal at 
                                                            
357 [1934] 1 KB 590, 593.  
358 [1932] 1 KB 733, 738.  
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least one power: that of impliedly repealing a particular 
statute. The contention was swiftly and unanimously 
rejected by the judges, with Maugham LJ emphatically 
upholding the orthodox principle by stating that:  
[t]he Legislature cannot, according to our 
constitution, bind itself as to the form of 
subsequent legislation, and it is impossible 
for Parliament to enact that in a subsequent 
statute dealing with the same subjectmatter 
there can be no implied repeal…359 
As a side note, it is appropriate to note that Hill was 
mistaken in an additional respect: Parliament, in its 
1919 enactment, was most likely not purporting to bind 
its successors at all. Indeed, the marginal note 
appended to s.7 of the 1919 Act read: ‘Effect of Act on 
existing enactments’. Albeit normally being a “most 
unsure guide to the construction of the enacting 
section”,360 it is submitted that the said marginal note 
signifies, in the clearest manner possible, the intention 
of Parliament with regard to the reach of s.7.  
                                                            
359 [1934] 1 KB 590, 597.  
360 DPP v Schildkamp  [1971] AC 1, 28. See also: ibid. ,  26-28; 
[1932] 1 KB 733, 743. C.f. Bennion,1981, at pp.145-146.  
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God and the stone  
 
Having resolved the remaining ambiguities pertaining 
to the scope of the implied repeal doctrine in UK law, 
the final point made with regard to the Ellen Street 
Estates  and Vauxhall Estates  cases allows for reverting 
to an important, neighbouring issue. According to these 
cases, even if Parliament had intended s.7 of the 1919 
Act to have prospective effect (as it did not), such 
intention would not have been effective. Does  it follow 
from such conclusion that Parliament cannot legally do 
certain things – exempli gratia , enact a section such as 
s.7 that has prospective effect – and that therefore it is 
not sovereign? More broadly put, can the twin 
propositions ‘Parliament is sovereign’ and ‘Parliament 
cannot  bind its successors’ be resolved, or does 
acknowledging, as Wade himself did, that “there is one, 
and only one, limit to Parliament’s legal power” 361 
fatally wound its claim to unbridled, sovereign power? 
The most typically encountered version of the syllogism 
is concisely cited by Professor Gray:  
                                                            
361 Wade, 1955, at p.174.  
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[I]f Parliament is sovereign, there is nothing 
it cannot do by legislation; if there is 
nothing Parliament cannot do by legislation, 
it may bind itself hand and foot by 
legislation; if Parliament so binds itself by 
legislation there are things which it cannot 
do by legislation; and if there are such 
things Parliament is not sovereign. 362 
The question’s philosoph ical colourings are immediately 
apparent. Indeed, the aforementioned dilemma 
constitutes a variant of an antediluvian paradox that 
has perturbed theologians and philosophers alike since 
the earliest of ages: the paradox of God and the stone. 
The classic exposition of the paradox is in the following 
form: 
 
{ 
EITHER  
(a) God can create a stone He cannot lift       
OR  
                                                            
362 Gray, 1953-1954, at p.54.  
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(b) God cannot create a stone He cannot lift  
 
IF (a) is true, then God is not omnipotent, since He 
cannot lift the stone in question.  
IF (b) is true, then God is not omnipotent since He 
cannot create the stone in question.  
 
THEREFORE , God is not omnipotent.  
} 
 
Several solutions to the logical paradox have been 
proposed over the years. Chief amongst them is the 
Hume-inspired response heralded, inter alios , by 
Mavrodes,363 that omnipotence does not require the 
ability to accomplish “pseudo -tasks”;364 that is tasks 
which are logically impossible, such as the task of 
making a round square, a two-dimensional cube or a 
                                                            
363 Mavrodes, 1963. See also:  Anderson, 1984.  
364 ibid . ,  at p.223.  
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Penrose triangle (famously described by its populariser 
as ‘impossibility in its purest form’), the task of 
realising that one has never been omnipotent (in the 
case of an omnipotent God),365 the task of bringing about 
Caesar’s freely  refraining from crossing the Rubicon, 366 
the task of proving the stare decisis  doctrine by 
reference to precedent,367 or the task of enacting an 
‘ illegal’ Act (in the case of a sovereign body such as the 
UK Parliament),368 but not the customarily adduced task 
of making a woman a man.369 As the 12 th  century 
philosopher Maimonides maintained: 
That which is impossible has a permanent 
and constant property, which is not the 
                                                            
365 Consideration of this (pseudo -)task leads to even more 
oxymoronic results since it is a task that, presumably, an 
omnipotent being cannot perform, but a human being can.  
366 See: Plantinga, 1974, Ch.9.  
367 Williams, 1954, at p.471. Although some noteworthy 
solutions have been offered with regard to this apparent 
pseudo-task: Cross, 1977.  
368 See: London (City) v Wood  (1701) 12 Mod 669, 687-688; 
[1968] 1 WLR 242, 247.  
369 See: De Lolme, 1838 [1775],  at p.695, fn.*.  
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result of some agent, and cannot in any way 
change, and consequently we do not ascribe 
to God the power of doing what is 
impossible… [I]t is impossible that God 
should produce a being like Himself, or 
annihilate, corporify, or change Himself. The 
power of God is not assumed to extend to any 
of these impossibilities…  
[T]here are things which are impossible, 
whose existence cannot be admitted, and 
whose creation is excluded from the power of 
God, and the assumption that God does not 
change their nature does not imply weakness 
in God, or a limit to His power. Consequently 
things impossible remain impossible, and do 
not depend on the action of an agent. 370  
In other words, rather than constituting limits on an 
omnipotent being’s actual agency, such pseudo -tasks in 
fact constitute its epistemological boundaries and 
emanate from our need to identify and define it, in a 
process much like the one defined by Kant as the 
‘transcendental illusion’.371 Therefore, the conundrum 
                                                            
370 Maimonides, 1904 [c.1190],  at pp.279 -280. 
371 Kant, 1899 [1781],  at pp.188-189. 
  
 
234 
 
can, according to this line of argument, be resolved by 
rephrasing the initial position from posing an ‘either/or’ 
question into a statement that:  
Every stone that God can create, 372 God can 
lift.  
Although Blackstone seems to lend his support to this 
idea when stating that Parliament “can, in short, do 
every thing that is not naturally impossible” 373 or, as 
Jonathan Swift once elegantly put it, “any thing within 
the compass of human power”,374 the response does not 
seem particularly capable in assisting the resolution of 
the paradox’s Parliamentary variant since, as Bradley 
and Ewing maintain,375 it is by no means logically 
inconceivable that Parliament, a human institution, 
could make fresh constitutional arrangements for the 
future, including binding its successors. To be fair, it 
may be possible, per analogiam ,  to characterise the task 
                                                            
372 Or, perhaps, even more appropriately,  every stone that can 
be created.  
373 Blackstone, 1765, at p.156.  
374 Swift, 1762, at p.57.  
375 Bradley and Ewing, 2007, at p.63.  
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of binding successor Parliaments as a ‘pseudo -task’ by 
arguing that, even if not logically inconceivable, it i s, 
under the UK Constitution, legally  inconceivable for 
Parliament to bind its successors since the courts, so 
long as they are acting within the confines of their 
constitutional role, will not give effect to any such 
attempt. To be sure however, it is best to seek a more 
suitable and impervious answer.  
An alternative solution that has been met with 
relatively acclamatory reception in academic cycles is 
the approach suggesting that the paradox constitutes a 
semantic pseudo-dilemma and is therefore not amenable 
to an answer. The complex system of structured human 
communication which we call language, despite its 
breadth, is unable – the argument flows – to capture, 
explore and explain transcendental subjects such as, to 
name merely a few, God, omnipotence and  infinity: 
“[f]or an answer which cannot be expressed the question 
too cannot be expressed”,376 as Wittgenstein elegantly 
puts it.  
Similarly, it must be remembered that not all 
grammatically and syntactically correct combinations of 
linguistic elements into sentences are meaningful and 
                                                            
376 Wittgenstein, 1922, at p.89.  
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therefore qualify as speech-acts. Consequently, 
attempting to assign to them a classical binary truth 
value is futile. As Jørgensen notes:  
[T]he expression ‘This sentence is false’ is 
not a sentence at all in any logical sense. If 
the expression mentioned is considered a 
sentence and the word ‘false’ is considered 
the logical predicate of this sentence, then 
the logical subject cannot be the whole 
expression, but at most either the words 
‘This sentence’ or the designation of these 
words. In the first case the whole expression 
is meaningless because ‘false’ is not the kind 
of predicate which can be meaningfully 
ascribed to descriptions as ‘This sentence’. 
And in the latter case the whole expression 
is meaningless because the description ‘This 
sentence’ has no object, there being no 
sentence to which these words can refer. In 
neither case can any conclusions be drawn 
from the expression mentioned, and no 
paradoxes emerge.377 
                                                            
377 Jørgensen, 1953, at p.290. See also:  Hicks, 1971.  
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If Wittgenstein is right about our language’s inability 
to grasp certain topics such as omnipotence, it may well 
be the case that sentences such as ‘a boulder God 
cannot lift’  or ‘an Act binding a sovereign Parliament’s 
successors’ do not qualify as speech -acts properly so 
called378 and, therefore, the paradox is i llusory. In fact, 
as Hume would have it, the logically impossible is 
inconceivable.  
Alternatively, it may be argued, in line with 
Descartes,379 that God can create a stone he cannot lift 
and then lift it; that He, in other words, is, in 
Heraclitean terms, coincidentia oppositorum  and can 
therefore make rational antinomies true such as 
bringing “it about that it should be untrue that twice 
four make eight”.380 In commenting on the problematic 
nature of voluntarism, as this solution has frequently 
been termed, it suffices to highlight how deeply it 
treads into the unchartered territory of dialetheism and 
paraconsistent logic by necessarily transgressing one of 
the most basic and intuitive rules of inference – the 
                                                            
378 And, consequently, as tasks open to be performed.  
379 See also: Frankfurt,  1964.  
380 Descartes,  1955 [1619-1649], at p.251.  
  
 
238 
 
validity of disjunctive syllogisms – and, therefore, 
ultimately, violating the law of non-contradiction: “αὕτη 
δὴ  πασῶν ἐστὶ βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν”,381,382 according to 
Aristotle himself.  
An analogous, more premiss-consistent solution may be 
arrived at via the theological route. Unlike Islamism 
that preaches the strict and absolute indivisibility of 
God, Christian doctrine, for instance, defines God in a 
Trinitarian manner to include three hypostases: the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. The three 
hypostases are distinct – each being God, whole and 
entire – yet, they are one ‘substance, essence or nature’. 
Hinduism, for its part, considers Brahman  (God) as a 
singular ultimate being and ātman as the innermost, 
divine self of an individual. Putting at one side non-
dualist approaches that regard Brahman  and ātman  as 
ultimately indistinct, Hinduism endorses infinite 
manifestations of God, with different sects worshiping 
different manifestations of His divinity. In this light, it 
could be maintained that an omnipotent God can 
withstand the paradox of the stone: one incarnation 
creating the stone He cannot lift, and another lifting it.  
                                                            
381 [Which law is the most certain of all principles].  
382 Aristotle, c.350 BC, Book Γ  (Gamma). 
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The solution appears less exposed to scrutiny than the 
paraconsistent Descartian approach but one cannot fail 
to mention its metaphysical nature. In terms of the 
traditional paradox, the theological approach may well, 
therefore, be rejected as the effortless way out. In so far 
as its Parliamentary variant herein discussed is 
concerned, however, it fares better. To explain, in orde r 
to understand how the principle that Parliament cannot 
bind its successors does not deduct from its sovereignty , 
it is essential to fathom, in line with the earlier 
comments towards that effect, that the UK Parliament 
is best conceived as a singular, perpetual institution 
with sovereign power that exists out of time – a 
constitutional, omnipotent being akin to the religious 
God. Much like the Christian and Hindu conceptions of 
God, the omnicompetent, atemporal God of UK 
constitutional law, Parliament, appears in several, 
ephemeral manifestations through the process of 
dissolution and consequent re-summoning. Each 
reconstituted Parliament is distinct from both its 
predecessor as well as its future incarnations. It is 
neither more nor less sovereign than any of them 
however, since each and every incarnation is 
‘Parliament’, whole and entire. There is, therefore, 
nothing that the present manifestation of Parliament 
cannot do, including binding its successors. As future 
representations are equally sovereign, whether they 
will or will not remain bound, is exclusively up to them. 
Dispelling the paradox, therefore, does not require a 
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drastic revision but merely a rephrasing of the principle 
that ‘Parliament cannot bind its successors’ in the 
following manner:  
 
{ 
Parliament, being sovereign, can do 
anything, including binding its successors               
AND 
Parliament, being sovereign, can do 
anything, including unbinding itself from its 
predecessors 
}383 
 
This reconceptualisation of the doctrine is preferable to 
Wade’s thesis that “there is one, and only one, limit to 
                                                            
383 The remainder of the thesis will espouse this reformulated 
version of the orthodox doctrine. However, for the purpose of 
clarity, it will  continue to be referred to as the doctrine that 
‘Parliament cannot  bind its successors’ .   
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Parliament’s legal power…”384 Indeed, the bounded 
sovereignty paradox would remain in place in Sir 
William’s thesis even if such thesis could be defended 
on the basis of Russell’s ‘theory of types’ 385 by 
conceiving of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty 
as belonging “to a normative level different from the 
normative level to which ordinary principles of the 
English Constitution belong”386 or on the basis of 
restrictively defining the doctrine’s subject -matter and 
reformulating the principle as:  
Parliament has the legal power to pass any 
law that does not affect its legislative 
competence.387 
Moreover, the reconceptualisation herein proposed also 
deals effectively with several accompanying lower -tier 
paradoxes such as how has Parliament achieved in 
granting upon colonial legislatures a power which it 
itself (allegedly) lacks: namely, the ability to bind 
                                                            
384 Wade, 1955, at p.174. 
385 Russell,  1903, at pp.523-524; Russell,  1908.  
386 Tammelo, 1958, at p.504.  
387 ibid . ,  at p.505.  
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themselves as to the ‘manner and form’ of future 
legislation.388  
To be fair and despite its merits, two legitimate 
questions arise from the above formulation. For one, 
has the present Parliament, being sovereign, genuinely 
succeeded in binding its successors? Indeed it has, for a 
conscious decision (albeit not necessari ly couched in 
express words) is required by a future Parliament in 
order to unbind itself; “as Samson was bound with his 
own consent, yet if the Philistines come; that is, if any 
just or important occasion do arise, it cannot hold or 
restrain the prerogative; it will be as thread, and 
broken as easy as the bonds of Samson…” 389  
But, in the second place, if the above is true, one is also 
legitimised in asking how does an Act binding 
Parliament’s successors differ from an ‘ordinary’ 
enactment that can be repealed on a whim?  
In one sense, the simple answer that can be provided is 
that it does not: both the proverbial Dentists Act 1878 
and the hypothetical Parliamentary Act 2017 requiring 
a two-thirds Parliamentary majority for its repeal bind 
                                                            
388 Detmold, 1985, at pp.207-213. 
389 Sir John Davies quoted in: Hume, 1819, at p.404.  
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Parliament in the same manner and quality as well as 
to the same extent. More generally, since, as the House 
of Commons European Scrutiny Committee emphasised 
in a recent report, “all Parliaments legislate for the 
future”,390 every  enactment binds Parliament’s 
successors, without rendering them any less supreme 
than the current Parliament, in the sense that it 
preoccupies and prejudices the law applicable in a 
particular field and, therefore, requires from a future 
Parliament a conscious decision for its amendment or 
repeal.391 That is, indeed, also why the hypothetical 
Parliamentary Act 2017 should not, as some would have 
thought,392 be conceived as any more ‘ineffective’ or, 
even worse, ‘void’ than the Dentists Act 1878 when a 
future Parliament repeals it. As Wade, correctly in this 
respect, puts it:  
                                                            
390 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, 2010, at 
p.32, para.90.  
391 This matter will further be elaborated upon in Chapter VII, 
in the context of the discussion of the constitutional position 
of the UK’s composite nations.  
392 See: Bacon, 1831, at p.185; Detmold, 1985, at p.212; 
Goldsworthy, 1987-1988, at p.406.  
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If Parliament cannot bind its successors, 
there must be some infirmity in Acts which 
attempt to do so. But it is no more than the 
common infirmity which is shared by all the 
Acts ever passed, viz .,  the possibility of 
being repealed. To say that Acts must be 
called ‘void’ for that reason is to create an 
artificial obstacle.393  
In another sense however, this is not a satisfactory 
answer as it comes close to rendering the paradox 
reformulation a nonsensical contradiction or, worse, the 
easy way out: if legislation with a proposed binding 
effect has no difference from ordinary legislation then, 
surely, Parliament cannot , even in the sense proposed 
above,  bind its successors and the reformulation is 
reduced to Wade’s traditional ‘one, and only one, limit’ 
thesis. Differently put, if ordinary and proposedly 
binding legislation are, for all intents and purposes, 
identical in effect, Parliament’s decision to use 
imperative, prospective language, as opposed to 
ordinary language, is wholly ineffective . This, in turn,  
casts serious doubt upon whether this theory genuinely 
honours Parliament’s intention and, thus, upon whether 
                                                            
393 Wade, 1955, at p.186.  
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it upholds, in practice and effect, Parliament’s 
sovereignty. 
The preferable, if more intricate, answer therefore 
should be that ordinary legislation does  differ from 
legislation intending to bind successor Parliaments. At 
least a handful of the later type of laws have found 
their way into the Statute Book over the years but, in 
retrospect, as will later be seen, this has not practically 
stopped posterior Parliaments from overriding, 
repealing or, in terms that are more relevant to the 
present context, ‘unbinding’  themselves from, these 
laws. As such and coupled with the compelling reasons 
recorded above, this answer at first seems implausible 
and requires elucidation.  
To that effect, it is warranted to have recourse to Dicey 
who, in the context of the legislation that brought about 
the union of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 
correctly made clear that the clauses therein to be 
found that are intended to bind successor Parliaments 
can be (and, by and large, have been as will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter VIII ) overturned but, at 
the same time, are certainly not “unmeaning”394 as they 
act as beacons issuing warnings that they “cannot be 
changed without grave danger to the Constitution of the 
                                                            
394 Dicey and Rait, 1920, at p.253.  
  
 
246 
 
country.”395 Evidently, under this prism, the meaning 
that is ascribed to prospective restrictive clauses is 
predominantly socio-political, not legal; a political 
consitutionalist’s dead hand of sorts. However, this 
should be sufficient to answer satisfactorily any 
suspicion of counterintuitiveness of the traditional 
principle’s reconceptualisation attempted above: 
Parliament can bind its successors on the political 
plane; Parliament can unbind itself from its 
predecessors on the legal plane.  Delving even deeper to 
provide an additional layer of confidence to this line of 
argument, there might be also be some discrete legal 
effects of statutes binding Parliament’s successors but 
these are better left for later, after the relevant legal 
landscape has been appropriately formulated in 
Chapters VII and VIII.  
In summary, readjusting the orthodox account of the 
UK Constitution so as to enable it to interpret 
coherently and systematically, as well as to respond 
adequately to the challenges arising from, contemporary 
constitutional developments  involves the restoration of 
the implied repeal doctrine to its roots . This restoration 
entails, as Chapter III proposes, conceiving the doctrine 
as a means to the end of discovering and upholding 
                                                            
395 ibid. ,  at pp.253-254.  
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Parliament’s genuine intention rather than an end 
(giving priority to chronologically more recent laws) in 
itself.  In the second place however, it also involves 
decisively severing it from the interrelated, but 
normatively distinct, principle that disallows 
Parliament from binding its successors . This is 
rendered possible, as Chapter IV illustrates, by 
assorting the two doctrines’ separate roles: the implied 
repeal doctrine being backward-looking and thus 
safeguarding the present Parliament’s sovereignty 
whilst the principle that Parliament cannot bind its 
successors being forward-looking and thus safeguarding 
future Parliaments’ sovereignty. In the process of 
disentangling the two doctrines however, an additional 
problem, this time relating to the latter principle,  is 
encountered: namely, the paradox of an omnicompetent 
Parliament’s inability to bind its successors . As Chapter 
IV shows, dispelling the paradox in a way that remains 
within the confines of orthodox theory is possible by a 
slight reconceptualisation of the traditional, otherwise 
veracious, principle. Nevertheless, an alternative 
proposal has also been advanced to understand the 
paradox that, if accepted, dismantles the foundations of 
the account herein constructed. Hence, naturally, the 
forthcoming Chapter is reserved for its analysis.  
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Chapter V: Self-embracing 
sovereignty theory 
 
The said alternative proposal stems from the basic 
modal characterisation of the distinction between 
essential and accidental properties of objects. Simply 
put, an essential property {P} of an object {X} is a {P} 
that {X} necessarily has, whereas a {P} is accidental if it 
is possible that {X} lacks {P}. In this vein, the 
distinction may be made between an essentially 
omnipotent and an accidentally omnipotent God. The 
paradox can only be resolved, the argument professes, 
by ascribing accidental omnipotence to God. Indeed, if 
omnipotence is merely an accidental property of God, it 
follows that it may be relinquished or otherwise 
removed –  that is, precisely, what the act of creating a 
stone He cannot lift involves. 396 Contrariwise, if 
                                                            
396 Evidently, this conclusion rejects all of the abovementioned 
solutions by assuming that the dilemma is real, that a stone 
God cannot lift  is a possible object,  as well as that God cannot 
create the said stone and then lift it.  
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omnipotence were an essential property of God, He 
would not be able to abandon His omnipotence; 
therefore He would be unable to create the said stone, 
rendering the statement that he is not omnipotent true 
and the paradox unsolvable.  
In terms of resolving the actual paradox, the approach 
has not met with a particularly welcoming reception, 
not least because the idea of a potentially non -
omnipotent God, an oxymoron in itself, does not sound 
appealing to theist ears. In terms of its Parliamentary 
variant, however, academic reactions have been more 
promising. Naturally, being a metaphysical topic 
resting on the boundaries of constitutional law and 
legal philosophy, it is Hart that lays most of its modern 
groundwork: 
Under the influence of the Austinian 
doctrine that law is essentially the product 
of a legally untrammelled will, older 
constitutional theorists wrote as if it was a 
logical necessity that there should be a 
legislature which was sovereign, in the sense 
that it is free, at every moment of its 
existence as a continuing body, not only from 
legal limitations imposed ab extra , but also 
from its own prior legislation… [A]nother 
principle which might equally well, perhaps 
better, deserve the name of ‘sovereignty’ 
[exists]. This is the principle that 
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Parliament should not be incapable of 
limiting irrevocably the legislative 
competence of its successors but, on the 
contrary, should have this wider self -
limiting power. Parliament would then at 
least once in its history be capable of 
exercising an even larger sphere of 
legislative competence than the accepted 
established doctrine allows it.  
It in effect … [is] a choice between a 
continuing omnipotence in all matters not 
affecting the legislative competence of 
successive parliaments, and an unrestricted 
self-embracing omnipotence the exercise of 
which can only be enjoyed once.397  
In other words, much like God in the latter approach to 
the traditional paradox, Parliament’s sovereignty, says 
Hart, could be either continuing (essential) or self -
embracing (accidental).398 It is important to fathom 
however that Hart’s remarks are  situated on the 
                                                            
397 Hart, 1961, at p.145.  
398 Mackie,  in similar vein, has made the distinction between 
‘sovereignty (1) ’  and ‘sovereignty (2)’  respectively: Mackie, 
1955, at pp.211-212. 
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theoretical and conceptual, rather than the empirical, 
plane. He merely contends that it is conceivable for a 
legislative body’s sovereignty to be self -embracing; the 
formerly accepted equation of sovereignty with 
continuing sovereignty was, in his opinion, conceptually 
and analytically flawed. In so far as the empirical UK 
context is concerned however, the legal theorist is clear:  
That [the UK] Parliament is sovereign in 
this [continuing] sense may now be regarded 
as established, and the principle that no 
earlier Parliament can preclude its 
‘successors’ from repealing its legislation 
constitutes part of the ultimate rule of 
recognition used by the courts in identifying 
valid rules of law.399 
Evidently rejecting, disregarding, or failing to make 
note of such remarks, several 20 th century theorists 
have sought to argue that the UK Parliament’s 
sovereignty should best be described as self -embracing 
–  id est, that Parliament’s sovereignty includes the 
ability to bind its successors by changing its 
                                                            
399 Hart, 1961 at p.145.  
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composition as well as the ‘manner and form’ 400 or the 
‘ forms and procedures’401 in which legislation is passed.  
Chief amongst such theorists is Sir Ivor Jennings, 402 
even if dissertating upon the matter chronologically 
prior to Hart. Jenn ings’s reasoning proceeded by 
questioning the appropriateness of the concept of 
sovereignty to conceive of the UK Parliament’s 
constitutional role and position. Sovereignty, he argued, 
was, in the sense utilised by Dicey, essentially a 
supreme power akin to that of a Bodinian prince that 
“can do anything, even to the extent of undoing the 
things which he had previously done.” 403 As Latham 
notes however, where, as in the UK:  
the purported sovereign is anyone but a 
single actual person, the designation of him 
                                                            
400 A term adapted from the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865, 
to be discussed later. See also:  Colonial Acts Confirmation Act 
1863, s.2.  
401 A term coined by: Marshall,  1971, at p.42.  
402 See: Jennings, 1959, Ch.4.  
403 ibid . ,  at p.152.  
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must include the statement of rules for the 
ascertainment of his will.404 
Therefore, rather than enjoying the ‘essential’,  
‘continuing’ or ‘absolute’ power of a true sovereign, 
Parliament possesses a sovereignty that should best be 
understood as being strictly legal and, even then, ‘legal 
sovereignty’ is “merely a name indicating that the 
legislature has for the time being power to make laws of 
any kind in the manner required by the law ”405 or, as 
Baker puts it, “not a capricious power of doing anything 
in any way …  [but, rather] the legal power of settling 
finally legal questions in a legal way.” 406 Therefore, 
“legal sovereignty is not sovereignty at all” 407 but 
merely “a legal concept, a form of expression which 
lawyers use to express the relations between 
Parliament and the courts.”408 
                                                            
404 Latham, 1949, at p.523.  
405 Jennings, 1959, at pp.152-153 [emphasis added].  
406 Baker, 1951, at pp.60-61. 
407 Jennings, 1959 at p.149.  
408 ibid . .  
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To elaborate, the crux of Jennings’s argument is that 
unlike a Roman type of legibus solutus sovereign, 
Parliament’s edicts are subject to the courts’ 
interpretation and application, and must therefore 
observe a prescribed form to produce valid legal 
enactments. In practice, currently, to fulfil such form, a 
rule must, for most purposes, 409 be expressed to be 
enacted by the Queen’s (or King’s) ‘most Excellent 
Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this 
present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of 
the same’. For instance, a resolution adopted by the 
House of Commons alone,410 an ordinance having the 
assent of the King and Lords, but not the Commons, 411 a 
royal proclamation which is claimed to have the force of 
law,412 an international treaty signed by the Crown on 
                                                            
409 The procedural standard for Finance and Consolidation 
Fund Bills as well as Bills enacted under the Parliament Acts 
1911 and 1949 appears to be different.  
410 Stockdale v Hansard  (1839) 9 Ad&El 1, 108; Bowles v Bank 
of England  [1913] 1 Ch 57, 84-85.  
411 See: YB, 33 Hen VI, fo.17, p.8 quoted in: Cowen, 1953, at 
p.276, fn.15.  
412 12 Co Rep 74, 75-76. 
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behalf of the Executive,413 an enactment of a devolved 
body such as the Scottish Parliament, 414 and a decision 
passed by the Lords and Commons at a joint sitting 415 do 
not qualify as, or enjoy the legal force of, Acts of 
Parliament.  
Crucially, however, legal sovereignty is a doubled -edged 
sword. On the negative side, Parliament being legally  
sovereign means that it cannot produce valid and 
effective legislation, save by recording its intention in 
the particular ‘manner and form’ prescribed by law: “the 
Constitution determines the law.” 416 On the other hand, 
Parliament being legally sovereign  also means it can 
transmute the lex et consuetudo parliamenti  –  that is, 
inter alia , the rules stipulating how Parliament is 
                                                            
413 See above: fns.24-25, and ensuing discussion.  
414 C.f.  below: fn.885-886, and ensuing discussion.  
415 The bicameral nature of Parliament was established during 
the reign of Edward III. Thenceforth, the two Houses have sat 
separately to levy taxes and address the grievances of the 
Realm. Thus, it  has sometimes been thought that a single joint 
assembly of the three elements of Parliament, or any other 
combination thereof,  “could not enact a statute” (Latham, 
1949, at p.523).   
416 Jennings, 1959, at p.313.  
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constituted, the rules prescribing the ‘manner and form’ 
required for putative pronouncements to qualify as 
valid legal directives and the rules about how such 
rules may be altered: ‘the law determines the 
Constitution’.417 Doing so, however, is merely another 
way of saying that Parliament can bind its future 
incarnations. Therefore, Jennings concludes, the 
traditional Diceyan doctrine that Parliament cannot 
bind its successors is fundamentally flawed.  
It is important, however, to note at this point that it 
has sometimes been suggested that categorising 
Jennings with other self -embracing sovereignty 
theorists is both unfair and inappropriate. 418 To explain, 
as is the case with an accidentally omnipotent God 
discussed above, one would expect a Parliament 
possessing genuinely self -embracing sovereign power to 
be able to render itself unfree. It is, therefore, not 
surprising that, in the works of se lf-embracing 
sovereignty theorists such as Heuston or Latham, 419 
                                                            
417 “[T]he constitution is the result of the ordinary law of th e 
land”: Dicey, 1889, at p.190.  
418 Gordon, 2009, at pp.540-542. 
419 Although Heuston suggests that “[t]here is no need to 
rehearse here the familiar examples which prove that there is 
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Parliament is able to do just that. Sir John Salmon, for 
instance, asks:  
The exercise of legislative power is 
admittedly subject to legal conditions ;  why 
not, then, to legal limitations? If the law can 
regulate the manner  of the exercise of 
legislative power, why not also its matter? … 
Such a rule may be very unwise, but by what 
argument are we to prove that it involves a 
logical absurdity?420  
Contrariwise, as the earlier analysis shows, Jennings’s 
theory, properly understood, does not allow Parliament 
to bind its successors in the sense of restricting their 
competence (formally at least), but, rather, merely in 
the sense of redefining the modus  in which their power 
will be exercised; in other words, it avows, as Marshall 
has observed, that “Parliament in some shape will be 
obeyed”.421  
                                                                                                                                                       
no restriction on the area or ambit of the power of Parliament” 
(Heuston, 1964, at p.9), the Irish jurist’s cited assertion 
should not be taken at face -value since it is probably fuelled 
by his “concern to reconcile his argument with the view that 
Parliament is ‘sovereign’”,  as Elliott notes (Elliott, 2001, at 
p.51), and is, ult imately, incongruous with the broader context 
of his thesis.  
420 Salmond, 1913, at p.472 [emphasis in original].  
421 Marshall,  1971, at p.50.  
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Although, in a formal sense, it is indeed true, as Hogg 422 
and Gray,423 inter alios ,  have noted, that “[t]he mere 
existence of procedural restrictions on Parliament does  
not prevent the passing or repeal of any Act by 
Parliament provided it is done in the manner and form 
prescribed by the law”,424 in practice, the argument 
appears cumbersome, for it relies on a strained, 
formalistic distinction between procedural/adjective and 
substantive/subject-matter restrictions to Parliament’s 
power that has long been convincingly refuted by, inter 
alios ,  Hart.425 A convenient example may be proffered by 
envisaging a hypothetical change in the lex et 
consuetudo parliamenti  to the effect that a two-thirds 
majority vote in both Houses is required before 
purported alterations in the field of, say, human rights 
are deemed valid. Is it sincerely convincing to 
characterise such a change as a mere procedural re -
constitution of Parliament for part icular purposes, 
rather than a substantive restriction to its power? If 
yes, what about a hypothetical change requiring a 
                                                            
422 Hogg, 1985, at pp.262-264. 
423 Gray, 1953-1954. 
424 ibid . ,  at p.71.  
425 Hart, 1961, at p.147.  
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unanimous vote in both Houses? A change requiring the 
consent of the majority of the electorate or one 
requiring the consent of all  women voters, in relation to 
a law affecting women’s rights? A change requiring that 
two years should elapse before the laws under question 
are altered or a change requiring that one-thousand 
years should elapse? A change requiring the explicit 
consent of the MP for the Cambridge Constituency or 
one requiring the explicit consent of any former MP for 
the Cambridge University constituency 426 abolished in 
1950 such as Sir Isaac Newton? 
King CJ in the Supreme Court of South Australia once 
noted:  
There must be a point at which a special 
majority provision would appear as an 
attempt to deprive the parliament of powers 
rather than as a measure to prescribe the 
manner and form of their exercise. 427 
But that is precisely what the argumenta ad absurda  
referred to above colourfully (dis)prove: that the feat of 
normatively identifying such a ‘point’ – an ability 
                                                            
426 All of whom are, incidentally,  now deceased.  
427 West Lakes v South Australia  (1980) 25 SASR 389, 397.  
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necessary in order for the putative distinction between 
substance and procedure, or between manner and form, 
Parliamentary ‘reconstitution’ and subject -matter 
restrictions to be maintained intelligibly – is not merely 
a difficult factual exercise but is, rather, impossible.  
Friedmann, for instance, who, being almost alone in the 
tradition of self-embracing sovereignty theory in 
recognising the difficulty of distinguishing substance 
from procedure, valiantly, yet arguably unsuccessfully, 
attempted to devise a test for systematically 
demarcating the two types of legislative restrictions 
along the lines of the Canadian ‘pith and substance’ 
doctrine428 utilised in division of powers cases, was 
himself essentially, if tacitly, forced to concede the 
futility and circularity of his approach when 
acknowledging that:  
the borderline would [as is the case with the 
original ‘pith and substance’ test, one may 
add] be a matter for judicial discretion in 
appraisal of a particular situation. 429 
                                                            
428 See e.g. :  Hodge v Queen  (1883) 9 App Cas 117, 131.  
429 Friedmann, 1950, at p.106.  
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It seems, therefore, that any doctrinal diversion from 
the orthodox principle that Parliament cannot bind its 
successors, no matter how hard one tries to avoid it, is 
a one way street leading unmistakably to the decisive 
(whether it be, in a formal sense, substantive or 
procedural) restriction of Parliament’s sovereign power. 
One is, in other words, bound to agree with Winterton 
in his suggestion that:  
it is perfectly consistent to believe either in 
totally ‘continuing’ supremacy or totally 
‘self-embracing’ supremacy, but there is no 
consistency in asserting that the doctrine is 
half of each.430,431  
                                                            
430 Winterton, 1976, at p.604.  
431 To be fair,  albeit being located at a dif ferent plane, a 
distinction does after all exist between the respective 
sovereignty theories held by Jennings and Heuston. As already 
noted, Jennings’s basic intuition was that Parliament’s power 
is derived from the law. Any reference to ‘the law’ in the U K 
however –  reasons Heuston hinging upon such intuition –  must 
be understood as being about the ordinary law of the land; 
that is, the common law (see also:  Amos, 1930, at p.24).  It 
follows that Parliamentary sovereignty is,  ultimately,  a 
common law doctrine and, therefore, that the determination of 
the criteria of legal validity –  themselves being logically prior 
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Either way, self-embracing sovereignty theory, on face 
value, has at least some merit as an alternative to the 
revised, double-faceted, orthodox doctrine that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors. Therefore, its 
suitability to describe the present UK constitutional 
settlement must be evaluated. After all, as Loveland 
correctly notices:  
[o]ne would be quite justified in assuming … 
that academic theories are rather less 
important than case law in assessing the 
legal status of constitutional ideas. 432  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
to Parliament –  is ultimately a prerogative of the courts.   
This idea of common law constitutionalism is not new. Its 
disciples are not limited to self-embracing sovereignty 
theorists and span across the academic spectrum. Jennings, 
however, is not amongst them. For one, he correctly concedes 
that,  as a matter of fact,  the present constitutional settlement 
has been imposed upon, rather than having been created by, 
the judiciary and, therefore, it  is up to Parliament, rather 
than the courts, to promulgate or alter criteria of legal 
validity (Jennings, 1959, at p.39). Secondly and most 
importantly, Jennings’s treatise of sovereignty is a 
normatively descriptive venture whereas Heuston’s ‘new view’, 
engineered to counter “the dangers arising from an abuse of 
sovereignty” (Heuston, 1964, at p.30), is admittedly polemical.  
432 Loveland, 2009, at p.38.  
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Judicial precedent in support of 
self-embracing sovereignty theory 
 
Self-embracing sovereignty theorists primarily rely on 
three cases that allegedly evince Parliament’s ability to 
bind – be it procedurally or substantively – its 
successors by altering the criteria proposed legislation 
is required to fulfil in order to be considered valid. As 
will at once be noticed, in none of the adduced cases are 
conflicts between British citizen-subjects on UK law 
resolved by a UK court; the cases are either decisions of 
the Privy Council in its capacity as final court of appeal 
for some Commonwealth nation or judgements of former 
colonial jurisdictions. Therefore, overly relying on such 
cases as confirmation of an ostensibly UK law doctrine 
is arguably ab initio  problematic, if not outrightly 
assailable. Nevertheless, there are better, more 
unequivocal and conclusive, if more detailed, 
alternatives to show that the said cases prove little, if 
anything, in regards to the applicability, or otherwise, 
of the doctrine that Parliament cannot bind its 
successors in UK law.  
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Trethowan 
The first case, Trethowan ,433 was an appeal from a 
decree of the High Court of Australia 434 to the Privy 
Council and revolved around two impugned Bills passed 
by the New South Wales (NSW) Parliament in 1930. The 
contested issue – that is, whether or not the said Bills 
could lawfully be presented to the state viceroy, the 
‘Governor’, for His Majesty the King’s assent –  
depended on the true construction of several statutes.  
The first relevant enactment, the Constitution Bill, was 
passed by the NSW legislature in 1853 and sent to the 
UK for the signification of Her Majesty’s pleasure. In 
view of its conflict with several UK statutes however, 
the Bill could not, as was customary, simply receive the 
Royal Assent. Rather, Parliament was required to enact 
specific legislation to permit the Crown to give assent 
to it whilst, at the same time, making the relevant 
amendments to the conflicting Acts. Therefore, the New 
South Wales Constitution Act 1855 was enacted and an 
amended version of the Constitution Bill was attached 
to it as a schedule. Importantly, the statute instituted a 
                                                            
433 Attorney-General (NSW) v Trethowan  [1932] AC 526.  
434 Attorney-General (NSW) v Trethowan  (1931) 44 CLR 394.  
  
 
265 
 
bicameral legislature roughly on the prototype of the 
Parliament at Westminster; “His Majesty the King, with 
the advice and consent of the Legislative Council and 
Legislative Assembly”,435 as the Constitution Act 1902, 
replacing the 1855 Act, defined it.  
The second statute, the Constitution (Legislative 
Council) Amendment Act 1929, amended the 
Constitution Act 1902 by therein inserting s.7A that 
provided that a Bill purporting to abolish or alter the 
constitution or powers of the Legislative Council shall 
not be presented for the Royal Assent unless it has been 
approved by the two houses of Parliament as well as by 
the majority of the electorate. In a questionable attempt 
at double entrenchment, a similar requirement was laid 
down with respect to the repeal of the section itself. 436 
The contested Bills, for their part, sought, in short, to 
abolish the Legislative Council and repeal s.7A without 
following the procedure promulgated in s.7A of the 
                                                            
435 Constitution Act 1902, s.3.  
436 Constitution (Legislative Council)  Amendment Act 1928, 
s.7A(6).  Indeed, as Goldsworthy notes, there appears to have 
been confusion regarding both the intended as well as the 
actual effect of the sub-section even at the time of its 
enactment: Goldsworthy, 2006, at p.102.  
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amended 1902 Act. Thus, the question before the court 
was whether such Bills could lawfully be assented to by 
His Excellency the Governor on behalf of the Crown, 
and, in turn, become valid and effective laws. The court 
responded negatively: the colonial legislature by virtue 
of s.7A of the amended 1902 Act had effectively bound 
its successors.  
At first sight, the case437 appears to provide ample 
support for self-embracing sovereignty theory. In truth, 
however, the decision relied predominantly if not 
exclusively438 on the Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865  
(CLVA) which had been enacted by the Imperial 
Parliament in the interim period between the 1855 
Constitution Act and the amended 1902 Act. Crucially, 
by virtue of s.5 of such “charter of colonial legislative 
                                                            
437 In which, interestingly, Latham’s father, Sir John Latham, 
intervened at the request of the court in his capacity as 
Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia and 
supported the validity of s.7A.  
438 The opinions of Rich and Dixon JJ in the lower courts also 
contain alternative grounds for reaching the same conclusion 
but the case is binding authority only in relation to the 
‘manner and form’ proviso  (Goldsworthy, 1987-1988, at p.407, 
fn.33; c.f.  Campbell,  1977; Lee, 1992).  
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independence”,439 as Dicey had portrayed the 1865 Act, 
the colonial legislature was deemed as having:  
full power to make laws respecting the 
constitution, powers, and procedure of such 
legislature, provided that such laws shall 
have been passed in such manner and form 
as may from time to time be required by any 
Act of Parliament … or colonial law…  
According to Viscount Sankey in Trethowan , from the 
enactment of the 1865 Act onwards the NSW legislature 
exercised its power subject to this proviso:  
[T]hat in respect of certain laws 440 they can 
only become effectual provided they have 
                                                            
439 Dicey, 1889, at p.99.  
440 That is, laws ‘respecting the constitution, powers, or 
procedure’ of Parliament: Clayton v Heffron  (1960) 105 CLR 
214, 273; Comalco v Attorney-General (Qld)  [1976] Qd R 231, 
236-237; Attorney-General (WA) v Marquet  (2003) 217 CLR 
545, at paras.70, 80, 206, 214-215; 25 SASR 389, 397; 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s.106; 
Australia Acts 1986 (UK & Cth), s.6. In enacting all other 
types of laws, the power of the NSW Parliament, as well as the 
power of other State Parliaments of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, are free from any fetter (c.f.  Goldsworthy, 2005). 
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been passed in such manner and form as may 
from time to time be required by any Act 
still on the statute book.441  
Interestingly, in an allusion to the evasive distinction 
between substance and procedure, one can find indices 
of the idea, more audibly expressed in the lower courts 
dealing with Trethowan , that because the proviso 
expressly provides for the retainment of colonial 
legislatures’ full power  to make laws, it must be 
understood as conferring a power that is continuing  in 
nature and should therefore not be interpreted as 
authorising “any regulation, control or impairment of 
the power it describes”442 but merely as allowing the 
legislature to alter its composition or structure for 
particular purposes, or modify the procedure by which 
legislation is passed.  
At any rate, what is for present purposes important is 
that it was on the basis of such proviso, and on such 
proviso alone, that the conclusion was reached that 
Parliament was bound by the manner and form 
                                                                                                                                                       
Note also the position of the Parliament of Australia itself:  
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s.128.  
441 [1932] AC 526, 539-540. 
442 44 CLR 394, 430-431. 
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requirement enshrined in s.7A443 of the amended 1902 
Act with the effect that it could neither lawfully abolish 
the Legislative Council nor repeal s.7A as ordinarily 
constituted.  
The contrast with the UK constitutional framework is, 
however, startling. For one, the UK Parliament was not 
created by statute. Correspondingly, there exists no 
statutory enactment or other written document from 
which Parliament derives its powers, in which such 
powers are described, encompassed or circumscribed, 
and which, more generally, encapsulates the 
constitutional arrangement present in the UK. In other 
words, no parallel to the Constitution Acts of 1855 and 
1902 for NSW exists for the UK.  
Nevertheless, in and of itself, this acknowledgement 
neither sufficiently nor accurately differentiates the UK 
from NSW in respect of the issues at hand. Indeed, the 
mere fact that a document approximating what may 
properly be called a written ‘Constitution’ existed in 
NSW in the mid-19 th century does not mean that such 
‘Constitution’ was necessarily ‘controlled’ and, 
therefore, that the NSW Parliament did not  share, or 
                                                            
443 See also: Constitution Act 1902, s.5; Union Steamship v 
King  (1988) 62 ALJR 645, 648.  
  
 
270 
 
could not have shared, the characteristics of the 
Parliament at Westminster.  
For one, leaving for one moment aside the  axiomatic 
fact that, ex definitione , the powers of colonial 
legislatures were circumscribed by the doctrines of 
repugnancy and extraterritoriality whilst their 
legislation was subject to the Crown’s prerogatives of 
reservation and disallowance, 444 “when acting within 
those limits” –445 as Lord Selbourne in considering the 
powers of the Indian colonial legislature, explained –  
they were:  
not in any sense an agent or delegate of the 
Imperial Parliament, but ha[d], and w[ere] 
intended to have, plenary powers of 
legislation, as large and of the same nature, 
as those of Parliament itself. 446  
                                                            
444 See e.g. :  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, 
ss.58, 59; New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, ss.57, 65, 68, 
69. 
445 R v Burah  (1878) 2 App Cas 889, 904. See also: R (Bancoult) 
v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
and Another  [2001] QB 1067, 1103.  
446 ibid . .   
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Secondly, insofar as the particular case of NSW is 
concerned, it is revealing to remember that although 
the Select Committee of the Legislative Council that 
prepared the draft Constitution in 1853 had sought to 
“frame a Constitution in perpetuity for the colony –  not 
a constitution which could be set aside …  by every blast 
of popular opinion”,447 its intentions were expressly 
discounted as the Imperial enabling act contained a 
provision that read:  
It shall be lawful for the Legislature of New 
South Wales to make laws altering or 
repealing all or any of the provisions of the 
said reserved Bill in the same manner as any 
other laws for the good government of the 
said Colony…448 
Therefore, it is safe to assume that the NSW 
Constitution was intended as a ‘flexible’ or 
‘uncontrolled’ Constitution449 whilst its Parliament, at 
least initially, was ordained to be a sovereign 
                                                            
447 Wentworth, 1853 quoted in: Twomen, 2004, at p.269, fn.2. 
448 New South Wales Constitution Act 1855, s.4.  
449 A view confirmed in: Mccawley v The King  [1920] AC 691, 
703-706. 
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legislative body450 or, as the American scholar James 
Kent would have it, a legislative body with “plenary and 
absolute [power] within its acknowledged limits.” 451 
After all, it must be reminded that New South Wales 
being a settled, as opposed to a conquered or ceded, 
colony,452 the “invisible and inescapable cargo” 453 of 
English law, with everything that that implies, was  
                                                            
450 Two special majority requirements remained in the 
amended Constitution Act 1855 but it was common ground in 
both the UK and NSW that since neither was doubly 
entrenched, they could be repealed by ordinary legislation, as 
they in fact were by the Constitut ion Act (Amendment) Act 
1857. Incidentally, in this light,  one is entitled to conclude 
that the fact that s.7A was doubly entrenched weighed largely 
in the court’s decision that it constituted an effective ‘manner 
and form’ requirement. Support for this co nclusion may also be 
found in: 25 SASR 389, 414.  
451 Kent, 1826, at p.410. See also: (1878) 2 App Cas 889, 904 -
905; (1883) 9 App Cas 117, 132.  
452 Blackstone, 1765, at pp.76-78. C.f.  Oliver, 2005, at p.40.  
453 Reynolds, 1987, at p.1.  
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deemed to be automatically applicable therein, upon its 
establishment.454  
It follows that the differentiation vital for present 
purposes cannot be the mere existence of a 
constitutional statute in NSW as such. Nor can it be the 
fact that the NSW Legislature was created by such 
statute455 and, therefore, legislative powers and 
procedures were, unlike in the UK, 456 regulated by law. 
Rather, the compelling distinction must be sought 
between the lines of Lord Selbourne’s words of 
reservation “when acting within those limits” 457 in the 
aforequoted passage. To explain, what decidedly 
separates the said colonial jurisdiction from the UK, is 
that in the former there was in place a constitutional 
body – the Imperial Parliament – that was superior to, 
and had therefore reserved for itself the ability to set 
                                                            
454 Cooper v Stuart  14 App Cas (1889) 286, 291; Australian 
Courts Act 1828.  
455 This conclusion will  also prove useful later when refuting 
the argument that the Parliament of Great Britain was “born 
unfree”: Mitchell,  1968, at p.69.   
456 See: Brookfield, 1981-1984, at pp.609-616. 
457 2 App Cas 889, 904.  
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limits and ultimately control the constitutional status 
and powers of, the colonial legislature. By contrast, in 
the UK context, there is no external person or body 
legally capable of enacting a statute equivalent to the 
CLVA that, according to the Privy Council, allowed for 
the imposition of ‘manner and form’ restrictions on 
Parliament’s power and therefore opened the floodgates 
of questioning the validity of legislation  on grounds 
other than repugnancy with Imperial laws or, more 
generally, paved the path for what was a sub modo 
sovereign Parliament to render itself non-sovereign.  
Therefore, although Friedmann takes a first step in the 
right direction by suggesting that  “the distinction 
between ‘sovereign’ and ‘non -sovereign’ legislatures … 
is irrelevant to this problem”, 458 his second, appendant 
postulate of implying that no distinction at all can be 
made and, consequently, that Trethowan  applies in the 
UK context is more akin to a logical leap that cannot be 
accepted. The better view is that although the 
sovereign/non-sovereign division is, indeed, overly rigid, 
an alternative categorisation of the legislative bodies at 
hand may be made in the following manner: (I) 
sovereign legislative bodies such as the UK Parliament; 
(II) sub modo  sovereign bodies such as the NSW 
                                                            
458 Friedmann, 1950, at p.104.  
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Parliament until 1865; (III) self -embracingly sovereign 
bodies such as the NSW Parliament between 1865 and 
1929; (IV) partly non-sovereign bodies such as the NSW 
Parliament after 1929; (V) non-sovereign bodies such as 
the Competition Commission, the BBC and the NHS. 459  
Understood in this way, Wade’s proposition that the 
relevant distinction in the present case is one between a 
body producing ultimately “sovereign  legislation [that] 
depends for its authority on an ‘ultimate legal 
principle’, i.e. , a political fact for which no purely legal 
explanation can be given”460 and a body producing 
“subordinate legislation [that] depends for its authority 
on some ulterior legal power for which a legal 
explanation can be given”,461 and therefore that 
Trethowan  possesses no explanatory power with respect 
                                                            
459 These classifications are, of course, non -exhaustive and are 
expounded here insofar as they illuminate the case at hand; 
indeed, a plethora of further divisions between 
supreme/subordinate bodies and between bodi es operating 
under an unwritten/written, unitary/federal or 
flexible/controlled Constitution can, inter alia ,  be usefully 
made.  
460 Wade, 1955, at p.189.  
461 ibid .  [emphasis in original].  
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to the UK Constitution because it “in no way raised any 
question of the validity of acts of a[n unconditionally] 
sovereign legislature [(I)], but was rather concerned 
with subordinate, or delegated, legislative power [(II), 
(III), (IV)]”,462 may be exonerated from the charges of 
Austinian anachronism and false dichotomy usage. 463 
In light of the above, therefore, Trethowan  can be 
summarily dispensed with insofar as its alleged 
usefulness in the UK constitutional law context is 
concerned. Before proceeding however, three further 
remarks must be made.  
Firstly, in light of the above, the deficiency of the 
respondents’ argument that “[t]he constitutional 
principle that parliament cannot bind its successor has 
never been applied to a legislature which has not 
sovereign but derived powers”, 464 becomes apparent. In 
                                                            
462 ibid . ,  at p.173.  
463 On the other hand, Dicey’s likening of Dominion 
legislatures to “railway companies, school boards, town 
councils,  and the like, which possess a limited power of 
making laws” [Dicey, 1889, at p.93] goes too far and must be 
rejected.  
464 [1932] AC 526, 532.  
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truth, as already noted, the NSW Parliament’s powers 
were at the same time ‘derived’ and continuingly 
‘sovereign’, in the sense that they did not include the 
ability to bind successor Parliaments. Therefore, the 
difference is located in the manner in which different 
types of legislative bodies enjoy sovereignty; bodies 
such as the Parliament at Westminster enjoy it 
unconditionally and perpetually, whereas bodies with 
‘derived powers’ enjoy it conditionally and ephemerally 
since they may be deprived of it in the same manner as 
it was bestowed upon them by an external actor, as the 
imposition of the 1865 Act by the Imperial Parliament 
in NSW illustrates.  
Secondly, it is questionable whether, in truth, the 1865 
Imperial Act merely sought to ‘remove doubts as to the 
validity of colonial legislatures’, as its long title 
expressly provides,465 or whether it was additionally 
                                                            
465 In bolstering this position, the localised persp ective as 
expressed by Australian Professor Coper may be relevant. He 
maintained that the 1865 Act was aimed at liberating “the 
local legislatures from the spectacular aberrations of South 
Australian Judge Benjamin Boothby, who had persistently 
struck down any local legislation which had, in his view, ‘the 
slightest whiff of inconsistency with the general principles of 
English law’” (Coper, 1987, at p.7 quoted in: Lee, 1988, at 
pp.299-300). S.3 of the 1865 Act, for its part, providing that 
  
 
278 
 
aimed at fettering the powers of colonial legislatures. 
Even if the latter interpretation is accepted, it is 
unclear whether such fetters related solely to the 
conservation of the ‘representative’  nature of the 
colonial legislative bodies,466 or whether they also 
included the ability to bind successor Parliaments as to 
the ‘manner and form’ of future legislation, as the 
customary judicial understanding of s.5 has it. 
Supporting the former, less intrusive interpretation of 
the 1865 Act, Goldsworthy is able to construct a strong 
argument against the correctness of Trethowan .467 
Proving the decision’s inappositeness in the UK context, 
however, need not rely on such argument. The only 
concession necessary is that an Act setting limits upon 
a colonial Parliament’s legislative power could have 
been enacted by a superior constitutional body; whether 
                                                                                                                                                       
colonial laws shall only be deemed void if they are repugnant 
to the provisions of an ‘Imperial statute’ rather than, 
generally, inconsistent with common law principles and 
‘ received statutes’  –  that is UK laws that had become part of a 
colony’s laws by way of reception –  reinforces the position 
further (see: Hogg, 1985, Ch.2).  
466 Colonial Laws Validity Act,  s.1,  s.5; Taylor v Attorney-
General (Qld)  (1917) 23 CLR 457, 468, 474, 477.  
467 Goldsworthy, 2006. See also: Friedmann, 1950; McWhinney, 
1955-1956, at pp.37-39; Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v Gair  (1955) 
28 ALJ 437, 438 (regarding the correctness of Trethowan ’s 
procedural aspect );  O’Brien, 1980 -1981, at pp.238-249. 
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or not the 1865 Act constituted such an Act is 
immaterial.468  
Thirdly, it is imperative to note that Acts equivalent to 
the 1865 and 1929 Acts could, evidently, be enacted in 
the UK. Much like its NSW equivalent, the 1929 Act 
would have the effect of binding successor Parliaments. 
Indeed, as will be explained in Chapter VIII further by 
introducing the concept of internally effective intra-
Parliamentary decision-making agreements, if 
Parliament opted to legislate under the equivalent to 
s.7A for the purpose of abolishing the equivalent of the 
Legislative Council it would have to do so with the 
consent of its three constituent elements as well as the 
assent of the electorate. Unlike its colonial counterpart, 
however, Parliament would retain the right to legislate 
                                                            
468 And, incidentally, nowadays a moot point. Indeed, as noted 
in Marquet ,  “[i]t  is now too late to correct the judicial 
decisions that construed the proviso to s.5 as an authority to 
fetter the constituent and legislative power of Australia’s 
State Parliaments” (217 CLR 545, 609), the reason being that 
the particular judicial interpretation of the words ‘manner and  
form’ has not only been applied by other State Courts ( e.g. :  23 
CLR 457, 468, 470) but has also,  as Goldsworthy notices,  
“received legislative endorsement by … [its] unqualified re -
enactment in s.6 [of the Australia Act 1986]” (Goldsworthy, 
2006, at p.125). 
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for that, as well as for all other purposes, in the 
customary tripartite manner. Importantly, not only 
would Parliament have a choice of whether to legislate 
customarily or under s.7A but, furthermore –  in tandem 
with the formulation of the principle that Parliament 
cannot bind its successors proposed above –  
Parliament’s successors, being equally sovereign, would 
have the right to unbind themselves from the equivalent 
of the 1929 Act by expressly or impliedly repealing it. 
Indeed, the hypothetical equivalents of the 1930 Bills 
would have precisely such an effect, for –  in tandem 
with the formulation of the implied repeal doctrine 
proposed above – it would be logically impossible for 
them to stand together with the equivalent of the 1929 
Act. That is why Ferguson J in the NSW Supreme 
Court469 and later Dixon J in the High Court of 
Australia were mistaken in their obiter dicta  that if an 
equivalent situation arises in the UK:  
the Courts might be called upon the consider 
whether the supreme legislative power in 
respect of the matter had in truth been 
exercised in the manner required for its 
                                                            
469 Trethowan v Peden  (1930) 31 SR (NSW) 183, 207.  
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authentic expression and by the elements in 
which it had come to reside.470  
For good measure, in view of the fact that the said 1930 
equivalents would have so blatantly disregarded the 
special procedure Parliament itself had instituted in 
the equivalent of the 1929 Act, it is likely that they 
would also be considered as exhibiting an intention that 
Parliament no longer wishes the courts to apply the 
voluntary ‘manner and form’ requirements it may have 
imposed from time to time, or to interpret future 
statutes under the existent prism of whether or not they 
intend to impose such voluntary requirements . In short, 
it is likely that the said 1930 equivalents would also 
have the effect of impliedly repealing the equivalent of 
the 1865 Act altogether.471,472 
                                                            
470 44 CLR 394, 426.  
471 Goldsworthy, 1987-1988, at pp.405-406. C.f.  Fajgenbaum 
and Hanks, 1972, at p.280.  
472 Interestingly, again, as above, the criticism that the version 
of the implied repeal doctrine herein defended immunises, in 
practice, certain statutes from being repealed impliedly, is 
refuted. Much like the ECA, a repeal by implication need not 
take the form of an imposition of a duty upon the courts that 
directly contradicts their hypothetical current  duty stemming 
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Ranasinghe  
The second decision that is alleged by Marshall to have 
made “clearer what was left obscure in Dicey’s 
exposition of Parliamentary sovereignty” 473 is 
Ranasinghe ;474 an appeal to the Privy Council from a 
judgement and order of the Supreme Court of Ceylon. 475 
Once again, the court was essentially concerned with 
the status of a particular Parliamentary decree, albeit 
here, unlike in Trethowan , one that had already 
received the Royal Assent and was, therefore, 
presumably, in force at the time: the Bribery 
(Amendment) Act 1958.  
It is elementary to commence by stressing that Ceylon 
became a Dominion of the British Commonwealth in 
1948. The process of devising a Constitution for the 
                                                                                                                                                       
from the hypothetical equivalent of the 1865 Act but may, 
rather, be brought about via  any linguistically intelligible 
method that unambiguously encapsulates such a repealing 
intention.  
473 Marshall,  1966-1967, at p.523.  
474 Bribery Commissioner  v Ranasinghe  [1965] AC 172.  
475 Ranasinghe v The Bribery Commissioner  (1962) 64 NLR 449.  
  
 
283 
 
newly-independent state476 culminated in the issuance 
of the Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946 and 
the Ceylon Independence Order in Council 1947, as well 
as the enactment of the Ceylon Independence Act 1947. 
The ‘Soulbury’ Constitution, largely based “on the 
pattern of the constitutional system of the United 
Kingdom”,477 established a bicameral Parliament 
consisting of Her Majesty, the Senate and the House of 
Representatives of Ceylon. Nevertheless, an important 
point of departure from the Westminster model was also 
present. Indeed s.29(4) of the 1946 Order in Council 478 
read: 
[Ν]o Bill for the amendment or repeal of any 
of the provisions of this Order shall be 
presented for the Royal Assent unless it has 
endorsed on it a certificate … that the 
number of votes cast in favour thereof in the 
House of Representatives amounted to no 
                                                            
476 In which, interestingly, Jennings had a paramount role to 
play as principal advisor of the independence activist and 
later PM Don Stephen Senanayake.  
477 Attorney-General (Ceylon) v de Livera  [1963] AC 103, 118.  
478 See also: Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946, s.18, 
s.29(2), s.29(3), s.39.  
  
 
284 
 
less than two-thirds of the whole number of 
Members of the House…  
To revert to the case itself, it proceeded as an appeal 
against Ranasinghe’s conviction by the so -called 
‘Bribery Tribunal’. It was contended on behalf of the 
plaintiff that the conviction should be quashed since the 
Tribunal’s members had not been lawfully appointed 
and had unlawfully exercised judicial powers. Indeed, 
even though the Constitution Order in Council, in its 
s.55, provided that the appointment of judicial officers 
was vested in the Judicial Service Commission (a body 
constitutionally fortified from political control), 479 the 
Tribunal’s members had been nominated, in line with 
s.41 of the 1958 Act, from a panel appointed by the 
Governor-General on the advice of the Minister of 
Justice. Therefore, contended the plaintiffs, whereas 
the Bribery Tribunal constituted a ‘judicial office’ and 
its members were ‘judicial officers’ within the meaning 
of s.55 of the Constitution, and whereas the 1958 Act 
did not, as s.29(4) of the Constitution required, bear a 
certificate to the effect that the necessary two-thirds 
majority to amend the said provision of the Constitution 
had been met, it was pro tanto  void and inoperative, 
and so were the appointments made under it, as well as, 
                                                            
479 ibid. ,  s.53, s.56.  
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consequently, any decisions taken by the corresponding 
appointees. 
In finding against the Bribery Commissioner, both the 
Supreme Court of Ceylon as well as the Privy Council 
matched the plaintiff’s arguments almost perfectly. The 
crux of the courts’ reasoning is appropriate ly condensed 
by Lord Pearce, who, by no means broke new ground in 
Ceylonese law,480 when stating:  
[I]n the case of amendment and repeal of the 
Constitution the Speaker’s certificate is a 
necessary part of the legislative process and 
any Bill which does not comply with the 
condition precedent of the proviso, is and 
remains …  invalid and ultra vires.481 
As with Trethowan , therefore, the UK lawyer is 
somewhat surprisingly faced with a case in which a 
legislature is found to be limited effectively by its 
predecessors in the ‘manner and form’ it may utilise in 
enacting legislation.  
                                                            
480 Indeed, the judgement is little more than an application of 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Ceylon in Thambiayah v 
Kulasingham  (1949) 50 NLR 25. 35.  
481 [1965] AC 172, 173.  
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In truth, however, much like its NSW equivalent, the 
Ceylonese Parliament was a creature of statutory 
instrument. Unlike the Constitution Act 1855, however, 
the 1946 Order in Council, with its s.29, positively 
prescribed the powers of the correspondingly created 
legislature.482 In other words, the Ceylonese legislature 
was, ab initio , a type IV (partly non-sovereign) 
legislature according to the classification proposed 
earlier. In and of itself, this acknowledgement is 
sufficient to arrest any attempt to draw parallels 
between Ranasinghe  and UK jurisprudence, as Dicey 
himself had already explained long before the case 
arose by discussing the qualitative differences between 
entrenched and non-entrenched Constitutions. 483 
Indeed, Lord Pearce was careful to highlight the 
distinction by noticing:  
[I]n the Constitution of the United Kingdom 
there is no governing instrument which 
prescribes the law-making powers and the 
forms which are essential to those powers. 
                                                            
482 Incidentally, therefore, it is noteworthy that the fact that 
the 1865 Act had ceased, at the time of the hearing, to apply 
to Ceylon is irrelevant.  
483 Dicey, 1889, Ch.2.  
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There was, therefore, never such a necessity 
as arises in the present case for the court to 
take a closer cognisance of the process of  
law-making.484 
This having been said, the Ranasinghe  precedent can, 
by and large, be disposed of. Nonetheless, two further 
remarks may usefully be set forth.  
Firstly, neither is Ceylon by any means unique amongst 
former colonies in establishing, nor is Ranasinghe  a 
judicial outlier in upholding the validity and 
effectiveness of, partially entrenched or ‘rigid’ 
Constitutions. To name but a few, similar propositions 
to the ones influencing the Privy Council in Ranasinghe  
have motivated courts in Sierra Leone485 and the Irish 
Free State486 to reach equivalent decisions when called 
                                                            
484 [1965] AC 172, 195. See also: Victoria v Commonwealth  
(1975) 134 CLR 81, 162-164. 
485 Sierra Leone (Constitution) Order in Council 1961, and the 
corresponding case of Akar v Attorney-General (Sierra Leone)  
(1968), JAL ,  12(2), 89.  
486 Constitution of the Irish Free State (Saorstát Éireann ) Act 
1922, and the corresponding case of R (O’Brien) v Military 
Governor  [1924] 1 IR 32.  
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upon to rule on the effectiveness of the entrenched 
clauses of their respective Constitutions.  
Secondly, although ultimately being on the losing side, 
there is at least one argument advanced by counsel for 
the Bribery Commissioner that seems to have been 
endorsed by the Privy Council; namely, the proposition 
that the Ceylonese Parliament is a sovereign body. In 
yet another obstinate attempt to draw a line between 
substance and form which has been extensively cited by, 
inter alios , Marshall in support of his self -embracing 
understanding of sovereignty, 487 Lord Pearce may be 
seen as suggesting:  
No question of sovereignty arises. A 
Parliament does not cease to be sovereign 
whenever its component members fail to 
produce among themselves a requisite 
majority…488 
In truth, amidst the relatively tumultuous political 
climate synthesised by unyielding nationalism on the 
part of both the majority Sinhala-Buddhists and the 
minority Sri Lankan Tamils, Marxist tendencies, 
                                                            
487 Marshall,  1966-1967, at p.525.  
488 [1965] AC 172, 200.  
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federal visions, anti-colonial sentiments, riots and 
cultural revivalist ideas, the attempt to reconcile the 
protection of fundamental values and rights as well as 
the integrity of the newly-sovereign state (by upholding 
the Constitution) with the authority of the 
representatively democratic legislature (by proclaiming 
its sovereignty) is understandable, albeit clearly 
impossible. Other Ceylonese courts and scholars, 
including Jennings himself, have acted more sensibly in 
not attempting to eschew constitutional reality and 
have conceded that the conclusion that the Ceylonese 
Parliament was a body with sovereign powers is largely 
misleading.489 Having said that, should the court have 
been determined to convey its message, it could have 
highlighted the distinction between the sovereignty of 
Parliament in domestic law and the sovereignty of the 
State in international law,490 reminding that the former 
is not a prerequisite for the latter. This was, indeed, 
the approach espoused by the South African courts 
                                                            
489 The Queen v Liyanage  (1962) 64 NLR 313, 350; PS Bus v 
Ceylon Transport Board  (1958) 61 NLR 491, 493; Jennings, 
1951, at p.24.  
490 Or, in Innes CJ’s terms, the difference between ‘ internal 
sovereignty’ and ‘external sovereignty’ respectively: R v 
Christian  (1924) AD 101, 112.  
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when faced with equivalent dilemmas in Harris No.1491 
and No.2 ,492 the cases to which the discussion now 
turns. 
 
Harris 
The double-faceted contest between, on the one hand, 
Harris and three other South African voters, and, on 
the other, Dönges, Minister of the Interior of the Union 
of South Africa at the time, constitutes the third 
judicial saga that has prominently appeared in the 
writings of self-embracing sovereignty theorists.  
Harris No.1  raised the question of the validity and 
enforceability of the Separate Representation of Voters 
Act 1951. The delicate issues at hand, however, compel 
the analysis’s point of departure to be set considerably 
further back than 1951, namely in 1908 when delegates 
of the Cape of Good Hope, Natal, the Transvaal and 
Orange River colonies assembled at the South African 
National Convention. As a result of the Convention’s 
workings, the South Africa Act 1909 was enacted by the 
                                                            
491 Harris v Minister  1952 (2) SA 428.   
492 Minister v Harris  1952 (4) SA 769.  
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Imperial Parliament. Its primary effect, enshrined in 
its s.4, was to unite the formerly separate colonies ‘in a 
Legislative Union under one Government under the 
name of the Union of South Africa.’ Legislative power 
was vested in a bicameral Parliament whilst, 
unsurprisingly, the ordinary legislative procedure was 
deemed as requiring the tripartite assent of the Senate, 
the House of Assembly and the Governor-General on 
behalf of the Crown.493 Although the 1909 Act was not 
placed outwith the legislative purview of Parliament, 
the acknowledgment in s.152 that ‘Parliament may by 
law repeal or alter any of the provisions of this Act’ was 
followed by an important caveat:  
Provided that no provision thereof, for the 
operation of which a definite period of time 
is prescribed, shall during such period be 
repealed or altered: And provided further 
that no repeal or alteration of the provisions 
contained in this section, or in sections 
thirty-three and thirty-four …, or in section 
thirty-five and one hundred and thirty-
seven, shall be valid unless the Bill 
embodying such repeal or alteration shall be 
passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting 
                                                            
493 South Africa Act 1909, s.19, s.31, s.50, s.64.  
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together, and at the third reading be agreed 
to by not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members of both Houses.  
Two categories of prima facie  entrenched clauses may 
be discerned from the above. On the one  hand, clauses 
that precluded their amendment within a definite 
period of time, such as s.24 regarding the constitution 
of the Senate, were deemed completely unalterable. 
Although formidable at first sight, in practice, the 
effect of such clauses was slim,  especially once the 
Union entered its second decade of life and their 
temporal scope had lapsed.494 On the other hand, certain 
sections named in s.152, as well as s.152 itself, were 
considered partly entrenched, requiring a two-thirds 
majority at a joint Parliamentary sitting for their 
repeal. Amongst such sections was s.35 which provided 
in its first subsection:  
                                                            
494 C.f.  the puzzling effect of novel time-related provisions. 
Indeed, following Trethowan ,  the Union Parliament, for as 
long as the 1865 Act applied in South Africa, pre sumably had 
the ability to bind its successors as to the ‘manner and form’ of 
future legislation. Therefore and in light of s.152, would novel 
time-related provisions have been considered permanently 
entrenched? 
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[N]o … law shall disqualify any person … 
who … is … registered as a voter from being 
so registered … by reason of his race or 
colour only … unless the Bill … be passed … 
by no less than two-thirds of the … members 
of both Houses.  
The 1951 Act, for its part, sought to further the 
Reunited National Party’s apartheid  agenda by making 
changes to the representation of ‘non -European’ voters 
in the Province of the Cape of Good Hope. The scheme 
essentially extended the separate constituency in which 
‘native’ (black) voters had been voting since the 
Representation of Natives Act 1936 to other ‘coloured’ 
voters. Unlike the 1936 Act that had been approved by 
two-thirds of the members of both Houses of Parliament 
however, the 1951 Act had been enacted through the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Therefore, the claimants 
maintained that the Act under question was null and 
void since, despite constituting a law laying down 
qualifications for voting within the meaning of s.35(1), 
its mode of enactment did not conform with the one 
prescribed in s.35(1) and s.152.  
Some second-tier contentions aside, the respondents 
had no difficulty in following the plaintiffs’ reasoning. 
Indeed, it was common ground that the contentious 
Act’s failure to conform with the procedure prescribed 
by s.35(1) and s.152 would have rendered it invalid, had 
it been enacted prior to 1931; after all, the South 
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African Parliament, in principle, was no different than 
its Ceylonese counterpart insofar as it constituted a 
type IV (partly non-sovereign) legislature according to 
the classification proposed above. However, in 1931 the 
Statute of Westminster was enacted and that is whence 
the central disagreement between the parties flowed. 
Therefore, in large part, the case turned upon the 
effect, if any, that the said statute had on the 1909 
Act’s entrenched provisions.  
Despite the South African government’s documented 
nervousness,495 its case before the Appellate Division 
appeared unwavering. For one, as will be seen, the 
arguments in support of the Statute of Westminster’s 
effect on the 1909 Act’s entrenched provisions were, in 
themselves, powerful, at least upon a literal 
interpretation of the statutes involved. Similarly, the 
overwhelming weight of academic opinion, indirectly 496 
or directly,497 was in support of the non-bindingness of 
the 1909 Act’s entrenched provisions and, by extension, 
                                                            
495 See e.g. :  Loveland, 1999, at pp.226-300. 
496 Pollak, 1931; Wheare, 1949; May, 1949, at pp.240 -245; 
Latham, 1937, at p.529.  
497 Wade was explicitly asked to form an opinion on the 1951 
Act which is reproduced as an appendix in: Marshall,  1957.  
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of the 1951 Act’s validity. Furthermore, the most recent 
and possibly sole authoritative judicial opinion on the 
matter498 was decidedly in favour of the government’s 
position. Lastly, in political terms, despite the vigorous 
protests surrounding the 1951 statute’s enactment, an 
important precedent favouring the government’s 
standpoint had been set by the Opposition some 5 years 
earlier.499  
In view of the above and amidst growing pressure from 
the government’s escalating apartheid  scheme, little 
blame would have been placed on the court should it 
have epidermally dealt with the case and ruled for the 
government. Nevertheless, it was not to be; the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, led by 
Centlivres CJ, preferred the uncharted path of 
genuinely considering the issues at hand which, 
                                                            
498 Ndlwana v Hofmeyr  [1937] AD 289.  
499 C.f.  Loveland, according to whom:  
since Indians did not have the franchise de facto  
in Natal and were denied it de jure  in the 
Transvaal,  the Act enhanced rather than reduced 
their voting rights.  
(Loveland, 1999, at p.226).  
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ultimately, led to the writing of a highly significant 
page in the histories of South Africa and Commonwealth 
constitutionalism, as well as the struggle against 
authoritarianism. 
More specifically, Centlivres began by the 
unobjectionable assertion that:  
the Statute of Westminster contains no 
express repeal of … [s.35 and s.152 of the 
South Africa Act]. The most that could 
possibly be contended for is that that Statute 
impliedly repeals those sections. 500 
Whether such repeal by implication had, in fact, 
occurred fell to be examined under two headings: 
namely, the effect of the revocation of the CLVA’s  effect 
in South Africa (s.2(1)) and the effect of the 
empowerment of the Union Parliament to make laws 
repugnant to any existing or future Act of the Imperial 
Parliament (s.2(2)).  
Insofar as the f irst heading is concerned, emphasis was 
placed upon two provisions of the 1865 Act which ceased 
to apply in South Africa by virtue of s.2(1) of the 1931 
Act. For one, s.2 of the 1865 Act deemed void and 
                                                            
500 1952 (2) SA 428, 459.  
  
 
297 
 
inoperative any colonial law which was in any respect  
repugnant to the provisions of any Act of Parliament. 
The termination of its effect was interpreted by counsel 
for the South African government as liberating the 
Union Parliament from the duty of following the 
procedures laid down by the entrenched provis ions of 
the 1909 Act –  an ‘Act of Parliament’. Centlivres’s 
understanding of the said section’s pre -1931 effect was, 
however, radically different. He said:  
A repeal … of the South Africa Act enacted 
by … the Union Parliament in accordance 
with … sec. 152 would be repugnant to the 
provisions so repealed… Those provisions are 
… contained in a British Act of Parliament 
… but that repugnancy is specifically 
authorised by that very British Act which is 
a later Act than the … [CLVA] and must 
therefore in case of conflict override the 
earlier Act. Sec. 2 could therefore have no 
application to a repeal or amendment of the 
South Africa Act.501  
                                                            
501 ibid. ,  461. 
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The second contentious provision, the effect of which 
was terminated in South Africa by s.2(1) of the 1931 
Act, was s.5 of the 1865 Act. According to Centlivres:  
[t]he only part of sec. 5 … which was of any 
importance as far as the Union was 
concerned was the power given to the Union 
Parliament to bind a subsequent Union 
Parliament to follow a prescribed procedure 
in amending specified provisions of the 
Union Constitution. [Trethowan  cited] That 
power was never, however, exercised by the 
Union Parliament before the Statute of 
Westminster … The rest of sec. 5 … was 
unnecessary as far as the Union was 
concerned, as the South Africa Act makes 
full provision for the matters mentioned in 
that section.502  
Surely, the Chief Justice is correct in pointing out that 
s.5 authorised colonial legislatures to bind themselves 
as to the ‘manner and form’ of future legislation. 
Indeed, that was precisely what the NSW Parliament 
had succeeded in doing by the enactment of the 
                                                            
502 ibid. .   
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Constitution (Legislative Council) Amendment Act 
1929, as Trethowan  confirms.  
However, as a closer look reveals, the said section’s 
intention and effect is not thuswise limited. Indeed, s.5 
bestows upon colonial legislatures ‘full power’ to make 
laws, provided that such laws ‘shall have been passed in 
such manner and form as may from time to time be 
required by any Act of Parliament ,  letters patent ,  Order 
in Council , or colonial law for the time being in force in 
the said colony.’503 In other words, the ability to 
implement ‘manner and form’ requirements (that 
colonial legislatures would then be under a duty to 
abide by when enacting laws) was not restricted, as 
Centlivres would have it, to the colonial legislatures 
themselves, but extended to the Imperial Parliament (in 
the form of Acts of Parliament), the Queen-in-Council 
(in the form of Orders in Council), as well as the Crown 
alone (in the form of letters patent). Therefore, unlike 
what was said in Harris No.1 , the 1909 Act – an Act of 
the UK Parliament –  fell well within the meaning of s.5 
of the 1865 Act and that is, at least partially, 
                                                            
503 [Emphasis added].  
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wherefrom the effectiveness of the ‘manner and form’ 
provisions contained therein emanated. 504 
Therefore, prima facie ,  the termination of the 1865 
Act’s effect in South Africa should, presumably, have 
been considered as having the reverse effect; that is, as 
rendering ineffective the 1909 Act’s ‘manner and form’ 
provisions. Although, therefore, admittedly, the 
Appellate Division’s interpretation of the 1865 Act’s 
effect upon the South Africa Act was partially 
misconceived, this neither conclusively answers the 
question regarding the entrenched provisions’ validity 
nor signifies that Harris No.1  was wrongly decided. To 
pronounce upon either of these propositions, the 
remaining issues raised in the case must be addressed.  
To that end, mention must be made to  the second 
heading under which the 1931 Act’s effect in South 
Africa was evaluated; namely, the effect of s.2(2) which, 
as already noted, provided that no colonial law shall be 
void on the ground that it is repugnant to any existing 
or future Act of Parliament. Since the 1909 Act was an 
‘existing Act of Parliament’, the position was taken by 
the government that the effect of s.2(2) was to absolve 
the Union Parliament from the obligation to follow the 
                                                            
504 See: Pollak, 1931, at pp.282-283. 
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procedures enshrined in the Act’s entrenched provisions 
by allowing it to repeal or amend the Act at will 
through the simple Parliamentary procedure.  
The court, however, once again disagreed. Prior to the  
1931 Act, it was argued, the Union Parliament already 
possessed full powers to amend the South Africa Act –  
whether it be through the normal bicameral procedure 
or through the unicameral procedure provided in s.35, 
s.63 and s.152.505 Therefore, s.2(2), the intention of 
which was to provide colonial Parliaments with the 
additional power of amending or repealing Acts of the 
Imperial Parliament, could have no effect vis-à-vis the 
Union Parliament or the 1909 Act.  
However, the logical crevices of this line of argument 
are quick to make their appearance. Literally speaking, 
the Union Parliament did not possess ‘full’  powers to 
amend the 1909 Act; the entrenched provisions could 
only be amended through the unicameral, two-thirds 
majority procedure – a de facto  more burdensome 
procedure than the bicameral simple majority 
procedure. It is therefore not an imperative conclusion, 
as the court suggested, that s.2(2) was necessarily 
                                                            
505 According to Sir Owen Dixon, “[t]he Constitution of the 
Union was therefore flexible”:  Dixon, 1935, at p.613.  
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ineffective vis-à-vis  the 1909 Act; it could have been 
deemed as granting the Union Parliament an additional 
power with respect to the 1909 Act: namely, the power 
to utilise the less burdensome Parliamentary procedure 
in repealing or amending any provision of the Act 
which, incidentally, was the precise power which the 
government contended s.2(2) had granted the Union 
Parliament.  
Clearly, therefore, this line of argument inevitably 
depends on a proposition popularised by Cowen: 506 
namely, interpreting the term ‘Parliament of a 
Dominion’ in the 1931 Act as meaning Parliament 
sitting either bicamerally or unicamerally in accordance 
with the requirements of the 1909 Act. 507 Only in view 
of this assumption can it intelligibly be contended that 
‘Parliament’ had full powers of modification of the 1909 
                                                            
506 Cowen, 1951.  
507 Unicamerally in a joint session of the two Houses with a 
two-thirds majority threshold for the purposes of legislation 
coming within the ambit of the entrenched clauses (s.35, s.137, 
s.152); unicamerally in a joint session of the two Houses and a 
simple majority threshold in the case of a deadlock between 
the Houses (s.63);  bicamerally by the Houses sitting 
separately for all other purposes.  
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Act prior to the Statute of Westminster, 508 that s.2(2) 
does not intend to repeal by implication the 1909 Act’s 
unicameral two-thirds majority procedures and that, 
ultimately, s.2(2) and the 1909 Act’s entrenched 
provisions can intelligibly be read side-by-side. Upon a 
literal reading of the Statute of Westminster, such an 
assumption is, to put it mildly, ill -fated. Appreciative of 
such fact and determined not to give in to what 
Goldsworthy in a different context characterises “a 
contrived rationalisation of a pre-determined 
conclusion” ,509 Centlivres was determined to seek the 
1931 Act’s mischief.  
Indeed, the Chief Justice commenced by referring to the 
1929 Conference on the Operation of Dominion 
Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation, the 
workings of which resulted in the drafting of the Bill 
which ultimately led to the Statute of Westminster. 
Importantly, certain saving provisions were inserted 
therein in respect of the Constitutions of the Dominions 
                                                            
508 It is in view of this concession that the court,  despite 
correctly acknowledging the distinction between State and  
Parliamentary sovereignty, ultimately concluded that the 
Union ‘Parliament’ was, in fact,  itself sovereign.  
509 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.160.  
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of Canada, Newfoundland and New Zealand, and the 
Commonwealth of Australia. These provisions, included 
at the request of the respective colonies, were 
eventually codified as ss.7-11 of the 1931 Act and 
served the purpose of protecting the entrenched 
Constitutions of the said colonies from the sweeping 
generality of s.2(1) and s.2(2).  
More specifically, to take the example of Canada, the 
British North America Act 1867, which formed the basis 
of the Dominion of Canada’s Constitution, conferred 
limited powers of amendment upon the Parliament of 
Canada;510 any other constitutional amendment had to 
originate at Westminster. At the time of the enactment 
of the 1931 Act, the political will on both sides of the 
Atlantic to alter this constitutional reality was slim 
and, thus, to safeguard the status quo , s.7 providing 
that ‘[n]othing in this Act shall be deemed to apply to 
the repeal, amendment or alteration of the British 
North America Acts, 1867 to 1930, or any order, rule or 
regulation made thereunder’, was inserted.  
The ostensible need for such saving clauses appears, at 
first sight, to prove that the intended effect of s.2(2) 
was to discard any limitations riddling the simple 
                                                            
510 British North America Act 1867, ss.91 -92. 
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Parliamentary procedure of colonial legislatures whilst 
the lack of a corresponding clause for South Africa 
testifies in favour of the application of s.2(2) to the 
entrenched provisions of the 1909 Act.  
In truth, however, the reasons behind the non-inclusion 
of a saving clause for South Africa were less 
straightforward than they may have appeared to 
counsel for the government, in the arguments of which 
the inclusion of saving clauses for the entrenched 
constitutions of other Dominions featured prominently. 
As Centlivres pointed out, the 1929 Conference’s report 
stated that:  
[s]imilar considerations do not arise in 
connexion with the Constitutions of the 
Union of South Africa and the Irish Free 
State. The Constitutions of both countries 
are framed on the unitary principle. Both 
include complete legal powers of 
constitutional amendment…511 
whilst the subsequent resolution of both Houses of the 
Union Parliament read:  
                                                            
511 Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs,  1930, at p.16.  
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That on the understanding that the proposed 
legislation will in no way derogate from the 
entrenched provisions of the South Africa 
Act, Parliament … authorises the 
Government to take such steps as may be 
necessary with a view to the enactment … of 
legislation on the lines set out in [the draft 
Bill which soon thereafter became the 
Statute of Westminster].512 
In short, therefore, unlike the literal meaning of the 
1931 Act and its s.2(2) in particular, a teleological 
interpretation of the workings leading up to its 
enactment clearly proves the existence of a willingness 
on the part of South Africa –  as well as a concessional 
disposition on the part of the UK Parliament to honour 
such willingness – for the preservation of the 
entrenched provisions’ effectiveness.  
                                                            
512 1952 (2) SA 428, 458. Wheare reports the Speaker of the 
House of Assembly as making the following relevant remark in 
connexion with the intended effect of the Statute of  
Westminster: “if  it is desired to amend or repeal any of the 
entrenched clauses, then the procedure laid down in the South 
Africa Act must be followed” (Wheare, 1949, at p.241; see also: 
Pollak, 1931, at p.284, fn.31).  
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This acknowledgement, in and of itself, was sufficient to 
justify the expansive interpretation of the term 
‘Parliament of a Dominion’ in the 1931 Act, with the 
associated propositions this carries, to confirm, in turn, 
the continued bindingness of the 1909 Act’s  entrenched 
clauses and, thence, ultimately, to decide the case in 
favour of the affected voters. Therefore, the discussion 
of the ‘first heading’ – that is, the termination of the 
1865 Act’s effect in South Africa – was not only 
partially misguided, as seen earlier, but was 
additionally unnecessary insofar as the case at hand 
was concerned. The reason this is so is located in the 
fact that the South Africa Act 1909 was neither merely 
an ‘existing’ Act of the UK Parliament within the 
meaning of s.2(2) of the 1931 Act nor an enactment the 
provisions of which were validated, interpreted, 
amended and repealed by previous and future 
legislative initiatives at Westminster. To be sure, the 
1909 Act was all of the above, but for South Africa it 
was also much more: a formal agreement – in the 
footsteps of the Boer Republics of the mid -nineteenth 
century that had sought, as Klug notices, “alternative 
sources of constitutionalism … [d]espite the dominance 
of English constitutionalism in the Cape and Natal” –513 
                                                            
513 Klug, 2000, at p.33.  
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reached at the 1908-1909 National Convention between 
the four South African colonies to form a union under 
the terms specified which, by all means, may be 
understood as a Constitution for the newly -born 
nation.514 The suggestion that for more than two 
decades such Constitution was at the mercy of an 
external power, the Imperial Parliament, although 
undoubtedly true, does not discount from the fact that 
the 1909 Act was accepted as the –  subordinate or 
otherwise – Constitution of the Union of South Africa by 
its citizens and officials alike. For good measure, the 
workings leading up to the enactment of the Statute of 
Westminster provided a unique constitutional 
opportunity for the Union to reject, set on a different 
footing, or confirm (as it ultimately did) the 1908 
agreement between the peoples of its several Provinces. 
Thus, even though the text of the Constitution was 
formally contained in an Act of the Imperial 
Parliament, even though its initial applicability to 
South Africa flowed from Westminster and even though 
the original effectiveness of the entrenched clauses was 
                                                            
514 Importantly,  as Keith narrates, “[i]n the case of Natal alone 
was a referendum of the people deemed necessary for 
acceptance. There was in fact no real doubt elsewhere that the 
measure was accepted by the majority of the representatives of 
public opinion.” (Keith, 1933, at p.360).  
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derived from another UK statute, the CLVA, its true 
origin and continued legitimacy were rooted, 
respectively, in the 1908 agreement between the four 
formerly separate colonies and its confirmation in 1931 
by the Union Parliament.  
In view of the above, then, Harris No.1  must be 
conceived as the constitutional moment – interestingly 
predicted by Latham in 1937 –515 in which the judiciary 
was called upon to make a decision similar to the one 
taken by the colonies’ delegates in 1908 and the Union 
Parliament in 1931. Although tension grew on both 
sides, the ephemeral political climate at the time of the 
decision was decidedly in favour of disregarding the 
1909 Act’s entrenched provisions and thereby silently 
revising the 1908 settlement. In this sense, Loveland is 
very much accurate in his characterisation of Harris 
No.1  as an “intensely conservative decision which was 
firmly rooted in South(ern) African constitutional law 
and tradition…”516  
                                                            
515 Latham, 1937, at pp.523-533. 
516 Loveland, 1999, at p.410.  
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In fact, although judicial resistance persisted, 517 the 
burgeoning momentum in support of the settlement’s 
revision ultimately prevailed: the government expanded 
the Appellate Division to eleven judges (thereby 
allowing for the appointment of six presumably furtive 
government-sympathisers),518 packed the Senate with 
National Party members (to ensure the requisite two-
thirds majority)519 and, some five years later, took 
pleasure in witnessing the judicial validation, in 
Collins v Minister ,520 of its South Africa Act Amendment 
Act 1956: an Act passed in accordance with the 
requirements of s.152 to declare the 1951 Act valid and 
repeal the entrenched clauses relating to franchise of 
the 1909 Act. The last official stratagem of the 1908 
settlement having fallen, it was not long before, in 
pursuance of a clean break from colonial past, the 
Union was declared a Republic, its Commonwealth 
membership was not renewed and the road was paved 
for the successful closure of, what historians agree 
                                                            
517 See e.g. :  1952 (4) SA 769. 
518 Appellate Division Quorum Act 1955.  
519 Senate Act 1955.  
520 1957 (1) SA 552.  
  
 
311 
 
constitutes,521 the first phase of apartheid  policy and 
the initiation of its more intensified second and third 
phases. 
Thus, in view of the above, it becomes evident that the 
proposition that it cannot be said that Harris No.1  was 
wrongly decided comes hand-in-hand with an important 
objection that must be raised against Centlivres’s 
opinion: namely, his lack of (expressed) appreciation for 
the fact that the decision, from a legal point of view, 
could have gone either way.522,523  
And even if such a confession is excessive to ask from a 
newly appointed Chief Justice that intends to strike 
                                                            
521 See e.g. :  Beck, 2000, at pp.126-141. 
522 As Wade puts it:   
[a]ll  the argument in Harris  … proceeded on the 
[fallacious] assumption that the central question 
… was a strictly legal one, to which there was a 
right or a wrong answer, according to the existing 
law. 
(Wade, 1955, at p.173).  
523 More precisely, the decision was a ‘meta - legal ’  one in  
Kelsenian terminology.  
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down, for the first time, an authoritarian government’s 
controversial piece of legislation, it is at least 
appropriate, in line with McWhinney, 524 to direct 
criticism towards Centlivres’s opinion for the fact that 
it was seldom ‘constitutional’ in nature, as it should 
have been. Rather the judgement was grounded on an 
overwhelmingly ‘formalistic’ basis which, ironically, 
would have been much more appropriate had he decided 
the case in favour of the government, which was as a 
matter of formal legal principle considerably weak, and 
which, consequently, rendered it open to both juridical 
and political criticism. More specifically, the Chief 
Justice’s unavailing attempt to decide the case by 
utilising the ordinary rules of statutory interpretation 
not only required reading away the blatant 
inconsistencies between the statutes at hand and 
attaching artificial meaning to the terms contained 
therein, but was, most crucially, premissed upon the 
understanding of the South Africa Act 1909 as a mere 
Act of Parliament that fell to be interpreted alongside 
other statutory enactments rather than as a wholly 
indigenous Constitution that, from a South African 
point of view, lay claim to superior authority vis-à-vis  
other statutes and, as Turpin and Tomkins remark, 
                                                            
524 McWhinney, 1952.  
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enjoyed a “special status [in defining the  powers of the 
Union Parliament] as the constituent instrument of that 
Parliament”.525  
It is, indeed, safe to speculate that by the time Harris 
No.2  came to be decided by the same court a mere 9 
months later, Centlivres had become aware of the 
conceptual and terminological defectiveness of his 
analysis.526  
                                                            
525 Turpin and Tomkins, 2011, at p.77. In particular, the Union 
Parliament owed its existence to s.19 and its legislative 
powers to s.59 of the 1909 Act.  
526 More specifically, the case revolved around the validity of  
the High Court of Parliament Act 1952 which had been passed 
bicamerally and sought, with its ss.2 -3, to establish a court 
comprised of every senator and every member of the House of 
Assembly, the ‘High Court of Parliament’,  and endowed with 
the power to review any Appellate Division judgement that 
declares invalid any provision of any Act of the Union 
Parliament.  Not surprisingly, the 1952 Act was considered as 
seeking to circumnavigate the two -thirds majority procedure 
laid down in the entrenched provisions of the 1909 Act by 
encroaching upon the citizen’s testing power in a ‘court of law’ 
(which, all  judges agreed, the High Court was not) contained 
in s.152. Most importantly for present purposes however is the 
fact that Centlivres, from the onset, set the  tone by specifying 
that he would thereinafter refer to the South Africa Act 1909 
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At any rate, what has hopefully become abundantly 
clear is that the magnitude of the dissimilarity between 
South Africa and the UK forbids the introduction of the 
case in the discussion of the soundness of self-
embracing sovereignty theory in the UK. Indeed, in 
summary, it may be remembered that the bindingness of 
the 1909 Act’s entrenched clauses depended either upon 
the statutory interpretation of laws imposed by an 
external, superior power – namely, the 1865, 1909 and 
1931 statutes enacted by the Imperial Parliament –527 or 
upon the judiciary’s approach towards the 
constitutional settlement embodied in the 1908 
agreement of the formerly separate colonies’ delegates 
and affirmed by the 1931 joint resolution of the Union 
Parliament’s Houses, or both. In the UK, neither of 
these circumstances appears applicable: no external, 
superior power created Parliament or exists to 
implement statutes that, subsequently, fall to be 
                                                                                                                                                       
as the “Constitution” (1952 (4) SA 769, 776) and proceeded to 
deliver an opinion imbued with terminology such as 
“constitutional guarantees” ( ibid. ,  780) and “rights in 
indiv iduals” ( ibid. ,  780-781),  as well as appeals to the 
“framers of the Constitution” ( ibid. ,  780) and the “duty of the 
courts” ( ibid. ) vis-à-vis  “our Constitution” ( ibid. ) and the 
people.  
527 One of which, the 1909 Act, incidentally,  had created the 
Parliament, the powers of which were under investigation.  
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interpreted by the judiciary whilst no constitutional 
settlement is at stake to be adjudicated by the courts. 528  
After all, it must be remembered that the cardinal idea 
that cast its shadow over the South African 
government’s argument in Harris No.1  and which its 
proposed reading of the 1931 Statute’s various sections 
sought ultimately to prove, was the portrayal of the 
Statute as having the effect of rendering the Union 
Parliament an exact replica of the UK Parliament in 
terms of its composition, essential attributes and 
powers.529 Although, evidently, the idea itself was 
outrightly rejected by the Appellate Division, 530,531 what 
                                                            
528 The closest parallel that can be drawn is between the 1908 
agreement and the 1707 and 1801 Treaties of Union. As will be 
seen in Chapter VII, this parallel is nevertheless still largely 
superficial.  
529 Espousing the fallacious equation of State and 
Parliamentary sovereignty (proposed in Ranasinghe ,  as earlier 
noted), such rendering was considered, in the government’s 
argument, as a prerequisite for the genuine divorcement of the 
South African nation from its restricted colonial past.  
530 This was, in fact, the vital difference between Ndlwana  and 
Harris No.1 ;  in the former, the court had erroneously 
assumed, Centlivres opined, that the 1931 St atute had 
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is valuable for present purposes is that it was common 
ground that should its correctness have been proven, 
the case would have gone in the opposite direction. In 
other words, it was conceded that courts operating in a 
legal system, the apex of which is the UK Parliament – 
or, for that matter, a hypothetical exact replica of such 
Parliament – are bound to look at the Parliamentary 
Roll, and no further, in ruling upon the validi ty of a 
statute since such Parliament is free from the fetters of 
both externally imposed and self -assumed special 
legislative procedures. After all, Cowen himself – the 
populariser of the reconstitution thesis –  was clear that 
his argument did not apply to the UK Parliament.  
In conclusion, therefore, it may confidently be stated 
that the cases customarily referred to in support of self -
embracing sovereignty theory add nothing to the 
question of whether a sovereign legislative body 
existing under an uncontrolled Constitution, such as 
the UK Constitution, and operating in a jurisdiction in 
which external superior persons or bodies cannot de 
                                                                                                                                                       
transformed the Union Parliament into a replica of the 
Parliament at Westminster.  
531 To the implicit argument as to the nature of sovereignty, 
the court, as already noted, responded by clearly 
distinguishing between State and Parliamentary soverei gnty 
although it was, at the same time, not prepared to go any 
further: the Union ‘Parliament’,  as variously defined in the 
1909 Act, was –  it was said –  sovereign.  
  
 
317 
 
jure  interfere, such as the UK jurisdiction, can 
effectively bind its future incarnations in any manner 
or form. However, to dismiss conclusively the 
alternative method of dispelling the paradox discussed 
in Chapter IV or, more correctly, to discard the putative 
relevance of self-embracing sovereignty theory at least 
in the current UK constitutional law context , certain 
domestic statutes which have variously been claimed as 
binding Parliament in one way or another, must also be 
discussed – namely, the Statute of Westminster 1931, 
the 1707 and 1801 Treaties of Union, as well as the 
Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949.  
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Chapter VI: The Statute of 
Westminster 1931 
 
The fact that the workings leading up to the enactment 
of the Statute of Westminster gave the Union of South 
Africa an unparalleled opportunity to confirm, reject or 
alter the 1908-9 constitutional settlement has already 
been mentioned. Similar constitutional opportunities, it 
is hardly necessary to remark, were available for the 
political representatives of the other former colonies 
affected; after all, the long title of the Statute itself did 
little to conceal its pol itically-imbued drafting history, 
intended aim, and envisioned repercussions:  
An Act to give effect to certain resolutions 
passed by the Imperial Conferences held in 
the years 1926 and 1930.  
More broadly, the Balfour Declaration acknowledgement 
resulting from the 1926 Imperial Conference that the 
formerly quasi-autonomous Dominions affected were to 
be “autonomous Communities within the British 
Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to 
  
 
319 
 
another …though united by a common allegiance to the 
Crown, and freely associated as members of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations”532 which was mirrored in the 
Statute’s provisions, in practice, had the effect of 
rendering them legislatively independent from the 
Imperial Parliament.  
In short, the Statute undoubtedly constitutes an 
important, historically well -examined artefact in the 
social, political and constitutional chronicles of the 
affected Dominions. Similarly, the Statute’s profound 
political effects on what was then an interbellum  
British Empire under pressure are widely 
acknowledged. Of current concern, however, is the 
Statute’s impact on another level; namely, the UK 
constitutional level and, more specifically, its effect on 
the fundamental principle of Parliamentary sovereignty 
as well as on Parliament’s ability to bind its successors.  
The case in support of the Statute’s positive effect on 
UK fundamental constitutional principles proceeds on 
the basis of its s.4 which reads:  
No Act of Parliament … shall extend, or be 
deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of 
                                                            
532 Imperial Conference, 1926, at p.14.  
  
 
320 
 
the law of that Dominion, unless it is 
expressly declared in that Act that that 
Dominion has requested, and consented to, 
the enactment thereof.  
The negative duty to refrain from unilaterally 
legislating that s.4 appears to impose upon Parliament 
has been variously considered as a genuine paradigm of 
its putative ability to bind its successors. 533 The 
contention portrays Parliament as having, intentionally 
or otherwise, reconstituted itself by appending an 
additional element to the normal tripartite legislative 
process – the consent of the Dominion concerned – with 
the result that, for as long as s.4 remains on the 
Statute Book, the courts will no longer recognise 
‘Parliament’ as having acted for the purpose of 
purported legislation extending to a Dominion, unless 
the fourth element has also been seen as acting  and 
approving the measure.534 Otherwise stated, the claim 
describes Parliament as having bound its successors as 
to the manner in which future legislation pertaining to 
specific fields must be passed and the form which it 
                                                            
533 See e.g. :  Dixon, 1935, at p.611.  
534 See e.g. :  Jennings, 1959, at pp.152-3, 163-168. 
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must possess535 or, more forcefully, as having restricted 
the power of its ordinarily-constituted future 
incarnations by removing their absolute, unilateral 
legislative initiative at least in certain fields.  
At any rate, the thesis can neither be supported nor 
refuted on the basis of theoret ical arguments anent the 
nature of sovereignty, of Parliament as an institution, 
or of the UK Constitution for that would be fatally 
circular; rather, the evaluation must take place on the 
basis of the language of the Statute’s provisions  as well 
as their interpretation in subsequent cases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
535 See e.g. :  Evatt, 1936, at pp.308-309. 
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Interpreting s.4: Effects in UK law? 
 
Commencing with the first of such tasks, it must be 
punctually repeated that s.4, proclaims that, in the 
absence of the concerned Dominion’s consent, no Act 
will extend to that Dominion ‘as part of  the law of that 
Dominion’. Halting for an instant to reflect upon such 
repeated phrase, an astounding conclusion may be 
drawn. Indeed, intriguingly, upon a literal 
interpretation, the provision has no legal effect 
whatsoever with regards to UK law: it merely describes 
the effect which UK statutes will, henceforth, have in 
the law of the Dominion concerned. In this sense, 
irrespective of whether the requirement of the 
Dominion’s consent is genuinely enforceable, the 
Statute’s critical section does not aspire to impose any 
duty upon Parliament in that it lays down principles 
destined to apply in foreign jurisdictions which are 
invariably outwith Parliament’s scope. Parliamentary 
sovereignty, it will be remembered, is a UK law doctrine  
and therefore its validity can only be proven or refuted 
by surveying whether the legislature at Westminster is 
omnicompetent as a matter of UK law, as understood 
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and applied by UK courts;536 whether or not its edicts 
are valid and enforceable in foreign law jurisdictions is 
entirely beyond the question.  
Although it is curious to propose that a provision 
enacted by the UK Parliament did not intend to have 
any effect on UK law but rather was solely aimed at 
producing rights and obligations in foreign legal 
systems, in support of the suggestion it must once again 
be emphasised that the Statute of Westminster is itself, 
as Jennings submits, “a very peculiar enactment” 537 
with an overwhelmingly political character. In this 
light, s.4 may be understood as a manifes tation of the 
Dominions’ anxiety, expressed during the relevant 
Imperial Conferences, to secure the inclusion in the 
upcoming political settlement (as they perceived it) of 
an acknowledgement that the links between the UK and 
their domestic legal systems were to be severed with the 
                                                            
536 Although a more speculative claim could be made that 
Parliament can decide on what it wishes the law of foreign 
jurisdictions to be considered as being by UK courts. It is not 
clear what purpose such a direction could serve but, surely, it 
must be within the sovereign Parliament’s powers to issue it.  
537 Jennings, 1936, at p.175.  
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effect that thenceforth they would –  at least 
jurisdictionally – be autonomous.  
True; the modus  chosen for such an acknowledgement –  
an Act of the UK Parliament – was, arguably, somewhat 
unsuitable in that the intention was not for UK courts 
(as is the normal intention of provisions of UK 
statutes)538 but rather for Dominion courts to take 
notice, and rely upon it. However, the UK lawyer is 
familiarised with such practices via the various Orders 
in Council granting independence to former colonies. 
Illustratively, Diplock LJ explains in Buck v Attorney-
General :539  
[a]s soon as Sierra Leone became 
independent, the [Sierra Leone 
(Constitution)] Order in Council [1961] 
ceased to have any effect as an Order in 
Council, that is, as an exercise of the 
sovereign power of the United Kingdom 
Government represented by the Attorney-
General of England.540  
                                                            
538 See: 5 Beav 574, 582.  
539 [1965] Ch 745.  
540 ibid . ,  771. See also: Raz,1980, at p.188.  
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For good measure, not only is it true – as Diplock 
continues – that, “[w]hatever effect it then had was as 
part of the law of a foreign sovereign state, into the 
validity of which this court has no jurisdiction to 
inquire”,541 but the rules under which such Orders in 
Council fell to be interpreted were strictly the domestic 
rules of Dominion law, as the Privy Council later 
emphasised542 with regard to the Bermuda Constitution 
Order 1968. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
541 ibid . .  
542 Minister v  Collins  [1980] AC 319, 328-329. 
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Interpreting s.4: Effects in 
Dominion law? 
 
Having thus established, one may proceed a step 
further and propose that, contra  the several 
Independence Orders in Council, the 1931 Act failed to 
produce any effects not merely in UK law but was also 
not cognisable by the courts of at least some of the 
Dominions in the laws of which it was presumably 
intended to apply. To elaborate,  s.10 of the 1931 Statute 
must be recited:  
None of the following sections of this Act 
[that is, ss.2-6] … shall extend to a Dominion 
to which this section applies [that is, the 
Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of 
New Zealand and Newfoundland] as part of 
the law of that Dominion unless that section 
is adopted by the Parliament of the 
Dominion…  
The first note to be made is that, in and of itself, s.10 
lends further support to the strictly literal 
interpretation that conceives of s.4 as being an 
unsuitably placed acknowledgement of the autonomy of 
Dominion jurisdictions that was intended to be cognised 
by Dominion, not UK, courts.  
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Indeed, in view of such clause, it was necessary for the 
Parliaments of Australia, New Zealand and 
Newfoundland to enact legislation in order to ratify the 
Statute’s validity and effect in their respective 
Dominions. Illustratively, the Dominion of 
Newfoundland preferred never to ratify the Statute. 
Rather, in 1934, it relinquished self -government and, 
upon its request to the Crown, direct rule from the UK 
was resumed.  
At any rate, more important for present purposes are 
Australia and New Zealand which both duly proceeded 
in ratifying the 1931 Statute through the Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act 1942 (Cth) and the Statute of 
Westminster Adoption Act 1947 (NZ) respectively. 
Crucially, the fact that, legally, these statutes went on 
to explain and supplement, rather than merely ratify, 
the 1931 Statute543 coupled with the reality of 
independence that, politically, the latter bestowed upon  
the Dominions, opened up a window for the judiciaries 
of – what had by then become –  the independent polities 
of the British Commonwealth,  to construct and espouse 
an independent constitutional theory; a  constitutional 
narrative that acknowledges a domestic, rather than an 
                                                            
543 See e.g. :  Statute of Westminster Adoption Act 1947 (NZ), 
s.3(1); Aikman, 1967, at p.60.  
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Imperial, fons  both for the concessions reached at the 
relevant Imperial conferences and enshrined in the UK 
and Dominion Acts as well as, more broadly,  for the 
ownership of their constitutional documents and the 
authority of their local legislatures .  
A palpable illustration of the gradual sprouting of this 
‘Independence theory’ narrative is provided by the 
Australian courts’ reception of the Australia Acts 1986. 
More specifically, following the Commonwealth 
Parliament’s request to that effect, 544 the Australia Act 
1986 was enacted by the UK Parliament. The 
Commonwealth Parliament, for its part, also proceeded 
in enacting an Australia Act 1986 that closely mirrored 
the provisions of the UK enactment. Indeed, s.1 of both 
the UK and Commonwealth versions of the enactment 
crucially provided that:  
[n]o Act of Parliament of the United 
Kingdom passed after the commencement of 
this Act shall extend, or be deemed to  
extend, to the Commonwealth, to a State or a 
Territory as part of the law of the 
Commonwealth, of the State or of the 
Territory. 
                                                            
544 Australia (Request and Consent) Act 1985 (Cth).  
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It follows that, extending the literal interpretation of 
s.4 of the 1931 Statute to s.1 of the Australia Act 1986 
(UK), the conclusion arrived at, by analogy, is that the 
latter, much like the former, did not produce any 
discernible effects in UK law but was intended to alter 
Australian law as understood by the federal, State and 
territory courts of Australia.  
For good measure, it is likely that s.1 of the Australia 
Act 1986 (UK) failed to produce legal effects not only in 
UK but also in Commonwealth law. To elaborate, the 
Australia Act 1986 (Cth) was enacted, according to its 
Preamble, under s.51(xxxviii) of the Australia 
Constitution545 although s.128 of the latter provides 
that ‘this Constitution shall not be altered except in the 
following manner’. Therefore, if the provisions of the 
Commonwealth version of the 1986 Act are not 
inconsistent and do not amend the Australian 
Constitution then, in strict law, the Australia Act 1986 
(UK) was not legally essential but was rather enacted 
out of abundance of caution. Although serious doubts 
have been raised in this regard, and in particular with 
                                                            
545 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900.  
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respect to s.15 of the Australia Act  1986 (Cth),546 the 
Australian courts – demonstrating that the seed 
inseminated in the mid-20 th century by, inter alia , the 
existence of both a domestic and an Imperial legal 
source for the Statute of Westminster’s provisions had, 
by that time, grown into a fully-fledged doctrine – have 
unwaveringly turned to the Australia Act 1986 (Cth), 
rather than the Australia Act 1986 (UK), for 
authoritative guidance. For instance, approving of the 
hallmark judgement in Sue v Hill ,547 the High Court of 
Australia in Marquet  declared that “constitutional 
norms, whatever may be their historical origins, are 
now to be traced to Australian sources.” 548 Such norms, 
in the court’s opinion, included the Australia Act which:  
too, is to be traced to its Australian source –  
the Constitution of the Commonwealth. The 
Australia Act takes its force and effect from 
the reference of power to the federal 
Parliament under section 51 [of the 
                                                            
546 Thomson, 1990, at pp.414-415; Zines, 1997, at p.306; 
Twomey, 2004, at pp.125-127; Oliver, 2005, at pp.275-278, 331-
336. C.f.  Blackshield, 2001, at p.45.  
547 (1999) 199 CLR 462, 491.  
548 217 CLR 545, 570.  
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Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 
1900] …549 
As to the version of the Australia Act 
enacted by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom … I deny the right of that 
Parliament in 1986 (even at the request and 
by the consent of the constituent 
Parliaments of Australia) to enact any law 
affecting in the slightest way the 
constitutional arrangements of this 
independent nation.550 
Thence, in view of the above, it is at least arguable that 
the Australia Act 1986 (UK) presents an exceptional 
instance of a UK statute that generates no legal effects 
whatsoever in UK, Australian, or any other law! 
Equivalently, it is not implausible to propose, by 
analogy, that the Statute of Westminster may well fall 
in the same category, at least to the extent that it 
provides for Australia and New Zealand.  
At any rate, admitting that the formalisation of the 
jurisdictional severance of the Dominions from the UK 
                                                            
549 ibid . ,  570-571. 
550 ibid . ,  612. 
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via  statute, rather than treaty, may have been partly 
inappropriate, cannot, eo ipso , impinge upon the 
appraisal of the strictly literal interpretation of the 
1931 Statute’s s.4. Towards that end, the clearest 
indication of the interpretation’s accuracy in grasping 
the genuine intention of s.4 is provided by an energetic 
controversy that has raged in Australia for decades 
regarding the scope of the 1931 Statute (or, for that 
matter, its domestic law equivalent). The conundrum 
revolves around the meaning of the phrase ‘law of the 
Dominion’ in the context of s.2 and s.4 of the Statute of 
Westminster and, more specifically, whether it merely 
connotes the law falling within the province of the 
Dominion Parliament (that is, Commonwealth law) or 
whether it intends to encompass the conception of the 
law in force in the territory constituting the Dominion 
(that is, both Commonwealth law and State law). 
Interestingly, the Commonwealth judiciary’s approach 
to what is nowadays a moot dispute appears to be in 
line with the latter, broader interpretation. 551 However, 
of current interest is the fact that the question was very 
much real at the time of the preparation of the Statute 
which led to revealing correspondence between State, 
Commonwealth and UK officials. Illuminatingly, the 
                                                            
551 Kirmani v Captain Cook  (1985) 159 CLR 351, 374-375. 
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Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs is reported as 
advising in a 1931 cablegram that the UK:  
has always understood that in its application 
to the Commonwealth of Australia the 
intention of that clause [s.4] was to re fer to 
the application of United Kingdom Acts to 
the Commonwealth as part of the Federal 
law of the Commonwealth…552 
For good measure, the workings surrounding the 
finalisation of the Statute’s wording, form and 
provisions, abound with equivalent clarifying 
statements by British officials.  
In short, the appropriateness of the literal 
interpretation of s.4 in depicting the genuine intention 
of its framers is beyond doubt. The provision sought to 
establish a rule of Dominion law to the effect that 
Dominion courts should, thenceforward, refuse to take 
notice of UK statutes unless the consent of the relevant 
Dominion had been provided. The justifications for the 
qualification enshrined in the s.4 rule gradually 
                                                            
552 Cablegram from the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs 
to the Governor-General, No.109, August 11 t h  1931, NAA: A432 
1935/49 quoted in: Twomey, 2004, at pp.66 -67, fn.97.  
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diminished and therefore, when the time for the 
repatriation of the Constitutions of the various 
Commonwealth nations came, the restriction was not re -
enacted.  
Apart from s.1 of the Australia Act 1986, s.2 of the 
Canada Act 1982 provides an additional case in point 553 
insofar as it provides:  
No Act of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom passed after the Constitution Act, 
1982 comes into force shall extend to Canada 
as part of its law. 
Evidently, as per the above, such a clause is exclusively 
aimed at altering the law of Canada –  it institutes a 
Canadian rule of law whereby Canadian courts are 
directed to disregard UK statutes when ascertaining 
and applying Canadian law.  
Therefore, a provision equivalent to s.2 of the Canada 
Act or s.4 of the 1931 Act itself does not, does not 
intend to, and cannot have any effect in UK law, nor 
promulgates a UK rule of law that UK courts can or 
should recognise and put into use. It necessarily follows 
that neither Act can have any effect whatsoever on 
                                                            
553 See also: Indian Independence Act 1947, s.6(4).  
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Parliament’s procedural and substantive sovereign 
ability to legislate.  
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The argument for interpreting s.4 
purposively  
 
Notwithstanding the above, an alternative, purposive 
approach towards s.4 has stealthily crept in to the 
literature surrounding the Statute of Westminster. 
Viewed under this prism that has doubtlessly also been 
fueled by unfortunate obiter dicta ,  s.4 is to be 
understood as pertaining to UK law by decreeing that 
no Act of Parliament will be deemed, as a matter of UK 
law as identified and applied by UK courts, to apply to 
a Dominion unless the latter’s consent has been 
adduced. If, then, s.4 constitutes an effective ‘manner 
and form’ requirement that binds Parliament’s future 
incarnations in their legislative attempts, by extension, 
a provision such as s.2 of the Canada Act 1982 would, 
presumably, have to be understood as a substantive 
restriction on the subject-matter of Parliament’s future 
legislation. 
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Madzimbamuto 
To assess this approach, the first case to be considered 
is Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke .554 Southern 
Rhodesia, whence the case arose, had become a colony 
in 1923,555 albeit one of “a very special kind”. 556 The 
distinguishingly large degree of responsible government 
enjoyed by the southern African nation was, crucially 
for present purposes, reflected in the development of a 
constitutional convention to the effect that, in respect 
of matters falling within the competence of the 
Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, the UK 
would only legislate pursuant to the Southern 
Rhodesian Government’s request and consent. Although 
such convention enjoyed both express recognition from 
the UK Government557 as well as appreciable 
                                                            
554 [1969] 1 AC 645.  
555 See: Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) Order in Council 
1923; Southern Rhodesia (Constitution) Letters Patent, 1 
September 1923.  
556 Marshall,  1968, at p.1022.  
557 Office of Commonwealth Relations, 1961. However, the 
convention’s existence prior to such official  recognition has 
been doubted: Palley, 1966, at pp.232 -233. 
  
 
338 
 
documentation in the literature, 558 it must, equally, be 
stressed that the 1923 Constitution contained a 
reservation of powers to the UK for the protection of the 
Rhodesian native population so it would be an 
aberration to conceive of colonial Southern Rhodesia as 
completely self-governing.559  
As for the case itself, it concerned the lawfulness of the 
continued detention of the applicant’s husband. 
Following the proclamation of a state of emergency by 
the Governor,560 Madzimbamuto had been detained 
pursuant to an order made by one of the respondents, as 
Minister of Justice, under s.4(6) of the Emergency 
Powers Act 1960. However, s.3(2) of such Act provided 
that a proclamation of such sort ‘shall be in force for 
[no] more than three months without prejudice to the 
issue of another proclamation at or before the end of 
that period if the Legislative Assembly by resolution so 
                                                            
558 See e.g. :  ibid . ,  at pp.241-271. C.f.  De Smith, 1964, at pp.42-
43; Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke ,  Judgement No. 
GD/CIV/23/66, 1966, September 9 t h ,  Rhodesian Government 
Blue Book, at p.8.  
559 ibid. ,  at pp.214, 236-271; McDougal and Reisman, 1968, at 
p.1, fn.4.  
560 Proclamation No.51 of Rhodesia, 1965.  
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determines’. When, naturally, the state of emergency 
under which Madzimbamuto was being detained 
expired, an order for the continuation of his detention 
under fresh emergency regulations was issued. 561  
The crucial factor that distinguishes Madzimbamuto  
from a typical case of alleged false imprisonment is the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) issued by 
the Southern Rhodesian administration 562 in the interim 
period between the original proclamation of an 
emergency state and its renewal several months later. 
The UDI aimed at making Southern Rhodesians, or 
more accurately the white minority thereof, “masters in 
… [their] own house”563 by severing colonial links with 
the UK and thereby rendering ‘Rhodesia’ – as 
professedly the country would thenceforth be known –  
an independent sovereign state.  
To that end, annexed to the UDI was a document 
purporting to embody a Constitution for the self -
proclaimed state. Such document in most respects 
                                                            
561 Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) 
Regulations, 1966, Regulation 47(3).  
562 Smith, 1966.  
563 Smith, 1965, at p.205.  
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mirrored the Constitution of 1961 that had been 
conferred by Order in Council; 564 after all, according to 
Smith PM, “we have never asked for anything other 
than independence on the basis of the … [1961] 
Constitution, and only such amendments are included 
as are necessary to adapt it to that of an independent 
country.”565 Unsurprisingly, such ‘necessary 
amendments’ relevantly included the repudiation of the 
applicability of future UK statutes in Rhodesia, unless 
otherwise extended therein by the Rhodesian 
legislature.  
In the meantime, in the UK, the Southern Rhodesia 
(Constitution) Order in Council 1965 was issued, s.2 of 
which provided that ‘any instrument made or other act 
done in purported promulgation of any constitution for 
Southern Rhodesia except as authorised by Act of 
Parliament is void and of no effect.’ Additionally, the 
Order declared, in its s.3(1)(a), that ‘no laws may be 
made by the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia … [and] 
no business may be transacted by the Legislative 
Assembly’, while, in the same breath, conferred, via its 
s.4(1)(a), all executive and legislative powers on the UK 
                                                            
564 Southern Rhodesia (Const itution) Order in Council 1961.  
565 Smith, 1965, at p.205.  
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Parliament, to be exercised by the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations.  
The substantial task of the court, therefore, was to 
select between two non-reconcilable claims to 
sovereignty –  the one advanced by the UK Parliament 
via  the 1965 Order that was grounded upon the 1961 
Constitution and the one advanced by the de facto  
administration that relied upon the UDI and the self -
styled ‘Constitution’ thereupon annexed.  
In a decision wholly consonant with orthodox UK 
constitutional doctrine, their Lordships in the Judicial 
Committee cut the Gordian knot by unmistakably 
choosing the former of the two conflicting sovereignty 
claims. The question to be answered, in their view, was 
whether some event or circumstance had had the effect 
of breaking the chain of valid claims to sovereignty by 
the UK Parliament at, or before, the time of the case. In 
the main, the Committee considered and rejected two 
such ostensible eventualities: the constitutional 
convention between the UK and Southern Rhodesia, and 
the doctrine of necessity.  
Insofar as the convention is concerned, Lord Reid’s 
celebrated passage captures the essence of their 
Lordships’ opinion:  
That was a very important convention but it 
had no legal effect in limiting the legal 
power of Parliament. It is often said that it 
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would be unconstitutional for … Parliament 
to do certain things, meaning that the moral, 
political and other reasons against  doing 
them are … strong … But that does not mean 
that it is beyond the power of Parliament to 
do such things. If Parliament chose to do any 
of them the Courts could not hold the Act of 
Parliament invalid.566 
The central principle confirmed by this dictum  is, 
doubtlessly, that constitutional conventions neither 
have the force of law nor, a fortiori ,  bind Parliament.567 
In its own right, this acknowledgement is an evident, as 
much as it is an important, pillar of the orthodox 
understanding of Parliament’s sovereignty.  
Beyond that however, the first directly relevant 
observation to be made in regard to the juxtaposition of 
s.4 of the 1931 Statute with the UK-Southern Rhodesia 
convention is that the latter, unlike the former, never 
                                                            
566 [1969] 1 AC 645, 723.  
567 It is submitted that although some room exists for 
discussing whether conventions are, or should be, ascribed 
“the dignity of law” (Allan, 1994, at p.240), the same cannot b e 
said for the claim (Elliott, 2002) that they possess the 
potential of binding Parliament.  
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acquired the formal legal recognition of Parliament. 
Therefore, Lord Reid’s opinion that “it is [not] beyond 
the power of Parliament”568 to disregard the convention 
does not, on a first cursory look, appear pertinent to the 
question of whether Parliament can do the same with 
s.4. However, to the extent that those contending that 
Parliament cannot legislate for former Dominions, or 
cannot repeal s.4, without their consent, do so either on 
the basis of “moral [and] political … reasons”, 569 or on 
the basis that s.4 embodies a pre-existing convention, 
the parallels between the Rhodesian convention and s.4 
quickly assume relevance and Lord Reid’s passage 
becomes valid as an effective counter-argument.  
However, an additional difference between the 
Rhodesian convention and s.4 can be identified that 
involves not their divergent legal status but rather 
their substantive context as such. Such difference is 
apposite for present purposes in that it critically 
accentuates, as will be seen, the distinction between the 
correct, literal interpretation of s.4, propounded above, 
and the more popular, fallacious, purposive one. To 
                                                            
568 [1969] 1 AC 645, 723.  
569 ibid . .  
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explain, one must commence by placing the two side by 
side: 
[The] Parliament at Westminster … [will] 
not … legislate for Southern Rhodesia on 
matters within the competence of the 
Legislative Assembly of Southern Rhodesia, 
except with the agreement of the Southern 
Rhodesia Government.570 
No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom 
… shall extend, or be deemed to extend, to a 
Dominion as part of the law of that 
Dominion, unless it is expressly declared in 
that Act that that Dominion has requested, 
and consented to, the enactment thereof. 571 
The key to the differentiation of the convention and 
statutory section –  adduced above, in that order – is 
once again located in the phrase ‘as part of the law of 
that Dominion’ contained in the latter. Evidently, the 
essence is not, as such, to be found in the absence of a 
similar term in the Executive-approved version of the 
Rhodesian convention, for that term can, without much 
                                                            
570 Office of Commonwealth Relations, 1961, at p.3.  
571 Statute of Westminster 1931, s.4.  
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difficulty, be assumed to have been impliedly intended. 
Rather, even upon such assumption, ‘law of Southern 
Rhodesia’ and ‘law of that Dominion’ are vitally 
different concepts: the latter, unlike the former, refers 
to an ‘autonomous community’.  
Indeed, outstandingly, an autonomous community, such 
as the Irish Free State in 1931, implies, inter multa 
alia , the existence of an independent, monolithic 
judiciary that adjudicates on the basis of the laws and 
principles of a discrete legal system. Contrariwise, a 
dependent community within the British Empire, such 
as Southern Rhodesia in 1961, involved a judiciary 
operating under a subordinate legal system that was 
subjected to the dictates of the superior British order.  
Therefore, a UK law purporting to apply to – say – 
Canada, as part of the law of Canada, was, for the 
Canadian judiciary just that: a foreign rule that 
attempted, in accordance with the Canadian rule of law 
enshrined in s.4 of the Statute of Westminster, to apply 
in domestic law. On the other hand, a UK law 
purporting to apply to Southern Rhodesia was, by 
definition, Southern Rhodesian law.  
In other words, for an autonomous polity such as 
Australia there is a sensible distinction to be made 
between UK laws applying therein as a matter of UK 
law and laws purporting to apply therein as a matter of 
Australian law. It follows, therefore, that, when faced 
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with a convention or rule of law such as the one 
enshrined in s.4, it is imperative to inquire into 
whether it intends to form part of UK law and be 
directed to UK judges or whether it intends to be part of 
Australian law and fall to be enforced by Australian 
judges (as s.4 ultimately was, as noted earlier). Per 
contra , for a dependent community such as Southern 
Rhodesia no distinction can be made between UK laws 
applying in their own right in Rhodesia and UK laws 
purporting to apply therein as a matter of Rhodesian 
law. By extension, since Rhodesian law did not 
constitute a separate, insulated body of law, it is a 
pseudo-dilemma to ask whether the constitutional 
convention at hand intended to form part of Rhodesian 
or UK law and be cognisable by Rhodesian or UK 
judges: the convention formed a (non-legally binding) 
part of UK law and therefore, by extension, was also 
part of Rhodesian law.  
Having established the constitutional morphology of the 
Rhodesian convention, it is illuminating for the 
purposes of the broader analysis of the 1931 Statute’s 
effect, to explore its interplay with Madzimbamuto . As 
already noted, the Rhodesian administration, with its 
UDI, had purported to render Southern Rhodesia a 
sovereign state or, in the terminology employed by the 
earlier analysis, an ‘autonomous polity’. Reactions, 
however, varied.  
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The UK, for one, both formally and in practice, 
continued treating it as a dependent colonial community 
and, consequently,572 the courts were obliged to follow 
suit without taking notice of any doctrine of necessity, 
the proposed effect of which could not be reconciled 
with the “drastic and unqualified” 573 terms of 
legislation.574 Therefore, it is not surprising – in view of 
the analysis supra  – that their Lordships in the Privy 
Council made no distinction between UK laws applying 
in their own right in Rhodesia and UK laws purporting 
to apply to Rhodesia as a matter of Rhodesian law, as 
well as did not bring their minds to considering whether 
the convention formed part of UK or Rhodesian law. It 
is also interesting to note that Lord Reid made mention 
of the fact that the Statute of Westminster did not 
                                                            
572 See: Luther v Sagor  [1921] 3 KB 532, 540; Duff v 
Government of Kelantan  [1924] AC 797, 824; Eekelaar, 1973, 
at pp.22-23. 
573 [1969] 1 AC 645, 729.  
574 It is this fact –  as well as, silently,  the recognition -of-
government line of cases –  that Lord Pearce contested and 
ultimately led him to deliver a di ssenting judgement ( ibid. ,  
737, 740, 743-745).  See also: Commission on Rhodesian 
Opinion under the Chairmanship of the Right Honourable Lord 
Pearce, 1972.  
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apply to Southern Rhodesia,575 thereby correctly hinting 
that the legal position, albeit not necessarily the 
ultimate decision of the court, would have been 
different, had that colony been deemed an autonomous 
community by the 1931 Act.  
In Rhodesia, the situation was markedly more 
labyrinthine. Smith’s UDI had placed the Rhodesian 
judiciary in “an extremely difficult position”, 576 as Lord 
Reid recognised. In both the General and Appellate 
Division of the High Court of Southern Rhodesia, the 
Rhodesian judges, with the exceptions of Quenet JP 577 
and Macdonald JA,578 refused to confer de jure  status on 
either the 1965 Constitution or the revolutionary 
regime operating thereunder. However, appearing 
                                                            
575 ibid . ,  722. 
576 ibid . ,  730. 
577 Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke and Another (No.2)  1968 
(2) SA 284, 367-368. 
578 Eekelaar correctly submits that Macdonald ( ibid. ,  412) 
made a “monstrous fallacy” (Eekelaar, 1969, at p.26) in 
adjudging a de facto  government (which, in his view, the Smith 
administration was) as being a de jure  government merely in 
view of the fact that it holds ‘ for the time being’ the power to 
make and enforce legislation.  
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prepared to incorporate in their legal opinions the 
practical consideration that the de jure  authority was 
failing, in the post-UDI era, to fulfil the duty of 
providing peace, order and good government whilst, at 
the same time, the rebel government was, in point of 
fact, in effective control of the territory and this control 
seemed likely to continue, they bestowed, to variable 
extents, de facto  status upon the Smith regime.  
Therefore, implied by the Rhodesian judges’ opinions on 
the regime’s status is the emergence  of a hiatus 
between Rhodesian and UK law. Consonantly with the 
earlier discussion, the acknowledgement of such a 
hiatus, in turn, led to the implicit distinction, in the 
judges’ analyses, between the scope and effect of the 
constitutional convention in UK law and Rhodesian law, 
as well as the distinction between UK laws applying as 
a matter of UK law in Southern Rhodesia and UK laws 
applying as a matter of Rhodesian law therein.  
As the former type of laws are never cognisable and 
enforceable by any court other than a UK court, 
legislative pronouncements such as the Southern 
Rhodesian (Constitution) Order 1965 would have to fall 
effectively within the latter category –  that of UK laws 
applying as a matter of Rhodesian law – if they were to 
be adjudged valid and enforceable by Rhodesian courts. 
In turn, the determination of whether or not these 
pronouncements were in fact UK laws applying as a 
matter of Rhodesian law was to be made on the basis of 
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the constitutional convention which itself fell to be 
interpreted, at least in Rhodesian courts, by Rhodesian 
law. But, said the General and Appellate Divisions, 
Rhodesian law conceived of the convention as being 
legally binding and, therefore, since the consent or 
request of the Southern Rhodesian Government had not 
been tendered, laws such as the 1965 Order could not be 
considered valid and enforceable as a matter of 
Rhodesian law. The fol lowing passage from Beadle CJ’s 
judgement enlightens the argument:  
[The convention] is part of the ‘fundamental 
law’ [Grundnorm] of Southern Rhodesia and 
cannot be withdrawn any more than the UK 
Parliament can now repeal the Statute of 
Westminster 1931 (which was only 
declaratory of the existing conventions) and 
now make Canada a Crown Colony. 579 
The crucial observation to be made with regard to this 
excerpt is the Chief Justice’s affirmation of the 
convention’s bindingness in law. Although, as will be 
remembered, in the Privy Council the convention was 
expressly dismissed as being non-binding, the 
judgements of Beadle CJ and Lord Reid should not be 
                                                            
579 ibid. ,  334. 
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considered as conflicting assessments of the same 
convention but, rather, as opinions expressed about two 
different topics: the convention as a matter of 
Rhodesian and UK law respectively. That the Chief 
Justice was referring to the scope of the convention in 
Rhodesian law as well as that he did, in fact, appreciate 
and endorse the distinction, analysed above, between 
UK laws applying in Southern Rhodesia in their own 
right and UK laws purporting to apply therein as a 
matter of Rhodesian law is illuminated by the analogy 
he employs between the withdrawal of the convention 
and the hypothetical annexation of Canada via the 
repeal of the Statute of Westminster. Indeed, the only 
way in which Canada, an autonomous community , could 
ever be annexed by the UK would be if a UK law 
purporting to apply to Canada as a matter of Canadian 
law was accepted by Canadian courts. The mere repeal 
of the Statute of Westminster, on the part of the UK, 
may have been interpreted by UK courts, if the words 
used were unmistakable, as signifying a Parliamentary 
intention for UK laws to apply in Canada as a matter of 
UK law but the reinstatement of the validity and 
enforceability of such laws as a matter of Canadian law 
would always be a matter for Canadian courts.  
Incidentally, that is, indeed, also why the caution with 
which the adoption of the Constitution of Ireland in 
1937 was approached should be regarded as having 
been, in a legal sense, superfluent: the fact that the 
Irish Free State’s initial Constitution was enshrined in 
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a UK statute, the Irish Free State Constitution Act 
1922, did not mean that the Irish courts would follow 
their British counterparts580 in regarding it as being 
dependent on UK law581 or, even worse, that a 
hypothetical repeal of such Act from the UK Parliament 
could have any effect in Irish law.  
In summary, for the purposes of UK constitutional law, 
Madzimbamuto , properly so understood, sheds ample 
light into the crucial distinction between UK laws 
applying in a territory in their own right, and UK laws 
applying therein as a matter of the sovereign law of 
that territory. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
580 Moore v Attorney-General (Irish Free State)  [1935] AC 484, 
497-498. 
581 As indeed they did not (see e.g. :  The State (Ryan) v Lennon  
[1935] 1 IR 170).  
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British Coal Corporation v King 
Of similarly educational value is the following obiter 
dictum  of Viscount Sankey in BCC v King :582 
It is doubtless true that the power of the 
Imperial Parliament to pass on its own 
initiative any legislation that it thought fit 
extending to Canada remains in  theory 
unimpaired: indeed, the Imperial Parliament 
could, as a matter of abstract law, repeal or 
disregard s.4 of the [1931] Statute. But that 
is theory and has no relation to realities. In 
truth Canada is in enjoyment of the full 
scope of self-government.583 
Naturally, it is the aforecited passage’s invocation of 
‘realities’ in juxtaposition with ‘theory’ that has elicited 
most comment but the vital, relevant question that has 
seldom been asked is: ‘which theory’?   
Is it an ostensible ‘theory’ that Parliament cannot 
interfere with the ‘full scope of self -government’ which 
Canada enjoys? If yes, then, evidently, Sankey is 
                                                            
582 [1935] AC 500.  
583 ibid. ,  520. 
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correct in maintaining that it is unrealistic. At the 
same time, however, he is wrong in treating  it as a 
‘theory’  of the UK Constitution. Indeed, it has never 
been argued, nor does s.4 of the 1931 Statute provide, 
that Parliamentary sovereignty is a doctrine that is 
accepted by Canadian courts or, more generally, that its 
validity depends upon being accepted by any other 
courts apart from UK courts, and that Parliament’s 
power extends to creating laws that will form part of 
Canadian law or, more generally, that it should 
thuswise extend in order to be considered a sovereign 
legislative power. As Murphy J, in the Australian case 
of Bistricic v Rokov ,584 correctly commented with 
regards to Sankey’s contentious passage : 
The United Kingdom Parliament could of 
course repeal the Statute of Westminster. It 
could repeal the Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act. But such repeals would 
have no effect in Australia. Their effect, if 
any, would be confined to the municipal law 
of the United Kingdom…585 
                                                            
584 (1976) 135 CLR 552.  
585 ibid. ,  567. 
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In the alternative, Sankey may have had ‘Imperial 
theory ’  in mind. If yes, then he is correct in treating it 
as a theory for this set of various, separate propositions 
that is broadly subsumed under the name Imperial 
theory does deserve the name theory properly so called . 
Indeed, this theory that dominated for the better part of 
the 20 th century the constitutional theory and practice 
of Australia, Canada and New Zealand essentially 
sought to provide a broad narrative of the fundamental 
nature and workings of the constitutional arrangements 
in these “well-behaved Dominions of the British 
Empire”586 while retaining UK law as its overarching 
compass. In particular,  according to this theory,  legal 
principles587,  actors588 and statutes589 that, happened to 
                                                            
586 Oliver, 2005, at p.1.  
587 Such as that the doctrine of the UK Parliament’s unlimited 
sovereignty and the doctrine that the UK Parliament cannot 
bind its successors.  
588 Such as the UK Parliament and Crown.  
589 Such as the British North America Act 1867 for Canada, the 
New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 and the New Zealand 
Constitution (Amendment) Act 1947 for New Zealand, the 
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 for 
Australia and the Statute of Westminster 1931, following its 
adoption, for all  three Dominions.  
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govern, exist and apply in both the UK as well as , by 
virtue of their shared Imperial past, Australia, Canada 
or New Zealand, were to be interpreted in the said 
Dominions in the same manner in which they were 
being treated by UK law.  
A prime example of Imperial theory in action is the 
Patriation Reference590 which revolved around the 
British North America Act 1867 or, as it would later be 
called,591 the Constitution Act 1867: an Imperial statute 
that had involved, as its Preamble recognised, the close 
collaboration of the North American provinces for its 
enactment and functioned as the main constitutional 
document of Canada at the time. Unlike the equivalent 
statutes enacted for New Zealand 592 and Australia,593 
the Constitution Act 1867 contained no express 
provision for its own amendment; a legal position that 
Canadian representatives had not only consciously 
                                                            
590 [1981] 1 SCR 753.  
591 Canada Act 1982, Sch.1.  
592 New Zealand Constitution Act 1852, s.68; New Zealand 
Constitution Amendment Act 1857, s.2.  
593 Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia Act 1900, 
s.128. 
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adopted in 1867 but, when given the chance some 60 
years later, had elected to preserve by virtue of s s.7(1) 
and 7(3) of the Statute of Westminster 1931.  Hence, a 
majority of Canadian political actors had always 
considered it necessary to turn to the UK Parliament 
for amending the Constitution Act  as the federal 
government in fact did when the political climate was 
ripe for wholesale constitutional amendment  in 1982. 
Interestingly, the Trudeau administration sought to 
combine other desired constitutional changes with the 
‘ (re-)patriation’ of the Constitution, as the process came 
to be known, or, more specifically, with the insertion of 
a domestic amendment clause in the 1867 Act.  
At any rate, the essential issue before the provincial 
Courts of Appeal Quebec, Manitoba and Newfoundland 
and, later, before the Supreme Court of Canada was 
whether the proposed constitutional amendments would 
affect the powers, rights and privileges of the provincial 
legislatures and, if yes, whether the Constitution  
empowered the Parliament of Canada to adopt the  
‘Proposed Resolution for a Joint Address to Her Majesty 
the Queen respecting the Constitution of Canada’ 
without the consent of the provinces . After responding 
affirmatively to the first question regarding the effect 
of the proposed amendments upon provincial 
legislatures, the Supreme Court ruled that before 
proceeding to adopt the Resolution or, more generally,  
before submitting any request to the UK Parliament for  
constitutional amendments of an equivalent nature , the 
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federal Parliament was, as a matter of constitutional 
convention, obliged to obtain the agreement of the 
provinces. Nevertheless, the majority found no evidence 
of the crystallisation into law of such constitutional 
convention which, in turn, led, without much further 
ado, to the disposal of the case against the appealing 
provinces. 
It is this catalytic proposition that  critics of the 
landmark judgement have considered as an 
unjustifiably excessive espousal of strong Imperial 
theory by the Supreme Court.  Emphasis is, in 
particular, placed upon the Supreme Court of Canada ’s 
suggestion that “the authority of the British Parliament 
or its practices and conventions are not matters upon 
which … [it] would presume to pronounce” .594 As a 
proponent of ‘Independence theory’  – or, more 
specifically, of the idea that “an independent Canadian 
understanding of the constitutional texts ...  [is] 
available and potentially applicable through the 
[Canadian] courts” –595 which, in his recent historic 
treatise, is proposed successfully as an alternative to 
the Imperial theory, Oliver is right to contend that: 
                                                            
594 [1981] 1 SCR 753, 774.  
595 Oliver, 2005, at p.135.  
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[a]lthough it is obvious why a Canadian 
court would not want to pronounce on the 
authority, practices and conventions of a 
foreign Parliament, it is not clear why it 
should not do so where that foreign 
Parliament is, for amendment purposes, an 
integral part of the local constitutional 
system.  
Otherwise stated, it is said that the court  was wrong to 
believe that “[h]istory cannot alter the fact that in law 
there is a British statute to construe and apply…” 596 
Rather, as Oliver notes:  
Canadian independence, or the autonomy and 
equality which came to be recognised in the 
former colony’s relationship with the United 
Kingdom, manifested itself … in the ability 
of Canadian courts to determine what 
amounted to the ultimate rule of the 
Canadian Constitution 
with the result that in law – in Canadian law – there 
was, at the time of the Patriation Reference , not a 
British statute to construe utilising British principles 
                                                            
596 [1981] 1 SCR 753, 803.  
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of interpretation, but rather the autochthonous 
Canadian Constitution that the highest court of that 
country was called upon by Canadian subjects to 
interpret and apply according to Canadian 
constitutional law and practice.         
At any rate, the outcome of the disputation between the 
Imperial and Independence theories  –  two competing 
theories developed in the context of foreign jurisdictions 
–  is absolutely irrelevant for  UK constitutional law 
purposes. For instance, if Australian legal scholars, in 
their attempt to explain their domestic constitutional 
arrangements, adopt an Independence theory position 
and concede – as they arguably must –597 that the UK 
Parliament, from an Australian constitutional law 
perspective, bound itself or abdicated part of its 
sovereignty in enacting the Australia Act 1986 (UK), 
not only must the UK scholar not follow suit in an 
equivalent recognition but rather must , if at all,  
observe the dialectic as she would a clarification of the 
ambit of, say, the right against self -incrimination in 
Russian law: that is, as an interesting, but legally 
immaterial, analysis of a foreign legal jurisdiction that 
happens to share, in name only, a right with the UK 
legal system.  
                                                            
597 See: Oliver, Chs.10, 13.  
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Indeed, the Parliament that UK courts recognise as 
sovereign is a different body than the UK Parliament 
which each foreign jurisdiction conceives of  for the 
purposes and through the lens of its own law.598 The 
nominal identification of these several bodies should 
not hide the fact that they are different creatures with 
their own life in their respective normatively closed 
social systems. Explained in the terms of autopoietic 
systems theory,599 the creation of intra-systemic 
procedures and principles, the delimitation of the 
powers of legal actors as well as the unique mechanics 
of selecting, idiosyncratically applying, and moulding 
anew reasoning devices –  what Luhmann would call 
‘binary codes’ –  are conserved for each second-order, 
                                                            
598 Analogously, as Cook shows, UK courts never apply foreign 
law as such but, rather, merely the reflection of such law. The 
foreign law must have been incorporated into domestic law in 
some way –  be it through an Act of Parliament or by 
implication –  before the courts take it into account and 
therefore it is the incorporated version of such law –  that is, a 
provision of UK law modelled on the foreign provision –  that is 
always being applied: Cook, 1923 -1924. 
599 Luhmann, 1995.  
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normatively closed,600 if cognitively open,601 social 
system, such as each legal system itself. 602  
After all, proponents of the Independence theory 
concede as much. Indeed, their cardinal criticism of, 
say, the Patriation Reference  is not that the court was 
mistaken in proposing that the “the legal competence of 
… [the UK] Parliament … remains unimpaired”603 as a 
matter of UK constitutional law or in suggesting that 
political practices such as the customary requirement of  
provincial consent for constitutional amendment of the 
1867 Act are mere unenforceable constitutional 
conventions yet again as a matter of UK law; it is 
common ground that these legal positions were at time, 
and remain, accurate. Rather, they question the  legal 
relevance of these positions in relation to issues that 
are at stake in Canadian law cases such as the 
Patriation Reference  and retaliate by proposing that  the 
court should have behaved like the dendrologist that 
distinguishes between the old, extinguished roots which 
                                                            
600 Luhmann, 2011, at p.112.  
601 Teubner, 1984, at p.293.  
602 See: Varela, Maturana and Uribe, 1974.  
603 [1981] 1 SCR 753, 799.  
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a tree owes its creation to and living roots which can 
affect its present and future and thus should have at 
least entertained the possibility that , as a matter of 
Canadian law, in the century that had elapsed since the 
enactment of the 1867 Act , the untrammeled authority 
of the Imperial Parliament and the conventional 
requirement of provincial consent for constitutional 
amendment “evolved in accordance with Canadian 
developments such as independence, federalism and the 
changing attitudes of the Canadian public” 604 with the 
effect that the former was reduced, for Canadian law 
purposes, to a subordinate legislative body or, at least, 
a legislative body with spent self -embracing sovereign 
powers and the latter crystallised into law and was 
rendered judicially enforceable by the Canadian 
courts.605 
Thus, although Imperial theory is a theory properly so 
called it is certainly not a theory that involves, pertains 
or relates to UK law. No ‘theory’  of the UK Constitution 
occupies itself with the issue of  whether Canadian or, 
                                                            
604 Oliver, 2005, at p.158.  
605 “That which might be a convention in British terms … could 
at the same time be a basic rule of constitutional law in 
Canadian terms”: ibid. ,  at p.149. 
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for that matter, Greek or German courts apply UK laws 
intending to extend to their territory  in the same spirit 
as UK courts do or utilising tools of their domestic legal 
tradition and judicial arsenal, or whether they choose to 
ignore such pronouncements altogether (as the majority 
of foreign jurisdictions have always done and as 
Canadian courts have been doing at least since 1982) .606 
Equally, whether or not such foreign courts obey 
dictates of the UK Parliament has no bearing 
whatsoever upon the latter’s sovereignty.  
To be fair, it must be noted that some authors have 
tentatively attempted to draw conclusions regarding the 
potential future attitude of UK courts vis-à-vis 
Parliamentary sovereignty from the manner in which 
former Dominion perceptions of the UK Parliament 
changed during the 20 th century. Oliver, for instance, 
claims that “[i]t may be that the United Kingdom 
perspective is finally shifting towards the sorts of self -
embracing interpretations of Westminster Parliament 
sovereignty that may now be favoured in Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand.”607 Indeed, it is argued that 
                                                            
606 See: Re Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to Amend the 
Constitution  [1982] 2 SCR 793, 805-806. 
607 Oliver, 2005, at p.311.  
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whether the UK Parliament, from a UK legal 
perspective, possesses continuing or self -embracing 
sovereign powers constitutes  a penumbral legal issue 
since “[p]rior to the middle part of the twentieth 
century, the United Kingdom Parliament seldom if ever 
tried to bind itself  (certainly not in clear, effective 
terms)…”608 To support this idea, modern statutes that 
allegedly attempt to bind Parliament’s successors , such 
as the ECA 1972, are compared with earlier attempts, 
such as the Acquisition of Land (Assessment and 
Compensation) Act 1919, and the conclusion is drawn 
that the language of the former is “infinitely clear er 
than … [their] precursor[s]”. 609 Therefore, judicial 
pronouncements based on these earlier attempts, such 
as Vauxhall Estates  and Ellen Street Estates , should be 
considered “exceptionally weak case law” 610 that extend 
only to the facts at hand –  namely, that “language such 
as that used in the 1919 Act could not bind a future 
Parliament” –611 and leave open the possibility that 
                                                            
608 ibid. ,  at p.340.  
609 ibid. ,  at p.308.  
610 ibid. ,  at p.306.  
611 ibid. ,  at p.307.  
  
 
366 
 
“Parliament might all along have possessed unexplored 
self-embracing potential.”612  
However, in truth, this reasoning is doomed to failure 
when one takes notice of – as Oliver does not – even 
earlier statutes that despite evincing, unlike the ECA, a 
genuine intention, on the part of Parliament, to bind its 
successors have been considered by the courts as 
ordinary statutes to be repealed impliedly or expressly 
via the tripartite consent and simple majority rule of 
future Parliaments.  As will be analysed in Chapter VII, 
such statutes include the Bill of Rights 1688, or at least 
certain provisions thereof, as well as the Acts of Union 
between England and Scotland to form Great Britain, 
and Great Britain and Ireland to form the United 
Kingdom. At any rate,  despite pursuing it in several 
publications,613 this part of Oliver’s reasoning is merely 
incidental to his exposition of Dominion constitutional 
law and, as such, its shortcomings do little to subtract 
from his overall argument or, indeed, from the forceful 
arguments of Independence theory adherents. Indeed, 
Oliver concludes that: 
                                                            
612 Oliver, 2003, at p.149.  
613 Oliver 1994; Oliver,  1995; Oliver, 1999; Oliver, 2003; 
Oliver, 2005.  
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there is no need for this [that is, the shifting 
of UK courts towards a self -embracing 
conception of the UK Parliament’s powers] to 
be so. Given their political, international and 
judicial independence, Australia, Canada and 
New Zealand are entitled to adopt distinct 
interpretations of the Westminster 
Parliament’s powers in so far as that 
institution affects their own legal 
systems…614            
To return to BCC v King ,  if, on yet a different 
interpretation of the Viscount’s judgement, the ‘theory’  
which he is referring to is one that allows Parliament to 
‘pass on its own initiative any legislation that it thinks 
fit extending to Canada’  then, yes, the Lord Chancellor 
is accurate in describing it as a (UK law) ‘theory’. In 
that case, however, Sankey is gravely mistaken in his 
characterisation of such theory as having ‘no relation to 
realities’. The ‘theory’ being recited – it will be 
remembered – is the most elementary aspect of the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty: Parliament’s 
ability to “make or unmake any law whatever…” 615 
                                                            
614 Oliver, 2005, at p.311.  
615 Dicey, 1889, at p.38.  
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Indeed, such ability is not in the least impaired by 
considerations about a statute ’s likelihood of being 
enforced as would be most clearly illustrated several 
years later by the same court in Madzimbamuto .   
For good measure, irrespective of which interpretation 
is preferred, there is an additional respect in which the 
then Lord Chancellor’s dictum  is misguided: namely, 
the legal consequences he implicitly attributes to the 
potential repeal of s.4 of the 1931 Statute. In his view, 
such a repeal would have the (proposed) effect of 
eliminating Canada’s full scope of self -government and 
reinstating the fetters on the Canadian legislature 
which were present under the previous status quo . But 
that is certainly not true. Indeed, since s.4, as earlier 
discussed, does not have any effect whatsoever in UK 
law, its repeal would, likewise, generate no appreciable 
effects in UK law, not to mention, any effects as 
monumental as the ones theorised by Sankey. For such 
effects to be actualised, Canadian courts would have to 
recognise the repeal as part of their domestic law –  a 
recognition that could only conceivably occur if an 
exceptionally strong version of the Imper ial theory were 
to be reinstated by the Canadian courts or if the repeal 
was initiated by the Canadian, rather than the UK, 
legislature. The example of Heligoland provided by 
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Bradley and Ewing616 is illustrative. The small North 
Sea archipelago was ceded to Germany via  the Anglo-
German Agreement Act 1890. Following Lord Sankey, a 
potential repeal of such Act would have intended to 
effectuate the re-annexation of Heligoland to the UK. 
Evidently however, that was neither what happened 
nor, crucially, what was intended to happen when the 
1890 Act was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act 
1953. 
At any rate, one may propose, in response, that it is a 
pseudo-dilemma to ask which of the alternative, 
erroneous interpretations should be attributed to the 
1935 obiter dictum , for the Lord Chancellor was merely 
suggesting that the likelihood that Parliament would 
utilise its ability to lay down UK laws that purport to 
apply in a foreign territory in their own right, is so slim 
that it is more sensible not to include it amongst 
Parliament’s actual rights. The argument was also 
frequently advanced in regard to the UK’s Community 
membership, only to be proven wrong in the wake of the 
second decade of the 21 st  century: the political and 
economic implications of departing from the 
Community, it was said, were so large that the 
probability of Parliament ever repealing the ECA was  
                                                            
616 Bradley and Ewing, 2007, at p.63.  
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extremely slim; therefore, the ECA was effectively 
entrenched and Parliament had succeeded in rendering 
its successors non-sovereign!  
Despite their attractiveness, one must apply 
extraordinary cautiousness when approaching such 
statements. This is a treatise of constitutional law –  a 
thesis striving to construct, refute and enlighten 
arguments and lines of thought on the basis of law and 
legal principle. For as long as one remains within this 
realm, a right either does or does not exist. The 
existence of a right in UK law, as well as in most other 
legal systems, may be traced to some rule, law, 
directive, principle or other source which the system, i n 
a structured manner, recognises as legal, but is in no 
way correlated with the likelihood of the right’s 
exercise. Similarly, the abrogation of a right follows 
organised, analytic paths that can be positively 
ascertained and, yet again, the realistic probability of 
the right’s usage is not one of them nor, for good 
measure, could it ever conceivably be. Illustratively, it 
is even qualitatively differentiated by a large margin 
with the legal doctrine notionally closest to it – that is, 
nullification by desuetude –  because, unlike the 
frequency of a right’s previous usage which such 
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doctrine appraises,617 the practical possibility of a 
right’s usage could never be evaluated in the consistent, 
principled way required by any legal method properly so 
called.  
Even outside the strictly legal sphere, equating the 
improbability of a right being used with the existence of 
such a right is a logical leap of indescribable 
proportions: merely because the UK was unlikely to 
withdraw from the EU does not mean that it did  not 
have the right to do so! Advocating the existence of such 
a right in law is neither ‘myopic’ nor ‘unrealistic’ but 
rather constitutes the duty of jurists, practitioners and 
judges alike as much as it is the responsibility of the 
socio-economic and political disciplines to discuss, inter 
alia , the likelihood of such right being used and the 
practical consequences entailed by its potential 
usage.618 Condoning the conflation of discrete, equally 
                                                            
617 At least in the few jurisdictions in which it is recognised, 
Scotland possibly (but certainly no t the UK and England: 
Bowman v Secular Society  [1917] AC 406, 454; M’Kendrick v 
Sinclair  1972 SC (HL) 25, 59) having been one of them in the 
past: M’Ara v Magistrates of Edinburgh  1913 SC 1059, 1075; 
Philip, 1931.  
618 This is so even if Jennings’s view that the study of the 
Constitution requires “an examination of the social and 
  
 
372 
 
resourceful discourses in the name of an elusive 
‘realism’, is both imprudent and, with respect, 
contemptuously cynical.  
 
Blackburn 
Lord Denning, for his part, is liable for many of the 
same errors when, in the margins of Blackburn , he 
cited, and proceeded to elaborate upon, Sankey’s 1935 
dictum . Indeed, veering away from the task at hand, the 
then Master of the Rolls opined: 
We have all been brought up to believe that, 
in legal theory, one Parliament cannot bind 
another and that no Act is irreversible. But 
legal theory does not always march alongside 
political reality. Take the Statute of 
Westminster 1931, which takes away the 
power of Parliament to legislate for the 
Dominions. Can any one imagine that 
Parliament could or would reverse that 
Statute? Take the Acts which have granted 
                                                                                                                                                       
political forces which make for changes in the ideas and 
desires and habits of the population and its various social 
strata” (Jennings, 1933, at p.viii) is preferred over Dicey’s 
understanding that the role of the constitutional lawyer is 
merely to “state what are the laws which form part of the 
constitution” (Dicey, 1889, at p.31).  
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independence to the Dominions and 
territories overseas. Can anyone imagine 
that Parliament could or would reverse those 
laws and take away their independence? 
Most clearly not. Freedom once given cannot 
be taken away. Legal theory must give way 
to practical politics.619 
Indeed, for one, the Statute of Westminster does not 
take away Parliament’s power to legislate for the 
Dominions –  laws relating to any subject -matter, person 
or territory can still be made and will be recognised by 
UK courts as valid and enforceable. In fact, the Statute 
leaves Parliament’s powers wholly intact for, as already 
seen, its effect, if any, is purely one that concerns 
former Dominion law by directing their courts not to 
acknowledge UK legislation as part of their domestic 
law unless the request and consent of their domestic 
legislature has been provided.  
The proposition advanced in response by Gray that 
“unless the legislation in question is treated by the 
courts in the dominion concerned as part of its law it 
cannot be said to have extended to that dominion”, 620 
                                                            
619 [1971] 1 WLR 1037, 1040.  
620 Gray, 1960, at p.648.  
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could not be more legally and factually inaccurate. 
Jennings621 appropriately confronts the argument with 
his example of a UK statute making it an offence to 
smoke in the streets of Paris. Such statute would be 
very much valid and any British, French or other 
citizen or subject coming before a UK court would be 
accordingly charged with the offence under it, should he 
have been smoking in the Parisian avenues. More 
generally, enactments having extraterritorial 
application have been commonplace in this country long 
before the enactment of the 1931 Statute or any 
independence Act, and continue, with even greater 
density, up to this day in fields ranging from 
competition law to criminal law and human rights. No 
question has, evidently, ever been seriously entertained 
as to whether such enactments are valid and 
enforceable in UK courts. Leaving the legal aspect to 
one side, as to whether, from a practical point of view, 
legislation cannot be said to extend to a foreign country 
unless the courts of such country treat it as  valid, 
individuals such as Sawoniuk – the Nazi collaborator 
who was sentenced to life imprisonment under UK law 
by a UK court622 for acts which were not to become 
                                                            
621 Jennings, 1959, at pp.170-171. 
622 R v Sawoniuk  [2000] 2 Cr App R 220.  
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retrospectively punishable as war crimes in the UK 
until some 50 years later623 and which he committed in a 
foreign country as a Polish national – and Zardad – the 
Afghan citizen convicted624 under the Criminal Law Act 
1977 for conspiracy and kidnapping in Afghanistan – as 
well as companies such as General Electric and 
Honeywell International – two US-incorporated firms, 
the attempted merger of which the EC authorities 625 
blocked despite having been cleared by the US 
Department of Justice –626 would beg to differ from 
Gray’s proposition.  
Secondly, as earlier discussed, the repeal of the 1931 
Statute or the reversal of independence laws would not 
have the intention or effect of ‘taking away’ the 
‘freedom’ or independence of former British territories.  
Thirdly, neither of these two concessions diminishes in 
the least Parliament’s sovereignty or indicates that  
                                                            
623 War Crimes Act 1991, s.1.  
624 R v Zardad  [2006] EWCA Crim 1640.  
625 Commission Decision of 03/07/2001, Case No.COMP/M.22 
20 –  General Electric/Honewell .  
626 US Department of Justice, 2001.  
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Parliament can or has bound its future incarnations, as 
Denning appears to imply.  
Lastly, the proposed distinction between ‘theory’ and 
‘practice’, as well as its underlying aim of championing 
the latter at the expense of the former, are deceiving. 
The only distinction to be made in law is between the 
existence and absence of a legal right; the likelihood of 
such right being used in practice cannot be ascertained 
with legal tools properly so called and, at any rate, falls 
clearly within the domain of other social science 
discourses. 
Therefore, the better view is the frequently forgotten 
one expressed by Salmon LJ in the same case in the 
following lines: 
As to Parliament, in the present state of the 
law, it can enact, amend and repeal any 
legislation it pleases. The sole power of the 
courts is to decide and enforce what is the 
law and not what it should be – now, or in 
the future.627  
 
                                                            
627 [1971] 1 WLR 1037, 1041.  
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Manuel 
The final case which may assist in enlightening the 
scope of the 1931 Statute’s s.4 is Manuel v Attorney-
General .628 The question before the court revolved 
around the Canada Act 1982; that is, the statute that, 
following the judicial outcome of the Patriation 
Reference  discussed earlier,  was enacted pursuant to 
the Canadian Senate’s and House of Commons’ address 
to the Queen requesting a Bill to be laid before the UK 
Parliament to amend the Constitution of Canada. 629 
Indeed, its Preamble provided that:  
Canada has requested and consented to the 
enactment of an Act of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom to give effect to the 
provisions hereinafter set forth…  
In the main, the astounding claim brought by several 
Canadian Indian Chiefs was that, in view of the 
constitutional safeguards of the Aboriginal peoples of 
Canada contained in the British North America Act 
                                                            
628 [1983] Ch 77.  
629 The Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of 
Commons on the Constitution of Canada, 1980 -1981.  
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1930 and the Statute of Westminster 1931, their 
consent was required for any valid amendment of the 
Constitution of Canada by the UK Parliament. It 
followed, in their view, that since the Canada Act 1982 
had been enacted merely by the request and consent of 
the federal Parliament of Canada but not the other 
“constituent constitutional fractions” 630 of the country, 
it was ultra vires . The fact that the statement of claim 
was stricken out as not disclosing any cause of action is 
not, in itself, surprising or remarkable. However, 
several remarks may be usefully made.  
For one, prominence must be given to Megarry V-C, the 
first instance judgement of whom is not merely an 
archetype of scholastic thinking and judicial decision -
making but is also assiduous in avoiding the logical  and 
legal errors noted above. Indeed, Sir Robert 
rationalises: 
I do not think that, as a matter of law, it 
makes any difference if the Act in question 
purports to apply outside the United 
Kingdom…   
                                                            
630 [1983] Ch 77, 86.  
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[I]f the other country is a foreign state …  
[n]o doubt the Act would normally be ignored 
by the foreign state and would not be 
enforced by it, but that would not invalidate 
the Act in this country… Legal validity is 
one thing, enforceability is another…   
I do not think that countries which were 
once colonies but have since been granted 
independence are in any different position. 
Plainly once statute has granted 
independence to a country, the repeal of the 
statute will not make the country dependent 
once more; what is done is done, and is not 
undone by revoking the authority to do it… 
But if Parliament then passes an Act 
applying to such a country, I cannot see why 
that Act should not be in the same position 
as an Act applying to what has always been 
a foreign country, namely, an Act which the 
English courts will recognise and apply but 
one which the other country will in all 
probability ignore…631 
                                                            
631 ibid. ,  87-89. 
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Secondly, it is noteworthy that the Court of Appeal was 
content in swiftly disposing of the case in favour of the 
defendants by assuming the correctness of  the 
plaintiffs’ first contention that the Statute of 
Westminster lays down an effective ‘manner and form’ 
requirement for Parliament’s future incarnations. The 
employment of such an assumption allowed the court to 
confirm one of the cornerstones of the doctrine of 
Parliament’s omnipotence: namely, that the ancient 
customary privilege, enshrined in Art.9 of the Bill of 
Rights 1688 and tirelessly confirmed in court, 632 of 
exclusively arbitrating its own proceedings and 
composition inheres in Parliament as a whole, as well 
as in each House separately, or, to put it differently, 
that lex et consuetudo Parliamenti  is a branch of law 
cognisable in no (other) court of law apart from the  
High Court of Parliament, the Highest Court of the 
                                                            
632 See e.g. :  The Prince’s Case  (1605) 8 Co Rep 13b, 20b; Heath 
v Pryn  (1669) 1 Vent 14, 15-16; Edinburgh and Dalkeith 
Railway v Wauchope  (1842) VIII Cl&F 710, 724-725; Lee v 
Bude and Torrington Railway  (1870-71) LR 6 CP 576, 582; Ex 
Parte Canon Selwyn  (1872) 36 JP 54, 55; Bradlaugh v Gossett  
(1884) 12 QBD 271, 275, 280 -281; BRB v Pickin  [1974] AC 765,  
798-800. 
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Realm.633 It follows, for the purposes of Manuel , that 
the courts cannot go behind a statutory declaration, 
such as one stating that a Dominion ‘has requested, and 
consented to, the enactment thereof’ ,  and attempt to 
ascertain whether it is genuine.  
However, neither the Vice Chancellor nor the Lord 
Justices could inhibit their intuitive urge to cast doubt 
on the convenient but utterly fallacious assumption that 
                                                            
633 See: Munro, 1975, at pp.231-234; McIlwain, 1910; 9 Ad&El 
1; Case of the Sheriff  of Middlesex  (1840) Ad&El 273. That the 
extent to which the court can inquire into whether a document 
purporting to be an Act of Parliament is an authentic 
expression of Parliament’s will ,  is a legitimate area of study, 
as Cowen advocates (Cowen, 1953, at pp.274 -283),  is true but 
beyond the present point. As Hood Phillips notes:  
[t]he question of the authentication of Acts is 
sometimes brought into the discussion of the 
legislative power of Parliament, but it is more 
appropriately described by Erskine May as falling 
under the heading of subsidiary points of 
legislative procedure.  
(Hood Phillips,  1973, at p.72).   
The matter will,  however, be elaborated further, in the context 
of the discussion of Parliament Acts that will  follow in 
Chapter VIII.  
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anything more than the tripartite consent of Commons, 
Lords and Queen could ever be required for the validity 
or enforceability of a Parliamentary enactment. Indeed, 
one finds Megarry stating that:  
There has been no suggestion that the copy 
before me is not a true copy of the [Canada] 
Act [1982] itself, or that it was not passed by 
the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords, or did not receive the Royal Assent. 
The Act is therefore an Act of Parliament 
and the court cannot hold it to be invalid. 634 
Lastly, it is instructive to underline that , paradoxically,  
despite clearly seeking to advance a strong variant of 
Independence theory much like their unsuccessful 
predecessors in the Patriation Reference , the Indian 
Chiefs in Manuel  implicitly disavowed that theory’s 
cardinal criticism of the competing Imperial theory.  To 
explain, on the one hand, by electing to ask the UK 
courts to adjudge upon their claim, they were, in 
essence, conceding that British, rather than Canadian, 
understandings governed both the powers of the UK 
Parliament for Canadian purposes and the application 
of UK laws in Canada. However, in spite of this implicit 
                                                            
634 [1983] Ch 77, 87. See also:  ibid. ,  103. 
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Imperial theory concession, the Indian Chiefs 
paradoxically demanded that the UK court entertain 
their claims regarding the scope of UK laws from the 
Canadian law perspective of Independence theory! As 
the Court of Appeal had, in vain, forewarned a year 
earlier in Alberta ,635 the plaintiffs would have been in 
much greater luck should their claim, that was founded 
upon a Canadian law theory such as Independence 
theory, had been brought before a Canadian, rather 
than a UK, court. As already discussed, whether a UK 
law applies to Canada as a matter of Canadian law  and, 
if yes, the tools that are to be utilised to interpret such 
law – or, more broadly, the issues which the Imperial 
and Independence theories are engaged with – are 
Canadian legal questions that can only be answered in 
Canadian courts. Indeed, indicatively, arguments such 
as that “‘Dominion’ has a wide meaning … [i]t means 
more than the House of Commons and the Senate of the 
Federal Parliament of  Canada”636 and that “[t]he court 
has a duty to see that the [Canadian] constitution is not 
infringed and to preserve it inviolate” 637 are, 
                                                            
635 Ex Parte Indian Association of Alberta  [1982] QB 892, 899-
900. 
636 [1983] Ch 77, 97.  
637 ibid. ,  98.  
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undoubtedly, best directed to Canadian, rather than 
UK, courts as the latter cannot even presume to 
pronounce upon such matters that, from their 
perspective, are foreign legal issues.  
In summary, it can be confidently stated that the 
Statute of Westminster did not intend to restrict or 
have the effect of restricting the successors of the 1931 
Parliament for, as judicial precedents and 
constitutional practice show, interpreting the statute 
literally must be preferred over  competing purposive 
accounts with the result that the inescapable conclusion 
is drawn that its crucial provisions  are aimed 
exclusively at producing rights and obligations in the 
domestic legal systems of former Dominions and have no 
discernible effects in UK law.  Hence, the enactment of 
the 1931 Statute as well as, correspondingly, the 
granting of independence to former colonies does not 
lend any support to the suitability of the self -embracing 
theory of sovereignty to describe the present UK 
constitutional settlement. Whether equivalent 
conclusions can be drawn with regard to the laws that 
accomplished the Unions of England and Scotland and, 
later, Great Britain and Ireland will be considered in 
the forthcoming chapter.  
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Chapter VII: The 
constitutional position of the 
UK’s composite nations 
 
The UK which currently, at least in statutory terms, is 
synonymous to “Great Britain and Northern Ireland”,638 
is the product of the assimilation of the Principality of 
Wales by the Kingdom of England via  the Laws in Wales 
Acts 1535 and 1542, the political and legislative union 
of the Kingdoms of Scotland and England executed by 
the Union with England Act 1707 and the Union with 
Scotland Act 1706 to form Great Britain, the merger 
and subsequent partitioning of Ireland enshrined in the 
Union with Ireland Act 1800 and the Act of Union 
(Ireland) 1800, and the Irish Free State (Agreement) 
and Irish Free State Constitution Acts 1922 
respectively, as well as the successive colonisation and 
decolonisation movements that commenced in the 16 th 
century with the 1583 claiming of Newfoundland for 
                                                            
638 Royal and Parliamentary Titles Act 1927, s.2(2) ;  
Interpretation Act 1978, Sch.1.  
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England by Sir Humphrey Gilbert and culminated 639 in 
the late 20 th century with the transfer of sovereignty of 
Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China. 640 This 
anomalous process through which the UK was created 
has bequeathed upon the modern British state a legacy 
of territorial, socio-political, legal and constitutional 
tensions.  
Indeed, although by virtue of the “over -whelming 
significance of England”641 population-wise, there is no 
need, or, perhaps, due to the unwritten nature of the 
Constitution, even no right,642 for the UK to be governed 
federally, it is probably neither true to assume, in 
congruence with the Lijphart classification, 643 the 
existence of a purely unitary state. 644 More specifically, 
in view of the fact that the existence, in anthropologic 
                                                            
639 However, four Crown dependencies and fourteen British 
Overseas Territories remain in existence.  
640 See: Hong Kong Act 1985.  
641 Tur, 2001, at p.348.  
642 See: Cole, 2004, at p.364.  
643 Lijphart, 1999.  
644 As does Brazier: Brazier,  1999, at pp.96, 99 -100. 
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and folkloric terms, of the UK’s constituent 
nationalities has been firmly accepted and, similarly, in 
territorial terms, that their boundaries have been 
recognised645 with the consequence that integration has 
always been understood to be “less than perfect”, 646 it is, 
in modern days,647 perceived as customarily preferable 
to view the UK as a de facto  “union state”648 – in which 
although “administrative standardization prevails over 
most of the territory, the consequences of personal 
union entail the survival in some areas of pre -union 
rights and institutional infrastructures which preserve 
some degree of regional autonomy” –,649 as a 
                                                            
645 The Local Government Act 1972, for instance, defines the 
area designated as ‘Wales’ and the Local Government 
(Boundaries) (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 defines the 7 
districts that together form ‘Northern Ireland’.  For Scotland, 
see: Treaty of York 1237; Scottish Adjacent Waters Boundaries 
Order 1999.  
646 Rokkan and Urwin, 1982, at p.11.  
647 See e.g. :  Royal Commission on the Constitution, 1973.  
648 See: Mitchell,  1996.  
649 Rokkan and Urwin, 1982, at p.11.  
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“federacy”650 or, more radically, as a “state of unions” 651 
between two or more nations652 and, equivalently, two or 
more discrete, comparable, civic communities. 653 In 
turn, the idea of a non-unitary state may contain 
unspoken-about connotations of plural conceptions of 
government and a multitude of power-centres which do 
not necessarily derive, or at least accept that they 
derive, their authority from an ultimate source: the UK 
Parliament. As MacCormick has put it:  
[t]here is no doubt that we have a single 
state, but it is at least possible that we have 
two interpretations, two conceptions, two 
understandings, of the constitution of that 
state. This is because the state as a law-
state, a ‘Rechtsstaat’, is recognised within 
two at least partly distinct systems of law. 654  
                                                            
650 Elazar, 1993, at p.190.  
651 Gamble, 2006, at p.23.  
652 Race Relations Act 1976, s.3;  British Nationality Act 1981, 
Part I;  Mandla v Dowell  [1983] 2 AC 548, 562; Northern Joint 
Police Board v Power  [1997] IRLR 610; Equality Act 2010, s.9.  
653 Tierney, 2007, at pp.232-233. 
654 MacCormick, 2000a, at p.727.  
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Indeed, inasmuch as a hiatus equivalent to the one 
between Rhodesian and UK law – the existence, or 
otherwise, of which, it will be remembered, constituted 
a catalytic, if implicit, factor in determining the 
divergent opinions of the Southern Rhodesian Appellate 
Division and Privy Council in Madzimbamuto  – may be 
perceived as existing between English and Welsh, 
Northern Irish, and Scots law and legal systems, 
similar, intra-national, UK constitutional conundrums 
are not unimaginable. The emergence of such issues 
becomes all the more probable if one also takes into 
account the fact that the intra-UK legal hiatus is not, 
similar to the one between Rhodesian and UK law, 
attributable to an academic and judicial minority’s 
questionable, if copious, effort to avoid the burning 
questions at hand by erecting a construct predicated 
upon an elusive constitutional convention that, at best, 
can be traced back no more than a half -century but, 
rather, to a tangible, coruscating and extensively 
documented phenomenon that, despite historic 
convergences655 that were possibly further fostered by 
                                                            
655 Coke, for instance, enumerates fourteen respects in which 
England and Scotland coincided, in order to substantiate his 
claim that “these two mighty, famous, and ancient kingdoms … 
were anciently but one”: 4 Co Inst ,  345-346.  
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the 1707 and 1801 Unions,656 spans from civil, criminal 
and family law to the respective court hierarchies and 
legal professions themselves, and uninterruptedly dates 
as far back as the establishment of Norman presence in 
the British isles in the 11 th  and 12 th  centuries and the 
moulding of those ‘modern’ (in a macroscopic sense) 
entities from which England, Wales, Scotland and 
Ireland have naturally developed. Further, the leap 
from recognising that the UK Parliament was created 
by the 1707 and 1800 Acts to parallelising its legal 
position and, in particular, its ability to bind successor 
Parliaments, with the legal position of the constituted 
or subordinate colonial legislatures  discussed earlier, 
does not, at first sight, appear to be an extravagant 
one.  
In particular, the Unions with Scotland and Ireland 
have both variously featured in the literature as 
potential restraining forces upon the UK Parliament’s 
legislative sovereignty.  
                                                            
656 See: Ford, 2007a, at pp.140-141. 
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The characterisation of the 1707 
Union and the challenges to 
orthodoxy flowing therefrom 
 
As outlined above, the Union of the Kingdoms of 
England (including Wales) and Scotland was executed 
in 1707 by virtue of the Treaty, or ‘Articles’, of Union 
1707, an “international treaty between Anne , Queen of 
Scots, and Queen Anne of England, on terms negotiated 
by commissioners appointed by the two Queens", 657 and 
ratified, approved and adopted in domestic law by the 
English Parliament and Scottish Estates via  the Union 
with Scotland Act 1706 and Union with England Act 
1707 respectively.  
However, shrouded between the lines of such uncoloured 
analysis, correct as it certainly is in form, is a 
timorousness which renders it inadequate for the 
purposes of constitutional law in view of the fact that it 
is critically silent with respect to what precisely 
happened to the Kingdoms of England and Scotland on 
                                                            
657 Walker, 1998, at p.86 [references omitted].  
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the eve of Union which, in turn, allows room for two 
challenges to the orthodox theory of the Constitution to 
emerge.  
To explain, if, for one, the Treaty of Union represents 
the merger of two states and the thesis that, unlike its 
English counterpart, sovereign properties did not inhere 
in the Scottish Estates is accepted, then the Roman 
maxim nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam 
ipse haberet658 may well emerge as a relevant 
consideration in the discussion as to whether the 
unified Parliament of Great Britain was, or could have 
been, a sovereign institution.  
Equivalently, in the second place, if in 1707 the two 
Kingdoms merged into one, then the  Treaty of Union 
could be validly perceived as containing a, no doubt 
peculiar, sort of merger terms which act as a constraint 
upon the then newly-created Parliament's legislative 
scope.  
Thence, it is prudent, in primis , to attempt to 
characterise systematically the 1707 Union according to 
the principal modalities of territorial sovereignty 
                                                            
658 [No one can transfer to another a right which he himself 
does not have]: Dig 50.17.54.  
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acquisition historically or modernly recognised by 
traditional public international law. 659 Naturally, 
however, this first step proves pendulous as the Anglo-
Scottish Union is unable to be accommodated 
comfortably by either Wicks's proposition of ‘cession’ as 
a possible root of title660 or the (now obsolete) 
alternatives of ‘marriage’, and ‘family pact’ or ‘pact of 
confraternity’661 that could be advanced; the former, as 
Wicks herself admits, conventionally describes the 
merging of one state into another rather than the 
historically exceptional instance of a merger of two 
states to form a new, third, state, whilst any of the 
latter, despite more accurately characterising the 
consequences of the 1707 Union, would pragmatically be 
farfetched as the legal basis for the creation of a 
sovereign state. 
It is thus arguably preferable to retrocede to the less 
formal terms of political economy and attempt to plot 
the 1707 Union on a notional merger-absorption 
continuum. In this respect, it is salutatory to commence 
                                                            
659 See: Brownlie,  1998, at p.129.  
660 Wicks, 2001, at p.110.  
661 See: Verzijl,  1970, at pp.297-298 
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by remembering that the forefront of critical Scottish 
thinking has diachronically castigated orthodox British 
theory for espousing a strictly "monocular, one -eyed 
English view"662 under which the events of 1707 are 
essentially conceived of as a takeover of the Scots 
Estates by the English Parliament. 663 This conception is 
allegedly grounded upon the "political fact" 664 that, as 
Little puts it:  
although both … Parliaments ceased to exist 
in 1707, the new Parliament of Great Britain 
was in reality the English Parliament with a 
small number of additional Scottish 
representatives.665  
The hegemonic attitude of the English academia 
towards the Anglo-Scots Union, remnants of which are 
still to be found in the works of modern scholars such as 
Goldsworthy’s,666 is perhaps best captured in Dicey's 
                                                            
662 Jamieson, 2007, at p.191.  
663 Dicey and Rait, 1920, at p.239.  
664 Little, 2004, at p.544.  
665 ibid. .  See also: Tierney, 2006, at p.30.  
666 Goldsworthy, 1999, at pp.165-166. 
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classic exposition of the doctrine of Parliamentary 
sovereignty that, despite having been articulated some 
180 years after 1707, refers to Parliament as  having the 
right to make or unmake any law whatever under the 
English  Constitution.667 Equally, Bagehot’s 
interchangeable use of ‘British’ and ‘English’ 
throughout his tellingly titled treatise ‘The English 
Constitution’668 cannot go unnoticed.  In truth however, 
and although undoubtedly there exists some symbolic 
value in the facts that the new state flew the English 
version of the Union Banner669,670 and that the new 
Parliament was comprised of all  513 and 168 previous 
English members of the House of Commons and House 
of Lords respectively with the addition of merely 45 
Scottish representatives and 16 Scottish peers, 671 and 
                                                            
667 Dicey, 1889, at p.38. See also:  Dicey, 1912a, at p.44 (“Great 
Britain, or to use ordinary language … England”).  
668 Bagehot, 1873.  
669 The Cross Saltire of St Andrew surmounted by the Cross of 
St George gules,  fimbriated of the second, rather than the 
reverse which was the preferred version between 1603 -1707 in 
Scotland (see: Crawford, 1909, at pp.612 -614). 
670 Treaty of Union 1707, Art.I.  
671 ibid. ,  Art.XXII. See also: Powicke and Fryde, 1961, at p.540.  
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sat at the same venue, utilised the same procedures, 
benefited from the same privileges and was presided by 
the same Speaker of the House of Commons672 as, whilst 
being bicameral like, the defunct English legislature, 673 
as well as it is largely true that, in retrospect, 
"Scotland was engulfed by England, even if by means of 
gradual and subtle political management", 674 
characterising the 1707 Union as a takeover or 
absorption would be flawed even in political – not to 
mention legal or constitutional –  terms, if not for any 
other reason, at least in view of the fact that the 
deliberations preceding the agreement between the 
English and Scottish commissioners resembled, as will 
further be elaborated below, much more closely a heated 
negotiation in which the weaker Scotland had entered 
with credible threats, rather than an aggressive 
takeover of the powerless target by an overly dominant 
                                                            
672 John Smith of South Tidworth albeit by re -election upon the 
convening of the unified Parliament. See: Sedgwick,  1970. 
673 Other parallels with the English legislature can certainly 
be drawn. For instance, Art.XXII provided that ‘the first 
Parliament of Great Britain … may continue for such Time 
only, as the present Parliament of England might have 
continued if  the Un ion … had not been made’.  
674 Addo and Smith, 1998, at p.49.  
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England. Indeed, at least for the better part of the 20 th  
century and onward, the dialectic of absorption has 
been all but abandoned, with modern scholarship 
correctly reverting to more amicable theories that 
perceive of the Parliament of Great Britain as a de novo 
creation.675 For present purposes, however, choosing 
between the proposed alternatives of ‘merger’ (or ‘co -
partnership’) and “two renunciations of title and a new 
state acquiring title over the same territory 
immediately thereafter" –676 the differences of which 
depend upon whether the Anglo-Scots Union was, in 
truth, effectuated by the legislative acts enacted by the 
two Kingdoms’ legislatures677 or by a Treaty jure 
gentium  concluded between the Executives of the two 
states –678 is strictly unnecessary. Indeed, since both 
alternatives agree that 1707 constitutes the beginning 
of “a new and all embracing polity”, 679 it does not 
                                                            
675 For Dicey and Rait, that the Parliament of Great Britain 
constituted a de novo  creation was “the most undeniable of 
truisms”: Dicey and Rait, 1920, at p.9.  
676 Wicks, 2001, at p.112.  
677 Mitchell,  1968, at pp.92-93; MacCormick, 1978, at p.16.  
678 Smith, 1957, at p.105; Walker, 1998, at pp.85 -90. 
679 Mitchell,  1980, at p.69.  
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necessarily follow from either that the newly founded 
legislative body should have inherited the qualities  – 
or, crucially, the alleged disabilities – of either 
Parliament. Therefore, the academic disputation over 
the characteristics of the pre-Union Scottish legislature 
is stripped of its averred compulsorily constitutional 
character. Similarly, although all variants of both 
modern accounts of the Union formation concede that 
either the Acts or the Treaty of Union (or, for that 
matter, both as part of the "complex and unorthodox 
agreement"680 between the two Kingdoms) formed the 
basis for the creation of the new state, it is a logical 
leap to suggest that they necessarily serve not merely 
as 'constituent' or 'constitutive', but additionally as 
‘constitutional’ documents681 that bind the said state's 
legislature. In short, the assessment of the twin 
challenges to Parliament's sovereign authority 
stemming from the 1707 Acts via the principled 
                                                            
680 Smith, 1957, at p.105.  
681 As it has been impliedly proposed (see: MacCormick, 1978, 
at p.1). After all,  it  will be remembered that earlier it was 
shown that,  despite the fact that the NSW Parliament had 
been created by statute, it  was intended to be, and considered, 
at least at the time of its creation, a sovereign legislative body 
operating under a ‘ flexible’  or ‘uncontrolled’ Constitution.  
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characterisation of the Union itself is inconclusive, and 
must thus proceed on the basis of their individual 
merits. 
 
‘Limited Scottish Estates ’ thesis 
To that end and insofar as the former ground upon 
which the 1707 Union has been perceived as a 
restrictive force on Parliament's unlimited legislative 
power is concerned, it is helpful to commence by 
singling out MacCormick v Lord Advocate 682 as the 
chronological re-ignition point of  an otherwise long-
dormant thesis. Therein, tentative obiter  remarks were 
uttered on the part of both Lord Russell 683 and, more 
memorably, Lord President Cooper to the effect that:  
[t]he principle of the unlimited sovereignty 
of Parliament is a distinctively English 
                                                            
682 1953 SC 396.  
683 ibid. ,  417. 
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principle which has no counterpart in 
Scottish constitutional law… 684 
Since then, a significant body of literature has shared 
Dicey and Rait’s conviction that “the Parliament of 
Scotland …  had never been either in theory or in fact a 
supreme or sovereign body” ,685 either because “it never 
felt itself [so] to be”686 or because it was not so “in the 
eyes of many Scotsmen”,687 whilst omitting both their 
clarification that they were referring to the period up to 
1689, from which point onwards –  in their view – the 
Scottish Parliament began enjoying properties similar 
to its English counterpart, as well as Dicey’s further 
remark that, at any rate, such consideration was 
absolutely inconsequential vis-à-vis the descendant 
British Parliament's unlimited legislative scope.688 
Analogously, such body of literature has placed 
                                                            
684 ibid. ,  411. 
685 Dicey and Rait, 1920, at p.239.  
686 ibid. ,  at p.20.  
687 ibid. ,  at p.22.  
688 See e.g. :  Dicey, 1889, at  p.65: “the Parliaments both of 
England and of Scotland did, at the Act of Union, each 
transfer sovereign power to a new sovereign body”.  
  
 
401 
 
emphasis on 17 th century Lord Advocates Sir John 
Nisbet and his successor, Sir George Mackenzie, for 
whom the proposition “that [Scottish] Parliaments 
cannot overturn Fundamentals, seem[ed] clear”689 whilst 
conveniently neglecting to note the polemical flavour of 
their writings.  
Indeed, for union scepticists such as the two Lord 
Advocates it followed from the thesis of a legislature 
bound by fundamental law that it would be treasonous 
for any Scottish Parliament to accede to the looming 
Union with England for that would be “destructive to 
the fundamental government of the kingdom of 
Scotland”690 since – as the anti-unionist Scottish 
Commissioner Andrew Fletcher reasoned – “if this 
present parliament of Scotland shall attempt to subvert 
the whole fabric of the Scots constitution, certainly a 
fortiori , an [sic] united parliament may invert, or 
rather regulate a part of the constitution”, 691 whilst for 
union sympathisers and propagators, such as Defoe, a 
limited Scottish Parliament meant, ex necessitate , a 
                                                            
689 Mackenzie,  1687, at p.315.  
690 Mackenzie,  1821, at p.199 (approvingly citing Nisbet for the 
point).  
691 Fletcher, 1771, at p.66.  
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limited British Parliament.692 Others, yet, proposed that 
the legislative scope of neither the Scottish nor the 
successor British Parliament were, or could have been, 
emasculated in any manner or form, and that, in fact, 
denying the sovereign capacity of either would involve 
treason whilst even the idea that the Estates, but not 
the successor British Parliament, were a limitless body 
attracted some support!693 In short, by navigating 
through the multitude of tracts, pamphlets, libels and 
discourses of a politically turbulent period such as 17 th 
                                                            
692 See e.g. :  Defoe, 1786 [1709],  at p.246.  
693 Ford, 2007a, at pp.132-135. Interestingly, Ford presents a 
thorough review of the views expressed in pre -union Scotland 
on the matter and concludes that:  
[I]f  pressed, most lawyers before the union would 
no doubt have agreed that in principle the Scottish 
parliament could legislate in any way it pleased 
without fear of judicial reappraisal of its decision. 
Yet it goes too far in the opposite direction to 
declare that the doctrine was well established  in 
Scotland since, mindful of how the law operated in 
practice,  few lawyers would have been likely to 
volunteer the opinion that the power of parliament 
is unlimited…  
(ibid . ,  at p.137, reference omitted).  
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and early 18 th century Scotland, the inclined scholar 
can trawl evidence for virtually any pseudo -theory of 
the Constitution he pleases.  
Thus, neither Nisbet nor Mackenzie can be advanced as 
authority on the matter or, if they must, it is only fair 
to also accept their counsel in relation to the sovereign 
powers of the then speculative institution that was to 
become the Parliament of Great Britain. Alternatively, 
their failed prediction concerning the Estates’ inability 
to bring about the Anglo-Scots Union could well be 
interpreted as a resounding collapse of their thesis. 
Indeed, to the same effect, if somewhat more 
qualitatively normative,  was Lord Gutihrie’s following 
comment in MacCormick :   
I do not require to examine the contention 
that the Scottish Parliament was not 
sovereign, but there could not be a more 
remarkable exercise of sovereign power than 
the abolition of the separate Kingdom of 
Scotland by the Act of Union. 694 
                                                            
694 1953 SC 396, 403. Goldsworthy makes an equivalen t point 
when stating:  
The Scottish Act of Union was itself an 
extraordinary demonstration of the authority of 
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For his part, Sir Neil MacCormick, son of the lead 
petitioner in MacCormick v Lord Advocate and one of 
the most prominent contemporary scholars of the 
limited Scottish Estates thesis, has sought to bring 
Buchanan, whom he identifies as “the first articulate 
theorist of sovereignty”,695 to his support.696 The 
eminent 16 th century Scottish theorist, inspired by 
French monarchomachical thinking, proposed a theory 
of governance in his De Jure Regni Apud Scotos697 that 
was rooted in monarchical conditionality, tyrannicide 
and a prior claim to sovereignty held by the community 
of the Realm. Drawing from De Jure Regni  as well as 
Scottish constitutional documents such as the 
Declaration of Arbroath of 1320, MacCormick  erects a 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Parliament that enacted it:  it  is difficult to 
conceive of laws more fundamental than those it 
altered. The term ‘fundamental laws’ usually 
meant, in Scotland, the fundamental laws of 
government, such as those relating to the 
succession to the Crown, the royal prerogative, 
and the structure of Parliament, and it was 
precisely those kinds of laws that were changed by 
the Act of Union.  
(Goldsworthy, 1999, at p.168 [reference omitted]).  
695 MacCormick, 2000b, at p.9.  
696 MacCormick, 1999.  
697 Buchanan, 1689 [1579].  
  
 
405 
 
thesis of quasi-popular sovereignty to antagonise the 
notion of Parliamentary sovereignty  as the cornerstone 
of the pre-Union Scottish Constitution. Interestingly, 
following MacCormick, popular sovereignty principles 
also formed the bedrock of the self-styled ‘Scottish 
Constitution Convention’ (SCC) that burdened itself 
with the task of inditing a scheme for a potential 
Scottish legislative body.  
In truth, however, Buchanan’s treatise does little to 
advance MacCormick’s thesis, for it belongs to the 
political or, at best, legal-philosophical realm; after all, 
the Scottish thinker had no formal legal education. 
Furthermore, the normative work of Buchanan had to 
compete with other theories of government that 
commanded equivalent or higher persuasion  amongst 
the Scottish institutionally empowered classes at the 
time.698 Moreover, Scotland is not alone in having been 
privileged with political theorists such as Buchanan. 
Indeed, the fact that Hobbes699 and Locke,700 for 
                                                            
698 Kidd, 2004, at p.230: “Only on the extreme margins of 
Scottish Whiggism … was a theory of popular sovereignty 
mooted, and a very peculiar one at that.”  
699 Hobbes, 2006 [1651].  
700 Locke, 1824 [1689].  
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instance, who both made invaluable contributions to 
social contract theory,701 were renowned Englishmen, 
has not led to suggestions that popular sovereignty 
constituted one of the fundamental principles upon 
which the English Constitution was grounded. After all, 
Dicey himself had no difficulty in expounding his classic 
defence of Parliamentary sovereignty despite admitting 
that, in political terms, “what is true of the power of a 
despot or of the authority of a constituent assembly is 
specially true of the sovereignty of Parliament; it is 
limited on every side by the possibility of popular 
resistance”702 and approvingly citing “the old Whig 
doctrine that oppression, and especially resistance to 
the will of the nation, might justify what … [is] 
technically conspiracy or rebellion.” 703 Lastly, in view of 
                                                            
701 Which, incidentally, has been understood as the intellectual 
descendant of monarchmach thinking.  
702 Dicey, 1889, at p.75.  
703 Dicey, 1913, at pp.125-126. As Little has put it,  it would be 
“simplistic to characterise the situation as a stand -off between 
a monologic,  to -down, Westminster-centric doctrine, on the one 
hand, and Scottish popular sovereignty, on the other” (Little, 
2004, at p.558),  for that would be presenting the reading with 
a false dilemma between legal sovereignty –  regulating the 
relationship between Parliament and courts –  and political  
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the pre-Union Scottish institutions’ elementary state of 
democratic accountability, it is arguably anachronistic, 
if not hypocritical, to embroider the principle of popular 
sovereignty as a foundational pillar of the Scottish 
constitutional arrangement.704  
Insofar as the Declaration of Arbroath is concerned, 
despite its undoubted importance and iconic status both 
at the time of its conclusion and submission to Pope 
John XXII as well as thereafter up to contemporary 
times, its similarities with Magna Carta  are 
unmistakable. Much like its English predecessor that 
has not sparked controversy regarding the relationship 
of popular sovereignty and the English Constitution 
since scholars have been careful to distinguish Magna 
Carta ’s luminous symbolic value from the fact that it 
was forced upon King John by a group of his feudal 
barons, rather than a group that could even faintly 
resemble a representative body or, a fortiori ,  the 
populace at large, the Declaration of Arbroath, despite 
its chimerical allusion to ‘due consent and assent of us 
all’, was agreed between a small number of magnates, 
nobles and clerks and is thus unable to either ass ist or 
hinder the Scottish pre-Union popular sovereignty 
thesis.  
                                                                                                                                                       
sovereignty –  regulating the relationship between a state’s 
institutional structures and its people.  
704 C.f.  Ford, 2007b, at pp.281-312. 
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As for the SCC, although the White Paper that led to 
the present Scottish devolutionary scheme 705 was 
procured in large part on the basis of the conclusions of 
the Convention’s final publication, 706 the single, albeit 
flamboyant, difference between the two is located in 
their stance on the popular sovereignty thesis. Indeed, 
whilst the Convention had confidently maintained that:  
the historical and historic Scottish 
constitutional principle … [is] … that power 
is limited … and is derived from the people 707 
the White Paper, as well as the subsequent Scotland Act 
1998, had, with equivalent fortitude, clarified that:  
[t]he UK Parliament … will remain sovereign 
in all matters … [D]evolving legislative 
responsibilities to a Scottish Parliament … 
[will not] … in any way … [diminish] its own 
powers.708 
                                                            
705 Scottish Office,  1997.  
706 Scottish Constitutional Convention, 1995.  
707 ibid. ,  ‘Beginnings’.   
708 Scottish Office,  1997, at p.12; Scotland Act 1998, s.28(7).  
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In short, therefore, the better view appears to be the 
one defended by jurists, such as Goldsworthy 709 and 
Addo and Smith,710 and historians, such as Goodare 711 
and Kidd:712 following the primacy of statute law, that 
had become established beyond doubt during  the late 
Middle Ages, the pre-Union Scottish Estates from the 
early 17 th century (during which time constitutional 
developments in the Kingdoms of England and Scotland, 
unified under one crown, exhibited manifest 
similarities)713 and, crucially, from 1689 (at which point, 
powerful institutions which could be understood, in 
various ways, as controlling the Scottish Parliament 
such as the Kirk’s General Assembly, the Committee of 
the Lords of the Articles and Convention of Estates 
were subordinated, abolished, or withered away) 714 
                                                            
709 Goldsworthy, 1999, at pp.165-173; Goldsworthy, 2010a, at 
pp.270-272. 
710 Addo and Smith, 1998, at pp.44-47. 
711 Goodare, 1999, at pp.11-37; Goodare, 2004, Ch.3.  
712 Kidd, 2004.  
713 Tomkins, 2005, at pp.109-111. 
714 See: Dicey and Rait,  1920, at pp.22, 33 -35, 75, 78; Clark, 
1956, at p.280. C.f.  Goldsworthy, 1999, at pp.167-168. 
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onwards, rapidly became a sovereign legislative body. 
Alternatively, if MacCormick’s thesis must be accepted, 
perceiving as inextricably linked the ideas of a 
legislature bound by fundamental principles and a 
power, vested in a discrete institution, to uphold such 
principles is very much a modern predilection: 715 it may 
well have been the case that the Scottish Parliament 
was, at once, understood as being bound by higher law 
and as being the sole interpreter and expositor of such 
law and adjudicator of its breaches, in the unimaginable 
case these occurred.716  
To conclude, if the Scottish Parliament transferred any 
of its peculiar characteristics to the unified Parliament 
of Great Britain, being legally limited by the populace 
at large or some abstruse body of fundamental law was 
certainly not one of them. At any rate, even if that were 
not correct and invocation of the nemo debbe esse  
principle to prove the professed inability of the 
allegedly limited Scottish Parliament to provide for a 
sovereign unified Parliament were permitted, appeal to 
the principle that a sovereign body cannot bind itself 
would also have to be allowed, from which principle the 
                                                            
715 See: Dicey and Rait,  1920, at pp.253-254; 4 Co Rep, Preface.  
716 See also: Ford, 2007b, at pp.322 -326. 
  
 
411 
 
conclusion that the sovereign English Parliament was 
unable to dissolve itself in favour of any legislature 
apart from an equally sovereign one, would be 
inescapable.  
Therefore, the better perspective, which also reserves 
some room for the second challenge to Parliament’s 
sovereignty deriving from the 1707 Union to be staged, 
is the one to which Wicks subscribes in rhetorically 
asking:  
If we accept, as we must, that 1707 was a 
starting point, why is it necessary to look 
beyond that date? Those who wish to argue 
that the U.K. Parliament since 1707 has  not 
been sovereign … would be more convincing 
if they emphasised the new start of 1707. 717  
 
 
 
                                                            
717 Wicks, 2001, at p.123.  
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The Treaty of Union 1707: a 
Constitution for Great Britain? 
The necessary point of departure of any comprehensive 
analysis of the latter respect in which the Anglo-Scots 
Union has been considered as constraining Parliament’s 
sovereign ability, is doubtlessly the negotiations 
between the two Kingdoms that preceded the ultimate 
agreement of 1706 as exemplified in the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Union 1707 and the subsequent enactment 
of the two Acts of Union by the respective Parliaments 
of England and Scotland.  
In the wake of the dynastic union of crowns in 1603, 
King James VI/I had impelled the two Realms under his 
dominion to engage in negotiations for a more integral 
union. The distinct failure of his project 718 as well as 
that of similar endeavours within the 17 th century, had 
rendered plainly visible that Scotland would not yield 
to an incorporating union merely by the brute economic 
force of England: an Anglo-Scots union would require 
either armed conflict719 or a genuine negotiation in 
                                                            
718 See: Levack, 1980; Wijffels,  2002.  
  
 
413 
 
which Scotland’s threats720 and demands721 would have 
to be taken seriously and, at least partially, assuaged.  
Rather than follow the paradigm of the 13 th  and 14 th  
centuries and add to the extensive li st of wars between 
the two nations, thirty-one commissioners on the part of 
both England and Scotland were appointed under the 
aegis of Queen Anne to treat for union which, in turn, 
after breviloquent but fervid deliberations, agreed upon 
the twenty-five Articles of Union of Scotland with 
England. These provisional 722 Articles – which together 
constitute what is loosely termed the ‘Treaty’ of Union –  
were subsequently presented to the Queen and, 
following her recommendation, were laid down before 
the Scottish Estates for ‘ratification, approval, and 
confirmation’.  
                                                                                                                                                       
719 Which was, in fact, nearly brought about by the conduct of 
both nations following the failed Scottish Darien Scheme:  
Munro, 2000, at p.137.  
720 Regarding the dissolution of the union of crowns: Act for the 
Security of the Kingdom 1704. C.f.  Act of Settlement 170, 
Art.I;  Smout, 1969, at p.215.  
721 Including, inter alia ,  the preservation of the laws of 
Scotland as well as guarantees on free trade.  
722 “They [the Commissioners] were expressly forbidden to 
conclude a treaty themselves”: Hope, 2000.  
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Despite the fact that, in view of sectarian divisions, 
ecclesiastical matters had been specifically excluded 
from the commissioners’ remit, 723 the Kirk’s Commission 
of the General Assembly, perturbed by the proposed 
presence of prelates in the House of Lords of  the unified 
Parliament of Great Britain,724 with its symbolic 
allusions to the still -fresh Bishops’ Wars, and fearful of 
being assimilated within the Anglican Communion, was 
able to exert effective pressure on Parliament to the 
effect that approval of the Articles by the latter was 
rendered conditional725 upon the approval by its English 
counterpart of the Act for Securing the Protestant 
Religion and Presbyterian Church Government 1707. 
The English Parliament, for its part, approved of the 
Articles as well as the appended Act, whilst itself 
choosing to activate the option which the Scottish had 
                                                            
723 Jackson, 2012, at pp.344-345. 
724 See: Defoe, 1786 [1709], at pp.618 -619. 
725 “[T]his approbation and ratification of the foresaid Artic les 
[of Union] and [Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church 
Act] shall be no ways binding on this Kingdom until the said 
Articles and Act be ratified approved and confirmed by her 
Majesty with and by the Authority of the Parliament of 
England”: Act for  Securing the Protestant Religion and 
Presbyterian Church Government 1707.  
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allowed for726 and which concerned equivalent 
guarantees for the protection of the Church of 
England.727 
In light of the above, it can seldom be controverted that 
the mindset of the institutionally empowered players in 
the period immediately preceding the Union was 
characterised, inter alia , by an intention to set limits 
on the powers of the unified Parliament that was being 
breathed life to. For good measure, both the spirit  and 
the wording of the Treaty and Acts of Union definitively 
attest to the same conclusion. Indicatively, Arts.I and II 
dictate, respectively, that ‘the two Kingdoms of England 
and Scotland shall … for ever after  be united into one 
Kingdom’728 and that ‘all  Papists and persons marrying 
Papists shall be excluded from and for ever  incapable to 
                                                            
726 “[T]he Parliament of England may provide for the Security 
of the Church of England as they think expedient to take place 
within the Bounds of the said Kingdom of England and not 
derogating from the Security above provided”: ibid. .  
727 An Act for Securing the Church of England as by Law 
Established 1706.  
728 [Emphasis added].  
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inherit possess or enjoy the …  Crown…’729 Similarly, 
Art.XVIII provides that:  
[N]o alteration  [shall] be made in Laws 
which concerns private Right except for 
evident utility  of the subjects within 
Scotland.730  
The Acts concerning the establishment of the respective 
Churches of England and Scotland, for their part, 
transmit their intention to bind the unified legislature 
in an even more unmistakable manner:  
Parliament doth hereby establish and 
confirm the said true Protestant Religion 
and the Worship Discipline and Government 
of this Church to continue without any 
Alteration  to the People of this Land in all 
succeeding Generations… And it is hereby 
statute and ordained that this Act of 
Parliament with the Establishment therein 
contained shall be held and observed in all 
time coming  as a Fundamental and Essential 
Condition  of any Treaty or Union to be 
                                                            
729 ibid. .  
730 ibid. .  
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concluded betwixt the two Kingdoms without 
any Alteration thereof or Derogation thereto 
in any sort for ever…731 
Additionally , the existence of “ ‘substantively but 
contingently’ entrenched provisions” 732 as Loveland calls 
them – that is, Articles that were expressly declared to 
be alterable by the Parliament of Great Britain at least 
in part, such as Arts.VI, XVII, XVIII, and XIX – further 
canvasses the commissioners’ restrictive intentions by 
highlighting the purposeful distinction between 
alterable and unalterable clauses.  
Dicey is, indeed, clearly in secure territory when 
suggesting that “[o]ne can hardly doubt that … [the 
ecclesiastical provisions] were meant to be immutable 
parts”733 of the Treaty of Union and, more generally, 
that:  
[o]f statutes intended to arrest the possible 
course of future legislation, the most 
noteworthy are the Acts which embody the 
                                                            
731 ibid. .  
732 Loveland, 2012, at p.44.  
733 Dicey and Rait, 1920, at p.247.  
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treaties of Union … The legislators who 
passed these Acts assuredly intended to give 
to certain portions of them more than the 
ordinary effect of statutes.734 
The matter cannot however be left at that. As Loughlin 
correctly submits:  
[T]he argument … that the Articles of Union 
… are constitutive of the United Kingdom … 
has a certain logic to it. But … [the] fallacy 
of this Scottish position is to be located in 
the assumption that the constitutional 
significance of these Acts can be discerned 
by logical analysis.735 
Indeed, having concluded that the spirit and wording, 
as well as the nature of the negotiations and 
preparatory work leading up to, the agreement that  
brought about the Anglo-Scots Union of 1707 manifested 
an intention to restrain the legislative scope of the 
thereby constituted Parliament of Great Britain, the 
next questions to be asked are whether it had the power 
to do so and, if yes, whether, in fact, it succeeded, in 
                                                            
734 Dicey, 1889, at p.62.  
735 Loughlin, 1999, at p.202 [references omitted].  
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doing so. The forthcoming answers, whatever they may 
be, will, indeed, incidentally, prove particularly 
illuminating since the Treaty and Acts of Union 
constitute the ideal test-case to determine whether 
Parliament can bind its successors,736 in light of the 
definitive intention of such Treaty and Acts to do so.  
                                                            
736 It is true that in the 17 t h  and early 18 t h  century –  an age of 
contingency and sweeping change in which, however, the 
plethora of different classes competing for governance still  felt 
zealous about their fundamentals –  language such as that 
utilised by the draughtsmen of the Anglo -Scots Treaty was not 
as astonishing and infrequent as it may appear to a modern 
disciple of the UK Constitution. The Bill of Rights 1688 
provides a pertinent example for,  despite the fact that its 
provisions were pronounced to ‘stand remaine and be the law 
of this Realme for ever’,  its declaration that:  
the sole and full Exercise of the Regall Power be 
onely in and executed by the said Prince of Orange 
[that is, William III] in the Names of the said 
Prince and Princesse [Mary II] dureing their joynt 
Lives And after their Deceases the said Crowne 
and Royall Dignitie … to be to the Heires of the 
Body of the said Princesse And for default of such 
Issue to the Princesse Anne of Denmarke and the 
Heires of her Body And for default of such Issue to 
the Heires of the Body of the said Prince of 
Orange. 
  
 
420 
 
It is preferable, however, to commence with the latter 
question and inquire into whether the intentions of the 
Union’s architects materialised with the effect that 
Parliament , in the words of Mitchell, was “born 
unfree”737 since, as Defoe proclaimed, “the articles of the 
treaty … cannot be touched by … [Parliament and] … 
                                                                                                                                                       
was challenged a mere 12 years later by the Act of Settlement 
1700. Interestingly, the latter Act does not constitute a mere 
clarification of the rules of succession established by the Bill 
of Rights, as is sometimes alleged, but, considering that 
during the debate pursuant to the enactment of the Bill of 
Rights, Parliament had rejected the House of Lords’  
amendment to enhance the line of succession by thereto 
appending Electress Sophia and her heirs (see: Melville,  1908,  
at p.130), arguably constitutes a direct abrogation thereof by 
virtue of its settlement of the succession in favour of the very 
same individual:  “the most Excellent Princess Sophia Electress 
and Dutchess Dowager of Hannover” (Act of Settlement 1700,  
Art.I).  
However, this having been said, the conviction that the Treaty 
of Union constitutes the ideal test -case to determine whether 
Parliament can bind its future incarnations is not in any sense 
discounted for. Indeed, if  not the actual statutory text then 
certainly the clarity of the intention of the union’s fabricators 
to create, in the words of the Scottish jurist Sir Francis Grant, 
an “unchangeable contract” (Anon [Grant], 1707, at p.10) and 
thereby place the newly-created Parliament in shackles, is 
exceptional even amongst 17 t h  and 18 t h  century legislative 
schemes. 
737 Mitchell,  1968, at p.69.  
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the moment they attempt it, they dissolve their own 
Constitution.. .”738  
To examine the effectiveness of the vehicles and 
mediums utilised to give effect to such intention, one 
must, therefore, look at the post-Union legal history of 
Great Britain and, in particular, place emphasis upon 
the existence, or otherwise, of subsequent breaches of 
the Treaty’s professedly unalterable clauses.   
Before doing so, it is useful, parenthetically, to 
highlight that in 1713, a Bill for dissolving the Union 
was proposed by aggrieved Scots MPs and defeated by a 
mere four votes in the House of Lords. This is reveal ing 
insofar as it indicates, in Goldsworthy’s words, that 
“[t]he Scots did not rely on Defoe’s thesis, that any 
breach of … [the Treaty’s] fundamental terms would 
automatically dissolve the union.” 739 
At any rate, allegations of breaches of the Treaty’s 
provisions have, over the years, been levelled against a 
plethora of statutes.740 Albeit, clearly, not every such 
                                                            
738 Defoe, 1786 [1709], at p.246.  
739 Goldsworthy, 1999, at p.170.  
740 For instance: the Treason Act 1708 (insofar as it abolished 
Scottish treason law, which was regarded by individuals such 
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as the Scottish lawyer and commissioner of the 1706 
deliberations, Sir John Clerk of Pennycuik, 2 nd  Baronet [Clerk, 
1993, at p.195],  as being a matter of ‘private Right’  within the 
meaning of Art.XVIII),  cases such as Earl of Rosebery v Inglis  
[(1708) 18 HL J 464, 555-556],  Gray v Hamilton  [(1708) 18 HL 
J 591, 659-660] and the far more publicised case o f 
Greenshields v The Lord Provost  [(1710) Col 427] saga (insofar 
as they established that appeals from the Lords of Council and 
Session lay with the House of Lords, contrary to at least one 
reading [c.f .  Ford, 2007a, at pp.122-123; MacLean, 1983-1984] 
of Art.XIX that had provided that no ‘Court in Westminster -
hall … shall have … Power to cognosce, review, or alter the 
Acts or Sentences of the Judicatures within Scotland’),  the 
Scottish Episcopalians Act 1711 (insofar as it allowed 
ministers such as Greenshields freely to conduct Episcopal 
services in Scotland, contrary to the popular meaning ascribed 
by Scottish Presbyterians to the Acts appended to the 1707 
Treaty), the Church Patronage (Scotland) Act 1711 (insofar as 
its restoration of lay patrons, who did  not need be members of 
the Church of Scotland, to their ancient right of presenting 
Ministers to their vacant Parishes, was perceived by the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland [see: Roger, 2008, 
Lecture 1] as overturning the settlement achieved in  the wake 
of the Glorious Revolution which had vested the right to select 
parish ministers in the whole congregation by approving or 
disapproving the candidates proposed by Presbyterian parish 
heritors and elders, as well as,  crucially,  compromising the 
entrenchment of the Presbyterian Church Government secured 
by the Act appended to the 1707 Treaty [see: Dicey, 1889, at 
p.62]),  the so-called ‘Malt Tax’  of 12 Anne c.2 (insofar as it 
extended the Malt Tax to Scotland contrary to the express 
provision of Art.XIV that had provided that ‘any Malt to be 
made and consumed in … Scotland … shall not be charged with 
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any imposition on Malt,  during this present War [of the 
Spanish Succession that had not ended whilst the Bill was 
being discussed]’) ,  the Heritable Jurisdictions (Scotland) Act 
1746 (to the extent that, in the aftermath of the 45’ ,  it sought 
to deal the finishing blow to one of the traditional strongholds 
of Jacobitism, the Scottish Highlands, by severely restricting 
the historic jurisdictional rights vested in Scottish clan chiefs 
and feudal landowners, contrary to the express reservation, in 
Art.XX, of ‘all heritable Offices, Superiorities, heritable 
Jurisdictions … to the Owners thereof … in the same Manner 
as they are now enjoyed by the Laws of Scotland ’ ) ,  the Union 
with Ireland Act 1800 (pursuant to which Great Britain would 
no longer be represented by ‘one and the same Parliament to 
be stiled the Parliament of Great Britain’,  as Art.III had 
provided), the Court of Session Act 1830 (to the extent that i ts 
s.21 abolished the Court of Admiralty contrary to Art.XIX that 
had provided that ‘there be alwayes continued in Scotland a 
Court of Admiralty such as in England’),  the Universities 
(Scotland) Act 1853 and the Parochial and Burgh 
Schoolmasters (Scotland)  Act 1861 (in view of the fact that 
they rendered it unnecessary ‘ for any Schoolmaster … of any 
Parochial School … [or any Professor of any University] to 
profess or subscribe the Confession of Faith, or the Formula of 
the Church of Scotland, or to profess  that he will submit 
himself to the Government and Discipline thereof’  which, in 
turn, was liable to be viewed as an outright abrogation of the 
Scottish Act appended to the Treaty, for such Act had provided 
that ‘no Professors, Principals … or others, bear ing Office in 
any University,  Colledge, or School within this Kingdom, be 
capable to be admitted, or allowed to continue in the Exercise 
of their said Function … [unless] … before, or at their 
Admissions, they do and shall acknowledge and profess,  and 
shal l  subscribe to the foresaid Confession of Faith … and that 
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they will practise and confirm themselves to the Worship 
presently in Use in this Church, and submit themselves to the 
Government and Discipline thereof ’ ),  the Statute Law Revision 
Act 1867 (insofar as it fully repealed Arts.V, VIII, X, XI, XII,  
XIII, XIV and XV as well as repealed, in part, Arts.VI, XVI, 
XIX and XXII of the 1707 Acts of Union), the Promissory Oaths 
Act 1871 (to the extent that it partially repealed Art.XXII),  
the Education (Scotland) Act 1872 (that, in excluding Gaelic 
languages from the compulsory education system it introduced, 
may have breached the autonomy of the Scottish education 
system that, according to one view [see: Patterson, 1994, at 
p.66], had been implicitly preserved by the 1707 Acts), the 
Churches (Scotland) Act 1905 (to the extent that its s.5 
empowered the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland to 
alter the Confession of Faith required from ministers and 
preachers, contrary to the Act appended to the 1707 Act),  the 
Weights and Measures Act 1878 (to the extent that its 
Schedule 6 repealed Art.XVII),  the Universities (Scotland) Act 
1932 (insofar as its s.5 unashamedly provided that ‘ [i]t  shall  
not be necessary for any person who shall have been, or shall 
be,  elected, presented or provided to the office of principal … 
or other office in any of the universities … in Scotland to make 
and subscribe the acknowledgement or declaration mentioned 
in the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Act 1707’) ,  
the Statute Law Revision Act 1948 (insofar as it 
acknowledged, and approved of, several past breaches of the 
1707 Acts by repealing, in part,  Arts.VI, VII, XIX as well as 
the relevant parts of the Act appended to the 1707 Acts), the 
Royal Titles Act 1953 (as suggested by  the petitioners in 
MacCormick v Lord Advocate ,  discussed infra),  the Peerage 
Act 1963 (to the extent that it repealed Art.XXII, according to 
the view of Lords Slynn and Hope in Lord Gray’s Motion  
[[2002] 1 AC 124, 129, 143],  to be discussed below), the 
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Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 (insofar as it 
partially repealed the appended Act and Arts.VI, VII and XIX 
of the Union with England Act 1707, as well as deemed Arts.IX 
and XXII of the same ‘obsolete,  spent or unnecessary’),  the 
ECA 1972 (as maintained by the pursuer in Gibson v Lord 
Advocate  [1975 SC 136],  analysed infra) ,  the Statute Law 
(Repeals) Act 1973 (to the extent that it repealed Art.IX in full 
and Arts.VI and XIX in part),  the Local Government (Scotland) 
Act 1973 (in view of its s.1(5) that –  contrary to Art.XXI that 
had stated that ‘the Rights and Privileges of the Royal 
Boroughs in Scotland as they now are Do Remain entire after 
the Union and notwithstanding thereof’  –  provided that ‘all 
local government areas existing immediately before  … [May 
16 t h  1975],  that is to say, all  counties,  counties of cities,  large 
burghs, small burghs and districts, shall cease to exist,  and 
the council of every such area shall also cease to exist’ ) ,  the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 (as four persons charged 
with vandalism thereunder maintained in Sillars v Smith  
[1982 SLT 539],  analysed below), the Abolition of Domestic 
Rates Etc (Scotland) Act 1987 (as maintained in the series of 
‘Community Charge’ cases, discussed infra),  the Statute Law 
(Repeals) Act 1993 (to the extent that it had the same effect 
upon Art.XXII of the Union with Scotland Act 1706 as the 
Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 had had upon the 
equivalent Article of the equivalent Scottish Act of 1707), the 
Scotland Act 1998 (insofar  as it blatantly provided in its s.37 
that the two Acts of Union were to have effect ‘subject to this 
Act’) ,  the House of Lords Act 1999 (as contended by Lord Gray, 
upon a motion in his name, in the House of Lords’  debate on 
July 27 t h  1999, discussed later  sub nomine  Lord Gray’s 
Motion ),  the creation of the UK Supreme Court (as Lord Hope 
forewarned the Constitutional Affairs Committee [see: Hope, 
2003]),  the Succession to the Crown Act 2013 (insofar as it will  
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statute has been equally received by scholars as being 
an outright breach of the Treaty and not every breach 
as being against a provision that was intended to be 
unalterable, it is generally accepted that such a 
conclusion is unavoidable at least in regards to the 
Universities (Scotland) Acts 1853 and 1932. Therefore, 
Munro’s proposition that “almost all of the Articles and 
sections of the legislation have been repealed or 
                                                                                                                                                       
provide, when it comes into force [see: Success ion to the Crown 
Act 2013, s.5],  that in determining the succession to the 
Crown, a person’s gender is no longer relevant [ ibid. ,  s.1] 
whilst his or her putative marriage to a person of the Roman 
Catholic faith is no longer disqualifying [ ibid. ,  s.2],  contra ,  
respectively, the Act of Settlement 1700, which had settled the 
succession to the throne in favour of Electress Sophia and on 
the basis of male-preference cognatic primogeniture thereafter 
[see: Bogdanor, 1995, at pp.42 -43],  as well as, crucially,  contra  
Art.II of the 1707 Treaty that had rendered ‘all Papists, and 
Persons marrying Papists … forever incapable to inherit, 
possess,  or enjoy the … Crown’),  the plethora of statutes 
which, in a union state such as the UK, are, naturally,  
impossible to be always ‘for the evident utility’  [see: Treaty of 
Union 1707, Art.XVIII] of all of its composite nations, as well 
as, lastly, a possible secession of Scotland from the UK [see: 
Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of Schedule 5) Order 2013] 
(which, ironically, is supported by the majority of those who 
claim that the UK Parliament is bound by the fundamental 
provisions of the Treaty despite the fact that it “would not 
only breach Article 1 of the Acts and Treaty of Union but 
would also undermine the entirety of the modern British 
constitution” [Wicks, 2006, at p.41]).  
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amended in whole or in part”741 appears to approximate 
the truth much more closely that Mitchell’s retort that 
it is “doubtful if there has as yet been any breach”. 742  
Nonetheless, anti-sovereignty theorists are not, as yet, 
prepared to concede that, as Dicey put it, “[s]hould the 
Dentists’ Act, 1878, unfortunately contravene the terms 
of the Act[s] of Union, the Act[s] of Union would be pro 
tanto  repealed”,743 and that, thus, the Anglo-Scots Union 
“affords the strongest proof of the futil ity inherent in 
every attempt of one sovereign legislature to restrain 
the action of another equally sovereign body.” 744 Indeed, 
several theses that have been proposed and attempt to 
prove the seemingly impossible – that is, defend the 
effectiveness of the Treaty’s self-professedly unalterable 
clauses whilst acknowledging the existence of at least 
some breaches thereof – call for comment. 
Firstly, Upton alleges that “constitutional objections 
[flowing from the Treaty of Union] have been invoked 
                                                            
741 Munro, 1999, at p.138.  
742 Mitchell,  1968, at p.73.  
743 Dicey, 1889, at p.136.  
744 ibid. ,  at p.62.  
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successfully on a number of occasions”,745 bringing to his 
support several Bills that failed to secure passage 
through Parliament and become law. Surely, however, 
the abandonment of certain legislative proposals that 
happened to be unpopular in a specific region of Great 
Britain at their time, even if wrapped with the political 
gloss of ‘constitutional objections’, can seldom be 
accepted, in and of itself, as more than indirect and 
circumstantial evidence of the Treaty’s inviolability. 
For instance, as Sharp correctly proposes:  
[t]he continued existence of Scottish law and 
institutions is better explained as moral 
entrenchment: put crudely, it has not been 
politically savvy to dismantle them. 746  
Further, Upton’s analysis is, at any rate, unable to 
interpret away the other sub-group of proposals that 
constituted Treaty breaches but were ultimately 
successful in receiving the Royal Assent.  
                                                            
745 Upton, 1989, at p.93. See also:  Allan, 1994, at p.271.  
746 Sharp, 2010, at p.141 [reference omitted].   
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In their attempt to remedy such failure, several 
scholars such as Smith,747 Upton,748 Phillipson749 and 
Mitchell,750 have erected an argument whereby the 
ascertained breaches of the Treaty’s provisions are 
deemed “distinguishable as examples of reform by 
consent.”751 More specifically, it is said that “[t]he logic 
of the … [deliberations preceding the Union] suggests 
not a purpose of ‘freezing’ 1689 … but a purpose of 
denying the new British polity jurisdiction over the 
most sacred parts of the two national lives”; 752 thus, 
alterations of the Treaty’s provisions impinging upon 
England are justifiable if favoured by England, whilst 
breaches of fundamental terms expressed for the benefit 
of Scotland are allowed if favoured by Scotland.  
In truth, however, it is highly doubtful that the consent 
formula aptly describes any more Treaty breaches than 
                                                            
747 Smith, 1957.  
748 Upton, 1989.  
749 Phillipson, 1969, at pp.170-176. 
750 Mitchell,  1968, at p.73.  
751 Upton, 1989, at p.93 [reference omitted].   
752 ibid. ,  at p.96 [reference omitted].  
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the ones carefully designated, in a circular manner, by 
the said formula’s proposers. Secondly, even in relation 
to the breaches it can appropriately describe, it would 
be wrong to be quick about inferring that Parliament 
felt obliged to submit to popular demand: a simpler and 
more intelligible reading of history would have 
Parliament considering public opinion and tactically, 
but voluntarily, giving effect to it, when such course of 
action appeared politically expedient. Thirdly, one 
cannot appeal to the intentions of the Union’s architects 
and, in the same breath, allege that “a mechanism o f 
reform must be inferred from the moral logic of their 
historical context”753 as that would be tantamount to 
ignoring their clearly articulated desire that certain 
amongst the Treaty provisions were to persist ‘for ever’, 
“there being no power on Earth”, 754 even if that be 
called Parliament with the consent of the nation 
affected, “capable to alter … [them]”, 755 as Grant put it. 
Fourthly, even if the English and Scottish 
commissioners had allowed room for amendment by 
consent (as they certainly did not), it is uncertain how 
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754 Anon [Grant], 1707, at p.18.  
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such system could be rendered workable. For instance, 
by which body and in what manner would the 
adjudication of which nation a proposed alteration 
affects be made? Similarly, how would the consent of 
the affected nation be certified? Bentham,  for instance, 
who espoused a consent formula in relation to Treaty 
alterations (albeit, it must be stressed, not as legally 
compulsory but rather as “highly expedient, to say no 
more, for the sake of preserving the public faith, and to 
avoid irritating the body of the nation”)756 had the 
following method to propose:  
Let the new law in question be enacted in 
the common form. But let its commencement 
be deferred to a distant period … let it then, 
at the end of that period, be in force, unless 
petitioned against, by [such] persons … as 
might be supposed fairly to represent the 
sentiments of the people in general: persons, 
for instance, of the description of those who 
at the time of the Union, constituted the 
body of electors.757 
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Notwithstanding the objections that may validly be 
raised against such proposal  which Bentham himself 
acknowledged, it is, ad minimis , a step in the direction 
of implementing politically a consent formula and 
several steps away from the manner and spirit in which 
the Treaty alterations, alleged to be distinguishable as 
examples of reform by consent, have actually been 
executed. Fifthly, the idea that fundamental laws can in 
any way be affected, or, even worse, be altered by mere 
popular demand runs counter to the very idea of 
fundamental or constitutional law. Lastly, even if all of 
the above objections are overlooked, it is unclear how in 
legal, rather than political, terms the issue of consent 
could be relevant. Evidently, consent to a breach is a 
relevant legal consideration in respect of a bilateral 
treaty under international law, currently enshrined in 
Art.60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
1969. However, it is impossible to employ such 
international law prism with respect to the Treaty of 
Union for both signatories to such treaty are no longer 
in existence; there is neither any international law 
entity capable of committing a “material breach” 758 of 
the 1707 Treaty nor one to cognise and “invoke the 
breach as a ground for terminating the t reaty or 
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suspending its operation in whole or in part.” 759 As Lord 
Hope has correctly reasoned:  
As the law of nations in international law is 
concerned only with states, and the states or 
kingdoms of Scotland and England ceased to 
exist on 1 May 1707, the Treaty became an 
executed, or spent, treaty on that date as by 
the merger the obligants under the treaty 
had ceased to exist…760 
No doubt, in response, the thesis has been proposed 
that 1707 should be perceived as a qualified transfer of 
powers by two acts of  delegation to the unified 
Parliament of Great Britain (in which case the Vienna 
Convention could be relevant), but the mere argument 
that has been advanced in favour of the continuing 
existence and authority of the prior English and 
Scottish legislatures is the fact that certain pre-Union 
statutes have remained in force. But that cannot be 
right for, as explained above, the two legislative bodies 
ratified themselves out of existence by giving effect to 
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760 Hope, 2000 [paraphrasing and adopting the arguments laid 
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the Treaty of Union which contained an express 
abolition of the two Parliaments in its Art.III and 
lacked any mechanism whatsoever for resummoning 
them. Indeed, a perusal of the Scottish Parliament 
records in the final days before the inception of the 
Union with England reveals that it was prorogued sine 
die, rather than merely adjourned; ‘there’s an end to an 
auld sang’, as the then Lord Chancellor of Scotland is 
said to have murmured whilst announcing the decision. 
At any rate, in following the delegation argument, one 
is entitled to wonder whether the alleged authority of 
the English and Scots legislatures will cease to  exist 
when the few extant pre-Union statutes761 are repealed, 
if they have not been somehow resummoned in the 
meantime. However, even if the delegation argument 
were correct, it would solely al low the old legislatures, 
                                                            
761 McBain notes that:   
there are some 102 Acts pre -1800 extant, but only 
c 300 sections in total!  Indeed, in many instances 
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(McBain, 2011, at p.1).   
Evidently, then, the pre -1707 statutes that remain in force are 
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435 
 
or at least bodies acting on their behalf, to alter the 
Treaty and, undoubtedly, an ill -defined, 
phantasmagoric ‘consent of the nation’ would seldom 
qualify as the consent of such a body, not least in view 
of the pre-democratic characteristics of the pre-Union 
legislatures.  
Jennings and Young,762 for their part, in attempting to 
defend the Treaty provisions as being fundamental law 
despite the existence of breaches thereof, have proposed 
a different argument. They maintain that “the  fact that 
provisions of the Acts of Union … which some lawyers 
… have regarded as intended to be permanent, have in 
fact been repealed”763 does little to prove that the 
Treaty provisions are, in fact, amendable, for 
“[h]istorical precedents, even if actual in point, are not 
legal precedents”.764 Although, undoubtedly, there is 
some truth in the proposition that changing climates of 
opinion may alter the conventional reading of a statute 
or constitutional document, in the case of the Treaty of 
Union the proposition that its provisions have fallen in 
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desuetude, as has sometimes been claimed, is as much 
false as the contrary, and in many ways absurd, 
allegation that Treaty breaches were at one time, but 
are no longer, allowed. Indeed, as earlier seen, 
alterations to the Treaty’s self -professedly unalterable 
clauses began a mere 4 years after its ratification and 
have continued at a steady pace throughout the 18 th, 
19 th, 20 th  and 21s t centuries up to 2013 with no 
exception. 
Fourthly, Mitchell contends that all ascertained 
breaches have been against non-fundamental provisions 
of the Treaty and that no alteration whatsoever has 
been made to the Treaty’s unalterable, fundamental 
clauses. The gist of his argument, however, rests with 
the fact that “[w]hat is, in [his] view, entrenched is 
carefully defined by …”765 himself. Therefore, despite 
his copious efforts, one can hardly resist attributing to 
his work a circular methodology of hindsight whereby 
the unalterability of Treaty clauses is not dependent 
upon the intention of their authors or upon the 
interpretation of the wording used by their 
draughtsmen but, rather, essentially, upon whether or 
not they have, in practice, been breached. This is 
especially true in view of the fact that Mitchell refuses 
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to assign766 fundamental character to the Protestant 
Religion and Presbyterian Church Act 1707 which, as 
earlier analysed, both by virtue of its wording and 
overall spirit as well as by virtue of the manner in 
which it was appended to the 1707 Treaty, arguably 
constitutes the chief instance of the Union architects’ 
attempt to bind the impending Parliament of Great 
Britain.  
Finally, it has been contended by, inter alios , Middleton 
that although “[i]t must be conceded that since 1707 
Parliament has sometimes purported to ‘repeal’ articles 
[of the Treaty] or parts of them … [i]t does not follow 
that Parliament was entitled to do so…”767 Walker, in 
further elucidating the contention, suggests that:  
Parliament [does] not have legal power to 
amend or repeal a provision of an 
international treaty, unless the treaty gives 
power to do so. It can repeal parts of its own 
legislation or subordinate legislation 
authorised by it. Thus it could repeal the 
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Human Rights Act 1998, but not the 
Convention on Human Rights.768 
In truth, however, to utilise the example given, should 
the HRA be repealed (as Walker concedes it can), the 
ECHR would, for all domestic intents and purposes, be 
denied legal effect, as was indeed the case in the pre -
1998 era. The UK would, evidently, be liable for any 
potential breaches thereof, but only in international 
law. Analogously, in respect to the Treaty of Union, the 
sole liability for breaches could have been in 
international law but, as earlier analysed, the two 
signatories to the 1707 Treaty are no longer in 
existence so there is neither any international law 
entity capable of breaching the Treaty (after all, Great 
Britain is not a signatory to the Treaty) nor any entity 
capable of cognising such breaches.  
Beyond the international law point however, if 
Parliament, in altering the Treaty’s provisions, was 
acting in a legally unwarranted manner, surely the 
courts would have had a duty to intervene. Therefore, 
ascertaining whether such intervention has indeed 
occurred is a legitimate area of study.  
                                                            
768 Walker, 2007.  
  
 
439 
 
❖  
A perusal of Scottish court rolls reveals that, albeit not 
frequently, Scottish judges, for the better part of the 
20 th century and onwards, have had to deal with 
claimants craving the court to adjudge invalid 
Parliamentary legislation that is allegedly contrary to 
the 1707 Treaty. The natural starting point of any 
analysis of such atypical anthology of cases is, 
undoubtedly, MacCormick .  Indeed, the case was 
concerned with deeper issues than the historiographic, 
and fallacious, remark regarding the powers of the pre-
Union Scottish Parliament referred to earlier, insofar 
as it involved a petition of suspension and interdict, on 
the part of two members of the Scottish public, against 
the Lord Advocate to prevent the publishing of a 
proclamation entitling the Queen as ‘Elizabeth  the 
Second of the United Kingdom of Great Britain’, as the 
Royal Titles Act 1953 would have authorised, 769 since 
the use in Her Majesty’s title of the numeral ‘the 
Second’ would be, allegedly, inconsistent with historical 
fact, political reality and, crucially, Art.I of the Treaty 
of Union. Albeit the court had little difficulty in 
disposing of MacCormick and Hamilton’s petition, as no 
                                                            
769 C.f.  1953 SC 396, 409-411. 
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explicit or sufficiently implicit prohibition in Art.I of 
the Treaty against the controversial numeral was 
discovered, Lord President Cooper proceeded to 
maintain that: 
I have not found in the Union legislation any 
provision that the Parliament of Great 
Britain should be ‘absolutely sovereign’ in 
the sense that that Parliament should be 
free to alter the Treaty at will. 770 
Although the aforecited submission is undoubtedly true, 
it does not follow, as the Lord President stealthily, but 
surely, implies, that Parliament is, therefore, not free 
to alter the Treaty. For one, it could be responded that 
although no provision is made for Parliament’s 
sovereignty, the Treaty, equally, fails to bestow upon 
any court the ability – or, more generally, create any 
other mechanism –  to invalidate subsequent legislation 
infringing the entrenched Treaty provisions. More 
importantly still, any provision declaring Parliament to 
be sovereign would arguably have the diametrically 
opposed effect to the one intended for such provision 
would be liable to be interpreted by the judiciary which, 
in turn, would squarely confine the professed 
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sovereignty to the strict boundar ies of the provision’s 
wording or to a “very large tapestry”, 771 as Laws LJ 
would have it, that, nevertheless, necessarily, “has a 
border.”772 
Setting aside the said obiter dictum  –  as one assuredly 
can – the only remaining offending passage of the 
MacCormick  decision is situated in Cooper’s expressed 
constraint:  
to hold that the action as laid is incompetent 
in respect that it has not been shown that 
the Court of Session has authority to 
entertain the issue sought to be raised. 773 
The enthusiasm amongst anti-sovereignty theorists 
surrounding Lord Cooper’s enigmatic dictum  would 
surely be tempered, however, if placed in juxtaposition 
with the moderate view expressed upon the matter by 
his fellow in the Inner House as well as the firm 
position taken by the judge at first instance in the same 
case. Indeed, Lord Russell, despite electing to reserve 
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his opinion on “the hypothetical question as to the 
power that might be exercised by this Court in relation 
to an Act passed which infringed … provisions … of the 
Treaty of Union”,774 went on and arrived “without 
doubt”775 at the unqualified conclusion that “the remedy 
sought by the petitioners … is unsupported by any 
authority … [and] is outwith the power of this Court to 
grant…”776 The Lord Ordinary, Lord Guthrie, for his 
part, was forceful in his suggestion that “[n]o Scottish 
Court has ever held an Act of Parliament to be ultra 
vires ,  and it has never been suggested that it could do 
so.”777  
At any rate, whether justified or not, MacCormick ,  as a 
matter of fact, constitutes a critical juncture in the 
resurrection and enkindlement of a posi tion last held by 
a segment of 18 th  century Scottish pamphleteers, viz.,  
that the Treaty of Union contains valid and enforceable 
restraints vis-à-vis  Parliament’s legislative power.  
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Indeed, over the course of the second half of the 20 th 
century, corresponding arguments were, on several 
occasions, ventilated in Scottish courts, with Gibson v 
Lord Advocate  standing out as possibly the most 
comprehensive amongst them. Therein, the Lord 
Advocate was sued for declarator that s.2(1) ECA, to the 
extent that it sought to incorporate Art.2 of Regulation 
No.2141/70 into Scottish law, was contrary to Art.XVIII 
of the Treaty of Union and therefore null and of no 
effect. The crux of the pursuer’s contention was that the 
implementation of the 1970 Regulation, via s.2(1) ECA, 
was not ‘for the evident utility of the subjects within 
Scotland’ within the meaning of Art.XVIII, since, by 
permitting vessels from other Community Member 
States to fish off the Scottish coast, it would cause 
grave financial loss to the majority of Scottish 
fishermen as well as deprive the rest of the country of 
the income hitherto derived from fishing. Yet again, the 
allegations, as such, were swiftly and trivially refuted 
by the court, since it was correctly maintained that the 
control of fishing in territorial waters is a matter of 
public, rather than private, law and is, thus, outside 
the scope of Art.XVIII. Nevertheless, Lord Keith was 
prepared to go further and speculate about breaches of 
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the Treaty’s fundamental provisions. Despite reserving 
his opinion as to “what the position would be” 778 if 
Parliament procured a blatant Treaty breach, he was 
unyielding in his resolve that:  
the question whether a particular Act … 
altering a particular aspect of Scots private 
law is or is not ‘for the evident utili ty’ of the 
subjects within Scotland is not a justiciable 
issue in this Court.779  
Considering its firm and abrupt sealing of the 
constitutional crevices opened by Lord Cooper in 
MacCormick , the fact that Lord Keith’s judgement has 
attracted criticism from certain quarters as possibly 
being “too absolute”780 should not appear surprising. 
Neither should it be considered warranted, however, as 
Gibson  is far from an outlier, even when viewed in the 
context of purely Scottish, rather than UK, 
jurisprudence. 
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Indeed, a mere 7 years later, a similar approach was 
espoused in Sillars v Smith , a case in which four 
persons alleged that the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 
1980 was invalid in view of the fact that the enactment 
of such statute would have been within the competence 
not of the UK Parliament but rather of the Scottish 
Assembly which, in turn, was a body that would have 
been created if the Scotland Act 1978 had come into 
force, as it illegally and contrary to the wishes of the 
Scottish people did not. Sheriff  Macvicar was of the 
view that “it is not competent for a court of summary 
criminal jurisdiction to question the validity of an Act 
of Parliament” .781  
Equally illuminating are the series of cases arising in 
the wake of the introduction of the ‘Community Charge’ 
or ‘Poll Tax’. The skeletal argument broadly advanced 
in all these cases revolved around the alleged 
incompatibility of the Abolition of Domestic Rates Etc 
(Scotland) Act 1987, which levied the infamous flat -rate 
per-capita tax in Scotland a year earlier than in the 
rest of the UK, with the 1707 Treaty in two relevant 
respects: first, insofar as it contravened the safeguard 
that ‘excises’ should be the same in England and 
Scotland (Art.XVIII) or the provision that ‘there be a 
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Communication of all other Rights Privileges, and 
Advantages, which do or may belong to the Subjects of 
each Kingdom’ (Art.IV) by imposing an ‘excise’ in only 
one part of the UK and, second, insofar as it was not 
‘ for the evident utility’ of Scottish citizen -subjects 
despite being a matter of private right (Art.XVIII). 
Ultimately, the claimants’ contentions were outrightly 
rejected as neither could the community charge be 
understood as an ‘excise’ – that is, a tax on commodities 
–  within the meaning of Art.XVIII, nor could the 1987 
Act be conceived as being concerned with matters of 
private right within the meaning of the same Treaty 
Article.782  
Nevertheless, in all four cases the judges proceeded in 
commenting on the justiciability of Treaty breaches, 
with the chronologically first case, Stewart v Henry , 
being the sole in which the relevant judge, Sheriff 
Stewart, declared himself unprepared “to hold that 
there is an absolute bar to a court’s considering the 
question whether a particular change in the law is for 
the ‘evident utility’ of the subjects in Scotland.” 783 
                                                            
782 Fraser v MacCorquodale  1989 SLT (Sh Ct) 39, 40-41. C.f.  
Stewart v Henry  1989 SLT (Sh Ct) 34, 37.  
783 1989 SLT (Sh Ct) 34, 38. See also: Robbie v Hingston  1998 
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Similarly, in Fraser v MacCorquodale , Sheriff 
Henderson suggested that MacCormick  “is not authority 
for the proposition that evident utility is a ‘justiciable 
issue’”784 and defended Lord Keith’s proposition in 
Gibson  against Smith and Bradley’s criticism mentioned 
earlier by maintaining that:  
it appears to me to be wholly consistent with 
the present law and practice, and no 
precedent or authority was cited in support 
of the far reaching considerations contended 
for by the applicant.785  
The final case,786 Murray v Rogers , was presided, yet 
again, by Lord President Hope who, this time, tellingly 
distinguished the position whereby an Act is questioned 
on the grounds of its alleged incompatibility with 
Community law from the position whereby an Act is 
questioned on any other grounds, such as its alleged 
incompatibility with the 1707 Treaty, “simply because 
no legislation which is enacted by Parliament is 
acknowledged by Parliament as being open to scrutiny 
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by any other court…”787 It is also noteworthy that in the 
same case, Lord Kirkwood approvingly cited Gibson  and 
commented that “[a] choice between different systems of 
raising finance for local government is a political 
matter and is not suitable for determination by the 
court.”788 
In decyphering such dicta , it is also imperative to 
consider the most recent instance of judicial elaboration 
upon the burning question which emanated from the 
House of Lords’ reference, upon the consideration of a 
motion in the name of Lord Gray, of the following 
question to the Committee for Privileges:  
Whether the House of Lords Bill … would, if 
enacted, breach the provisions of the Treaty 
of Union…789  
The gist of Lord Gray’s Motion  was that the House of 
Lords Bill 1999, insofar as it provided in its clause 1 
that ‘no-one shall be a member of the House of Lords by 
virtue of a hereditary peerage’, would, if enacted, be in 
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breach of the guarantee of adequate representation of 
Scotland in both Houses of Parliament, implicit in 
Art.XXII of the 1707 Treaty. In truth, however, the 
principle of adequate Scottish representation lacked  
any words of enactment in the Union agreement and, 
therefore, as Lord Hope maintained, it would be 
“difficult to regard it as having the character of 
fundamental law  in these circumstances.”790 Even if that 
were not so and Mitchell were correct in his suggestion 
that Art.XXII was intended to guarantee adequate 
Scottish representation in the unified Parliament of 
Great Britain,791 Lord Gray’s contentions would still 
remain bound to fail as, in their Lordships’ view, 
Scotland would not be discriminated against unfairly in 
comparison with England if the House of Lords Bill 
were enacted; after all Art.XXII had already been 
amended on various occasions in the past 792 as well as 
had been ultimately repealed in both its Scottish and 
English incarnation by the Statute Law Revision 
(Scotland) Act 1964 and the Statute Law (Repeals) Act 
1993 respectively. Despite the effortlessness of the 
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792 See: [2002] 1 AC 124, 142.  
  
 
450 
 
Committee’s unanimous negative answer to the House 
of Lords’ question, their Lordships were prepared to 
take the further, strictly unnecessary, step of 
commenting, even if discrepantly between themselves, 
on the critical issue of the Treaty provisions’ 
entrenchment.  
It is, in the first place, noteworthy that although Lords 
Nicholls793 and Slynn794 appeared to open the door to the 
justiciability of Treaty breaches by distinguishing 
between the Acts and the Treaty of Union, the former 
made nothing of such distinction whilst the latter 
commented that “since 1707 there is no party to the 
treaty which could enforce it.” 795 Furthermore, Lord 
Slynn expressed doubts as to whether “a provision, even 
if regarded as fundamental and as part of the 
constitution, cannot be altered by Parliament” 796 whilst 
Lord Nicholls was of  the view that “[t]here is room for 
argument that the Treaty of Union would be breached if 
Scotland ceased to have adequate representation in both 
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Houses of the United Kingdom Parliament.” 797 However, 
despite proceeding to suggest that in such a “politically  
unthinkable”798 instance, “there would be scope to 
contend that this constituted a breach of a condition 
implicit in the Treaty”,799 he failed to propose what, if 
anything, could be done judicially about such breach, 
apart from its identification. In similar vein, Lord Hope 
verified that “[t]he court has always been able to find 
another route for the disposal of the argument, making 
it unnecessary to resolve the question whether there 
was a breach of the Union Agreement”, 800 but his 
further comment that “[t]he argument that the 
legislative powers of the new Parliament of Great 
Britain were subject to the restrictions expressed in the 
Union Agreement by which it was constituted cannot be 
dismissed as entirely fanciful” 801 was devoid of any 
explanatory or propositional substance.  
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Similarly, although the earlier case of Laughland v 
Wansborough Paper802 has been variously identified as 
the only case “in which the incompetence of Parliament 
to legislate in derogation from the fundamental clauses 
of the Union was squarely at issue”803 and in which “the 
court was prepared to consider whether Parliament had 
acted ultra vires”,804 the truth is that, in the case at 
hand, no “sufficient ground … [was] … shewn by the 
complainer to justify the conclusion that the procedure 
embodied in the new sub-rule [made under statutory 
powers contained in s.17 of the Supreme Court of 
Judicature Act 1875]”805 is contrary to Art.XVIII whilst, 
more importantly, the presiding judge in the Bill 
Chamber, Lord Ashmore, was silent as to the 
consequences of a potential Treaty breach. In other 
words, the fact that the Scottish judge decided to deal 
with the case by delving deeper into the merits of the 
complainer’s contentions does not mean that, should he 
have considered that the said sub-rule was in breach of  
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Art.XVIII, he would have been prepared to go further 
than ascertaining the existence of such a breach.  
What is more, Ex Parte Bennett ,806 the one case that, 
according to Jenkins, “makes clear that the Acts of 
Union do establish constitutional limits on the 
jurisdiction of English courts”, 807 despite standing for 
the submission that Art.XIX of the Treaty did not 
permit an English court to interfere with the execution 
of a Scottish arrest warrant in England and Wales, was 
not concerned with the conflict of the said Treaty article 
with any express or implied contrary provision of a 
Parliamentary enactment. It is, therefore, a logical leap 
to suggest, as Jenkins has, that the:  
implication of Ex parte Bennett  is that 
primary legislation enlarging the 
jurisdiction of English courts … would … 
breach … an express provision of the Acts of 
Union … [and] would violate one of the Acts ’  
underlying principles…808 
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Lastly, it must not be forgotten that some of the 
earliest and most forceful judicial declarations of the 
principle of Parliamentary sovereignty have been 
enounced in Scotland.809 
In summary, it is evident from the foregoing evaluation 
that, despite the resourceful, if at times tortuous, 
contentions of litigants over the years, the courts have 
refused to act upon the several Treaty breaches that 
Parliament intentionally and knowledgeably has 
committed. In the words of Neil MacCormick himself:  
It has to be said that neither in MacCormick ,  
nor in any subsequent case … has any 
challenge to an Act of the UK Parliament on 
the argument that it infringes fundamental 
law looked at all likely to succeed before a 
Scottish court.810  
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It follows that the hindmost thesis – proposed by, inter 
alios , Middleton and Walker and referred to earlier –  
that seeks to portray the Treaty as entrenched whilst 
acknowledging the existence of breaches thereof, fails: 
since Parliament has breached the Treaty and all other 
potentially relevant state officials  including the 
primary law-applying agencies, have remained, at best, 
apathetic towards such breaches, it cannot be true that 
Parliament “was [not] entitled to” 811 actualise such 
breaches via its legislative initiatives. Neither the 
Treaty nor the Acts of Union constitute fundamental 
law that has had the effect of binding successor 
Parliaments in any manner or form.  
It will be remembered that, earlier, following the 
conclusion that the 1707 statesmen possessed an 
unmistakable intention to bind the British Parliament, 
the questions which were posed were whether they had 
the capacity to do so and, if yes, whether, in fact, they 
succeeded in doing so. Having now resolved the latter 
question in the negative, the reader justifiably will also 
anticipate an answer to the former question –  that is, to 
put it differently, what, if anything, more could the 
Union architects have done to give effect to their 
intention to bind the British Parliament – as well as to 
                                                                                                                                                       
identical to the interpretation grounded in English common 
law” (ibid.) .  
811 Middleton, 1954, at p.43.  
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the related query of what, if any, was the effect of the 
language they utilised, if not to bind the said 
legislature. 
Insofar as the first question is concerned, the answer 
lies in the abolition of the English and Scottish 
Parliaments in the wake of the Union. Had they 
remained in being for the purpose of adjudging Treaty 
breaches, or had equivalent bodies been empowered to 
do so on their behalf, it could very well have been the 
case that they would have retained their sovereignty. 812 
Similarly, should the Treaty have provided for the 
resummoning of the defunct Parliaments, the idea of a 
limited British Parliament could have been sensible. 
                                                            
812 Dicey agrees:  
If  indeed the Act[s] of Union had left alive the 
Parl iaments of England and of Scotland … then 
the Act[s] of Union would have been a 
fundamental law unchangeable legally by the 
British Parliament; but in this case the 
Parliament of Great Britain would have been, not 
a sovereign, but a subordinate, legislature, and 
the ultimate sovereign body … would have been 
the two Parliaments of England and of Scotland 
respectively.  
(Dicey, 1889, at p.65).  
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Indeed, Upton’s l imited British Parliament thesis, 
earlier outlined, would have been compelling should he 
have been able to adduce any evidence, apart from the 
continuing validity of some pre-Union statutes, in 
support of his assumption that the authority of the 
previous English and Scottish legislatures remains 
alive. As Lord Cooper conceded in MacCormick :  
it is of little avail to ask whether the 
Parliament of Great Britain ‘can’ do this 
thing or that, without going on to inquire 
who can stop them if they do. 813 
Indeed, in the absence of such bodies to regulate Treaty 
breaches, as well as in view of the failure of the Treaty 
to provide any jurisdiction to the courts for that 
purpose, Parliament itself, ex necessitate , constitutes 
the only body endowed with the twin abilities  of making 
the determination as to whether a potential measure 
would be inconsistent with a fundamental provision of 
the 1707 Treaty and, thereafter, cognising and 
controlling such breaches.  
This inescapable conclusion coincides with McIlwain’s 
notion of Parliament as the “highest ‘court’ of the 
                                                            
813 1953 SC 396, 412.  
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Realm”,814 whilst at the same time being capable of 
responding to the related query advanced above.  Indeed, 
the intentions of the Union’s makers, as embodied in 
the language of the Treaty of Union, are not 
“necessarily futile”;815 to the contrary, although, in 
Dicey’s words, “[a] sovereign Parliament … cannot be 
logically bound to abstain from changing any given 
law”,816 it may “by the fact that an Act when it was 
passed had been declared to be unchangeable, receive a 
warning that it cannot be changed without grave danger 
to the Constitution of the country.” 817 Indeed, as 
discussed in Chapter IV,  although, in one sense, it could 
be proposed that a law that seeks to bind Parliament’s 
successors does not differ from an ordinary enactment , 
this proposition, when taken to its limits, is 
implausible. Thus, the contrary view is preferable: it is 
not true to assume that the former type of enactment is 
in any sense “unmeaning”,818 for that would be to deny 
                                                            
814 McIlwain, 1910, at p.viii .  
815 Dicey and Rait, 1920, at p.253.  
816 ibid. .  
817 ibid. ,  at pp.253-254. See also:  4 Co Rep, Preface.  
818 ibid. ,  at p.253.  
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the sovereignty of previous incarnations of Parliament, 
but, rather, is very much effective in issuing a 
‘warning’, akin to the one Dicey had in mind, which 
future Parliaments will undoubtedly receive, consider 
and – being themselves equally sovereign –  decide 
whether to follow or ignore. Apart from this political 
dimension, the differentiation between ordinary and 
prospective restrive legislation also has a more strictly 
legal face that will be illuminated in the forthcoming 
chapter. 
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The case of Ireland 
 
Although Carroll proclaims that “it is not possible to 
express similar reservations [with the ones expressed in 
relation to the 1707 Acts] about the validity of 
legislation inconsistent with the Acts of Union with 
Ireland”,819 he fails to propose any of the promised 
“variety of reasons”820 for which that is so. Similarly, 
Munro grounds his claim that the 1707 Acts are “not so 
obviously in tatters”821 as the Irish Union legislation on 
mere practical considerations revealed in retrospection, 
rather than formal legal or constitutional reasons. 
Indeed, the question as to the basis upon which the 
literature822 has assumed that the fundamental 
provisions of the 1707 Union possess a peculiar 
forcefulness unmatched by the ones contained in the 
                                                            
819 Carroll,  2007, at p.104.  
820 ibid. .  
821 Munro, 1999, at p.138.  
822 With the notable exception of:  Calvert,  1968.  
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1801 Union, remains a matter of conjecture, 823 since, in 
truth, the constitutional position of Ireland in the UK 
has followed an equivalent path to that of Scotland.  
More specifically, following the establishment of the 
Lordship of Ireland by Henry II in 1171 and the 
ensuant 400-year period of feudal rule of Ireland under 
the King of England as overlord, as well as the 
subsequent 260-year personal union of crowns of the 
Kingdoms of England and Ireland proclaimed by the 
Crown of Ireland Act 1542, political union between the 
two countries to create the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland was achieved via  the enactment of 
the Union with Ireland Act 1800 and the Act of Union 
(Ireland) 1800 by the Parliaments of Great Britain and 
Ireland respectively. Much like the statesmen of 1707, 
the devisers of the 1801 Union possessed a palpable 
intention to bind the descendant UK Parliament in 
several respects. Indeed, the Preamble of the two Acts 
squarely captures such intention by referring to the 
agreement to unite the two Kingdoms into one, ‘in such 
Manner, and on such Terms and Conditions, as may be 
established by the Acts’ whilst Art.I –  with its 
                                                            
823 One possible,  if pessimistic,  such conjecture would attribute 
the unequal assessment of the two unions upon the more vocal 
anti-sovereignty Scottish academic camp.  
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pronouncement that ‘the … Kingdoms of Great Britain 
and Ireland shall … for ever after, be united into one 
Kingdom’ – and Art.V – with its resolution that ‘the 
Churches of England and Ireland … be united into one 
Protestant Episcopal Church … and that the Doctrine, 
Worship, Discipline, and Government of the said United 
Church shall be, and shall remain in full force for ever 
… and that the Continuance and Preservation of the 
said United Church … shall be deemed and taken to be 
an essential and fundamental Part of the Union’ –  
exemplify it in practice. Analogously, following the 
partition of Ireland in 1922, Northern Ireland union ists 
obtained the guarantee, enshrined in s.1(2) of the 
Ireland Act 1949, that:  
in no event will Northern Ireland or any part 
thereof cease to be part of His Majesty’s 
dominions and of the United Kingdom 
without the consent of the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland. 
Despite the use of such clear language to communicate 
their unwavering intention, the British and Irish 
officials of 1800 and 1949, once again much like their 
English and Scottish predecessors of 1707, failed to 
succeed in limiting the legislative scope of the newly-
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created Parliament. Indeed, as Munro has proposed, 
“every Article and section in the Union with Ireland Act 
1800 … has been repealed or amended.” 824 More 
specifically, in the aftermath of the Tithe War of the 
1830s, the Irish Church Act 1869 disestablished the 
Church of Ireland, contrary to Art.V, whilst the Irish 
Free State (Agreement) Act 1922, giving effect to the 
Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921 following the Irish War of 
Independence, granted dominion status to the 26 
southern counties that together would thenceforth 
comprise the Irish Free State and, consequently, 
abrogated the Union between Great Britain and Ireland, 
that had been proclaimed to remain in force ‘for ever’ by 
Art.I, except with regard to the six counties of Northern 
Ireland.825  
S.1(2) of the 1949 Act, for its part, has been 
fundamentally altered twice: first, via the Northern 
Ireland Constitution Act 1973 that, without complying 
with the ‘manner and form’ requirement of the Northern 
Ireland Parliament’s consent, 826 provided in its s.1 that 
                                                            
824 Munro, 1999, at p.138.  
825 See also: Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.2.  
826 For good measure, not only did the 1973 Act abolish the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland but, at the time of its 
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‘ in no event will Northern Ireland or any part of it 
cease to be part of Her Majesty’s dominions and of the 
United Kingdom without the consent of the majority of 
the people of Northern Ireland voting in a poll ’827 and, 
secondly, by s.1(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 
insofar as it deleted the references to ‘Her Majesty’s 
Dominions’ and to a possible partial secession of 
Northern Ireland,828 yet again without the holding of a 
poll for the purpose of these changes 829 or, at least, a 
statement that such a poll has been held.  
The final analogy between the positions of Scotland and 
Ireland under the 1707 and 1801 Union respectively is 
located in the stance of the judiciary towards the 
alterations effected by Parliament to the Union 
agreements’ entrenched provisions. Indeed, case law 
has, tellingly, been scarce with Ex Parte Canon Selwyn  
                                                                                                                                                       
enactment, the said Parliament stood in prorogation as per  
s.1(3) of the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1972.  
827 [Emphasis added].  
828 The phrases ‘any part thereof ’  (Ireland Act 1949, s.1(2)) or 
‘any part of it ’  (Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, s.1) 
are absent from the 1998 Act.  
829 The only question the Northern Irish electorate was asked 
to respond to in 1998 was: ‘Do you support the agreement 
reached at the multi -party talks on Northern Ireland and set 
out in Command Paper 3883?’.  
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being the only recognisable instance in which the 
validity of a statute in conflict with the 1800 Acts was 
at issue. Although, to be fair, the petitioner did not 
reason that the Irish Church Act 1869 was invalid in 
view of its inconsistency with Art.V of the 1800 Acts 
but, rather, contended that the grant of the Royal 
Assent to such Act was in conflict with the Act of 
Settlement and Her Majesty’s Coronation Oath, it is 
equally essential to highlight that the court outrightly 
rejected his petition and affirmed Parliament’s 
sovereignty in the following unequivocal terms:  
An act of the legislature is superior in 
authority to any court of law. We have only 
to administer the law as we find it, and no 
court could pronounce judgement as to the 
validity of an act of parliament. 830 
The conclusions to be drawn from the 19 th century 
Union of Great Britain and Ireland, therefore, are 
equivalent to the ones proposed for the Union achieved 
a century earlier between England and Scotland. 
Indeed, the terms upon which both Unions were 
concluded evinced a clear intention to remove certain 
sensitive areas from the legislative scope of the unified 
                                                            
830 36 JP 54, 55.  
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Parliaments which they created by rendering several of  
the respective agreements’ provisions fundamental and 
unalterable. Such intention, as encapsulated in the 
wording and spirit of several Treaty provisions, has 
been unsuccessful in either restraining Parliament from 
encroaching upon such sensitive areas or  encouraging 
the courts to cognise and act upon such Parliamentary 
encroachment. It would be wrong, however, to surmise 
that the calculated efforts of the 1707 and 1800 
statesmen were ‘futile’ or ‘unmeaning’, for they did have 
the effect, as Dicey highlights, of issuing a warning to 
future Parliaments that any change to the fundamental 
terms of the respective agreements would be perilous 
for the Constitution of the country. Indeed, it is 
illustrative that, in respect to Ireland, Dicey, as a 
zealous Liberal Unionist, could not conceal his fury at  
William Gladstone when the latter sought to justify the 
introduction of the Government of Ireland Bill 1886 by 
citing the constitutional theorist’s ‘Law of the 
Constitution’. It was a logical leap of gigantic 
proportions on the part of the then Prime Minister, sa id 
Dicey in his numerous critiques of Home Rule, 831 to 
deduce from the truthful proposition that, legally ,  there 
                                                            
831 Dicey, 1886; Dicey, 1887; Dicey, 1910, at p.554; Dicey, 
1912a; Dicey, 1913.  
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could be no objection to an Act, such as the 1886 Bill, 
that would amend the 1800 Acts by granting limited 
legislative powers to a devolved assembly for Ireland, 
the misconceived argument that, therefore, a 
Government was morally  entitled rashly to attempt to 
enact such a Bill.832  
In conclusion, invaluable insights with respect to 
whether sovereignty, in the UK constitutional context, 
is best understood as being continuous or self-
embracing can be drawn from the legislation 
accomplishing the Unions of England and Scotland and, 
later, Great Britain and Ireland. Indeed, in a negative 
sense, much like the Statute of Westminster and the 
granting of independence to former colonies, the said 
Union statutes lend no (further) force to the self -
embracing theory of sovereignty for they have not 
effectuated the circumscription of the powers of 
successor Parliaments. Importantly, however, the 
respective Acts of Union can also positively be utilised 
to reinforce the arguments of continuing sovereignty 
                                                            
832 Interestingly, Dicey has been misinterpreted, yet ag ain, 
this time by McLean and McMillan who propose that “[b]y 
1913 … Dicey has moved away from parliamentary sovereignty 
altogether to a belief in popular sovereignty” (McLean and 
McMillan, 2007, at p.439; c.f.  Bogdanor, 2008, at p.19).  
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theorists for, despite the fact that the institutionally 
empowered players in the period immediately preceding 
the two Unions possessed an unmistakable intention to 
bind the unified Parliaments that were being breathed 
life to, the said Parliaments were not “born unfree”. 833    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
833 Mitchell,  1968, at  p.69. 
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Chapter VIII: The Parliament 
Act(s) 
 
The Parliament Act(s) procedure constitutes the final 
instance of Parliament’s alleged attempt to bind its 
future instantiations that requires attention. 
Intriguingly, as will be seen, both the official as well as 
the academic discussion surrounding the law-making 
procedure instituted in 1911 and professedly amended 
in 1949 has also raised broader questions regarding the 
nature and inviolability of Parliament’s sovereignty.  
As is well-rehearsed, the practically entrenched party -
political majorities in the House of Lords, fuelled by the 
Upper House’s overwhelmingly hereditary composition 
in the pre-1958834 and pre-1999835 eras, constituted a 
recurring issue of concern for government 
administration. The delicate mid-19 th century balance of 
Liberal and Conservative peers was inevitably 
                                                            
834 See: Life Peerages Act 1958.  
835 See: House of Lords Act 1999.  
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disturbed by, inter alia , Gladstone’s commitment to 
Irish Home Rule which led to the 1886 schism in the 
Liberal Party and, in turn, to the tenacious alliance of 
the Liberal Unionist apostates with the Conservative 
Party. Thus, although the vulnerable minority Liberal 
government of 1892 was unable to react to the staunch, 
coordinated obstruction of its legislative programme by 
the Conservative-dominated House of Lords,836 by the 
time the Liberal Party returned to power in 1905 it had 
become abundantly clear that its leadership was willing 
and – this time –  able to react to the Upper House’s 
obstructionism that nevertheless ensued in the form of 
the ‘amendment out of recognition’ of 9 Liberal Bills 
between 1906 and 1909 as well as, remarkably, the 
rejection of the Finance Bill 1909 –  an event that had 
not occurred in at least 150 years 837 and which was 
allegedly a “breach of the Constitution, and a 
                                                            
836 Exemplified by the latter’s rejection of the Home Rule Bill 
1893 by 419 votes to 41 –  the heaviest governmental defeat in 
recorded British history (see: Jenkings, 1954, at pp.27, 33).  
837 Searle, 2004, at p.411 quoted in: R (Jackson and Others) v 
Attorney General  [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at 
para.13. C.f.  ibid. ,  315; Prakke, 2006, at p.123.  
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usurpation of the rights of the Commons.” 838 Indeed, 
pursuing the vision of his predecessor Campbell -
Bannerman,839 Asquith PM introduced a Parliament Bill 
in 1910 and, justifiably feeling mandated by the  results 
of the subsequent election of December 1910 that was 
roundly fought upon the very issue of the powers of the 
Upper House and its relationship with the Commons, 
secured and publicised the promise of George V to raise 
sufficient numbers of Liberals to the peerage in order to 
ensure the Bill ’s passage. In the event, the radical 
action taken in 1711 by Queen Anne840 was not required; 
much like in 1832,841 the mere threat was enough, for 
the so-called ‘hedgers’ outnumbered the ‘ditchers’ by 
131 to 114 in the divided House of Lords and the 
Parliament Act 1911 was enacted.  
                                                            
838 HC Debs, 1909, 2n d  December, vol.13, col.546 (Herbert 
Asquith PM). C.f.  Anson, 1912, at pp.678-679; Bogdanor, 2009, 
at p.153.  
839 See: [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005 -06, at paras.13-20. 
840 That is,  the creation of 12 peers to ensure the passage of 
the Treaty of Utrecht 1713.  
841 When William IV’s threat to create peers was enough to 
guarantee the passage of the Representation of the People Act 
1832. 
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The 1911 Act – an Act promulgated, according to its 
long title, ‘to make provision with respect to the powers 
of the House of Lords in relation to those of the House 
of Commons, and to limit the duration of Parliament’ – 
provided, in its s.2(1), that any Public Bill (other than a 
Money Bill842 or a Bill containing any provision to 
extend the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five 
years)843 that has been passed by the House of Commons 
in three successive sessions and has been rejected by 
the House of Lords in each of those sessions, shall, 
provided that two years have elapsed between the date 
of the second reading in the first of those sessions of 
the Bill in the House of Commons and the date on which 
it passes the House of Commons in the third of those 
sessions, become an Act of Parliament on the Royal 
Assent being signified844 thereto.  
                                                            
842 Such exception is attributed to the fact that an easier 
regime for the enactment of Money Bills is provided in s.1 of 
the same Act.  
843 S.7 amended the Septennial Act 1715 to the effect that five 
years were substituted for seven years as the time fixed for 
the maximum duration of Parliament.  
844 This appears to be a draughtsmanship slip that does not 
alter the fundamental rule that the Royal Assent must be 
signified and  communicated to both Houses in order to be 
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Parliament, as is well known, has considered it prudent 
to utilise the s.2 procedure 845 thrice846 for the enactment 
of the Government of Ireland Act 1914, the Welsh 
Church Act 1914, and the Parliament Act 1949. 
Although all three enactments effectuated important 
and controversial changes to the law as it then stood 847 
it is, undoubtedly, the 1949 Act that, from a 
constitutional law viewpoint, is most significant.  
Indeed, the Parliament Act 1949, enacted via  s.2 of the 
Parliament Act 1911, sought to amend the said 
procedure of the latter Act by reducing the number of 
successive sessions in which a Public Bill needed to 
have been passed by the House of Commons and 
rejected by the House of Lords from three to two, as 
well as the time elapsed between the date of the second 
reading in the first of those sessions of the Bill in the 
House of Commons and the date on which it passes the 
                                                                                                                                                       
complete: Bennion, 1981, at p.143, fn.41; Royal Assent Act 
1967, s.1(1).  
845 The s.1 procedure is relied upon regularly, without 
stimulating much constitutional controversy.  
846 See also: Temperance (Scotland) Act 1913.  
847 The first by providing for Irish self-government, the second 
by disestablishing the Anglican Church in Wales and 
Monmouthshire and the third by purporting to amend the 1911 
Act itself.   
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House of Commons in the second of these sessions from 
two years to one.  
For its part, the Parliament Act 1949 has been utilised 
on four occasions848 for the enactment of the War Crimes 
Act 1991, the European Parliamentary Elections Act 
1999, the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 2000, and 
the Hunting Act 2004.  
Serious questions have arisen both in the literature as 
well as, on two separate instances, 849 in the courts by 
adversely affected claimants with respect to the 1949 
Act as well as the statutes professedly enacted under it.  
 
 
 
                                                            
848 See also: Trade Union and Labour Relations (Amendment) 
Act 1976; Aircraft and Shipbuilding Industries Act 1977.  
849 Unfortunately, no record remains of the first such case: R v 
Serafinowicz (unreported). The other case (R (Jackson and 
Others) v Attorney General  [2005] EWHC 94 (Admin); [2005] 
EWCA Civ 126; [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005 -06) will  be 
analysed below.  
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The status of legislation passed 
under the 1911 Act 
 
The cardinal challenge to the validity of the 1949 Act 
has originated in the so-called ‘delegation argument’. 
The argument, that has been defended powerfully by 
authorities such as Hood Phillips and Jackson, 850 
Wade,851 and Lord Donaldson of Lymington, 852 conceives 
of the 1911 Act as an instrument whereby a superior 
body, Parliament, delegated legislative authority to the 
House of Commons and Crown strictly upon the 
conditions prescribed. As Sir William succinctly puts it:  
The acid test of primary legislation, surely, 
is that it is accepted by the courts at its own 
face value, without needing support from any 
superior authority. But an Act passed by 
                                                            
850 Hood Phillips and Jackson, 2001, at pp.79 -81. 
851 Wade, 1955, at pp.193-194; Wade, 1980, at pp.27-28. 
852 HL Debs, 2001, 19 t h  January, vol.620, cols.1309-1313 (Lord 
Donaldson of Lymington).  
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Queen and Commons only has no face value 
on its own… [It] is accepted by the  courts 
only because it is authorised by the 
Parliament Acts –  and indeed it is required 
to recite that it is passed ‘in accordance with 
the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 and by 
authority of the same’. This is the hall -mark 
of subordinate legislation… 853  
The consequences of accepting that legislation made 
under the 1911 Act is of a delegated, subordinate or 
derivative kind are –  the delegation argument continues 
–  in all likelihood fatal for the validity of the self -
amendment of the 1911 Act attempted in 1949. Indeed, 
firstly, as is well established, the courts will, in all 
events, consider it warranted to adopt a narrow, 
restrictive approach towards delegation terms. 854 
Therefore, secondly and relatedly, it is a “fundamental 
tenet of constitutional law”, 855 as the former Master of 
                                                            
853 Wade, 1980, at pp.27-28 [reference omitted].  
854 R (on the application of Spath Holme Ltd) v Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions  [2001] 2 
AC 349, 401.  
855 HL Debs, 2001, 19 t h  January, vol.620, col.1309 (Lord 
Donaldson of Lymington).  
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the Rolls, Lord Donaldson, observed extra-judicially, 
that a delegate will not be conceived as being entitled 
to attenuate or remove the conditions upon which he 
has been granted authority, unless Parliament has 
unambiguously so provided by, for instance, employing 
a relevant Henry VIII clause. 856 Thirdly, delegated 
legislation is amenable to judicial review. It follows 
from the above propositions that, if the delegation 
argument is correct, the courts would be entitled to 
interpret the words ‘any Public Bill ’ in s.2 of the 1911 
Act strictly against the delegate (that is, the Commons 
and Crown) so as not to empower, in lack of clear 
provision to the contrary, variations or enlargements of 
its own authority without the approval of the parent  
body (that is, Parliament) and, therefore, would be 
obliged to strike down any attempt such as the one 
encapsulated in the 1949 ‘Act’.  
When the argument was rehearsed by Sir Sydney 
Kentridge QC for the claimants in Jackson  however, 
with the exception of the Court of Appeal that appeared 
to approach it somewhat sympathetically, 857 it was 
rejected as erroneous. Before substantiating why such 
                                                            
856 Hood Phillips and Jackson, 2001, at pp.79 -81.  
857 [2005] EWCA Civ 126, at paras. 28 -48. 
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rejection of the delegation argument is well -founded 
from an orthodox viewpoint, it is useful to outline the 
principal response proposed in Jackson  by the 
Divisional Court and the House of Lords. Indeed, 
firstly, emphasis was rightly placed on the fact that the 
original s.2(1) clearly provided that any Public Bill that 
has successfully been enacted according to the terms it 
lays down shall become an ‘Act of Parliament’. As Lord 
Bingham suggested: 
The meaning of the expression "Act of 
Parliament" is not doubtful, ambiguous or 
obscure. It is as clear and well understood as 
any expression in the lexicon of the law. It is 
used, and used only, to denote primary 
legislation.858  
Secondly and more controversially, prominence was 
given to the alleged purpose of the 1911 Act that was 
variously described as being “to change the relationship 
between the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords”,859 “to create a second, parallel route by which, 
with the stated exceptions … any public Bill introduced 
                                                            
858 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.24.  
859 [2005] EWHC 94 (Admin), at para.23.  
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in the Commons could become … an Act of 
Parliament”860 and to “redefin[e] the sovereign 
parliament's legislative process … in certain 
circumstances…”861 Despite the controversy regarding 
what the purpose of the 1911 Act was,  it was common 
ground what the Act’s purpose was not : to delegate 
power to two of its composite parts. Thirdly and 
relatedly, it was proposed that, faithfully construed 
within its proper linguistic and historical context, the 
1911 Act does not involve, as the delegation argument 
suggests, an enlargement of the powers of the Commons 
and Crown, but, rather, a restriction of those of the 
Lords; “[t]he overall object of the 1911 Act”, 862 says Lord 
Bingham, “was not to delegate power: it was to restrict, 
subject to … specified … conditions, the power of the 
Lords to defeat measures supported by a majority of the 
Commons…”863 Lastly, Lord Carswell alone advanced 
the proposition that it does not make “sense to regard 
the Sovereign and the House of Commons as delegates, 
                                                            
860 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.64.  
861 ibid. ,  at para.187.  
862 ibid. ,  at para.25.  
863 ibid. .  
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when they themselves constituted two of the 
delegators.”864 
Commencing from the latter suggestion, it is essential 
to highlight that there is, in truth, nothing absurd 
about a sovereign Parliament acting as a parent body 
and delegating power to some of its constituent parts 
or, even, to itself as a whole for particular purposes, as 
long as such intention is articulately expressed. Indeed, 
deferring to any different view would be tantamount to 
accepting the subtraction of at least one power from 
that sovereign legislature’s arsenal. Further, as a 
matter of practice, Parliament frequently delegates 
authority to its constituent parts; for instance, to the 
Crown, exercisable by Order in Council, to Ministers of 
the Crown (that is, predominantly, Members of either 
House of Parliament) exercisable by Statutory 
Instrument, and to the House of Commons, under the 
Provisional Collection of Taxes Act 1913. Clearly, 
however, the fallaciousness of Lord Carswell’s 
suggestion is not critical; the mere fact that Parliament 
can delegate powers to its constituent parts does not 
mean that it actually did so in enacting the 1911 Act.  
                                                            
864 ibid. ,  at para.173.  
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The penultimate proposition which is referred to above 
is, similarly, not dispositive of the delegation argument 
but is, yet again, misconceived. Although the argument 
that the 1911 Act restricted the powers of the Upper 
House rather than empowered the Commons and Crown 
may, indeed, forcefully draw from the historical context 
of the statute’s enactment, from its Preamble that 
provides that ‘it is expedient to make … provision … for 
restricting the existing powers of the House of Lords’,  
as well as from the sidenote to s.2 that reads 
‘ [r]estriction of the powers of the House of Lords as to 
Bills other than Money Bills’, conceiving of the pre -1911 
powers of the Lords as an ‘absolute veto’ that was, for 
certain purposes, reduced to a mere “suspensory veto” 865 
in 1911 is a misleading underestimation of the Upper 
House’s powers.866 In truth, the separate elements of a 
                                                            
865 Samuels, 2003, at p.237.  
866 This erroneous understanding of the House of Lords’ powers 
in law possibly owes its existence to Bagehot or, rather more 
correctly, to those that read Bagehot’s ‘The English 
Constitution’ as a legal treatise. Indeed, Bagehot, writing in 
1873 from his unique perspective, proposed:  
Since the … [Representation of the People Act 
1867] … the House of Lords has become a revising 
and suspending House… The House has ceased to 
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composite body authorised to take decisions by 
unanimity have an equal share in this decision -making 
process which they discharge by proposing, amending, 
consenting and rejecting. “In formal theory”,867 as a 
1998 House of Commons Research Paper correctly 
underlines, in the case of disagreements between the 
two Houses over items of legislation, “the House of 
Commons is just as much in disagreement with the 
House of Lords as the House of Lords is with the House 
of Commons.”868 Therefore, if one insists on utilising 
confrontational language, the natural conclusion of such 
reasoning is that all three composite parts of 
Parliament possess veto powers. 869 If such conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                       
be one of latent directors, and has become one of 
temporary rejectors and palpable altere rs. 
(Bagehot, 1873, at pp.163-164).  
867 Winetrobe, 1998, at p.27.  
868 ibid. .  
869 Although Tomkins commits the same conceptualisation 
mistake in his proposition that the Queen has a “unique veto 
over all legislation” (Tomkins, 2002, at p.744), he is correct in 
suggesting that the Crown is entitled to withhold assent to a 
Bill .  Although the last to refuse a Bill  in modern times was 
Queen Anne in 1708, most preceding monarchs did so regularly 
and several succeeding monarchs, such as George V, seriously 
contemplated the possibility. “The King’s negative to Bills”,  
Dicey in his letter to The Times  dated September 15 t h  1913 
approvingly quotes Burke (Burke, 2013 [1777], at p.38) as 
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misrepresents the constructive, positive work that 
Parliament is tasked with carrying out (as it certainly 
does), then, for good measure, the idea that the Lords 
alone have an, ‘absolute’ or ‘suspensory’, veto power 
(with the Commons, presumably, legislating and the 
Crown rubber stamping) is a blatant distortion of the 
tripartite enterprise that composes Parliament. As 
Ekins brilliantly puts it:  
[T]he term veto wrongly suggests that the 
Queen and Commons … legislate and the 
Lords choose whether or not to exercise their 
veto… The 1911 Act may modify this 
situation, but it does so by enabling 
Parliament to act without the assent of the 
Lords, not by removing a veto that does not 
exist. An Act that purports to preclude the 
Commons and the Lords from vetoing 
legislation does not permit the Queen to 
enact Acts of Parliament alone, for it is not 
the case that but for the veto of the 
Commons or Lords the Queen would be free 
to legislate.870 
If, then, neither the idea that each composite element of 
Parliament has a veto power nor, a fortiori ,  the idea 
                                                                                                                                                       
submitting, “is one of the most undisputed of the Royal 
prerogatives, and it extends to al l  cases whatsoever.”  
870 Ekins, 2007, at p.96.  
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that the Commons legislate and the Lords veto aptly 
describe the UK Parliamentary system, how should one 
proceed to characterise the effect of the 1911 Act? It is 
submitted that the distinction between ‘empowerment’ 
and ‘restriction’ must be adjudged according to the 
mandate of the body in question; that is, the authority 
of legislating, not the privilege of disagreeing. Under 
this rubric, the powers of the Lords were not restricted 
in 1911, for their authority to take part in the 
legislative process remains fully in tact. 871 Equally, 
however, the powers of the Commons and Crown were 
not enhanced, for they are not empowered to legislate 
without the Lords or to assent to legislation on their 
behalf: indeed, in contradistinction to the pos ition 
ensuing following the repeal of empowering 
legislation,872 the validity of the statutes enacted under 
the Parliament Acts would not be open to challenge if 
                                                            
871 Lord Hope was of the view that the 1911 Act “has l imited 
the power of the House of Lords to legislate” ([2005] UKHL 56, 
SESSION 2005-06, at para.113) but that is, with respect,  
incorrect. Firstly, the Lords never possessed the power to 
legislate but, merely, a right and duty to take part in the 
legislative process. Secondly, such right and duty remains 
unaffected by the 1911 Act.  
872 See e.g. :  Wiseman v Canterbury  [1983] 2 AC 685, 687.  
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such 1911 and 1949 Acts were to be repealed. The 
dichotomy is, thus, a demonstrable falsehood and, as 
such, can neither assist nor hinder the correctness of 
the delegation argument. The fact that the court in 
Jackson  thought otherwise is, correspondingly, 
inconsequential.  
The genuinely forceful refutation of the delegation 
argument is encapsulated in the first and second 
propositions referred to above which correctly submit 
that the intention of Parliament in enacting the 1911 
Act, as exemplified both by its context as well as, 
crucially, by the language employed, was for Public 
Bills properly undergoing the procedure instituted by 
s.2 to become Acts of Parliament and to be treated as 
such by the courts.  
The matter can be put differently to accentuate how the 
orthodox sovereignty doctrine is here at stake. First, 
suppose Parliament in 1911 intended for Public Bills 
enacted under the terms of s.2 of the 1911 Act to 
become primary legislation. What more could it have 
done than expressly specify that any such Public Bill 
will ‘become an Act of Parliament’? By necessity, 
proponents of the delegation argument are ultimately 
obliged to concede that there is nothing Parliament can 
do to give effect to such an intention: a grant of 
legislative authority will always be, at most, authority 
to produce delegated, subordinate or secondary 
legislation. Wade, for instance, implicitly subscribed to 
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such view insofar as he considered the rules governing 
Parliament’s legislative powers as grounded on 
‘political fact’873 and, therefore, changeable only by the 
courts or, more appropriately, by a consensus amongst 
the state’s  senior officials. In truth, however, a body 
that is considered as having sovereign power cannot be 
denied – as the delegation argument implicitly proposes 
–  the right to devise a conditional framework, like the 
one in s.2 of the 1911 Act. As for Wade’s reasoning, the 
flaw is located in his assumption that the UK’s 
‘ultimate rule ’874 encompasses prescriptions as to how 
Parliament must exercise its authority whereas, in 
truth, at its most fundamental level, it merely includes 
Parliament’s unlimited legislative  authority: the UK’s 
‘ultimate rule ’ is ‘what Parliament enacts is law’, 875 not 
‘Parliament may enact laws by the tripartite indenture 
of Commons, Lords and Crown’; differently put, the UK 
                                                            
873 See: Wade, 1955, at pp.188-189. 
874 The neutral term ‘ultimate rule’  borrows from established 
l iterature merely the idea of accepting (or presupposing) that 
at the heart of every legal system lies a basic norm without 
being burdened with the baggage of metaphysical concepts 
such as Kelsen’s ‘Grundnorm ’  or Hart’s ‘rule of recognition’.   
875 This proposition, of course, leads to the question ‘what is 
Parliament’ which will  be dealt with below.  
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Constitution defines ‘sovereignty’, not ‘the sovereign’. 876 
Therefore, rules addressing the circumstances under 
which the courts should acknowledge Parliament as 
having acted for the purpose of enacting Acts of 
Parliament are freely amendable by Parliament itself; 877 
it is only the cornerstone principle of Parliamen t’s 
sovereignty that, by virtue of acting as the UK’s 
‘ultimate rule ’, is unilaterally unamendable by a 
subdivision of the state’s officials. It may incidentally 
be noted that this conclusion constitutes the main the 
reason why Parliament (a mere segment o f the UK’s 
officials) ‘cannot’878 unilaterally abdicate its authority, 
as well as why the courts (another such segment) may 
not unilaterally decide to cease obeying Parliament’s 
sovereign will.  
                                                            
876 By analogy, and contradistinction, to Beinart’s phrase that 
the South Africa Act 1909 defined “the sovereign, not 
sovereignty” in South Africa: Beinart, 1954, at pp.136 -137. 
877 See: Griffith and Ryle,  2003, at pp.250 -256. 
878 As earlier seen, the better formulation of this veritable 
principle is that the present incarnation of Parliament can  do 
so but future incarnations are free to renounce such 
abdication.  
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Secondly, suppose that Parliament intended that Public 
Bills amending s.2 could be enacted through s.2 itself. 
What more could it have done than reject all proposed 
amendments that were moved to the opposite effect 879 
and unconditionally provide that s.2 will apply to ‘any 
Public Bill (other than a Money Bill or a Bill c ontaining 
any provision to extend the maximum duration of 
Parliament beyond five years)’? Sir Sydney for the 
claimants in Jackson  is reported as submitting that:  
                                                            
879 To be fair, Lord Carswell,  relying on Viscountess Rhondda’s 
Claim [1922] 2 AC 339, 383, was unconvinced that it would be 
correct “for the court to draw conclusions from such elements 
of the Parliamentary history of the legislation as the proposal 
and rejection of amendments” ([2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 
2005-06, at para.172).  Bennion, for his part,  advocates  that 
the rule in [1922] 2 AC 339 has been subsequently relaxed by 
Pepper v Hart  ([1993] AC 593), a view to which the majority of 
their Lordships in Jackson appeared to subscribe (Bennion, 
2002, at pp.541-542). Another argument against placing 
excessive emphasis on the particular amendments rejected 
during the passage of the Parliament Bill  1911 is provided by 
Banner and Boutle,  who contend that such rejections “should 
anyhow be assessed in the context of the then -government’s 
rejection en bloc  of almost all  alterations to the Parliament 
Bill on the ground that the Bill had been put before the voters 
at the previous general election” (Banner and Boutle, 2004, at 
p.1467).  
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because the Act … does not expressly provide 
for its own amendment … the [s.2] procedure 
cannot be used for that purpose.880  
Counsel can, in essence, be seen as urging the court to 
adjudge ineffective the 1911 Parliament’s attempt to 
give effect to its intention that s.2 should be open to 
self-amendment despite the fact that the broadest 
expression –  short of express provision – available to 
that effect was employed! To do so, according to Sir 
Sydney, Parliament would have to follow a specified 
‘manner and form’ in its legislative attempt: namely, to 
utilise express words providing for self -amendment. The 
court was, therefore, upholding Parliament’s 
continuously sovereign law-making ability when 
correctly rejecting the submission and adjudging that 
s.2 can be validly utilised (as in 1949) for the purposes 
of self-amendment. 
Although the court was, therefore, on secure ground 
when dismissing the delegation thesis as well as the bar 
on self-amendment of s.2 it sought to place, the judges 
would have been entitled to go a step further and, more 
broadly, question the relevance of such thesis with 
respect to the issues at hand. Earlier, it will be 
                                                            
880 [2005] EWHC 94 (Admin), at para.27.  
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remembered, three propositions were cited in support of 
the contention that conceding to the delegation thesis 
is, in all likelihood, fatal for the validity of the 1949 
Act. First, the principle that delegated legi slation will 
be interpreted narrowly was noted. It is submitted, 
however, that no interpretation, no matter how strict, 
can rob expressions such as ‘any Public Bill ’ and ‘shall 
… become an Act of Parliament’ from their meaning, 
especially when utilised by the sovereign Parliament 
itself. Secondly, it was said, a delegate cannot – 
following the legendary Baron Münchhausen – perform 
an act of levitation and lift  itself above its powers by 
tugging on its own bootstraps unless ‘assisted’ (that is, 
in legal terms, authorised) by the parent body. In point 
of fact, however, even if the introduction into UK 
constitutional law of the delegatus non potest delegare  
maxim is not “inappropriate”, 881 as Marshall thought, 
such authorisation need not take the form of a Henry 
VIII clause; it may, equally, be exemplified through 
words rendering such an implication irresistible. 
Indeed, with respect to the Parliament Act 1911 itself, 
it appears that Wade, towards the dusk of his career, if 
not earlier, held the view that, despite  the fact that 
enactments created under the s.2 procedure were 
                                                            
881 Marshall,  1971, at p.116.  
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delegated legislation, the 1949 self -amendment of such 
procedure was intra vires .882 Finally, the contention 
that delegated legislation is amenable to judicial review 
was adduced. Nevertheless, in actu , once again, the 
point is misconceived. Indeed, Prerogative Orders in 
Council are subject to judicial review 883 despite the fact 
that they are considered primary legislation. 884 Similar 
considerations apply to Acts of the Scottish Parliament 
that have been considered by several authors 885 as being 
primary legislation.886 Contrariwise, statutory ouster 
clauses may preclude judicial review of delegated 
legislation. In other words, as Barber and Young have 
correctly proposed: 
                                                            
882 See: [2005] EWCA Civ 126, at para.37.  
883 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and 
Commonwealth Affairs (No 2)  [2009] 1 AC 453, 484-485.  
884 See e.g. :  HRA, s.21(1); Bennion, 2002, at p.194.  
885 Scotland Act 1998, s.28(1);  Burrows, 2000, at pp.55 -65, 74-
79, 87-90; Hadfield, 2000. C.f.  Wade and Forsyth, 2004, at 
p.858; HRA, s.21(1); Baer, 2002; AXA General Insurance Ltd v 
The Lord Advocate  [2012] HRLR 3.  
886 See also: Church of England Assembly (Powers) Act 1919.  
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[t]he gap between primary and secondary 
legislation is not as wide as might first be 
thought: even if a sharp definitional line can 
be found, the normative consequences of the 
division should not be overstated. 887 
Thus, advancing, like the claimants in Jackson , the 
delegation argument to evince that s.2 is not open to 
self-amendment is both deceptive and wasteful, for 
neither would its acceptance mean that the Parliament 
Act 1949 is automatically invalid nor would its rejection 
be tantamount to a judicial seal of approval of the 1949 
statute. Indeed, in the occasion, the court, despite 
refuting the delegation argument and proceeding to 
uphold the validity of the Parliament Act 1949, claimed, 
as will now be discussed, to have jurisdiction to ensure 
that the primary  legislation professedly created under 
s.2 complies with the restrictions laid down in the 1911 
Act.  
 
                                                            
887 Barber and Young, 2003, at p.118.  
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The effect of the Parliament Act 
1911 
 
It was earlier noted that consensus was reached 
amongst the judges in Jackson , and correctly so, 
regarding what the 1911 Act’s effect is  not: a delegation 
of power to the Commons and Crown. By contrast, those 
perusing the voluminous judgements for a positive 
answer as to what the 1911 Act’s effect actually is will 
not be as fortunate since at least two divergent 
interpretations were proposed: the ‘alternative 
procedure’ and the ‘reconstitution’ thesis.  
 
‘Alternative procedure’ thesis 
The ‘alternative procedure’ thesis is best explained by 
its prime proponent in Jackson , Lord Nicholls:  
[I]n enacting section 2 the intention of 
Parliament was to create a second, parallel 
route by which, with the stated exceptions … 
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any public Bill introduced in the Commons 
could become law as an Act of Parliament. 888 
From 1911 onwards, therefore, it is said, two routes for 
the creation of Acts of Parliament have been in 
existence: the ‘traditional’ route requiring the consent 
of the Queen-in-Parliament and the ‘alternative’ route 
requiring the consent of the Commons and Crown in 
accordance with the procedure laid down in s.2(1). The 
Parliament Act 1949, for its part, was validly enacted 
via (and incidentally also amended) the latter, 
‘alternative’ route of legislating.  
Appealing as it may seem, at least two crippling 
objections may be proposed against such thesis. The 
first is vigorously advanced by Forsyth when asking:  
[I]f it were possible to amend one part of 
section 2(1), using the ‘parallel route’ (as 
was done in the 1949 amendment), why 
should it not be possible to amend other 
parts of it by that route? And, if that were 
possible, why should one bill not remove the 
restriction on legislating to extend the life of 
Parliament, allowing another bill to follow 
                                                            
888 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.64.  
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hard on its heels to extend the life of 
Parliament!889 
There can, indeed, be no convincing answer to such 
reasoning. Thus, with respect, it is unfounded – as 
Lords Nicholls, Hope and Rodger appeared at variable 
extents to do and as academics, such as Goldsworthy, 890 
have proposed – to accept the ‘alternative procedure ’ 
thesis and proceed, in the same breath, to express 
doubts as to whether such ‘procedure’ could be utilised 
to remove the foreclosure regarding the extension of 
Parliament’s life contained in the parenthesis following 
s.2’s ‘any Public Bill ’ stipulation. The only coherent 
approach amongst their Lordships, in this respect, was 
the one espoused by Lord Bingham who contended that:  
[o]nce it is accepted … that an Act passed 
pursuant to the procedures in section 2(1) … 
is in every sense an Act of Parliament … I  
see no basis … for holding that the 
parenthesis in … [s.2(1)], or for that 
                                                            
889 Forsyth, 2011, at p.136.  
890 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at pp.177-178; Goldsworthy, 2013, at 
p.63. 
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matter section 7, are unamendable save with 
the consent of the Lords.891 
However, respectfully, and its coherence 
notwithstanding, the Senior Law Lord’s proposal is 
equally unacceptable with the ones advanced by his 
fellow judges in the House of Lords, albeit for a 
different reason: namely, because it fails to give the 
appropriate weight to the express restrictions contained 
in the 1911 Act that concern the use of s.2;  that is, the 
declared restrictions against its employment in 
extending the life of Parliament beyond 5 years (s.2(1)), 
in enacting a Bill for confirming a Provisional Order 
(s.5), in enacting a Money Bill (s.2(1)), and in enacting 
a Bill other than a Public Bill (s.2(1)). Indeed, in Lord 
Bingham’s view, the intention of Parliament as laid 
down, for instance, in the expression ‘any Public Bill 
(other than … a Bill containing any provision to extend 
the maximum duration of Parliament beyond five years)’ 
must be understood as merely disallowing the use of the 
s.2 procedure in extending Parliament’s life in one step: 
a statute enacted under s.2 to remove such restriction 
followed by a statute, enacted under the amended s.2, to 
extend Parliament’s life would both  be valid. 
                                                            
891 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.32.  
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Notwithstanding the fact that, as Twomey notes, 892 
Australian authorities, if asked, may take a different 
view on the matter, in the UK that is far from a faithful 
interpretation of the sovereign Parliament’s express 
intention. As Lord Nicholls correctly argued:  
[t]his implied  restriction [of amending s.2(1) 
to remove the express restriction against 
extending Parliament’s life] is necessary in 
order to render the express  restriction 
effectual. It is ancillary to the express 
exclusion.893  
To put it differently, one must remember the passage of 
the Parliament Bill 1911 during which the House of 
Lords attempted to insert words after ‘other than a 
Money Bill’  in s.2(1) such as “or a Bill containing any 
provisions to extend the maximum duration of 
Parliament beyond five years”894 (which was ultimately 
the sole successful such attempt), “or a Bill to establish 
                                                            
892 Twomey, 2007, at p.6.  
893 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.61 [emphasis in 
original].  
894 HL Debs, 1911, 3 r d  July, vol.9,  cols.6-12 (Lord Avebury).  
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a separate Parliament and Executive for Ireland”, 895 “or 
[a] Bill for modifying this Act” 896 and “or a Bill which 
contains any provision which affects the  Constitution of 
the House of Lords.”897 Would it not be paradoxical, 
indeed highly artificial, for one to conclude that the 
tempestuous debate revolving around such amendments 
and ultimately forcing the Government formally to ask 
the King to proceed, if need be, to a ‘large and prompt’ 
creation of peers in order to secure the Bill’s passage, 
was (and, more importantly, was intended by 
Parliament to be) merely about whether the procedure 
could be utilised to enact a statute in one or two steps?  
In UK jurisprudence, there is arguably room only for an 
affirmative answer to such question but it is useful to 
remark that, by contrast, in Australia a negative 
answer could also be contemplated. Indeed, for 
Australian authorities, the only amendment that would 
be effective in rendering such debate about anything 
                                                            
895 HC Debs, 1911, 24 t h  April,  vol.24, col.1372-1378 (John 
Lonsdale MP).  
896 ibid. ,  col.1469-1472 (Sir Philip Magnus MP).  
897 ibid. ,  cols.1507-1512 (Dr Alfred Hillier MP).  
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above and beyond the repeal by one or two steps 898 
would be an amendment along the following lines: ‘a 
Bill for modifying this Act’ or ‘a Bill for removing the 
restriction in s.2(1)’. But, in the UK, thus requir ing 
from Parliament would be synonymous with placing 
upon it a ‘manner and form’ requirement to utilise 
express words so as to give effect to an otherwise 
conspicuous intention and is, consequently, 
inadmissible.  
                                                            
898 Or more correctly,  rendering such debate about anything 
above and beyond repeal by the ‘simple’,  customary law -
making process. To explain, in Australia, laws that are doubly 
entrenched may not be repealed whilst laws that are singly 
entrenched or are not entrenched at all ,  may be repealed in 
one step. As Twomey reveals:  
In the absence of double entrenchment … a later 
law would impliedly amend or repeal the 
purported manner and form constraint. There 
would be no need to complete this exercise in two 
stages,  as passage of the Bill  in contravention of 
the purported manner and form constraint would 
be regarded as effective in both removing that 
constraint and making the substantive 
amendment.  
(Twomey, 2007, at p.6, references omitted).   
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It is also of paramount importance to highlight that the 
conclusion herein reached that castigates the 
‘alternative procedure’ thesis for the direct consequence 
flowing therefrom and relating to the professed ability 
to remove the restriction of s.2(1) utilising the so -called 
‘alternative procedure’ of law-making, is in no sense 
whatsoever related, as several of their Lordships tacitly 
suggested, with the fact that such restriction happens 
to be of “major”899 or “fundamental constitutional 
importance”,900 relates to the House of Common’s 
“accountability to the electorate”,901 reinforces “the 
democratic element”902 of the UK Parliamentary system 
and its removal would be “politically unreasonable”. 903 
Indeed, precisely the same conclusion would have been 
reached should the declared restriction in the use of the  
s.2 procedure related to as constitutionally minor an 
issue as the repeal of the Dentists Act 1878.  
                                                            
899 [2006] 1 AC, 262, 290.  
900 ibid. ,  313. 
901 ibid. ,  290. 
902 ibid. ,  317. 
903 ibid. ,  326. 
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The second reason for which the ‘alternative procedure’ 
thesis is unacceptable under the UK’s current 
constitutional paradigm is its assumption that there  are 
two methods of legislating: one by Parliament and one 
by the Commons and Crown as established in the 1911 
Act. For instance, Lord Hope opines that:  
[t]he House of Commons, acting alone, has 
no inherent power to legislate. The only 
power which it has to legislate on its own is 
that described in section 2(1).904 
But that cannot be right. It is Parliament, and 
Parliament alone, that is entrusted by the UK 
Constitution to make laws for the Realm. None of its 
constituent parts, or any combination thereof, have any 
power – inherent or derived – to legislate. Their only 
right and duty, in this respect, is to take part in the 
legislative process. This basic fact, far from being 
challenged by the 1911 Act, was therein confirmed, for 
the Lords firmly retained their integral part in the 
legislative process. Their consent  may, admittedly, no 
longer be required for the passage of certain species of 
legislation (which, tellingly, become, as per  s.2(1), Acts 
of Parliament , and the granting of the Royal Assent to 
                                                            
904 ibid. ,  307. 
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which is always declared in the House of Lords), 905 but 
their presence and action  (or inaction) is still very much 
necessary as the requirement that a Public Bill under 
s.2(1) must be rejected in each of the two successive 
sessions that it has been sent to the Lords following its 
passage by the Commons exemplifies. In short, it makes 
no more sense to suggest that, merely because its 
consent is not required, the House of Lords has been 
removed or is being bypassed or supplanted, even if 
only for certain purposes, than to propose that when a 
Bill is enacted by Parliament with the customary 
tripartite consent it is, in truth, not the Queen by and 
with the advice and consent of the Lords and  Commons 
that legislates but, rather, the Queen by and with the 
advice of the two discrete majorities  thereof! Hence, the 
idea of an ‘alternative procedure’ whereby the Commons 
and Crown alone legislate is unfounded both 
normatively and descriptively.  
 
 
 
                                                            
905 May, 2004, at p.653.  
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‘Reconstitution’ thesis 
The latter thesis, having the forceful academic support 
of Forsyth906 and Bennion,907 as well as having been 
espoused by Maurice Kay LJ in the Administrative 
Court908 and several of their Lordships in the House of 
Lords,909 interprets the 1911 Act as a successful attempt 
by Parliament to reconstitute itself in respect of 
legislation passed under its terms. “Once the necessity 
of defining Parliament is recognized”, 910 says Forsyth, 
the following interpretation of the 1911 Act’s  effect can 
be deduced: 
Parliament for all purposes, including 
extending the life of Parliament, is a 
bicameral body … ; however, it may also 
legislate unicamerally (by the Commons 
                                                            
906 Forsyth, 2011.  
907 Bennion, 2004, at pp.931-932. 
908 [2005] EWHC 94 (Admin), at para.24.  
909 Lord Steyn [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005 -06, at paras.80-
95), Lord Brown ( ibid. ,  at paras.184-191) and Baroness Hale 
(ibid. ,  at paras.158-161).  
910 Forsyth, 2011, at p.140 [reference omitted].  
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alone), where the preconditions of section 2 
… are fulfilled for all purposes, except 
extending the life of Parliament .911 
The thesis’s intrinsic value lies with its ability to 
respond effectively to both criticisms levelled against 
the ‘alternative procedure’ interpretation of the 1911 
Act’s effect. For one, the removal of the res trictions 
placed on the utilisation of the s.2 procedure is 
unsanctioned: ‘Parliament’, sitting unicamerally in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1911 Act, is, by  
definition, required to fulfil  the conditions laid down 
therein in order to legislate and, therefore, unicameral 
legislation extending the life of Parliament would not 
be considered a valid expression of Parliament’s will. 
Secondly, the difficulty of assuming that the Commons 
and Crown legislate is avoided: it is always ‘Parliament’ 
that enacts statutes, albeit composed differently on 
different occasions. Moreover, the fundamental insight 
that Parliament may reconstitute, remodel or redefine 
itself finds support in Centlivres’s dictum  in Harris 
No.1 .912 
                                                            
911 ibid.  [emphasis in original,  reference omitted].  
912 1952 (2) SA 428, 463.  
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Notwithstanding the above, the ‘reconstitution’ thesis is 
not itself unproblematic. To explain, one must 
commence by the logical assumption that a sovereign 
Parliament, such as the one situated at the apex of the 
UK Constitution, can, ex vi termini ,  do anything, 
including its re-definition, for specified purposes, into a 
non-sovereign body. However, thus proposing leads to 
one of two unwarranted conclusions. Indeed, it follows 
from the fact that –  as proposed supra  –  the present 
incarnation of Parliament, being sovereign, can do 
anything, including unbinding itself from its 
predecessors, that the reconstituted ‘Parliament’ may 
free itself from its shackles. But such conclusion is 
unsatisfactory, for it commits one of the very flaws of 
the ‘alternative procedure’ thesis which it was designed 
to cure: namely, that it is not consonant with 
Parliament’s intention to treat the s.2(1) restriction 
relating to the extension of Parliament’s life as being 
worthless. Surely, then, the second conclusion must be 
true: the reconstituted ‘Parliament’ cannot unilaterally 
unbind itself from the restrictions placed upon it by the 
1911 Act. However, if such conclusion is true, there can 
be no answer to Young’s proposition that s.2(1):  
is entrenched. It binds future Parliaments. 
Parliaments wishing to overturn its 
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provisions can only do so by adopting a 
specific manner and form…913  
In other words, concluding that the reconstituted 
‘Parliament’ cannot unilaterally unbind itself, one is by 
definition conceding the existence of at least one non-
sovereign ‘Parliament’ that must observe a particular 
‘manner and form’ in its legislative endeavours in order 
to enact valid statutes, which is itself an absurd 
observation that, as Banner and Boutle correctly note, 
“robs the notion that Parliament cannot bind its 
successors of any efficacy or content.” 914  
Admittedly, one may validly respond that such 
concession is excusable in view of the fact that, 
empirically, Parliament’s supreme legislative capacity 
remains intact as such reconstituted, non-sovereign 
‘Parliament’ exists side -by-side with the traditional, 
sovereign Parliament comprised of the Commons, Lords 
and Queen. Normatively, however, it is, indeed, absurd 
as the following hypothetical example illustrates. Let it 
be assumed that Parliament enacts the Parliament Act 
                                                            
913 Young, 2006, at p.194. See also: Elliott, 2007, at pp.374 -
375. 
914 Banner and Boutle, 2004, at p.1466.  
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2017, a statute that is similar to the 1911 Act in that it 
professedly attempts to remodel Parliament. Let it 
further be assumed that such remodeling is grounded 
upon a statutory provision, equivalent to the one 
contained in the South Africa Act 1909, albeit 
embracing not merely disenfranchisement laws but 
rather all  types of legislative outcomes in the following 
manner: 
No Bill shall be presented to Her Majesty 
and become an Act of Parliament on the 
Royal Assent being signified thereto, unless 
passed by both Houses of Parliament sitting 
together, and at the third reading be agreed 
to by not less than two-thirds of the total 
number of members of both Houses.  
Since it has been assumed that the courts have accepted 
Parliament’s alleged reconstitution for some  purposes 
under the 1911 Act, there is no valid reason why they 
would correspondingly not sanction an attempted 
remodeling for all  purposes under the Parliament Act 
2017. Furthermore, since it has been assumed that the 
reconstituted Parliament under the 1911 Act cannot 
unilaterally free itself from the restrictions placed upon 
it by such Act, there is no valid reason to assume that 
the reconstituted Parliament under the 2017 Act will be 
able to do otherwise. The disquieting conclusion is that 
the Parliament of 2017 has not only successfully bound 
its successors (as, being sovereign, it may well do  in the 
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political sense analysed above as well as in the more 
strictly legal way to be discussed subsequently ) but, 
further, that future Parliaments cannot unbind 
themselves (as they would have been able to do if, in 
tandem with the dictates of the orthodox doctrine, they 
remained sovereign). Can it seriously be contended that 
the courts would not uphold a hypothetical Parliament 
Act (Repeal) Act 2017 enacted with the consent of the 
customary triumvirate? 
The only possible arrest of such line of reasoning, on 
the part of proponents of the ‘reconstitution’ thesis, 
may originate in the distinction between presumably 
effective legislative procedures that have a ‘downwards’ 
vector and presumably ineffective procedures than have 
an ‘upwards’ one or, to put it differently, procedures 
that validly make it easier for Parliament to legislate 
and those that unsuccessfully attempt to make it more 
demanding, respectively.915 Although, conceptually, the 
distinction is very much real, it is doubtful whether it 
can be invoked by advocates of the ‘reconstitution’ 
thesis, for the distinction emphasises the ability of 
Parliament to legislate whereas the ‘reconstitution’ 
thesis focuses on the question ‘what is Parliament’. To 
                                                            
915 See e.g. :  Munro, 1999, at p.164; Chander, 1991 -1992, at 
pp.466-467. 
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explain, whereas, on familiar principles of statutory 
construction, it may logically be concluded that the 
1911 Act made it easier for Parliament to legislate 
(insofar as it provided an additional way in which 
Parliament will be considered as having acted), under 
‘reconstitution’ principles the conclusion must be 
different: namely, that the said Act’s effect was to make 
it harder for Parliament (at least as reconstituted) to 
legislate since, as originally constituted, it could 
legislate on any topic whatsoever whereas as remodeled 
for the purposes of the 1911 Act it may legislate only on 
a restricted range of topics and only by following a 
particular procedure. In other words, by treating the 
1911 Act as having effected a redefinition of 
Parliament, the reconstitution thesis sanctions 
alterations of the legislative procedure with an 
‘upwards’ vector and is therefore barred from later 
invoking the upwards/downwards distinction to explain 
away the effect of a hypothetical redefinition of 
Parliament for all purposes.  
As for Harris No.1 , the support it lends to the 
‘reconstitution’ thesis must, in the final analysis, yield 
to the extant differences between the UK and the pre -
Republican constitutional arrangement of South Africa. 
For one, the antithesis between the ‘uncontrolled’ UK 
Constitution and the Union of South Africa’s ‘controlled’ 
or ‘entrenched’ Constitution – or, according to the 
classification earlier devised, between a type I 
(sovereign) legislature and a type IV (partly non-
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sovereign) legislature – must be accentuated. Such 
differentiation, apart from being of regnant importance 
in its own right, has a special role to play vis-à-vis  the 
‘reconstitution’ thesis. More specifically, both the 
unicameral and the b icameral ‘Parliament’ of South 
Africa, that were adjudged in Harris No.1  as being in 
existence, were established by the South Africa Act 
1909 –916 that is, the Imperial statute that, as earlier 
noted, must be understood as a Constitution for the 
newly-born nation –  whilst in the UK, no statute has 
vested Parliament with unlimited power or prescribes 
legal rules as to when it must be understood as having 
acted and what its composition must be for different 
purposes. The asymmetry is undoubtedly important for 
in South Africa the 1909 Act defines “the sovereign, not 
sovereignty”,917 whereas, in the UK, the ‘ultimate rule ’  
points at the locus  of sovereignty, not the sovereign and 
the rules that it utilises to legislate: as earlier 
discussed, the ‘ultimate rule ’ at the heart of the UK 
Constitution is ‘what Parliament enacts is law’, not 
‘Parliament may enact laws by the tripartite indenture 
of Commons, Lords and Crown’ . Secondly it will be 
remembered that it was common ground in Harris No.1  
                                                            
916 In particular, s.19 and s.59.  
917 Beinart, 1954, at pp.136-137. 
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that should it have been proven that the respondents 
were correct in portraying the Statute of Westminster 
1931 as having rendered the Union Parliament an exact 
replica of the UK Parliament, the reconstitution thesis 
would have been rejected and the case would have gone 
in the opposite direction!  
 
‘Intra-Parliamentary decision-making 
agreement’ thesis 
Granted that both theses proposed in Jackson  are 
flawed, the vital quest for finding an overarching theory 
that reflects the 1911 Act’s genuine effect must persist. 
The interpretation herein proposed may be termed the 
‘intra-Parliamentary decision-making agreement 
thesis’. Despite its unintendedly complex title, such 
thesis may uncomplicatedly be summarised in the 
following manner: the 1911 Act neither reconstitutes 
Parliament nor lays down an alternative procedure 
through which legislation may be enacted but, rather, 
addresses how Parliament may act .  
For one, such thesis does not make the mistake of 
assuming, like the ‘alternative procedure’ thesis, that 
the 1911 Act impaired the House of Lords’ integral role 
in the legislative process or authorised the Commons 
and Crown alone to legislate alongside  Parliament. 
Indeed, as the thesis herein advanced conceives of the 
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1911 Act as a mere intra-Parliamentary agreement on 
the circumstances under which the courts should 
acknowledge Parliament as having acted, it is always 
the body entrusted by the UK Consti tution to legislate 
that does so: namely, Parliament.  
Moreover, the ‘Parliament’ that always acts (either 
customarily by the positive action of the triumvirate of 
Commons, Lords and Crown, as recognised, but not 
established,918 in The Prince’s Case ,  or under the 
circumstances agreed upon in 1911 and providing that 
Parliament may also act by the positive action of 
Commons and Crown and the negative action or inaction 
of the Lords) is the Queen-in-Parliament, not some 
reconstituted version thereof and, therefore, the 
problem of having to concede – like the ‘reconstitution’ 
thesis has to – the existence of at least one non-
sovereign manifestation of Parliament is avoided.  
Indeed, insofar as the foreclosure of the extension of 
Parliament’s life enshrined in s.2(1), the thesis herein 
adduced avoids being caught between the ‘Scylla’ of 
                                                            
918 Indeed, the fundamental truth of the fact that Parliament 
acts when its three composite elements agree rests upon 
custom, has not been laid down by the courts and cannot, 
therefore, thuswise, unilaterally, be changed by them.  
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erroneously conceding that because the so -called 
‘alternative procedure’ may be used to enact primary 
legislation it can also be used to remove the said 
restriction and the ‘Charybdis’ of being forced – in order 
to guard the restriction from its removal by the very 
procedure it was intended to restrict – to accept that 
Parliament has attempted and succeeded in 
reconstituting itself but, in the process, has also bound 
its reconstituted self in respect of certain matters. 919  
                                                            
919 In an attempt to clarify the above, the example of Jules 
Vernes’s legendary ‘Nautilus’  submarine may be emp loyed, 
aboard which, in the absence of any explicit decision -making 
procedure agreed between crew members or imposed by 
external superior authority, decisions for the launch of 
missiles are customarily made when Captain Nemo, the 
Commander and the Lieutenant agree. In such case, the 
‘Nautilus’ has unlimited power to launch missiles against any 
target. Let it now be assumed that the naval troika agrees and 
informs the crew that, henceforth, missiles may also be 
launched by ‘Nautilus’ against any target, apar t from the 
White House, upon the agreement of Nemo and his 
Commander. How would the crew (that is, by analogy, the 
state’s officials) interpret such agreement? The ‘ intra-
Parliamentary decision-making agreement’  thesis proposes 
that,  upon the announcement of such agreement, the crew will  
proceed to set up a computer software that allows missile 
launching when all three launch keys (that are promptly 
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attached to a launching board and access to which is given 
only to Nemo, the Commander and the Lieutenant 
individually) are simultaneously turned to the right or –  
provided that the target is not at 38° N, 77° W (that is,  the 
coordinates of the White House) –  when the keys of Nemo and 
his Commander are simultaneously turned to the right and the 
Lieutenant’s key is either turned to the left or has not been 
turned at all one minute after the two first keys have been 
turned. The decision is fully honoured and given effect to 
because the ‘Nautilus’  retains its autonomy in selecting 
targets to launch missiles, the Lieutenant retains his role in 
the submarine’s decision -making process (as his key, whether 
turned to the left,  turned to the right or unturned, must 
always remain on the launching board) whilst Nemo with his 
Commander cannot unilaterally alter the software to  allow a 
launch at 38° N, 77° W. Contrariwise, according to the 
‘alternative procedure’  thesis, the crew would have to amend 
the submarine’s anatomy so as to provide for a second, parallel 
firing tube. The original firing tube would launch missiles by 
the simultaneous turning of the three keys on the launching 
board whilst the second firing tube would launch missiles upon 
the turning of the keys of Nemo and his Commander, 
irrespective of whether the Lieutenant’s key is on the 
launching board. To make matters worse, Nemo and his 
Commander could by themselves change the software and upon 
the turning of their keys alone fire at 38° N, 77° W. According 
to the ‘reconstitution’ thesis, the naval troika’s agreement 
would be interpreted by the crew as an order to bu ild a second 
‘Nautilus’.  Both ‘Nautili ’  would be equipped with launching 
boards but the reconstituted submarine would not possess the 
same autonomy to select targets enjoyed by the original;  no 
matter what was done aboard the reconstituted submarine it  
would be physically unable to target 38° N, 77° W. Which of 
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In addition, it is essential to highlight that under the 
‘intra-Parliamentary decision-making agreement’ 
thesis, unlike under the other two competing theses, the 
hypothetical Parliament Act 2017 would in no sense be 
the cause of concern. Indeed, such Act would not have 
the effect of reconstituting Parliament for all purposes 
(or, for that matter, the effect of providing an 
‘alternative route’ through which two -thirds majorities 
of the total number of members of both Houses sitting 
together, rather than Parliament, could legislate) but, 
merely, of addressing how Parliament may act. The key 
to the proposed thesis’s superiority to the ‘alternative 
procedure’ thesis, in this regard, is, once again, lo cated 
in the fact that only the former recognises that it is 
always Parliament, rather than a cross -section of its 
constituent elements, that legislates.  
Insofar as the ‘reconstitution’ thesis is concerned, the 
position is somewhat more complex. To explain, under 
the ‘reconstitution’ rubric, the Parliament Act 2017 
would effectuate a reconstitution of Parliament for all 
purposes whereas, under the prism herein proposed, it 
would merely have the effect of addressing how 
Parliament may act: by the customary tripartite consent 
for all purposes or by the two-thirds majority in a joint 
sitting again for all purposes.  
                                                                                                                                                       
the three approaches would be more rational for the crew to 
espouse in response to the ‘Nautilus’  officers’  decision is –  it is  
submitted –  evident.  
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Under the latter prism, in other words, the sovereign 
Parliament would have a choice when deciding how to 
act in the future: it could proceed to act solely by two-
thirds majorities in joint sit tings and therefore within 
the confines of the 2017 Act, it could continue 
legislating through the traditional tripartite consent of 
Commons, Lords and Crown whilst leaving the 2017 Act 
on the Statute Book, or it could choose to expressly or 
impliedly repeal the 2017 Act acting under the Act 
itself or through the customary consent of the Queen-in-
Parliament.920 In all three scenarios, Parliament would 
remain sovereign.  
It may be remembered that the same reasoning was 
applied, albeit in cruder form owing to the lack of the 
presently-developed theoretical-normative substratum , 
with respect to the earlier discussion of the position 
that would ensue should Acts equivalent to the ones 
applying in NSW that gave rise to the Trethowan  case 
                                                            
920 This position is not exceptional. Indeed, the de scribed 
powers are precisely the ones the Parliaments of the 
Australian states enjoy vis-à-vis  non-entrenched laws laying 
down procedural rules (see e.g. :  [1920] AC 691, 703-706). The 
only difference is that the UK Parliament also enjoys these 
powers in respect to laws that are, purportedly, doubly 
entrenched. 
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were to be enacted for the UK, 921,922 and may equally be 
applied in respect of other statutes that have been 
considered as having reconstituted Parliament, such as 
the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 and the European 
Union Act 2011.  
The former did not – in providing that an early 
Parliamentary general election is to take place if the 
House of Commons passes a relevant motion that is 
accepted by a two-thirds majority of the number of 
members who vote –923 reconstitute Parliament for the 
purposes of an early election. Further, even if it had 
provided that such early election would only ensue if a 
statute , rather than a mere resolution, were enacted to 
that effect by both the Commons and Lords voting 
separately by two-thirds majorities, it would still not 
have had the effect of denying Parliament the right to 
                                                            
921 See above: pp.279-281. 
922 Equally, the conundrum noted earlier regarding whether a 
joint assembly of Parliament’s three elements could, by simple 
majority, enact statutes must be answered definitively in the 
affirmative, provided that Parliament has concluded and 
unambiguously communicated an intra-Parliamentary 
decision-making agreement to that effect.   
923 Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011, s.2.  
  
 
518 
 
order an early election or to repeal the Act by simple 
majority; rather, it would have provided Parliament 
with the choice of acting for the purposes of so ordering 
in a additional, different way.  
Equally, the European Union Act 2011 provides that a 
Treaty that amends or replaces the TEU or the TFEU is 
not to be ratified924 unless, inter alia , it has been 
approved by Act of Parliament which, itself, will not 
come into force until a referendum on the matter has 
been held and the majority of those voting therein are 
in favour of such approval. Such Act, however, merely 
relates, respectively, to the ‘manner and form’ in which 
the royal prerogative of treaty ratification must be 
exercised, not the ‘manner and form’ that Parliament 
must follow in legislating. Even removing the Executive 
from the legislative frame however, the Act does not 
provide that relevant statutes that have not been 
approved in a referendum will be invalid but, merely, 
that they will, for the time, be inoperative; therefore, at 
any rate, Parliament’s unlimited legislative potential is 
preserved. Lastly, even if the Act had provided that, 
unless the said ‘manner and form’ had been followed, 
relevant statutes would be invalid, sti ll Parliament 
                                                            
924 European Union Act 2011, s.2. See also: ibid. ,  s.3, s.6(2),  
s.6(3), s.6(5).  
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would not have been redefined to include the electorate 
for the purposes stated above: the Act would have 
merely provided Parliament with the choice to legislate 
on the matter solely in collaboration with the 
electorate, to continue legislating customarily by 
tripartite assent whilst leaving the 2011 Act on the 
Statute Book, or to expressly or impliedly repeal  such 
Act acting either under the Act itself or with the 
customary tripartite consent of Commons, Lords and 
Crown. Contrary to Goldsworthy’s view,925 this would be 
so even if the ‘manner and form’ requirement were itself 
entrenched or even if it had been enacted by the same 
procedure (here, a referendum) it purported to oblige 
future Parliaments to follow in order to unbind 
themselves.  
Under the former rubric, however, if Parliament had 
been reconstituted for all purposes then, by definition, 
the reconstituted Parliament would be the sole 
Parliament in existence and therefore no  choice in 
deciding how to act would abide. Indeed, since the 
‘reconstitution’ thesis allows for effective ‘manner and 
form’ requirements to be placed upon non -sovereign 
                                                            
925 Goldsworthy, 2010b, at pp.31-32; Goldsworthy, 2012. See 
also: Bamforth, 2011; Gordon and Dougan, 2012, at p.26.  
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incarnations of Parliament,  Parliament would be unable 
to unbind itself from such restrictions.  
It is instructive, parenthetically, to highlight that these 
conclusions relating to the position of the hypothetical 
Parliament Act 2017 as well as that of the two 2011 
Acts under the intra-Parliamentary decision-making 
agreement rubric, as may be seen, are all reached 
without the need to rely on the aforementioned 
precarious upwards/downwards distinction. It may be 
remembered that, much earlier, 926 the same distinction 
was again dismissed as being unnecessary in a different 
context: that of the interrelationship between 
Community and UK law and, in particular, the 
consistency, or otherwise, of Factortame  with the 
orthodox reading of the Constitution.  Apart from 
unnecessary however, the distinction is also 
fundamentally flawed and it is imperative to explain 
why that is so as it constitutes the cardinal narrative 
employed currently by traditionalist theorists to 
rationalise, in a purportedly orthodox manner, many of 
the difficulties posed towards the principle of 
Parliamentary sovereignty by recent developments such 
as the enactment of the European Communities and 
Human Rights Acts.  
                                                            
926 See above: pp.110-111. 
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The argument in favour of the soundness and usefulness 
of the distinction, as expressed by Goldsworthy, begins 
with the proposition that provisions “dealing with 
matters such as quorums, the voting rights of presiding 
officers, and the manner in which finance bills must be 
initiated”–927 that is, in other words, provisions dealing 
with how Parliament acts and, more importantly, how 
courts, upon Parliament’s instruction, should consider 
Parliament as acting – are both legally valid, in the 
sense, at least, that “the parliaments that enacted them 
had legal power to do so, and they do not violate any 
higher or superior law” ,928 and legally binding, in the 
sense not of judicial enforceability but rather of : 
impos[ing] legal obligations that are clearly 
intended to govern the conduct of the two 
Houses of Parliament… [T]hey can be 
‘enforced’ by the Houses themselves, their 
members and presiding officers.929        
These legally valid and binding provisions, the 
argument continues, can also be made judicially 
                                                            
927 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.186.  
928 ibid. ,  at p.187.  
929 ibid. .  
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enforceable, if Parliament so desires,  because 
Parliament has “plenary legislative power that surely 
includes power to prescribe procedures for … [its] own 
decision-making…”930 Otherwise stated, to deny that 
they could be made enforceable, “it would be necessary 
to argue that Parliament’s sovereign power is 
limited…”931 However, a caveat is also added: these 
provisions can only be rendered judicially enforceable 
provided that:  
they do not substantively limit Parliament’s 
lawmaking authority, or make it so  difficult 
for … [Parliament] …  to legislate that its 
power to do so is diminished… If Parliament 
purported to enact such a requirement, it 
could be repealed, perhaps even by 
implication…  [a]nd its validity might be 
successfully challenged on the ground that, 
in substance, it violates this limit to the 
power used to enact it.932  
                                                            
930 ibid. ,  at p.190.  
931 ibid. ,  at p.191.  
932 Goldsworthy, 2013, at pp.62-63. 
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Via this framework, the Australian scholar understands 
and seeks to explain and render unproblematic, from an 
orthodox UK constitutional law perspective, statutes 
such as the ECA, the Parliament Acts, the Statute of 
Westminster as well as hypothetical enactments such as 
an amended HRA under which courts would have the 
ability to invalidate legislation inconsistent with the 
rights protected therein, unless such legislation 
expressly declared that Parliament intended  to override 
the Act’s terms.933 The ECA, for instance, says 
Goldsworthy, imposes a “requirement as to form of 
future legislation – namely, that any breach of 
applicable EC law must be authorized by express words 
clearly communicating Parliament’s intention to do 
so.”934 This requirement (which was not fulfiled by 
statutes such as the MSA 1988 and the Weights and 
Measures Act 1985 that, consequently, faced partial 
disapplication in Factortame  and Thoburn  respectively) 
as well as similar legislative requirements of a purely 
procedural or formal kind, are, professedly, not only 
consistent with orthodox constitutional theory but also 
enhance Parliament’s sovereignty since they allow for 
greater control over Parliamentary deliberative and 
                                                            
933 ibid. .  
934 ibid. ,  at p.64.  
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decision-making processes and hence can be utilised to 
protect long-term standing commitments, such as the 
hypothetical polar researcher’s commitment not to get 
anywhere near chocolate during his twelve month stay 
in the Antarctic,935 from inadvertent violation.  
To explain why the argument is not merely unnecessary 
but also erroneous it is essential to begin by 
accentuating that, in truth, it constitutes a barely 
masked contemporary restatement of the formalistic 
distinction between procedural/adjective and 
substantive/subject-matter restrictions to Parliament’s 
power which was earlier discussed and refuted as not 
merely involving “difficult borderline cases raising 
questions of degree”,936 as Goldsworthy would have it, 
but rather as being altogether normatively untenable 
when taken to its logical limits.937 Although, therefore, 
rhetorical questions such as at which point does a 
super-majority requirement for the repeal of a statute 
transmutes itself from being a purely procedural into a 
substantive constraint upon Parliament’s power need 
                                                            
935 See: Goldsworthy, 2010a, at pp.179 -182. 
936 ibid. ,  at p.114.  
937 See above: pp.258-261. 
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not be re-posed, a different illuminating example can be 
introduced.  
Let it be assumed that the hypothetical Reform Act 
2017 is enacted that requires, mirroring in this regard 
Part.XX of the Indian Constitution, an absolute 
majority as well as a majority of no less than two-thirds 
of the members of each House for overriding or 
repealing the statute’s reforms.  According to 
Goldsworthy, absolute majority requirements are “very 
innocuous”938 and “do not in any way diminish 
parliament’s substantive power” 939 whilst “[s]uper 
majority requirements, such as a requirement of a two -
thirds … majority, are more problematic … [,] … should 
not be regarded as purely procedural, and therefore 
should not be held binding…”940 The reasoning for 
distinguishing between the two requirements  – 
accepting the former whilst rejecting the latter as 
judicially enforceable – appears to be that the latter, 
unlike the former, has an ‘upwards’ vector or, in other 
words, is substantive, rather than formal or procedural, 
                                                            
938 Goldsworthy, 2010c, at p.144.  
939 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.200.  
940 ibid. ,  at p.198.  
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in nature and thus makes it harder for Parliament to 
legislate.  
However, such reasoning is flawed. Evidence for that 
conclusion can be sought by additionally assuming that 
a divisive, in party-political terms, Private Member’s 
Bill is introduced to repeal the Reform Act 2017. The 
government, knowing that several of its MPs are willing 
to break the whip, decides , as it not infrequently 
does,941 to abstain from voting. In the occasion, the Bill 
is passed by a vote of 300-3 and thus proponents of the 
upwards/downwards distinction find themselves in the 
paradoxical situation in which Parliament has  fulfiled 
the professedly ‘harder’, ‘substantive’ two-thirds 
requirement but failed by some 25 votes to fulfil the 
allegedly ‘formal’ requirement of an absolute majority.   
To deconstruct further the superficial distinction 
between law-making requirements that make it ‘harder’ 
and requirements that are neutral or make it ‘easier’ 
for Parliament to legislate, a further pertinent example 
can be provided, this time involving two actual 
enactments.  
                                                            
941 The most recent instance being during the Blair 
administration, in July 2006.  
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The first is the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms that forms part of the Constitution Act, 1982, 
which is, in turn, attached as a schedule to the Canada 
Act 1982. Remedies for violations of the rights protected 
therein are provided by s.24 unless such violations 
result from an Act of Parliament or of the legislature of 
a province that, as per s.33, has been expressly declared 
to ‘operate notwithstanding a provision included in … 
[the relevant sections] … of this Charter . ’  According to 
Goldsworthy, a ‘notwithstanding’ clause, such as s.33, 
as well as, more generally, any requirement of using 
express words, or even a particular verbal formula, is 
“merely a requirement as to form that could be made 
binding and justiciable…”942 because it neither makes 
the passage of legislation more difficult nor in any 
other way subtracts from Parliament’s sovereignty. 943 In 
fact, the ECA, for instance, it is said, contains precisely 
such a clause: one that obliges Parliament to utilise 
                                                            
942 Goldsworthy, 2013, at p.65.  
943 In truth, s.33 limits Parliament’s sovereignty in several 
(other) ways that are not relevant for present purposes. For 
instance, it  does not allow the abrogation of every Charter 
right [s.33(1)] whilst the violations it allow s are time-limited 
[s.33(3)].  
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express words if it wishes its enactments that are 
inconsistent with Community law to be applied.  
The second enactment is the Abolition of Early Parole 
Act, 2011; s.10(1) of which was considered by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in Whaling944 as being in 
violation of s.11 of the Charter and, accordingly, as the 
2011 Act did not contain any ‘clause dérogatoire’  within 
the meaning of s.33 of the Charter, as also being of no 
force or effect . The 2011 Act’s contentious provision is 
but one of a myriad provisions that in the past three 
decades Parliament has failed to protect from 
invalidation under the Charter by accompanying them 
with the requisite ‘literary form’.  Paradoxically, 
however, although the Canadian federal legislative body  
has been almost completely unable – save in one or, at 
most, in a handful of instances – to fulfil the ‘purely 
formal’ requirement of ‘mere’  express words that 
allegedly does not make it harder for Parliament to 
legislate, it would overwhelmingly have been able to 
fulfil, in these same instances,  ‘substantive’, ‘more 
onerous ’  super-majority requirements, had they been in 
place: the 2011 Act, for instance, was approved in the 
House of Commons by a vote of 184-105 or, in other 
words, a majority in excess of 63%.   
                                                            
944 Attorney-General (Canada) v Whaling  2014 SCC 20.  
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In short, the distinction between requirements that 
make it ‘harder’ and requirements that are neutral or 
make it ‘easier’ for Parliament to legislate is absolutely 
untenable. Goldsworthy suggests that “[i]t is not clear 
why section 33 has been so rarely used” 945 but, with 
respect, the reason is abundantly straightforward: the 
Charter’s ‘notwithstanding’ clause has made it harder ,  
if not virtually impossible, for Parliament to legislate 
contrary to Charter rights in practice.  Importantly, this 
empirical political proposition also has its counterpart 
in the theoretical plane:  as has already been noted in 
several parts of the thesis, a ‘notwithstanding’ clause  
makes it harder for Parliament to legislate as it 
removes from its legislative arsenal at least one weapon 
–  that of repealing by implication statutes it 
disapproves. The same is true of any mandatory 
requirement that pertains to the law-making process.  
Even if, however, that is not so,  and the distinction is, 
at least in some cases, tenable in either normative or 
empirical terms, or in both,  several unanswerable 
criticisms can be raised.  
For one, there appears to be no normative reason for 
carving the distinction between ‘harder’, ‘neutral’ and 
‘easier’ requirements solely from the angle of enacting 
                                                            
945 Goldsworthy, 2003, at p.275.  
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legislation. Surely,  if any, the appropriate lens for 
distinguishing them should be whether a requirement 
makes the business  transacted by Parliament ‘harder ’ or 
easier’. Under this rubric  then, an Act, such as the 
Parliament Act 1911, renders Parliamentary business 
simultaneously easier and harder to accomplish; despite 
making it, prima facie , ‘easier’ for Par liament to 
legislate as it can, henceforth, enact measures in an 
additional way to the customary tripartite consent of 
Commons, Lords and Crown, it equally makes it ‘harder’ 
for Parliament to refuse legislative measures. This 
suggestion may, at first sight, appear strange but, in 
truth, it is very much valid as there is no 
differentiation between votes cast in Parliament; votes 
in favour of a legislative proposal are  not qualitatively 
superior to votes against that same proposal. To suggest 
otherwise would be to cast positive, a priori  judgement 
on any and every legislative proposal as well as, more 
generally, on legal change as such.    
Secondly, if legislation that makes it ‘easier’ for 
Parliament to act is allowed and legislation that makes 
it ‘harder’ is disallowed, then all instances of the fo rmer 
type of legislation, once enacted, become entrenched. 
For instance, an Act such as the Parliament Act 1911 
making it ‘easier’ to legislate cannot, according to this 
reasoning, be repealed, for its repeal would make it 
‘harder’ for Parliament to act. The same is true for 
‘notwithstanding’ clauses such as those allegedly found 
in the ECA and the Statute of Westminster since, as 
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already seen, according to Goldsworthy, they enhance 
Parliament’s sovereignty by allowing the legislature to 
protect its long-term commitments from accidental 
repeal. 
Thirdly, the distinction can hardly be said to remain 
within the confines of orthodox theory for  it opens the 
door for anti-sovereignty theorists, like Allan, 
justifiably to claim that:  
[i]f it is possible to recognise limits on the 
power of Parliament to enact legislation … 
even if only to the extent of requiring 
express wording, it is equally possible  to 
countenance other limits on parliamentary 
sovereignty which reflect the demands of 
constitutional principle.946  
Fourthly, as already noted, the cardinal justification in 
favour of obliging the legislature to follow any 
procedural requirements it has instituted is the 
protection of Parliament’s heretofore allegedly 
unprotected long-term undertakings from ignorant or 
negligent repeal. However, the doctrine of implied 
repeal, as modified above, is more than capable of 
                                                            
946 Allan, 1997, at p.448.  
  
 
532 
 
fulfiling that role. Indeed, it should be reminded that 
implied repeal, properly construed, is merely a tool in 
the courts’ possession more effectively to discover and 
uphold Parliament’s intention: statutes will not be 
taken to repeal one another by implication  unless it is 
impossible to interpret them in a harmonious, 
intelligible manner or unless any other attestation of 
Parliament’s intention towards that effect is brought 
before the court. Thus, by definition, there can be no 
accidental or negligent –  that is, unintentional –  repeal 
by implication as the literalist and mechanistic 
understanding of the doctrine of implied repeal  
suggests. The adoption of this anachronistic 
understanding of implied repeal  on the part of 
Goldsworthy, leads him to claim that Factortame  is 
inconsistent with the doctrine and, hence, in his 
attempt to explain the said leading House of Lords 
decision consistently with orthodox theory, dismisses 
implied repeal as not “sacrosanct” 947 or “essential to the 
doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty” 948 and, in 
substitution, advances the upwards/downwards thesis 
in question.  
                                                            
947 Goldsworthy, 2013, at p.62.  
948 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.182 [reference omitted].  
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In the vivid terms of Goldsworthy’s example, following 
the dictates of the orthodox modified implied repeal 
doctrine,  the recipient of the polar explorer’s letter may 
be perplexed as he is faced with a prima facie  
incompatible set of intentions –  an older directive not to 
send anything containing chocolate and a more recent 
one requesting a particular brand of biscuits that 
contain chocolate – but he must first attempt to 
reconcile them if, taking into account all factors which 
he considers are relevant to unearthing his friend’s 
genuine intention, it appears possible to do so and, only 
thereafter, disregard the explorer’s earlier 
pronouncement and give effect to his more recent one. 
At most therefore, Goldsworthy’s  graphic example is 
capable of illustrating the hardships with which the 
judiciary is faced when discharging the burden of 
discovering and giving effect to Parliament’s intention. 
Factortame ,  for its part, is an instance in which the 
explorer believes, and the recipient knows the explorer 
believes, that a product he has requested does not 
contain chocolate but is proven to be wrong, either 
because he was misinformed about the product’s 
ingredients or because, during the time he is away at 
the Antarctic, the manufacturer has decided to add 
chocolate in the said brand. Evidently, the explorer’s 
‘faithful agent’ would not proceed to send the said 
product nor does the implied repeal doctrine, properly 
understood, obliges him to do so. 
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Fifthly, the orthodox doctr ine of implied repeal is not 
only able to fulfi l adequately the role of sheltering 
Parliament’s long-term undertakings without entailing 
any of the abovementioned doctrinal problems or 
subtractions from orthodox principle that Goldsworthy’s 
thesis involves, but is also superior in two additional 
respects. For one, the latter thesis’s proposition that 
mandatory ‘manner and form’ requirements 949 are 
necessary to save the legislature (that ignorantly makes 
statutes repugnant to one another)  from itself,950 has 
the regrettable, if not heretical, consequence of casting 
doubt on the wisdom of the sovereign Parliament.  The 
orthodox implied repeal doctrine, on the other hand, 
evades any such consequence. Moreover, unlike the 
modified implied repeal doctrine, Goldsworthy’s thesis  
not only fails to keep Parliament’s intention as its 
guiding principle but also authorises its violation. As 
the Australian scholar admits:  
                                                            
949 Or, as Goldsworthy prefers to call them to avoid confusion 
with s.5 of the CLVA and the Trethowan  decision, 
requirements as to ‘procedure or form’:  Goldsworthy, 2010a, 
Ch.7. 
950 In Goldsworthy’s own words, “to protect itself from its own 
ignorance or negligence...” [Goldsworthy, 2013, at p.62].  
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[W]hen Parliament is bound by a 
requirement as to form, it is bound by an 
earlier law regardless of whatever its later 
intentions may have been…951 
[R]equirements as to procedure or form … 
are enforced regardless of Parliament’s 
intentions in enacting the later law… [Such 
a] requirement … takes on a life of its own, 
in the sense that legislation purport ing to 
amend or repeal that principle, but passed 
contrary to the requirement, will be invalid 
even if it is quite clear that the amendment 
or repeal was not inadvertent[!] 952 
This is unquestionably the thesis’s most striking flaw. 
The attentive reader is left feeling deprived of a 
justification for the argument that Goldsworthy’s  thesis 
enhances Parliamentary sovereignty when, in reality, it 
explicitly denies effect to Parliament’s clearly 
articulated intention.  Indeed, it is highly unlikely that 
the explorer’s sovereignty would be enhanced rather 
than diminished if, no matter how specific he is in his 
                                                            
951 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.298.  
952 ibid. ,  at p.183.  
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request of the branded food products to be sent to him, 
he frustratingly finds several items of his order missin g 
unless he wastes the invaluable time and resources of 
his expedition to reflect upon the ingredients of every 
single item on his otherwise very specific and well -
thought-out list and state expressly that he is aware of 
each and every one that includes chocolate, or any other 
by-product of cocoa beans, even if only in minor 
portions. Even more importantly, the recipient of the 
explorer’s requests would seldom consider himself as 
honouring his friend’s intentions when he benumbedly 
finds out that, following Goldsworthy’s 
recommendation, he must send shortbread biscuits and 
carrot cakes to the Antarctic even though he has been 
repeatedly asked to send brownies and black forest 
cakes – items that he is aware that his friend knows 
contain chocolate. And if the recipient should so 
blatantly disregard an unambiguous request for items 
that contain chocolate, why not proceed to disobey 
express requests for items containing chocolate or even 
fail to uphold a complete reversal of the explorer’s long -
term commitment to abstain from chocolate?      
Sixthly, the argument is not intended to be a positive 
law proposition and thus must be evaluated accordingly. 
Indeed, Goldsworthy himself in few, but enlightening, 
passages of his work on the matter, essentially reveals 
that, in truth, he intends to advance a normative 
argument. Indeed, at one point he contends that “[o]ne 
of the reasons for entrusting Parliament with 
  
 
537 
 
substantive continuing sovereignty is that mistakes and 
injustices can be corrected by future Parliaments.” 953 
“But if Parliament had substantive self -embracing 
sovereignty”,954 he continues, that is if Parliament were 
allowed to institute requirements that make it ‘harder’ 
to legislate, “ it could make this very difficult or 
impossible.”955 For good measure, later, he even more 
clearly admits that: 
I do not maintain that it is currently 
generally accepted that Parliament can enact 
mild requirements as to procedure or form. 
My argument is that it could, and should 
be…956 
Indeed, Goldsworthy criticises  Tomkins’s theory, 
referred to earlier, that the doctrine of implied repeal 
does not come into play where there is an ostensible 
conflict between two statutes regulating different 
                                                            
953 Goldsworthy, 2013, at p.58.  
954 ibid. .  
955 ibid. .  
956 ibid. ,  at p.63.  
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subject-matters957 for being “novel”958 and absent from 
relevant “leading texts”,959 yet his own normative thesis 
that distinguishes between legislative requirements as 
to ‘substance’ and ‘procedure and form’ is equally 
riddled with propositions that are nowhere to be found 
at least in the UK literature or case law such as the 
idea that any procedural or formal requirement enacted 
by Parliament, in order to be effective, should comply 
with ‘symmetric entrenchment’960 or, in other words, 
should itself comply with the requirement it institutes.   
In response, Goldsworthy claims that  “there is evidence 
that the courts have already changed their position” 961 
in favour of his thesis. If Parliament and other senior 
state officials were also to submit to such change, it is 
said, a “wholly consensual change in the official 
consensus”  that need not be characterised “extra -legal 
                                                            
957 Tomkins, 2003, at pp.117-119. 
958 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.291.  
959 ibid. .  
960 Goldsworthy, 2013, at pp.65-67. 
961 ibid. ,  at p.63.  
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and revolutionary”962 will have taken place with the 
result that the UK’s ‘ultimate rule ’ will have changed. 
Nevertheless, even accepting the truthfulness of these 
propositions, the syllogism evades two burning 
questions. First, even if the courts have altered their 
position, as they have certainly not, was such alteration 
within the powers and consonant with the 
constitutional role and obligations of the judiciary? 
Secondly, even if Parliament also acquiesces to such 
ostensible change, will the new paradigm – whether it 
be achieved through gradual and consensual or abrupt 
and radical metamorphosis of the consensus of senior 
officials and whether, or not, it should be considered 
revolutionary – be consistent with Parliament’s 
sovereignty?    
Seventhly, the Australian scholar concedes that:  
it is sometimes unclear whether a statutory 
directive … operate[s] as a mandatory 
requirement as to form, which is a 
precondition to the validity of subsequent 
                                                            
962 ibid. ,  at p.58.  
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legislation, or as a mere interpretive 
presumption.963 
Hence, even if the distinction could be imported into UK 
law, as it certainly cannot at least under the current 
constitutional paradigm, it would have to be dismissed 
for it is unacceptable for a matter as serious as the 
invalidation of statutes to be dependent upon a 
penumbral issue.  
Eighthly, by proposing his upwards/downwards 
distinction, Goldsworthy inevitably has to acknowledge 
the correctness of Laws’s ‘constitutional statutes’ 
thesis964 with all the pitfalls, enumerated earlier, that 
it involves.  
Lastly, Goldsworthy commits an additional set of 
errors. For one, he contradicts himself when 
contending, correctly,  that to deny that Parliament has 
the right to institute legislative requirements “it would 
be necessary to argue that Parliament’s sovereign power 
is limited…”965 and then proceeding, in the same breath 
                                                            
963 Goldsworthy, 2010a, at p.184.  
964 As he, indeed does: ibid. ,  at pp.312-314. 
965 ibid. ,  at p.191.  
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and mistakenly, to qualify that right to the effect that 
the institution of substantive legislative requirement s 
is disallowed. For good measure, at one point he even 
proposes that such a substantive requirement – unlike, 
professedly, a requirement as to ‘procedure or form’ –  
would not only be ineffective and able to be repealed by 
implication but would additionally be “invalid in 
Britain, because it would not bind the  only body it 
purported to bind[!]”966 Secondly, by proposing that 
requirements as to form or procedure can be made 
mandatory and failure to follow them can become 
judicially enforceable, he critically fails to take into 
account his own thorough historical analysis of the lex 
et consuetudo parliamenti  that unmistakably and 
correctly concludes that “the powers and privileges of 
the ‘High Court of Parliament’ … [are not] … subject to 
the ‘common erudition’  of ‘inferior courts. ’”967 Thirdly, 
and in light of the above, Goldsworthy contends that he 
is advancing a thesis that not only respects but also 
enhances Parliament’s sovereignty but his thesis 
condones the, heretofore unheard of in orthodox 
constitutional theory, invalidation of Acts of the 
sovereign Parliament that (a) institute  substantive 
                                                            
966 ibid. ,  at p.192.  
967 ibid. ,  at p.26.  
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legislative requirements and (b) fail to follow the 
procedural and formal legislative requirements that 
have been made judicially enforceable by previous 
Parliaments.      
Hence, the better view appears to be the one express 
above. On the one hand, since Parliament is sovereign, 
it can equally institute both ‘upwards’ and ‘downwards’, 
or substantive and procedural, legislative requirements. 
For the same reason, these requirements can be made 
judicially enforceable. On the other hand, since lex et 
consuetudo Parliamenti  is a branch of law cognisable in 
no (other) court of law apart from the  High Court of 
Parliament – the King’s highest seat of judgement – the 
‘ inferior courts’ cannot substitute their  judgement for 
that of Parliament in selecting whether to act through 
the customary indenture of Commons, Lords and Crown 
or legislate via any of the intra-Parliamentary decision-
making agreements it has instituted.  To be fair, 
Detmold disagrees by arguing that it is ultimately up to 
the judiciary to determine its jurisdiction and, in turn, 
decide fundamental questions, such as these, regarding 
Parliament’s legislative scope because, at least the 
courts highest in the judicial hierarchy, possess “self -
validating jurisdictional power” 968 or, in other words, 
                                                            
968 Detmold, 1989, at p.104.  
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their judgement, even if legally wrong or ultra vires , is 
binding until and unless overridden. However, 
notwithstanding the fact that his criticism may well be 
valid in other jurisdictions, it cannot apply in the UK 
wherein, as already noted, it is Parliament that 
constitutes the Highest Court of the Realm.  In other 
words, in the UK, the (inferior) courts ’ role is to uphold 
faithfully Parliament’s intention and, consequently, 
they cannot invalidate legislative edicts that have been 
properly enacted by the Queen’s  ‘most Excellent 
Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this 
present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of 
the same’ for failure to follow particular procedures or 
forms. What they can, and must, do however is to 
ensure Parliament has acted and, thus, when 
Parliament selects to act via an intra-Parliamentary 
decision-making agreement, they must ensure that the 
agreement’s requirements – be they substantive or 
procedural – have been fulfiled.  
In short, legislative requirements promulgated by 
Parliament place internally effective  restrictions on the 
intra-Parliamentary decision-making agreements they 
institute. Schematically, if Parliament’s sovereign 
ability is a square and novel decision-making 
agreements are circles (the circumferences of which 
constitute the internal restrictions of the respective 
decision-making agreements), a ‘downwards’ change 
may be conceived of as a circle inscribed in the square 
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whereas an ‘upwards’ change may be conceived of as a 
circle that lies firmly within such square and is not 
tangent to (i.e.  does not touch) any side of the outer 
figure. A change such as the ‘upwards’ one institu ted by 
the hypothetical Parliament Act 2017, for its part, could 
schematically be conveyed as a square superimposed 
upon the original square representing Parliament’s 
sovereign ability.  
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❖  
Lastly, although precedent in support of the thesis 
herein introduced may not be plentiful in the post -
colonial jurisprudence, the 1911 Act itself catalytically 
leans in its favour. In elaboration, it is prudent to 
remind that the enacting formula for Bills enacted 
under s.2 is dictated by s.4(1) as being:  
Be it enacted by the King’s most Excellent 
Majesty, by and with the advice and consent 
of the Commons in this present Parliament  
assembled, in accordance with the provisions 
of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, and 
by authority of the same , as follows.969 
The italicised parts indeed confirm what is conspicuous 
from the Act taken as whole: namely, that the Lords 
retain their integral part in the legislative process even 
if their consent is not required for the passage of 
legislation. Bills promulgated pursuant to s.2 are 
correctly declared to have been enacted ‘in this present 
Parliament assembled’, where ‘Parliament’ undoubtedly 
means the Commons, Lords and Crown. Equally, a 
                                                            
969 [Emphasis added].  
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studious inspection of the enacting formula and, in 
particular, the punctuation used 970 by the responsible 
draughtsman,971 reveals that ‘by authority of the same’ 
means neither ‘by authority of the Commons and Crown’ 
nor ‘by authority of the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949’ 
but, rather, ‘by authority of Parliament’, where 
‘Parliament’ once again undoubtedly means the 
Commons, Lords and Crown. The same is true of the 
1911 Act’s Preamble that makes reference to the 
provision that will hereafter be required ‘to be made by 
Parliament’. Admittedly, in the House of Lords, Lord 
Steyn appeared to disagree with such interpretation to 
the extent that he was of the view that the contention 
that ‘Parliament’ on all or any of these occasions means 
the Commons, Lords and Crown:  
is convincingly answered by the fact that in 
section 1(2), in the context of Money Bills, 
reference is made to ‘money provided by 
Parliament’. This contemplates money 
                                                            
970 See:  Inland Revenue Commissioners v Hinchy  [1960] AC 
748, 765. C.f. Bennion, 1981, at pp.145-146. 
971 This point is also convincingly defended by: Ekins, 2007, at 
p.99. See also: Ekins, 2006.  
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provided by Parliament in its reduced 
form.972  
If it were true, as Lord Steyn thought,973 that the Lords 
were legally excluded from the law-making process that 
related to Money Bills then the phrase ‘money provided 
by Parliament’ in s.1(2) could well have been 
interpreted as ‘money provided by the Commons’. In 
truth however, no such legal exclusion had ever taken 
place; the rule concerning the Lords’ powers in respect 
to Money Bills was a legally non-enforceable 
constitutional convention; a self -denying ordinance on 
the part of the House of Lords that “had accepted”,974 as 
Baroness Hale puts it, “that it could not block the 
Government’s sources of supply”. 975  
The trick, however, is that Lord Steyn was, with 
respect, as much in the wrong in refuting the claimants’ 
contention as was counsel for advancing it, for it does 
                                                            
972 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.89.  
973 “[B]y long standing arrangement Money Bills were specially 
provided for by placing it beyond the power of the House of 
Lords to delay them…”: ibid. ,  at para.78.  
974 ibid. ,  at para.145.  
975 ibid. .  See also: House of Lords Financial Powers Bill  2001.  
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not follow – as the claimants would have wanted – from 
the fact that ‘Parliament’ in the 1911 Act always means 
the Queen-in-Parliament that the 1911 Act can 
therefore only be amended by the triumvirate of 
Commons, Lords and Crown. The true position is that – 
whether by the customary tripartite assent or by the 
assent of Commons and Crown and the refusal of the 
Lords –  it is always Parliament that legislates. Thus, 
there is, prima facie , nothing in, say, the Preamble’s 
stipulation that ‘provision will require hereafter to be 
made by Parliament  in a measure effecting such 
substitution for limiting and defining the powers of the 
new Second Chamber’ to suggest that such measure 
must be effected by Parliament acting with the assent 
of all its composite elements rather than Parliament 
acting with the assent of Commons and Crown and the 
refusal of the Lords, for in both instances it will have 
been effect ‘by Parliament’. The ascertainment of any 
restrictions to the utilisation of s.2 for the purposes of 
bringing about particular legislative outcomes cannot, 
therefore, be accomplished by emphasising on the 1911 
Act’s use of the term ‘Parliament’ in the Preamble or 
elsewhere but must, rather, be attempted on a careful 
interpretation of the 1911 Act’s provisions. This is, in 
fact, what follows immediately below.  
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Express and implied restrictions on 
the use of s.2 
 
It has already been established that Balfour was largely 
in the right when exclaiming, during the passage of the 
1911 Act, that:  
You ask us not merely to assent to 
revolution, but to assent to revolution which 
in turn makes future revolution a matter of a  
‘temporary, precarious, and insignificant’ 
majority.976 
What is less clear is the extent to which such ‘future 
revolution’ was condoned by the schematic ‘revolution’ 
of 1911.  
On its face, the 1911 Act appears to provide that 
Parliament will not be deemed to have acted with the 
consent of Commons and Crown and the rejection of the 
Lords in relation to Money Bills (s.2(1)), Bills that are 
                                                            
976 HC Debs, 1911, 24 t h  April,  vol.24, col.1475 (Arthur Balfour 
MP). 
  
 
550 
 
not Public Bills (s.2(1)), Bills for conf irming a 
Provisional Order (s.5) and Bills containing any 
provision to extend the maximum duration of 
Parliament beyond five years (s.2(1)). Earlier, in the 
context of the latter restriction, it was argued that it is 
not only effective in forbidding the use of s.2 in 
enacting a Bill that extends Parliament’s life but, 
additionally, carries an implied restriction against 
using s.2 to achieve the same outcome in two steps. 
There is, indeed, no reason why the same rationale 
should not be applied to the remaining three 
restrictions placed upon the use of s.2 by the 1911 Act 
although it must be noted that the ones relating to 
Money Bills and provisional order confirmation Bills are 
both nominal insofar as the latter have fallen into 
disuse whilst an even easier regime is provided for the 
enactment of the former in s.1 of the 1911 Act.  
The question that remains to be asked, therefore, is the 
one posed by Lord Hope in Jackson ;  namely, “how much 
… room is there for other prohibitions to be implied?” 977 
The answer given by his Lordship was that “I would not 
go so far as to say that the stated limitations rule out 
                                                            
977 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.123.  
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limitations which are unstated.” 978 Equivalent 
sentiments were voiced by Lords Carswell 979 and 
Brown980 The contrary view was expressed by Baroness 
Hale981 and Lord Nicholls.982  
Nevertheless, it should not be assumed that the matter 
was dealt with as straightforwardly as may appear from 
the above outline. Indeed, discussion of the matter in 
the Appellate Committee is particularly difficult to 
follow not merely because, as is customary, their 
Lordships’ views are dispersed within vast analyses of 
different issues, but, additionally, because most judges 
treated the implied, ancillary limitation regarding the 
use of s.2 to remove the restriction against extending 
Parliament’s life con junctly with other potential 
limitations. To make matters worse, some of the judges 
conflated normative considerations relating to the 
commendability of certain restrictions upon the use of 
                                                            
978 ibid. ,  at para.122.  
979 ibid. ,  at paras.176-178.  
980 ibid. ,  at paras.193-194. 
981 ibid. ,  at para.158.  
982 ibid. ,  at paras.56-62. 
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s.2 with the interpretive task of ascertaining whether 
any such restrictions exist. In fact, in certain instances, 
it is arguable that the investigation of implied 
limitations of s.2(1) was used as pretense to discuss 
professed limitations on Parliament’s sovereign 
legislative power. Exempli gratia , Lord Hope, at one 
point, may be observed as noting that:  
a conclusion that there are no legal limits to 
what can be done under section 2(1)  does not 
mean that the power to legislate which it 
contains is without any limits whatever. 
Parliamentary sovereignty is an empty 
principle if legislation is passed which is so 
absurd or so unacceptable that the populace 
at large refuses to recognise it as law. 983 
Lord Steyn, for his part, went astray in like fashion 
when reasoning: 
Strict legalism suggests that the Attorney 
General may be right [in suggesting that the 
1949 Act can be used to abolish the House of 
Lords]. But I am deeply troubled about 
assenting to the validity of such an 
                                                            
983 ibid. ,  at para.120.  
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exorbitant assertion of government power in 
our bi-cameral system … If the Attorney 
General is right the 1949 Act could also be 
used to introduce oppressive and wholly 
undemocratic legislation … This is where we 
may have to come back to the point about the 
supremacy of Parliament. We do not in the 
United Kingdom have an uncontrolled 
constitution…984 
In short, either on account of its disjointedness or by 
reason of its misguided nature, the Jackson  discussion 
of s.2’s implied limitations cannot act as the scholar’s 
navigational instrument and thus the quest for 
discovering such limitations must proceed 
independently. The starting point of such quest must, 
undoubtedly, be the principle ‘expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius’ . Concocting mythological implied 
restrictions on the basis of whether it is normatively 
meritorious to foreclose the implementation of specific  
legislative outcomes, such as the ousting of judicial 
review, is always easy, but will not do; whether the 
quest’s starting point will not, simultaneously, 
constitute its abrupt ending depends upon the discovery 
of convincing reasons to that effect, not l east because as 
                                                            
984 ibid. ,  at para.102.  
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Lords Bingham985 and Steyn986 noted, Parliament should 
not be understood, unless such understanding is 
irresistible, as having burdened the Speaker with the 
onerous duty of making a judgement in accordance with 
unstated limitations.  
The only such reason –  although, in fact, an 
exceptionally powerful one – flows directly from the 
‘intra-Parliamentary decision-making agreement’ 
thesis. If that thesis is veracious (as it has, hopefully, 
been shown to be), then the Lords have retained their 
integral role in law-making whether by consenting or, 
in specified circumstances, by objecting to proposals. 
And if such conclusion is accepted, then it follows that 
the continuing existence and meaningful participation 
of the Upper House in the legislative process is implied 
by the 1911 Act. Conversely stated, its abolition would 
render ss.1-2, as well as, indeed, the 1911 Act as a 
whole, otiose and, consequently, the conclusion that the 
1911 Act impliedly forecloses the attainment of such 
                                                            
985 ibid. ,  at para.38.  
986 ibid. ,  at para.88.   
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legislative outcome by s .2 is inescapable.987 What is 
more, an equivalent conclusion is warranted in the case 
of legislation not directly aimed at abolishing the Lords 
but ultimately having that effect indirectly, for 
instance, certainly by amending the 1911 Act to provide 
for an express power to abolish the Lords, probably by 
assimilating the Lords’ powers over Money Bills and 
Public Bills to the lowest common denominator (that is, 
its exiguous powers over Money Bills currently 
prescribed by s.1 of the 1911 Act), and possibly by 
excluding and substituting all its present members at 
once with a fundamentally different, much smaller 
group of peers that does not command an equivalent 
respect from the nation. Interestingly, the then 
Secretary of State for the Home Department appeared 
to subscribe to such understanding when he proposed 
that, despite reducing the Lords’ powers of delay, the 
                                                            
987 See also: Mirfield, 1979, at pp.53 -56. Dicey, for his part, 
fallaciously,  with respect, subscribed to the contrary view 
when stating that:  
A House of Commons majority may, under the 
Parliament Act, cut down the suspensive veto of 
the Peers to one years or to six months, or indeed 
may abolish it altogether.  
(Dicey, 1912b, at p.91).  
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Parliament Bill 1949 could be validly enacted via s.2 of 
the 1911 Act:  
We feel that the length of time allowed in 
this Bill of one year and two Sessions is 
adequate to ensure that proposals which may 
be the subject of controversy between the 
two Houses shall receive full and ample 
consideration before being carried into 
effect…988 
Thus, despite having been disparaged (and, 
predominantly, rightly so) by virtually all judges in the 
House of Lords,989 the Court of Appeal’s 
‘modest’/ ‘fundamental’ distinction 990 is, ultimately, not 
without value, if only to the extent that it can be 
understood as contending that there is a fine line 
between Bills that relate to the ‘modest’ curtailment of 
the Lords’ powers and may be validly made under s.2, 
and Bills that intend to bring about a mortally 
‘ fundamental’ reduction of the Upper House’s powers 
                                                            
988 HC Debs, 1947, 10 t h  December, vol.445, col.1017 (James Ede 
MP). 
989 C.f.  [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at paras.176-178. 
990 [2005] EWCA Civ 126, at paras.46, 71, 98.  
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and are precluded from being enacted thereunder. That 
is, indeed, how the question that sparked controversy in 
the 2010-11 Parliamentary session991 of whether House 
of Lords reforms could be implemented by Parliament 
acting under the 1911 Act as amended, should be 
addressed.  
It is noteworthy that the conclusion that s.2 impliedly 
forbids its use to abolish the House of Lords may be also 
arrived at through a different route. Namely, if a 
statute enacted via  the intra-Parliamentary agreement 
of 1911 were to abolish the Upper House, the Commons 
alone would, thenceforward, be able unilaterally to 
extend Par liament’s life. But since it has already been 
established that s.2 cannot be used to extend 
                                                            
991 See: Joint Committee on the Draft House of Lords Reform 
Bill ,  2012, at pp.89-91. See also: Shrimpton, 1999. Evidently, 
Parliament may act,  under the 1911 intra-Parliamentary 
decision-making agreement ,  to make changes to Parliament’s 
composition as it,  indeed, has by the Welsh Church Act 1914 
that disqualified bishops holding sees in Wales from sitting in 
the House of Lords. Nonetheless, as already noted, to the 
extent that excluding and substituting a t once the current 
membership of the Upper House with a drastically smaller and 
fundamentally different group of peers may be understood as a 
virtual,  if indirect, abolition of the House of Lords, it  may not 
be within the ambit of the decision -making agreement of 1911.  
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Parliament’s life, it follows that the said section can 
neither be used to abolish the House of Lords, the 
reason being that such abolition is, notionally, on the 
same level as an Act made under s.2 to remove the 
restriction concerning the extension of Parliament’s 
life: they are both implied restrictions that are 
ancillary to the express exclusion and are necessary to 
render it meaningfully effectual.  
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The justiciability of Jackson and 
the conclusiveness of the Rolls of 
Parliament 
 
The final respect in which the Parliament Acts may 
constitute a cause of concern vis-à-vis the acceptance of 
the orthodox reading of the UK Constitution revolves 
around whether the courts’ assumption of jurisdiction to 
decide Jackson  was an illegitimate overstepping of 
authority that breached Parliamentary privilege and, 
thereby, indirectly questioned the inviolability of the 
legislature’s sovereignty. The crux of the challenge is 
advanced by no less a public law jurist than Jowell in 
the following manner:  
In … Jackson … the House of Lords did in 
effect review the validity of Acts of 
Parliament, albeit under the rubric of 
statutory interpretation.992 
                                                            
992 Jowell,  2006, at p.563. See also: Weill,  2012, at p.105.  
  
 
560 
 
To elaborate, what is essentially being submitted is 
that allowing the three Countryside Alliance members’ 
arguments regarding the alleged invalidity of the 
Parliament Act 1949 to be ventilated in court robbed 
Parliament from one of the intrinsic properties of its 
sovereign power, also enshrined in Art.9 of the Bill of 
Rights 1688: namely, its privilege to regulate its own 
proceedings, free from impeachment. Since, as per Lord 
Campbell in Wauchope :  
[a]ll that a Court of Justice can do is to look 
to the Parliamentary roll … [and] if from 
that it should appear that a bill has passed 
both Houses and received the Royal Assent, 
no Court of Justice can inquire into the mode 
in which it was introduced into Par liament993  
the fact that the Parliament Act 1949 appears in the 
(descendant of the) Parliamentary Roll should have 
precluded – it is reasoned – all comment concerning its 
validity. If need be one may also turn to s.3 of the 1911 
Act for confirmation of the above for such section 
provides that the certificate of the Speaker of the House 
of Commons to the effect that the provisions of s.2 have 
                                                            
993 VIII Cl&F 710, 725.  
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been duly complied with which is compulsorily994 
endorsed on any Bill presented to Her Majesty for 
assent in pursuance of s.2, ‘shall be conclusive for all 
purposes, and shall not be questioned in any court of 
law’.  
Evidently, the contrary view was taken in Jackson , with 
judges at all three levels unanimously agreeing that the 
claim was justiciable although, unlike the 
Administrative Court,995 both the Court of Appeal and 
the House of Lords felt:  
some sense of strangeness at the exercise 
which the courts have … been invited to 
undertake in these proceedings.996  
To lay down the true position regarding justiciability 
and explain why it pertains, what firstly needs to be 
accentuated is the fallacious equation of Parliament’s 
ancient privilege to regulate its own proceedings with 
the conclusiveness of the Parliamentary Roll; an 
                                                            
994 See: Parliament Act 1911, s.2(2).  
995 [2005] EWHC 94 (Admin), at para.10 per Maurice Kay LJ.  
996 [2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.27 per Lord 
Bingham. 
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equation, no doubt, fuelled by Lord Campbell’s dictum  
in Wauchope .997 To explain, one may commence by 
stating that the Parliamentary Roll, both literally and 
figuratively, no longer exists for since 1849 998 the 
official copy of a statute is printed and kept at the 
‘House of Lords Record Office’, recently renamed into 
the ‘Parliamentary Archives’ and located at Victoria 
Tower. The problem with Lord Campbell’s reasoning, 
however, is not terminological; after all, Wauchope  was 
decided in 1842, at a time when the official copy of a 
statute was still a manuscript. The capital objection 
that must be raised against the equation of the bar 
against impeachment of Parliamentary proceedings with 
the conclusiveness of the Parliamentary Roll relates not 
to the Roll as such but, rather, to its conclusiveness. To 
understand the objection, it is necessary to examine 
how legislation is normally enacted.  
In the first place, customarily, a Bill is prepared and 
printed for consideration of the first House, be it the 
Commons or the Lords. After completing all stages in 
such House, a printed copy of the Bill, as amended, is 
                                                            
997 See also: The King and the Lord Hunsdon v The Countess of 
Arundel,  and the Lord William Howard  (1615) Hob 109, 110.  
998 Heuston, 1964, at p.18.  
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certified by the Clerk of that House as being a ‘House 
Bill ’ and is presented to the second House for 
consideration. Although after each stage in the second 
House and, thereafter, in the first House and so on so 
forth as the case may be, the Bill is reprinted to take 
account of amendments, the original version of the 
‘House Bill ’ remains in place and any changes are 
thereupon marked by hand. When the exchanges 
between the two Houses have successfully come to a 
conclusion, the ‘House Bill’ , as amended, is laid on the 
Table of the House for the Royal Assent. Thereafter, an 
updated copy is sent to the Queen’s Printer which, afte r 
moulding the text into the customary shape and style of 
statutes, returns it for the certification of the Clerk of 
Public Bills. This updated version, which is known as 
the ‘certified proof’, is then once again returned to the 
Queen’s Printer for printing. Indeed, some six months 
later, two copies are printed on vellum: (i) the official 
copy which the Clerk of the Parliaments signs and 
endorses with the appropriate Norman French words 
and which is kept at the Parliamentary Archives as well 
as (ii) an unofficial copy that is sent for custody to the 
‘Public Record Office’, the descendant of the Chancery 
Roll that was recently renamed into ‘The National 
Archives’.  
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When, therefore, Lord Campbell opined that “[a]ll that 
a Court of Justice can do is to look at the Parliamentary 
roll”999 he was, undoubtedly, referring to what today 
constitutes (i) above; namely, the vellum copy of the 
Bill that is signed and endorsed by the Clerk of the 
Parliaments and is kept at the Parliamentary Archives. 
But that cannot be right for two reasons.  
In the first place, if the object of the court’s inquiry is 
to ascertain whether Parliament has acted (as it 
certainly must be), then the investigation will not be 
confined to the Parliamentary Archives: if serious 
doubts have been raised in the course of litigation 
regarding the accuracy of the Parliamentary Archives’ 
copy of the Act of Parliament under question then, 
surely, the authentic document demonstrating whether, 
and if yes to what precise text, the Commons, Lords and 
Crown have assented to (that is, the marked-up ‘House 
Bill ’) can and must be sought. 1000 In fact, the sole Clerk 
of the Parliaments that has been publicly consulted 
about whether he would entertain a request for access 
to either the ‘certified proof’ or the ‘House Bill ’,  has 
responded affirmatively, adding that such documents 
                                                            
999 VIII Cl&F 710, 725.  
1000 See also: Cowen, 1953.  
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“are public records and are not subject to any conditions 
of secrecy.”1001  
For good measure, not only is the refusal of the court to 
investigate a step beyond the Parliamentary Archives’ 
copy of a statute self-imposed but, for good measure, it 
serves no normative purpose. Indeed, requesting the 
‘certified proof’ or ‘House Bill ’ to ascertain whether  
Parliament has acted does not involve questioning or 
impeaching the ‘Freedome of Speech and Debates or 
Proceedings in Parlyament’ contrary to Art.9 of the Bill 
of Rights 1688; indeed, such ascertainment constitutes 
a duty owed by the judiciary to the claimant, the 
populace at large, as well as Parliament itself and the 
discharging of which, far from challenging Parliament’s 
authority, strengthens it by striving to recognise as 
legally supreme the will of Parliament, and of 
Parliament alone, in all instances. 1002 By contrast, such 
                                                            
1001 Mr Hayter, “Private Communication”,  September 19 t h  1996 
quoted in: Jackson, 1997, at p.192, fn.55.  
1002 Lord Bingham advanced an additional respect in which an 
inquiry in relation to the Parliament Acts specifically 
strengthens Parliament’s sovereignty:  
The appellants have raised a question of law 
which cannot, as such, be resolved by Parliament. 
But it would not be satisfactory, or consistent with 
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illegal impeachment would be involved if a court were 
to question the very fact that Parliament has acted as 
the plaintiff in Pickin  unsuccessfully encouraged the 
court to do by alleging that the promoters of the British 
Railways Act 1968 should not be allowed relief on the 
statute as it affected him because the British Railways 
Board had concealed certain matters from Parliament 
and had thereby fraudulently misled it in consenting to 
the enactment of the 1968 Act: his claim was not that 
Parliament had not acted but, rather, that Parliament 
should not be understood as having acted, despite 
having manifestly done so, because it would not have 
acted, had it not been misled.  
Secondly, even if the Parliamentary Archives’ copy of a 
statute enacted under the customary tripartite consent 
is prima facie  proof that the Commons, Lords and 
Crown have consented as well as prima facie  proof of 
the precise text they have consented to, and, therefore, 
the court must only look beyond such copy and request 
the authoritative, marked-up ‘House Bill ’ if serious 
doubts have been raised regarding its accuracy in 
respect of either of the two matters, the same cannot be 
                                                                                                                                                       
the rule of law, if it  could not be resolved at all.  
So it seems to me necessary that the courts should 
resolve it,  and that to do so involves no breach of 
constitutional propriety.  
([2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005-06, at para.27).  
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said when statutes enacted under s.2 of the 1911 Act, as 
amended, are concerned. Indeed, the Parliamentary 
Archives’ copy of a statute enacted under the 1911 Act 
does not, at any point, bear the cert ificate of the 
Speaker of the House of Commons that the provisions of 
s.2 have been duly complied with! Since, therefore, the 
endorsement of such certificate is deemed necessary for 
the enactment of legislation pursuant to the 1911 Act, 
the Parliamentary Archives’ copy of a statute 
professedly enacted under the 1911 Act is not even 
prima facie  proof of its validity. A court seeking such 
proof must necessarily refer to the hand-amended 
‘House Bill’ , for it is only upon such copy of the statute 
that the prescribed certificate is attached.  
These matters having been clarified, the justiciability 
issue in Jackson  can now more directly be engaged. As 
per  the above, a claim brought against the validity of a 
statute enacted under the 1911 Act, 1003 such as the 
Parliament Act 1949, would empower the court to seek 
                                                            
1003 Or, to put it the orthodox way and uproot in its genesis the 
argument that this type of enquiry is “exactly the kind of 
exercise that characterises review in countries with written 
constitutions” and l imited legislatures (Jowell,  2006, at 
p.577), an argument questioning whether such a professed Act 
is indeed a genuine expression of Parliament’s will .   
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the ‘House Bill ’ from which the Act originated in order 
to ascertain: (1) whether, and to what text, the 
Commons and Crown assented, (2) whether the Lords 
objected and (3) whether the certificate of the Speaker 
of the House of Commons was endorsed on the Bill.  
Such a case, if brought, would constitute a justiciable 
issue since the court, in addressing the claim, would be 
inquiring into whether Parliament has acted and, 
therefore, whether the particular precept was genuinely 
an Act of Parliament. However, the Countryside 
Alliance members did not impugn any of the above three 
propositions; their claim was deeper and involved a 
challenge to whether the 1949 Act was within the ambit 
of the intra-Parliamentary decision-making agreement 
of 1911. At first blush, such challenge bears much 
greater resemblance to the illegitimate question raised 
by George Pickin in the synonymous case rather than to 
the admissible query ‘has Parliament spoken’ and, 
therefore, according to Ek ins’s forceful argument, is:  
non-justiciable because the interpretive 
question touches too closely on how 
Parliament acts, which is a matter that the 
court ought to leave to legislators … The 
court in Jackson  and the Speaker who 
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certified the Hunting Bill  … were engaged in 
the same interpretive task.1004 
For its part, the stipulation of the 1911 Act’s s.3 that 
the Speaker’s certificate ‘shall be conclusive for all 
purposes, and shall not be questioned in any court of 
law’, at worst, is mere surplusage to the bar against 
impeachment of Parliament’s proceedings whilst, at 
best, slightly strengthens Ekins’s line of argument by 
emphasising and particularising the said ancient 
privilege inhering in Parliament.  
However, the submission that no justiciable issue was 
involves in Jackson  must, in the final analysis, be 
rejected. True; the certificate of the presiding officer of 
the House of Commons cannot be questioned and is 
conclusive for all purposes. But when will such 
certificate be issued by the Speaker and endorsed on a 
Bill?  
When a Bill is presented to [Her] Majesty for 
assent in pursuance of the provisions of this 
section…  
s.2(2) responds. And when will a Bill be so presented? 
When a:  
                                                            
1004 Ekins, 2007, at p.113.  
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Public Bill (other than a Money Bill or a Bill 
containing any provision to extend the 
maximum duration of Parliament beyond five 
years) is passed by the House of Commons in 
two successive sessions … [and] is rejected 
by the House of Lords in each of those 
sessions…  
is the authoritative response that s.2(1) itself provides. 
In other words, the Speaker’s duty to issue a certificate 
is activated only after  a Bill has fulfiled the conditions 
of s.2. The question as to whether such conditions have 
been fulfiled, therefore, comes prior to  the issuance and 
attachment of the Speaker’s certificate to the Bill. 
Thus, without impugning the Speaker’s decision to issue 
a certificate and despite treating it as conclusive for all 
purposes (that is, for all purposes it can be conclusive 
about), the courts have a valid, justiciable question to 
address;1005 namely:  
                                                            
1005 “The very fact that the court is bound to accept certain 
evidence as being conclusive of the letter of the law”, Gray 
correctly submits, “necessarily implies that the court is in a 
position and under a duty to receive evidence in order to 
determine what is the law”: Gray, 1953 -1954, at p.60.  
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Were the conditions enshrined in the intra-
Parliamentary decision-making agreement of 
1911 fulfiled so as to enable the Speaker to 
make a decision as to whether or not to issue 
a non-challengeable certificate, the content 
of which is conclusive for all purposes? 
Consequently, has Parliament acted?  
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The obiter dicta of Jackson 
 
Before proceeding, it is only fair for mention to be had 
to the fact that, in Jackson , unprecedented obiter dicta  
concerning the ostensible limitations of the orthodox 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty were uttered in 
the House of Lords.1006 Nevertheless, it is essential to 
                                                            
1006 Indeed, Lord Steyn, drawing the fir st blood, opined that 
“[w]e do not in the United Kingdom have an uncontrolled 
constitution” ([2005] UKHL 56, SESSION 2005 -06, at 
para.102) and proceeded to recount the reasons for his 
conclusion. For one, reference was made to the enactment of 
the ECA and the resultant Factortame  l ine of authority. On 
this point,  Lord Steyn had the support of Baroness Hale and 
Lord Hope, the second of which claimed that “[t]he doctrine of 
the supremacy of Community law restricts the absolute 
authority of Parliament to legis late as it wants in this area” 
(ibid. ,  at para.105). Secondly, mention was had to the partial 
incorporation of the ECHR by the HRA ( ibid. ,  at para.102). 
Once again, Baroness Hale and Lord Hope ( ibid. ,  at para.105) 
agreed, with the former stating that “Parl iament has … for the 
time being at least, l imited its own powers … by the Human 
Rights Act 1998” ( ibid. ,  at para.159). Thirdly, the common law 
constitutionalism thesis was proposed by Lord Steyn in the 
following manner:  
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[T]he supremacy of Parliament … is a construct of 
the common law. The judges created this principle. 
[I]t is not unthinkable that the circumstances 
could arise where the courts may have to qualify 
… [it].  
(ibid . ,  at para.102).  
In this regard, his Lordship was supported by Baroness Hale 
as well as Lords Hope and Carswell (see e.g. :  ibid. ,  at 
para.168). Lord Steyn’s final assertion centred on the 
devolution arrangement under the Scotland Act 1998 that, 
purportedly, “point[s] to a divided sovereignty” ( ibid. ,  at 
para.102). Although this particular point was not taken up by 
any of his fellow Lordships in Jackson ,  the judges did not 
hesitate to supplement his provocative list in other respects.  
Indeed, Lord Hope, a Scottish Law Lord,  after conditioning the 
principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament 
as “English” ( ibid. ,  at para.104),  proceeded to advance the 
suggestion that certain provisions of the Acts of Union 1706 -7 
“are so fundamental that they lie beyond Parl iament's power 
to legislate” ( ibid. ,  at para.106). Additionally, the former Lord 
President of the Court of Session and Lord Justice General of 
Scotland appeared to espouse a similar conception to the 
popular sovereignty thesis which has mistakenly been 
conceived as describing the powers of the pre -union Scottish 
Estates when stating that:  
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty … is 
built upon the assumption that Parliament 
represents the people whom it exists to serve.  
(ibid. ,  at para.126).  
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It is important, however, in this regard, to stress that all  
other judges –  crucially including the other Scottish judge of 
the panel,  Lord Rodger –  failed to make any reference 
whatsoever to these two issues, apart from Baroness Hale. 
Indeed, Her Ladyship proposed that:  
The concept of parliamentary sovereignty which 
has been fundamental to the constitution of 
England and Wales since the 17 t h  century (I 
appreciate that Scotland may have taken a 
different view )  means that Parliament can do 
anything. 
(ibid. ,  at para.159 [emphasis added]).   
Lastly, Baroness Hale was the sole judge to have proponed 
explicitly that Parliament may successfully bind its 
successors,  in the following manner:  
If  the sovereign Parliament can redefine itself 
downwards, to remove or modify the requirement 
for the consent of the Upper House, it may very 
well be that it can also redefine itself upwards, to 
require a particular parliamentary majority or a 
popular referendum for particular types of 
measure.  
(ibid. ,  at para.163).  
In summary, had it not been for the judges’ omission of the 
Statute of Westminster 1931 (which is, at any rate, in reality 
an extension of the idea that Parliament can successfully bind 
its successors, espoused by Baroness Hale), as well as the 
common law theory of judicial review and the idea that 
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fathom that the actual case was decided, as Forsyth 
notes, “formally and in a wholly orthodox manner”. 1007 
Indeed, all courts attempted (in large part, successfully) 
to discover Parliament’s true intent as exemplified in 
the 1911 Act, the interpretation of which was conducted 
on a strictly literal and grammatical basis. That is, in 
                                                                                                                                                       
fundamental law conceptions dominated 17 t h  century British 
legal scholarship (which, are, similarly, both nothing more 
than outgrowths of the common law constitutionalism thesis 
defended by Lords Steyn, Hope and Carswell,  as well as 
Baroness Hale), the House of Lords’  decision in Jackson  could 
have, in all sincerity, acted as a comprehensive handbook of 
all  challenges against the orthodox reading of the UK 
Constitution ever raised. Thus, irrespective of whether the 
refutation, from a constitutionally conservative point of view, 
of the principal such challenges attempted in this present 
thesis is accepted, one is entitled to wonder, in a well -
intentioned manner, whether their Lordships were truly 
convinced about the legal gravity of all  such challenges or 
whether they were grasping the opportunity to forward their 
normative aspirations regarding the future of the UK 
Constitution, at a time when the creation of a Supreme Court 
had just been provided for by the enactment of Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005, and whether such Court would be “tempt ed 
to live up to its new name” (McLeod, 2005, at p.915) or follow 
the tradition of its predecessor (as it,  ultimately, did) was yet 
considered unknown by certain cycles; whether, to put it 
differently, they were “staking out their position for future 
battles” (Mullen, 2007, at p.15) that were never to be fought.  
1007 Forsyth, 2011, at p.142 [reference omitted].  
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fact, precisely why anti-sovereignty theorists such as 
Allan have castigated the decision . “Every judge in 
Jackson”,1008 says Allan, “appears  to assume that the 
meaning and effect of the Parliament Act 1911 are 
ultimately matters of legislative intention ;  at issue is a 
question of what Parliament in 1911 sought to achieve 
by the words it enacted.”1009 This allegedly fallacious 
hypothesis in turn: 
assumes that Parliament was free to act as it 
chose; but that is to beg the question at 
issue, which concerns the validity (and 
limits) of any such attempt to redistribute 
legislative power.1010 
As for critical voices conceiving of the decision as a 
denudation of Parliament’s sovereign ability, it must be 
remembered that these can seldom be avoided in the 
wake of hard cases such as Jackson ,  whatever the 
decision may be. After all, if the decision had gone the 
other way, would commentators have not designated it 
an unacceptable judicial invalidation of statute (and 
                                                            
1008 Allan, 2011, at p.161.  
1009 ibid. ,  at pp.161-162 [emphasis in original].  
1010 Allan, 2013, at p.151.  
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rightly so)? It is therefore submitted that, in truth, 
both the approach as well as the conclusion of the 
Appellate Committee in Jackson , despite at times erring 
in its obiter  remarks, strengthen Parliament’s 
legislative supremacy, exemplify the courts’ fa ithful 
obedience to its edicts, and uphold the principle that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors.  
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Chapter IX: Conclusion 
 
This present thesis has been driven by two 
fundamental, inter-related premisses. First, that it is 
the orthodox reading of the UK Constitution which best 
describes the present constitutional arrangement: the 
UK Parliament is a sovereign institution sitting at the 
apex of the UK Constitution and vested with the right 
to make and unmake any law whatsoever. In the second 
place, that, notwithstanding the above, this very 
reading of the UK Constitution is currently deficient in 
terms of both coherence and adaptability, and therefore 
requires substantial readjustment in order to be able 
adequately to respond to the increasing number of 
permeating challenges it faces. Therefore, the mission 
embarked upon was a fundamentally descriptive one:  to 
evaluate critically, expand upon, refine and readjust 
this orthodoxy. 
The natural starting point of a modern, orthodox 
account of the UK Constitution is undoubtedly 
Community membership; the most radical 
constitutional, political and economic development of 
recent times, even if, very soon, it will be a thing of the 
(constitutional) past. The questions raised by such 
membership can be answered satisfactorily without the 
employment of concepts and terms that are foreign to 
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the UK constitutional discourse, such as revolutions, 
manner and form restrictions, artificial statutory 
presumptions and constructions, noble lies or 
constitutional statutes, by recalling that, in every 
instance, including Factortame , Parliament’s genuine 
intention has been –  and, in light of enduring judicial 
interpretation of the framework laid down in the ECA 
1972, continues to be –  given effect to.  This simple and 
unproblematic solution has been clouded by a 
misunderstanding of the doctrine of implied repeal ; a 
doctrine that has hitherto been considered orthodox, 
and rightly so, but requires readjustment. This 
readjustment entails , in the first place,  conceiving of 
Parliament as an atemporal, continuous institution 
with a singular will whence it follows that  the doctrine 
is, in truth, a means to the end of discovering and 
upholding that singular, genuine intention rather than 
an end (such as giving priority to chronologically more 
recent laws) in itself. Apart from the revisiting of the 
implied repeal doctrine’s intellectual rationale and core 
purpose as well as the consequent attenuation of its 
hitherto mechanistic application, its return to 
traditional tracks also involves  decisively severing it 
from the interrelated, but normatively distinct , 
principle that disallows Parliament from binding its 
successors. This is rendered possible  by distinguishing 
between the two doctrines’ separate roles: the implied 
repeal doctrine being backward-looking and thus 
safeguarding the present Parliament’s sovereignty 
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whilst the principle that Parliament cannot bind its 
successors being forward-looking and thus safeguarding 
future Parliaments’ sovereignty.  In the process of 
disentangling the two doctrines however, an additional 
problem, this time relating to the latter principle, is 
encountered: namely, the paradox of an omnicompetent 
Parliament’s inability to bind its successors.  This 
paradox, which is but a variant of the theological 
paradox of God and the stone, can be resolved in one of 
two ways.  
On one hand, the paradox may be evaded by contending 
that the UK Parliament can effectively bind its 
successors. This is made possible by accentuating the 
differences between a Bodinian legibus solutus  
sovereign and a complex body that claims to be 
sovereign, such as Parliament. Unlike a genuine 
sovereign, the identification of the latter, self -
embracing sovereignty theory proposes, must include 
rules for the ascertainment of its will and thus its 
pronouncements are, by definition, subject to the court’s 
supervision that interprets, construes and applies them 
as well as ultimately oversees whether they have been 
made in the manner required by the law. It follows that 
Parliament’s sovereign power is, in nature, accidental 
rather than essential and, thus, is capable of being 
relinquished at any time by altering the rules 
stipulating the manner and form required for putative 
pronouncements to qualify as valid legal directives. 
Although, as Hart has made clear, there is no doctrinal, 
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normative or ana lytic reason why the UK Parliament’s 
sovereignty could not be either essential or accidental, 
UK constitutional theory and practice decisively point 
against the latter, self -embracing understanding.  
Indeed, on the one hand, colonial precedents that could 
be understood as favouring a self -embracing theory of 
sovereignty, such as Trethowan ,  Ranasinghe  and Harris 
No.1 , pertain to sub-modo  sovereign and partly non-
sovereign legislative bodies that are creatures of, and 
derive their circumscribed powers from, laws imposed  
by an external superior power,  the Imperial Parliament; 
thus their introduction in the discussion of the 
soundness of self-embracing sovereignty theory in the 
UK is unhelpful.  
Equally, on the other hand, the statutes that have been 
variously claimed as binding Parliament’s successors in 
truth neither evince such as intention or, if they do, fail 
to have such an effect.  
For one, by emphasising the distinction between laws 
applying in a foreign jurisdiction as a matter of 
domestic law and laws applying in the same jurisdiction 
as a matter of UK law, it becomes evident that the 
crucial provisions of the Statute of Westminster 1931 
have the intention and effect of producing rights and 
obligations in the domestic legal systems of former 
Dominions by proclaiming that Acts of the UK 
Parliament shall not extend to a Dominion, as a matter 
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of Dominion law, unless the said Dominion has 
requested and consented to the enactment thereof. As 
such, it has no discernible effects in UK law, not to 
mention the monumental effect of binding successor 
Parliaments. The same distinction demonstrates that no 
diminishment of Parliament’s powers was involved in 
the granting of independence to former colonies; the UK 
Parliament can still legislate for, inter alia , New 
Zealand, Australia and the ‘Thirteen Colonies’ of  North 
America and whomever comes before a UK court can 
and will be judged according to such laws even if the 
domestic courts of the respective foreign juri sdictions 
fail to recognise and uphold them.  
Contrariwise, the laws formalising the Unions between 
the UK’s composite nations exhibit an unequivocal 
intention to remove certain sensitive areas from the 
legislative scope of Parliament by rendering several o f 
the respective agreements’ provisions fundamental and 
unalterable. In strict law, this intention is encapsulated 
in the wording and spirit of several provisions of the 
respective laws whilst, from a historiographical point of 
view, equivalent conclusions are drawn by focusing on 
the determined mindset of the architects of the said 
Unions. Nevertheless, the same can certainly not be 
proposed for the effect of the said Union legislation for 
several of the purportedly unalterable clauses of the 
Union with Scotland and most, if not all, of the 
purportedly unalterable clauses of the Union with 
Ireland have been violated with the courts remaining, 
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at best, apathetic. Therefore, not only do the said Union 
statutes lend no (further) force to the self -embracing 
theory of sovereignty but, unlike the case in point of the 
1931 Statute, they can be positively utilised to reinforce 
the arguments of continuing sovereignty theorists: 
unlike 1931, the Parliaments of 1707 and 1801 sought 
to bind their successors but were, at least in the 
traditional sense, unsuccessful.   
Finally, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949 not only do 
not embody the intention, and have not had the effect, 
of stifling the power of future Parliaments but rather 
illustrate, in the most graphic way poss ible, the truly 
unlimited extent of the sovereign Parliament’s power. 
Indeed, such power is not confined to making any law 
whatever by the customary indenture of the House of 
Commons, House of Lords and Crown but also 
concluding agreements between its composite parts 
relating to additional circumstances under which the 
courts should acknowledge Parliament as having acted. 
One such intra-Parliamentary decision-making 
agreement is enshrined in the Parliament Act 1911 and 
provides that courts should recognise Parliament as 
having acted, in specified circumstances, by the positive 
action of Commons and Crown and the negative action 
or inaction of the Lords.  
Therefore, the alternative method of dispelling the 
bounded sovereignty paradox must be preferred. This 
method conceives of Parliament as an atemporal, 
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unified body with continuing rather than self -embracing 
sovereignty whilst at the same time honours both 
strands of the paradox – the proposition that 
Parliament is sovereign as well as the proposition that 
Parliament cannot bind its successors – by 
reconceptualising it along the following lines:  
 
{ 
Parliament, being sovereign, can do anything, including 
binding its successors               
AND 
Parliament, being sovereign, can do anything, including 
unbinding itself from its predecessors 
}  
 
To be fair, this solution has been criticised for trying to 
evade semantically an otherwise unsolvable paradox. If 
a future Parliament can unbind itself from its 
predecessors – it is said –  then its predecessors never 
truly succeeded in binding its successors and the 
solution is reduced to little more than Wade’s proposal 
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that “there is one, and only one, limit to Parliament’s 
legal power…”1011 which, evidently, cannot be accepted 
for it accentuates, rather than resolves  the paradox: if 
Parliament is sovereign there can be no limits –  not 
even ‘one and only one’ – on its power. For one, this 
criticism can be countered by proposing that an Act 
binding Parliament’s successors does not differ from an 
‘ordinary’ enactment that can be repealed on a whim: 
every  enactment binds Parliament’s successors, without 
rendering them any less supreme than the current 
Parliament, in the sense that it preoccupies and 
prejudices the law applicable in a particular field and, 
therefore, requires from a future Parliament a conscious 
decision for its amendment or repeal. However, the 
persistent scholar may well retaliate by asking how can 
Parliament be sovereign if the selection, on its part, of 
imperative rather than ‘ordinary’ language, when 
intending to bind its successors, is inconsequential?  
Illuminating insights in responding to this valid 
objection can be drawn from the analysis of the 
aforementioned Union legislation as well as the 
Parliament Acts. Indeed, the professedly unalterable 
clauses of the Acts of Union with Scotland and Ireland 
as well as, more generally, statutory clauses utilising 
                                                            
1011 Wade, 1955, at p.174.  
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imperative language are not inconsequential or, in 
Dicey’s words, ‘unmeaning’  for they do issue a ‘warning’ 
to future generations that unbinding themselves from 
such clauses could prove perilous for the Constitution of 
the country and, thus, neither should their repeal be 
ordered lightheartedly nor should the courts be quick to 
conclude that Parliament has so ordered.  
This is, of course, as earlier discussed, a predominantly 
political or, at best, political constitutionalist 
dimension of the differentiation of ordinary and 
prospective restrictive laws or, in other words, of the 
manner in which Parliament can, under the 
reconceptualisation of the tradit ional principle herein 
offered, bind its successors. The moment is, however, 
ripe to deliver on the earlier promise that  such 
differentiation can be fortified further by thereupon 
appending a more concretely legal dimension.     
What is, therefore in strict, legal terms, the effect of 
this ‘warning’? As established in Chapter VIII, 
Parliament can conclude decision-making agreements, 
such as the one enshrined in the Parliament Acts, that 
include legislative requirements for particular 
purposes. These requirements are not binding upon 
Parliament in the traditional sense for they cannot be 
enforced as against it by the courts when legislating in 
the customary tripartite manner. Equally however, 
these requirements are neither ineffective in the 
traditional sense for Parliament is legally required to 
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follow them when legislating via  a particular intra-
Parliament decision-making agreement. In that sense 
therefore –  in the sense that legislative requirements 
promulgated by Parliament place internally effective  
restrictions on the intra-Parliamentary decision-making 
agreements they institute –  it can be said that 
Parliament actually, not  merely semantically nor 
merely politically or ethically , can bind its successors 
without detracting from their sovereignty , for future 
Parliaments can unbind themselves from their 
predecessors. Lastly, it may be asked, why are these 
requirements merely internally and not externally 
effective? The answer lies firmly in the ancient 
customary privilege, enshrined in Art.9 of the Bill of 
Rights 1688 and tirelessly confirmed in court, 1012 of 
exclusively arbitrating its own proceedings and 
composition that inheres in Parliament as a whole, as 
well as in each House separately. In this light, it may 
be proposed that the distinction between externally and 
internally effective requirements is, in truth, not 
qualitative but merely a difference of which court in the 
judicial hierarchy can supervise their fulfilment: the 
latter, so-called internally effective requirements, as 
well as more generally the branch of law termed lex et 
                                                            
1012 See above: fns.632-633. 
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consuetudo Parliamenti , are cognisable in no (other) 
court of law apart from the High Court of Parliament, 
the Highest Court of the Realm. 1013         
Ultimately, the thread of this narrative coupled with 
several other statements of fundamental principle – 
such as the submission that the distinction between 
form and substance, insofar as types of putative 
restrictions to Parliament’s legislative ability are 
concerned, is not sustainable as well as the clarification 
of the principle proclaiming the Parliamentary Roll’s 
alleged conclusiveness – as well as additional case-
specific propositions –  such as the refutation of the 
limited Scottish Estates thesis – ran through the 
present thesis. Complementing one another, the 
overarching aim was to illuminate and readjust the 
orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty which, 
properly understood, entails, in this author’s view, the 
following propositions:  
The UK Parliament is an atemporal, 
sovereign institution comprised of the 
House of Commons, the House of Lords 
                                                            
1013 ibid. .  
 
  
 
589 
 
and the Crown, and vested, under the 
present constitutional arrangement, 
with the power to make any law 
whatsoever, including a law binding, 
primarily politically but also legally,  its 
future incarnations. Equally, it may 
unmake, expressly or impliedly, any law 
whatsoever, including a law by which it 
has been bound by its previous 
manifestations. The judiciary is under a 
duty to ascertain that Parliament has 
acted, whether by ensuring that the 
assent of its three elements has been 
tendered or by ensuring that the 
requirements of any other intra-
Parliamentary agreement dictating 
when the courts should acknowledge 
Parliament as having acted have been 
fulfiled, and enforce its sovereign will 
faithfully against whomever comes 
before a UK court. 
It is submitted that the UK constitutional discourse as 
a whole would stand to lose greatly should alternative 
constitutional theories that are less suited to describe 
and explain the current constitutional arrangement 
replace the orthodox reading of the Constitution by 
exploiting its evident internal lack of normative 
cohesion, its ingrained anachronistic dogmas as well as 
its limited adaptability potential. Therefore, as a 
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postscript, if this thesis has succeeded in readjusting 
orthodoxy in any of these counts so as to render it more 
capable of accomplishing the strenuous task of serving 
as the authoritative account of an ever -changing 
Constitution it has been endowed with, then it will be 
considered, at least in the eyes of its author, as ha ving 
been both worthwhile and successful.  
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